Published in the last months of the Bush administration, this work by Tamara Wittes (who was appointed U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in November 2009) is intended as a guide to a new foreign policy team for dealing with what she sees as a critical threat to U.S. interests in the region: the absence of meaningful political reform in the Arab world.
The basic argument is as follows: for too long, the United States has been willing to support authoritarian regimes in the region because the alternative seemed too threatening. While admitting that change brings uncertainty, Wittes argues that the costs of the failure to promote democracy are now too great for the United States to continue its business as usual approach with the region's autocrats.
To frame her argument, Wittes briefly surveys some of the political science literature on democratization and admits that democracy promotion is a fraught process. Moreover, the Bush administration, which made this goal a plank in its approach to the region, made numerous mistakes, the most important of which were, in her view, insufficient effective (as opposed to ideological) commitment to the goal and improper targeting of resources. As a result, current U.S. efforts aimed at democracy promotion in the region suffer from a credibility gap. However, Wittes argues that with a comprehensive approach demanding first and foremost the development of political freedoms, reinforced by a willingness to supply resources to key countries, the United States can achieve success.
Although I remain unconvinced that good governance and rule of law were ever a serious part of the Bush administration's agenda in the Arab world—they certainly were not a part of its domestic agenda—Wittes does genuinely want to see real democracy develop in the region. The problem, of course, is that simply wanting such a development for Arab countries is insufficient or unconvincing as a motive, because, in Washington's eyes, Arabs are regularly expendable in large numbers across all socioeconomic, religious, and age groups. The author therefore has to find another argument to attract the interest of policymakers. To do so, she argues that democracy promotion in the Arab world is in the national interests of the United States. Although problems stemming from authoritarian rule have long existed, they are now reaching a point where change seems inevitable. In her view, what the United States must do is to move ahead of the curve and start working for effective democratization now before other forces that the transformations ahead might unleash leave it with a less user-friendly set of leaders and regimes. The most potentially threatening of these, of course, are the radical Islamists.
The topic of this book and its implications are of critical importance. However, the work is marred by frequent repetition and an often meandering explanation of the basic arguments. An even more significant problem, however, lies in the author's prescriptions for how the United States might more effectively promote political reform. She simply does not convincingly explain how her proposals could be successfully implemented.
The distance one feels between the clichés of what passes for policy analysis and prescription in Washington and what one experiences in the region or reads and sees in its media is quite jarring. Certainly, Wittes is correct that Arab leaders and states are corrupt, repressive, and long overdue for reform. She is also correct in arguing that Arab publics view continued U.S. economic, military, and political support for much of the rogues gallery that passes for leadership in the region today as part of the hypocrisy involved in any putative U.S. concern with human rights. However, that situation also characterized U.S. policy under the Clinton and previous administrations. What Wittes seems to have missed are the bases of the Bush administration's Orwellian-titled “Freedom Agenda.”
To begin with, what of the massive death, destruction, and displacement brought to the people of Iraq in the most high-profile democracy-building project undertaken so far? That is an inappropriate test case, argues Wittes, because democratization was not an initial goal of the invasion of Iraq but rather an attempt at post facto justification for a war really aimed at rooting out weapons of mass destruction. We are urged instead to evaluate the Bush administration's record only in places where it actually intended to promote democracy in the first place. In other words, bringing up Abu Ghraib, extraordinary rendition, and torture would apparently be unfair in evaluating Bush's democratization record.
Moving westward, America's “unsteady march” in “building Arab democracy” was being completed in Gaza as I finished reading this book (early January 2009). It had begun with free elections held in January 2006 and was culminating in the most vicious military attacks against an Arab population since Israel's massive assault against Lebanon in July 2006. That last episode, characterized by Condoleeza Rice as “the birth pangs of a new Middle East,” had come slightly over one year after the U.S. administration had cheered on the politically transformative potential of the so-called Cedar Revolution.
As with Iraq, Wittes argues that we should not judge the potential of the United States to build democracies on the basis of these cases because the Bush administration erred in training its sights (my characterization, not hers) on weak states. Examples around the world (never specified) show that when democratization is pushed in weak states, where populations do not feel protected by their governments, they will take refuge in substate forms of affiliation, along ethnic or religious lines, neither of which is conducive to the deepening of democratic values or democratic practice. Subsequently, however, she notes that if states are strong, they pose their own problems for democratization and that a number of Middle Eastern states are in fact too strong. Still later in her discussion, it is not state strength, but the closeness of the relationship and degree of shared interests with the United States that become the primary criteria for determining which regimes the United States should pressure for reform. Clarity and consistency are not hallmarks of this analysis.
Returning to the question of weak states, at one point Wittes does note that the Palestinian Authority is not really a state. However, at no point does she engage that minor irritant in Palestinian attempts to democratize: Israeli occupation, in all of its land-confiscating, collective-punishing, and economic-strangling reality. Nor does she mention U.S. involvement in helping to foment civil war between Fatah and Hamas. The reader with some knowledge of the Palestine case is left to wonder where the deliberate undermining of elected governments fit in Bush's “Freedom Agenda.”
But by this time in the text, Wittes has already laid the groundwork for a downplaying of the importance of Palestine in democracy promotion. In her chapter, “The Vanishing Status Quo,” she becomes the umpteenth analyst to pronounce Arab nationalism dead, as she argues that the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein put the final nail in its coffin. This contention initially appears to be relevant to her argument because she wants to insist that Arabism has been one of the last refuges of Arab autocrats: with this ideology dead, she concludes, Arab leaders will have little choice but to respond to the demands of the citizenry. However, there is another aspect to the familiar “last nail in Arabism's coffin” contention. Given the overwhelmingly youthful composition of Arab societies, Wittes contends that for a large portion of the region's population Palestine is “more distant” than it was in the heyday of Arab nationalism: “justice for the Palestinians no longer serves to motivate patriotic loyalty as it did in decades past” (p. 50).
If this is the case, then what was one to make of the massive pro-Palestinian demonstrations from Morocco to Iraq during the war on Gaza? I am not sure what Wittes means by “patriotic loyalty,” but the reaction across the region, except where quashed by U.S.-allied Arab leaders, was deep anger that poured out into the streets. Arabism was alive, and Arabs were furious—not only with Arab leaders for their complicity, certainly, but also with Israel and the United States—about Palestine. If this is how Arabs react to a “distant” issue, one should beware of the anger closer ones may trigger.
Were it not so cynical and damaging, it would only be boring that segments of the policy community continue to hawk the canard that Arabs and Muslims do not care about Palestine anymore. But the goal is clear: if they can convince others that Palestine is not really that important to Arabs, then U.S. responsibility for the continuing Israeli occupation cannot possibly have anything to do with the “credibility gap” the United States currently suffers in the region when it talks about building freedom.
My contention is not that all the region's problems are derivative of the Palestine problem. Far from it. However, as long as the United States continues its generous financial and military support of a brutal occupation in the heart of the Middle East, not to mention wars on the Middle East and North Africa's frontiers—it has no legitimacy whatsoever to argue that its allies should implement political reforms or to formulate a vision of that freedom. In such a context, the euphemistically termed “credibility gap” can only widen, and Washington's efforts at democracy promotion—if that is what they are—will never be taken seriously by people in the region.
