Since Rawls's death in 2002, there has—unsurprisingly—arisen a veritable cottage industry dedicated to summarizing and analyzing his work and its past, present, and future impact on the disciplines of moral and political philosophy. Contributors to this genre include some very prominent philosophers such as Thomas Pogge, Samuel Freeman, Catherine Audard, and Percy Lehning. A number of the resulting texts focus primarily on providing an effective summary of the important features, evolution, and principal criticisms of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness as it manifests itself within his three principal works: A Theory of Justice (TJ), Political Liberalism (PL), and The Law of Peoples (LoP). Rawls: An Introduction is one of the latest additions to that genre.
Rawls is divided into three parts, devoted respectively to TJ, PL, and LoP, which are addressed in the order in which they were first published. However, “more than 50 percent” of the book “is dedicated to TJ” (13). Maffettone offers a number of reasons to justify that fact, including that “TJ is Rawls’s most important book” (14). Though Maffettone does not devote distinct portions of his book to a detailed review and analysis of “other significant books by Rawls”—namely, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (2000), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), and Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (2007)—he notes that they “deserve attention” and will be used to “support” his “general reading of Rawls's work” (15). Maffettone suggests that Rawls's work can plausibly be divided into two chronological periods: “Rawls1,” which encompasses 1950–1980, and “Rawls2,” which captures the period from the publication of “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (KCMT) in 1980 until Rawls's death in 2002 (14). Maffettone's division reflects his belief that “Rawls's writings immediately following TJ serve as a kind of appendix to [it],” while Rawls's work beginning with KCMT presents “basic new assumptions about the notions of person and society” (14) and, in so doing, represents an important modification to Rawls's thinking and argument.
In the course of his summarizing, Maffettone presents an abundance of engaging and, at times, provocative claims. However, rather than arbitrarily target a few specific arguments from among the many interesting candidates that could serve as the focus for this review, I will examine his overarching approach to reading and analyzing Rawls's work, as this is not only critical to understanding the basis for Maffettone's claims and conclusions and effectively assessing their persuasiveness, but it also offers a (relatively) encompassing yet manageable topic for this venue.
Maffettone's approach differs from that of many others who pursue essentially a chronologically sequential analysis of TJ, PL, and LoP. Specifically, his approach is informed by “three hermeneutical hypotheses” that “influence the whole structure of the book” (1). The interpretive hypothesis concerns what Maffettone identifies as “the much-debated question” of whether one should read Rawls's work as one continuous interactive argument or, alternatively, as a series of distinct enterprises that “discuss … different subjects” (16). Maffettone suggests that while the latter approach “seems to prevail,” the former approach is the correct one. He asserts that, despite suggestions to the contrary, there is “substantial continuity” across TJ, PL, and LoP. Though Rawls made “internal changes” to his “paradigm,” TJ, PL, and LoP can be understood as “three concentric circles,” with the second and third circles (PL and LoP, respectively) representing a broadening of “the scope of [Rawls's] political theory” (17).
Maffettone asserts that his “methodological and theoretical hypotheses offer some reasons” for supporting such an understanding. His methodological hypothesis suggests that the idea of the right over the good (i.e., “the priority of right”) constitutes “a unitary thread through which we can trigger the desired continuity in our reading of Rawls” (16); it is a “permanent and fundamental” feature of the “Rawlsian vision of politics” (21), as presented in TJ, PL, and LoP. In turn, a proper understanding of Rawls's conception and application of the priority of right requires the introduction of the distinction between justification and legitimation—the focus of Maffettone's theoretical hypothesis. In brief, whereas justification is concerned with theoretical arguments grounded in morals and metaphysics, legitimation is focused on institutional practices (primarily political processes) and does not “directly appeal to the moral and metaphysical roots of a culture” (21). According to Maffettone, Rawls's conception of justice relies on such a distinction. The character of Rawls's use of the priority of right—his requirement that disagreements about the right must be substantially more limited than disagreements about the good—demands that all citizens adopt the same understanding of legitimation, but not necessarily the same understanding of justification.
Without dismissing the potential significance of arguments contained in the material Maffettone references to make his case, his interpretive and methodological hypotheses seem only to state what for many might be somewhat obvious. In a number of instances (e.g., Political Liberalism [Columbia University Press, 2005], xiv–xvi) Rawls noted the continuity between TJ and PL, arguing that while PL is not merely a seamless extension and refinement of TJ, the character and content of PL clearly represent a development and extension of the project that consumed TJ: namely, to discover and articulate “the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society” (A Theory of Justice [Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971], viii). Similarly, the continuity between TJ, PL, and LoP is proclaimed in various remarks by Rawls. For example, he emphasizes that “it is important to see that the Law of Peoples is developed within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples” (The Law of Peoples [Harvard University Press, 1999], 9). He also notes the similarity of purpose that animates LoP, TJ, and PL, observing that while the latter two seek to demonstrate the possibility of establishing and sustaining a just liberal society, the former “hopes to say how a world Society of liberal and decent Peoples might be possible” (Law of Peoples, 6). Maffettone acknowledges that Rawls supported a continuity-based reading of TJ, PL, and LoP, but suggests that “authors’ intentions, however relevant they might be, are not and ought not to be the sole instruments of interpretations” (18). While that is certainly true, it seems equally true that such authorial assertions can reasonably be tentatively accepted until proven otherwise.
Maffettone's suggestion that the priority of right serves as the methodological framework within which Rawls develops his arguments also seems relatively innocuous or uneventful. While the priority of right is most prominent and overwhelming in PL, a careful reader can relatively easily discern the idea's fundamental importance to the arguments contained in TJ and LoP. Maffettone's theoretical hypothesis, however, addresses what could legitimately be labeled an underexplored element of Rawls's paradigm, and provides an engaging lens through which to evaluate Rawls's arguments.
Maffettone's dedication to analyzing Rawls's arguments holistically—or, more specifically, the manner in which he does so—offers a relatively unique “dialogue” between Rawls's texts, a conversation that spans the entirety of Rawls. Also noteworthy and immensely impressive is Maffettone's painstaking attention to detailing the evolution of Rawls's arguments. In the final analysis, regardless of whether one agrees with Maffettone's analytical approach and his resulting assessment of the character, strengths, and weaknesses of Rawls's arguments, Rawls offers an excellent survey of the features and evolution of Rawls's conception of justice as fairness as it manifests itself in and across TJ, PL, and LoP, and, in so doing, constitutes a useful and interesting addition to the existing scholarship.
