Pre-colonial Bornu

By the mid-19^th century the highest political, legal, and religious authority in Borno held the titleFootnote ¹⁴ of a Shehu (Sheik). The Shehu was the only land owner in Bornu with power to allocate territories for settlement (mostly executed to by lower officials) or to redistribute it among his fief holders. Figure 3 shows the Kanuri political hierarchy at the top of which the Shehu and his most powerful fief holders, the Chima Kura (Big Lords) resided in the capital. The Big Lords used a system of locally based fief holders, Chima Gana (Junior Lords) and below them Belama (local authorities, village heads) to administer the territories. Village heads and below them Mbarma (hamlet heads) held hereditary titles and stayed attached to influential families. The Lords were expected to raise militia for defense or military campaigns, administer justice, and levy taxes. Village heads and below were not directly appointed by the Shehu. They were usually the head of the most influential household in the village. Any commoner, who wanted to address a higher official of the Shehu (e.g. the Junior Lords), needed support of his village head. Junior Lords, on the other hand, needed cooperation with the village heads to generate revenues for his Big Lord in the capital. This could lead to conflicts, in particular if the village leader had the backing of the most influential families behind him. Very successful village heads could make a career and become a member of titled nobility with the blessing of the Shehu (Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 30–31). A second, ethnic based hierarchy existed with the aim to better administer (and tax) nomads or otherwise internally displaced (e.g. after wars). All titles were hereditary in the male line (Cohen, Reference Cohen1967: 25).

Figure 3.

Simplified political hierarchy of the Bornu Empire (late 19th century).

Source: own based on Cohen (Reference Cohen and Turner1971), Crowder (Reference Crowder1978a) and Kirscht (Reference Kirscht2001)

The pre-colonial Kanuri society was based on berzum (discipline-respect), the institution which organized the relationship between head of household, generally the father, and other household members. Berzum was reciprocal in nature. The client (e.g. the son) was to be completely respectful and loyal. He was expected to work for the patron (e.g. the father) who in turn gave security, (legal) protection, shelter, and finally food and occupation to guarantee the client's social status. Berzum was self-reinforcing, which means that its application was not restricted to within households (Greif and Laitin, Reference Greif and Laitin2004). The Kanuri believed that the rules governing social relations in the family and the household were essential guides to any form of human organization such as economy, politics, and society in general. Villagers, for example, needed to turn to the next higher representative (e.g. the hamlet head) to petition a specific cause such building on unsettled land or seeking justice.

The Kanuri patron client relationship was complemented by other institutions. It was peer-enforced by nungu (shame-avoidance), an effective sanction in a closely knit society (Cohen, Reference Cohen1967: 46–52). The nzia ceremony regulated gift-exchanges that again strengthened relations between a patron and his clients by informing the former about wealth status of the latter. In a typical nzia ceremony type, quantity and value of the gifts were called out and noted (if scribes were present). Nzia gifts had to be repaid with gifts of similar value on later occasions (Cohen, Reference Cohen1962: 360; Nachtigal, Reference Nachtigal1889: 11–12). Finally, Islam complemented many institutions of the Kanuri society. It introduced Arabic writing and provided the underlying framework for law and justice. Contractual agreements in trans-Saharan trade for example were institutions imported from Arabic traders and built on Islam (Lydon, Reference Lydon2009). Hence, religion and legal life were tightly intertwined. The Shehu was the highest religious leader and highest judge. Apart from conducting religious functions, Islamic scholars traditionally also served as scribes, legal advisors, teachers or judges. Influential families surrounded themselves with them (Cohen, Reference Cohen1967: 22).

Colonial Bornu

Colonial rule in Bornu lasted from 1902 to 1960. In this period, there were two phases of intensified institutional transfer: An early phase which began when the British took possession of Bornu in 1902 and a second phase in the 1950s, when efforts were made to prepare Nigeria for independence.

In the early colonial period institutional transfers intended to support fulfill three goals: Establishing and maintaining colonial control, increasing tax revenues, and directing trade flows towards Lagos and international markets (Crowder, Reference Crowder1978b: 199). The institutions transferred in support of the first two goals directly affected the Kanuri patron client relationship and deserve to be covered in more detail.

British ruling strategy in Bornu was indirect. In 1902 the British installed Shehu Garbai in Bornu and initially allowed him to rule in a pre-colonial manner. In the following years, institutional reforms aimed to increase efficiency of the traditional system. To facilitate taxation geographically fragmented fiefs (renamed into “districts”) and village areas were consolidated and the number of traditional leaders administering them was reduced. Likewise, the second hierarchy based on ethnicity was dropped (Crowder, Reference Crowder1978a: 199–200). After 1914, nobles residing close to the Shehu in the capital were organized as the Shehu's Council, which gradually developed into an early form of provincial government with each member fulfilling functions as heads of civil service departments. From 1920 on, British District Officers started to receive orders from the Council (Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 49).

Indirect rule worked well in Bornu. Overall political stability and revenues were satisfactoryFootnote ¹⁵ and enforcement costs low. A small police force sufficed of 28 European police officers and 838 non-commissioned officers for northern Nigeria sufficed for a territory roughly of the size of France (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1914: 10). Most problems in Bornu occurred in relation with the restructuring of districts whenever client relationships were perturbed. Typical cases of resistance included deposed traditional leader of merged villages or a religious practitioner who had been exempted from taxation in pre-colonial times. In another case, a former head of ethnic groups continued to levy taxes from ethnic kinsmen on a non-territorial basis (Cohen, Reference Cohen and Turner1971: 109). Figure 4 illustrates two facts: First, British influence never reached village level or below. On district level, the district officer had to report to the Shehu from 1920 onwards, which was unusual compared to other British colonies. Second, the traditional political and social hierarchy was not structurally changed. Even under British rule a common Kanuri had little interaction with British officials and still needed to petition through traditional authority structures. In 1906, a villager was flogged to death for having told people of his town that they could report alleged cases of corruption directly to the British officials (Cohen, Reference Cohen and Turner1971). Greif and Laitin (Reference Greif and Laitin2004) argue that British rule exogenously enforced berzum as the fundamental institution underlying the Shehu's authorityFootnote ¹⁶. The Sole Native Authority Law of 1933Footnote ¹⁷ formally acknowledged the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers of the Shehu as Native Ruler and his council as Native Authority.

Figure 4.

Simplified political hierarchy of Bornu under colonial rule.

Source: own based on Cohen (Reference Cohen and Turner1971), Crowder (Reference Crowder1978a) and Kirscht (Reference Kirscht2001)

Indirect rule limited the number of imported institutions and considerably adapted British institutions to make them stick to the local norms which guaranteed low enforcement costs. Justice can serve as an example for the extent and the process of institutional adaptation. In 1900, on the formation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, English common law was introduced to the (yet to be conquered) territories of northern Nigeria. Subsequent changes followed, which were introduced costlessly by proclamation. In 1902, native courts were allowed to administer justice under certain conditions (e.g. excluding Europeans). In 1904, English criminal law was suspended in northern Nigeria because of obvious incongruousness with local practice. Changes in 1906 aimed at limiting the application of Islamic law on Muslims only, although this was hard to achieve in some regions (such as southern Bornu) with non-Muslims minorities (Orr, Reference Orr1911: 230–244). The result was a considerable deviation from English common law. Only a fraction of cases was brought before the British court in the capital, which acted as court of last resort (Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 204–205). As a result, the British administration openly accepted Kanuri native justice, which was based on Islamic law (Great Britain, Colonial Office 1903: 75–6).

Institutional adaptation as a transfer strategy was intentionally selected by the British. Governor LugardFootnote ¹⁸ was aware that affecting change of local institutions in northern Nigeria would have needed a high population density with conditions more like Hong Kong (Lugard, Reference Lugard1922: 215). Alternatively, familiarity with European norms in Bornu was extremely low. It is unknown exactly how many Europeans lived in Bornu. In 1913, only 804 Europeans resided in all 13 provinces of the northern Nigeria (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1914). Within the British Empire the ruling strategy for a specific colonial possession (and with it the process of the institutional transfer) was decided by the extent of European migration, population density, the economic potential, geopolitical importance and the disease environment (Lange, Reference Lange2004: 908; Wengler, Reference Wengler1937: 361–2).

In hindsight adaptation as a strategy of institutional transfer in Bornu was a wise choice given that it was supported by a range of factors. First, the British considered Kanuri institutions centralized enough to be counterparts for British rule. The supportive role of Islam was acknowledged and Christian missionaries had little access to the Muslim northFootnote ¹⁹ (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1914: 25). Moreover, population density was low relative to other British possessions. Under these circumstances tax collection had to rely on native authorities who again relied on clientilism (Lugard, Reference Lugard1922: 215). Also, northern Nigeria had no resources of major importance and there were no geopolitical reasons (e.g. conflicts with other European powers) that would have justified the costs of a major colonial transfer of European institutions (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1914: 23–5). Furthermore adaptation costs were low. Changes could often be executed by means of a simple proclamation. Equally important, for the common Kanuri institutional change was driven and supported by their traditional leadership, the authority of which had not been weakened by British occupation. The Shehu and his administration could expect to win from the new arrangement in terms of political stability and their commitment to change was credible in the eyes of the local population (see also Coyne and Boettke, Reference Coyne and Boettke2009). Finally, British colonial administration was highly experienced in assessing existing norms and contriving compatible institutions. A key role in this regards was attributed to district officers who toured the provinces and advised on specifics and the extent of adaptationFootnote ²⁰ (Lugard, Reference Lugard1922: 220). The use of district officers and their role in adapting foreign institutions relates to the discussion of the role of institutional intermediaries. There is little research on intermediaries, but we can expect that their importance increases with the growing incompatibility between foreign and local institutions (see also Berkowitz, Reference Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard2001: 167).

Our analysis shows that adaptation was consciously chosen and other strategies discarded by the British in the light of circumstantial factors. However, imported institutions turned out ineffective where adaptation was technically difficult. Attempts to impose the Sterling in Bornu did technically not allow much room for adaptation. The Kanuri continued using cowry shells and the Maria Theresia dollar until the mid-20th century. In the first years, locally counterfeited versions of British pennies added to the confusion and lowered trust in the new currency (Crowder, Reference Crowder1978a: 190; Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1907: 42).

Independence

After World War II, London undertook steps to prepare British colonies for independence. A series of decrees and constitutional reforms from 1947 to 1960 increased the extent of institutional transfers in Nigeria. Our analysis starts with the changes introduced by the so-called Richards Constitution and continues on to discuss factors, which contributed to the transplant effect. We then explore the impact of constitutional reforms in 1976 and in 1989 on the role of Kanuri patron client relations in the current institutional framework in Borno.

In 1947, Arthur Richards, the Governor of Nigeria, passed a first constitution which made Bornu part of the newly created Northern Region (beside an Eastern and a Western Region) in Nigeria. The Richards Constitution established new democratic institutions roughly shaped on the British model: The Northern House of Assembly and the House of Chiefs. At this stage, members of the Houses were not yet elected but came from the colonial administration and the traditional hierarchy. Hence, there was little initial impact on traditional rule. The first regional political parties followed in the 1950s and quickly consolidated their power in their regions of origin. In the Northern Region, the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.) became the dominant political party, which was rooted in the traditional administration, Islam and supported by the political elites and the British colonial administration (Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 276 and 291).

The Richards constitution also introduced a unitary civil administration based on Whitehall. At first, political efforts focused on replacing British with Nigerian officers (“Nigerianization”). Soon, a debate over the allocation of new positions and of funds intensified between the three regions (Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 253–254). Higher levels of European education and more exposure to Europeans put candidates from Nigeria's south at an advantage and resulted in all senior positions being taken by SouthernersFootnote ²¹. In 1954, the tensions between the regions led to a division of the civil service into three regional and one federal public service (Coleman, Reference Coleman1963: 271–295; Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 274). Different standards emerged and reflected different levels of education in the regions. In the Northern Region and in Bornu, competence levels of newly recruited staff were generally lower relative to Nigeria's south and European educated recruits were rare. The problem was aggravated by political demands for “Nigerianization” and “Northernization” of the workforce. British staff were given incentives to leave early and the employment of competent southern Nigerians was effectively blocked. In 1960, an investigation into the training and staff development by the Ford Foundation described the situation in the Northern Region as staggering. General short-fall in staff was more than 25 per cent (Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 270). The north was also the only region to keep colonial traditions of public service: Among others, new bureaucrats were trained in etiquette such attendance of school sport days and polo matches. Ceremonial uniform for administrative officers were retained with swords and badges (Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 291–6). In Bornu, the influence of the Shehu on recruitment of bureaucrats and on political parties was considerable. Like everywhere else in the Northern Region, the pro-aristocratic N.P.C. served as a vehicle to place followers and family members of the Shehu into key positions (Harnischfeger, Reference Harnischfeger2008: 63). Opposition movements aroused suspicion and fear of disorder in both, the outgoing British administration and traditional leadership. In 1958 the Borno Youth League, a Kanuri opposition movement, was forbidden after riots had broken out in Maiduguri (Cohen, Reference Cohen1967: 110).

After independence, day-to-day politics remained firmly in the hand of the Shehu Umar III, who - being an old man - was represented by his first minister (Waziri). Figure 5 shows that the social and political hierarchy serving the Shehu had hardly changed from the late colonial period. Traditional leadership in Borno had quickly re-organized themselves and assumed the form of a political party, the N.P.C. who subsequently won the elections (Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 291). The Shehu, his first minister and the Native Authority CouncilFootnote ²² formally and informally constituted the highest political authority in Bornu. The council acted like a cabinet with council members directing functional departments. District heads were accountable to the council and received directives and policies from the departments. In return, they delivered tax revenues to the Native Authority Treasury. Anthropologic research of the early 1960s strongly suggests that berzum continued to dominate procedures within the administration between council members, district heads, and other traditional leaders. Kanuri clientilism was supported by gift exchange and small payments. Justice continued to be administered on all levels of the hierarchy based on Islam and local customs (Cohen, Reference Cohen1967: 103–5). Islamic judges and the police had strong informal ties with the N.P.C. and the Shehu, which proved helpful in suppressing the political opposition. The abolition of Islamic law had been one of the British conditions, which the Muslim north had to accept in exchange for independence. But negotiations with the British achieved little and ended with independenceFootnote ²³. The northern region introduced its own Penal Code, which was a more secular version of the Sharia and applicable to Muslims only. Until the adoption of full Sharia law in 2000, the application of Islamic law was supposed to be limited to civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal law such marriage and divorce or the ban of alcohol for Muslims (Harnischfeger, Reference Harnischfeger2008: 61–65).

Figure 5.

Simplified political hierarchy in the Emirate of Borno (post 1960).

Source: own based on Cohen (Reference Cohen1967)

In particular, outside Maiduguri berzum remained the fundamental institution of Kanuri social interaction. There was no noticeable feeling of change among the rural Kanuri. Interviews conducted with older Kanuri farmers in the 1990s revealed hardly any recollection of independence or of changes in connection with independence. However, the political and administrative reforms of the mid-1970s were remembered as decisive changesFootnote ²⁴ (Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 65). Anthropologic research conducted in Maiduguri after independence reported the emergence of a small new class of salaried bureaucrats. These young men were generally fluent in English and some had enjoyed a European education. Although competence and education did matter in the new civil service, personal relationships were the primary requisite to enlistment. Once recruited, loyalty and obedience to department leaders dominated the contractual agreement. Transfers between departments for example, were close to impossible, because in terms of berzum changing a job was equivalent to neglecting a client's duty (Cohen, Reference Cohen1967: 107–8).

What contributed to the transplant effect in Borno? Similar to the institutional transfer of the early colonial phase, there was no alternative to adaptation as the transfer strategy. Civil service in Borno lacked the experience and the size to affect a change of local institutions and familiarity with European institutions was minimal. Adaptation failed for various reasons. First, it was arguably impossible to contrive a single institutional framework that suited all of Nigeria's distinct ethnic groups with distinct local institutions. Moreover, the extent of envisaged institutional reform was considerable and the timeframe was limited. Failure of the British to negotiate a unitary and secular law for all Nigerians can serve as an example. Second, the British believed in the benefits of putting Nigerians in charge of the process from an early stage on (Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 276). Through a series of conferences and a new constitutionFootnote ²⁵, they gradually ceded control over the process of institutional reform. Although this allowed for a limited degree of localization, institutional changes soon served the conservation of political influence of traditional rulers. This effect was stronger in Borno and the Northern Region, where rulers had benefitted from the stability provided by the colonial system. This explains the continuation of colonial attire and customs in the civil service. The main function of bureaucracy – the impersonal provision of service to citizens – was not fulfilled. Third, there was, above all, a problem of incompatibility of traditional rule with modern governance. To conserve their political position elites relied on the patron client relationship which was incompatible with impersonalized norms of a modern democracy (see also Englebert, Reference Englebert2000 and Weingast, Reference Weingast and Chamlee-Wright2009). There was no easy solution for this dilemma. In Eastern Africa, the Tswana initially formalized the informal rights of traditional leaders by translating them into written law and used later legislation to erode these rights in a democratic process (Parson, Reference Parson1984: 43–6). But the Tswana traditional institutions of rule are believed to be more compatible with modern democratic rules and institutional reforms were implemented by a charismatic leader, who was himself a tribal king with an education in Oxford and who was convinced to gain from modernization (Acemoglu et al., Reference Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson2001a). In Borno, such a process of adaptation would have needed the support of the Shehu – an elderly man, who did not expect to benefit from modernization more than he feared to lose. Already in 1952, the Shehu and other northern Emirs had shown resistance to constitutional reform fearing loss of their political influence. At that time, many of the revolting Emirs had been discharged and exiled by the British. The Shehu of Bornu was allowed to stay on the condition of major changes in his council (Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 63). After independence, the regional government of the Northern Nigeria had fewer incentives to enforce imported institutions in BornoFootnote ²⁶. Fourth, the institutional changes around independence were not supported by a crisis or a break of established routines. There were no personnel changes in traditional leadership or otherwise a political shakeup. In fact, rural Kanuri hardly noticed changes in the first years after independence. In other parts of the British Empire, Botswana and Malaysia for example, political crises upon independence created opportunities that supported institutional change (Lange, Reference Lange2009). Finally, low levels of European educationFootnote ²⁷ and urbanizationFootnote ²⁸ in Bornu had a twofold effect. They limited the number of Kanuri with an orientation towards Europe (Cohen, Reference Cohen1967: 106) and restricted the supply of competent recruits for the civil service. Moreover, many northerners with a Western education pursued carriers in the N.P.C., which aimed to consolidate its own political dominance rather than institutional reform (Harnischfeger, Reference Harnischfeger2008: 63–4). Yet, wherever changes of local institutions took place in southern Nigeria, they were promoted by a European educated urban class who supported modernization (Falola and Heaton, Reference Falola and Heaton2008: 155–7). This was most evident in rapidly growing Lagos, where students had been the first social group to organize an independence movement (Crowder, Reference Crowder1978a: 217; Nicolson, Reference Nicolson1969: 295).

Whereas institutional adaptation was the chosen by the British upon independence, considerable income from oil and gas resources in the 1970s shifted the transfer strategy towards more change of local institutions. In 1976, constitutional reforms established a new republic based on a presidential system. More important for the analysis of the transplant effect, new local government areas (LGAs) with elected representatives were introduced on district level. Revenues from oil and natural gas were soon channeled to these newly established bodies enabling them to enforce imported – now federal – norms. Also in 1976, the Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme was launched and expanded Western education into rural Borno. This promoted urbanization as newly educated Kanuri left the countryside in search for employment in Maiduguri. Migration to urban centers led to labor shortages in the countryside and religious radicalization in towns (Csapo, Reference Csapo1983 and Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 68). The constitution of 1989 (in force since 1999) further deprived traditional leaders of all legislative, executive and judicial powers. Figure 6 shows that the traditional hierarchy today is no longer considered part of the official system of governance. Traditional leaders are granted advisory roles or may assist in raising taxes (Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 74).

Figure 6.

Simplified political hierarchy Borno State (post 1989).

Source: own based on Cohen (Reference Cohen and Turner1971), Crowder (Reference Crowder1978a) and Kirscht (Reference Kirscht2001)

The enforcement of federal institutions on state and district level altered the transfer process from adaptation to a change of local institutions. The process is ongoing. Whereas Kanuri patron client relations have remained dominant on village level and in the countryside (Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 78), institutional conflicts have become frequent on district level, where traditional leaders are now forced into cooperation with federal government structures (Englebert, Reference Englebert2009: 136). In best Hayekian sense the resulting institutional equilibrium today is of spontaneous nature and differs from the original intention of institutional design (Hayek, Reference Hayek1973: 41). The Kanuri patron client relationship has been weakened, but not replaced and it continues to shape the rules of the game, albeit with outcomes that depend on circumstances and can hardly be predicted. Kirscht (Reference Kirscht2001: 79) reports a case of the late 1990s, where the district head in MarteFootnote ²⁹ was called to solve a violent conflict between Fulani cattle herders and Kanuri farmers. The old man ordered a squadron of police, who are federal agents, to take a pick-up truck and assist him in settling the conflict. The police obeyed. Formally, district heads hold no executive powers over federal police agents, but old informal institutions make them responsible for solving conflicts between famers and cattle herders. The police officers, who were themselves ethnic Kanuri, had to decide between respecting the authority of the district leader or the law and followed the former. Sarch (Reference Sarch, Solomon and Turton2000) investigated a conflict between the Inland Fishing Decree of 1992, a federal law, and traditional norms regulating fishing rights on the shores of Lake Chad. Despite the use of military patrols on the lake, federal agents and LGA officers had to give in and accept the supremacy of the traditional solution. Conflicts over access and the use of land are another area where conflicting institutional norms provide uncertain outcomes. Although federal law grants equal access to land for all NigerianFootnote ³⁰, de facto allocation is based on traditional norms which favor local Kanuri over non-local Nigerians. In Marte district less than 3 per cent of local Kanuri had no access to agricultural land in 1999 compared to 35 per cent of non-local Nigerians (Kirscht, Reference Kirscht2001: 301). In a similar manner, the adoption of Sharia Law in Borno in 2000 has led to a situation where provisions of the more secular Penal Code of 1960 co-exist with conflicting regulations of new Sharia Penal Code (Ostien, Reference Ostien2007: 6). This has not only increased uncertainty in jurisdiction, but also upset the political stability of the region. With federal police not trained or willing to execute Islamic law, militarized Islamic groups (hisba) have emerged initially intending to fill this vacuum, which has led to violent clashes with opposing groups of Christian minorities (BBC, 2013; Harnischfeger, Reference Harnischfeger2008: 93–5).