Solidly conceived, fully documented, and finely written (as well as beautifully translated), van Middelaar's study is essential reading for anyone who endeavors to fathom how the labyrinthine structures and convoluted politics of the European Union have nevertheless permitted it to develop constructively despite frequent appearances to the contrary. As an adviser and speechwriter to European Council president Herman van Rompuy as well as a trained political philosopher, van Middelaar is eminently qualified to shed light upon its Byzantine dynamics. With empirical precision and conceptual sophistication, he subtly entwines the interplay between personalities (de Gaulle, Adenauer, Monnet, Hallstein, Thatcher, Delors, etc.); institutions (the Commission; the European Court of Justice; the European Council; parliament as established by the Treaties of Paris, Rome, Amsterdam, Maastricht, Nice); and “events” (postwar chaos; unexpected internal dissention à la de Gaulle, or Thatcher Ireland or Denmark; the pressures from without for extension; the fall of the Iron Curtain; 9/11; globalization [a word he avoids—see below]; the finance crisis, etc.). The result is a gripping historical narrative that interlaces politics and law around disruptive “events” woven into the form of a Bildungsroman. The genetic perspective permits van Middelaar clearly to explain step by step how the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament grew out of the Coal and Steel Community's High Authority, Council of Ministers, and Common Assembly, and he meticulously notes how changes in nomenclature reflected shifts in the distribution of authority and responsibility. Today's result is a dynamic tension between the Union's formally constituted, legally institutionalized “inner sphere,” an “outer sphere” of existing European national states, and a more nebulous “intermediate sphere” of member nations vying for influence in coping with the particularly fickle finger of European fate. On van Middelaar's view the latter is the moving force in Europe today.
Sensitivity to language and rhetoric is an essential aspect to his introduction to the Union as a form of political life. Thus he emphasizes that the unreflective use of certain seemingly innocent classificatory expressions such as “community,” “democracy deficit,” “integration,” etc., implicitly commits one arbitrarily to distorting sociological descriptions and correspondingly dubious political options. Similarly, the difference between comparing the Union to a structure that rests upon distinct “pillars” or the growth of “branches” on a tree can have serious political consequences in a given discussion. Furthermore, the antiseptic character of many typically “European” expressions can easily confuse the uninitiated: referring to a member's “vital” or “very important” interests turns out to be a firm threat that a country will employ its veto in a given matter; whereas the mandatory use of the circumlocution “the country that I know best” contains strong recognition on the part of a commissioner that s/he is forbidden to represent the interests of any individual member state, including her/his native land.
Van Middelaar's sensitivity to language is in fact embedded in a methodological awareness that controlling the narrative about “events” is itself a highly political activity, one that spills over from the political arena into academic discourse about politics, which turns out to mirror basic political differences about the nature of the Union. Briefly, European politics at every level has an irreducibly conceptual character, whereas academic (as well as media) descriptions of what transpires on the European political stage are anything but politically neutral. This is what makes philosophy profoundly relevant to any discussion of European politics—all the more so when a political insider emphasizes the point. Without a penetrating analysis of the nature of conflict, the question of what it is to have an identity, and even raising the sixty-four-thousand-dollar question, “what is politics?,” van Middelaar insists we cannot really illuminate what is genuinely perplexing about Europe today. Debates about Europe turn out to be framed in terms of three politically competing sets of descriptions employed by the three collective agents struggling to control the Union's destiny, which respectively focus upon the states, the civil service, and the peoples (as van Middelaar insists). Recognizing that as a given (Foucault), along with acknowledging the crucial dominance of the “intermediate sphere” of the national states as institutionalized in the European Council, is the key to understanding the dynamics of change. That is the message of the first two parts of the book, six chapters in all, organized into two groups of three (the Ghost of Hegel hovers above the triads) under the titles “The Secret of the Table: The Transition to Majority” and “Vicissitudes of Fortune: In the River of Time,” which contain a superb account of the origins of the “Europe of the States” and “the Europe of Offices.” The first explains how Europe has managed to “square the circle” (beginning with its capacity to cope with Charles de Gaulle's “empty chair” tactics in 1965) by transforming the legal principle of unanimity into sophisticated and subtly majoritarian practice. The second explains the frustrations of striving for an elusive “ever closer union” on the basis of treaties, failing with its attempt to found itself on the basis of a constitution but nevertheless continually managing to gain ground in a plethora of unspectacular but very real ways. Legal milestones such as the Van Gend & Loos Case that established the primacy of European law over national laws are underscored with laudable clarity and emphasis. The third section, “The Quest for a Public: Winning Applause,” surveys the three largely unsuccessful strategies for creating a European public sphere (Habermas) on the respective basis of common cultural heritage, common benefits (transport, education, etc.), and common political action. Since both the first and the second have failed to stimulate a sense of a common political identity, the answer must then be common political action. But here the Union has been an abysmal failure as, for example, declining participation in European elections clearly indicates. That would be enough for most commentators to throw in the towel. But that is just what van Middelaar does not do. His stance is entirely consistent with his narrative of development, namely, that the Union has seemed to be stymied often enough in the past and yet snatched victory from the jaws of defeat on the basis of its patience and persistence; it can here as well. The result is stunningly persuasive.
The difference between being stunning and being dazzling can be elusive, however. We can see that if we press the author's central claims a bit further than he does himself. Does his thesis about the value-laden character of Union politics apply to him? The answer is clearly and unabashedly, yes. His aim is to get Europeans to discuss the Union in his terms and thus to appreciate European achievements as he does. The Union is as it must be and it should be so. There are many Europeans who are deeply discontented with that opinion, however: some passively by ignoring European elections; others actively by supporting populist movements be they chauvinist, anticapitalist, or in the most recent variations antipolitical (e.g., the Italian Five Star Movement). All this indicates that the “democracy deficit,” downplayed implicitly as ignorance of the Union's complexities, is no mere chimerical function of the Union's Byzantine structures as is sometimes alleged. Moreover, in van Middelaar's Europe size most definitely counts. His scenario has Germany, France, and Britain in the leading roles, with bit parts for the likes of Denmark and Ireland, but only walk-ons for eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia merit but a single mention, whereas Bronislaw Geremek's lament that the Union's expansion into eastern Europe was met with a groan rather than a cheer is simply pooh-poohed). In today's Europe, however, we ignore, say, the Balkan states at our peril. Accepting austerity in view of joining the Euro in the face of all sorts of internal political squabbles, they demonstrate a political will to be integrated into a functioning Europe. They are in the highest sense the bearer of European values today. And it is precisely a sense that the Union's “intermediate sphere” does not take them seriously as indicated, say, by its capacity to overlook Greek ineligibility for fulfilling the requirements to meet the Euro, Bulgarian reticence to tackle corruption, and more or less everything surrounding the finance crisis on the continent, fuels Euroskepticism. The ensuing problem of confidence is a moral, and a fortiori a philosophical one. This aspect of the philosophical dimension of Europe, the question of European values, and the role of ideas generally does not figure in van Middelaar's analysis, however. That distinguishes him clearly from, say, Robert Schuman, who saw matters differently. Schuman was certainly no philosopher, but he was deeply inspired by both the Aristotelian tradition in political thought (ignored here) and ecumenical Christian values (in its conception Europe was largely a Christian Democrat project) specifically as incorporated in the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain (whom Franco once termed his worst enemy in France). From the start it was an alternative to the Hobbean tradition upon which van Middelaar's analysis rests. Indeed, on that account Schuman did not hesitate to term his vision of Europe “revolutionary,” so monumental did he conceive the task of bringing together enemies deeply suspicious of each other sixty years ago—and mirrored in today's North-South divide. This sense of a Europe based upon nothing less than moral heroism is what is entirely lacking in van Middelaar and the price for his astute but one-sided analysis of the status quo and the conventional account of political thought that it rests upon. There are few indications that “business as usual” can create a European public sphere and many that speak directly against it. In particular the research of Justine Lacroix and Peter Mair, to name but two, on the growing cleft between the parliamentary and the representative functions in the traditional European parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, the former at the cost of the latter, is a solid indicator that van Middelaar's “intermediate sphere” is not up to the task that he claims for it. The demand for European politics to jump over its own shadow rests with the least discussed, because least developed, Union organ, parliament. It is an open question if that sleeping giant can rise to the task of creating the missing link to the people it is supposed to represent. That in turn would mean creating an open public forum for critical discourse with an impact upon European policy (i.e., something that many European leaders today positively fear). But that would be a subject for another book. Meanwhile, everyone interested in Europe owes Luuk van Middelaar thanks for a lucid and penetrating study that enriches our understanding and provokes intelligent response.
