This is an excellent work, providing an overview of the history of Soviet and Russian thinking about deterrence, and clarifying current and prospective Russian concepts of deterrence and coercion and how they might fit into overall Russian appreciations of military and political strategy. Dmitry Adamsky’s previous works have established his reputation as a solid scholar in this field, and this work is doubtless his best yet. Of the many informative and interesting features of this work, some deserve special mention.

First, Adamsky discusses the Russian concept of strategic deterrence and compares it to the American construct of “cross-domain deterrence.” This is an interesting comparison, and the point of strategic deterrence a la Russe is that it is inclusive of nuclear, conventional, cyber, and other instruments of influence—including those aspects of “new generation warfare” much discussed in connection with NATO appreciations of Russian military thinking, including propaganda, disinformation, covert action, and other activities below the level of actual shooting war (also sometimes referred to as so-called “gray area” warfare). US concepts of cross-domain deterrence are similarly inclusive, spanning the five domains of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Adamsky suggests that in some respects, Russian theoreticians and practitioners have developed a conceptualization that is at least as sophisticated as their western counterparts, if not better. The Russian approach includes an emphasis on synergetic effect: new domains do not substitute for, but complement, the existing ones. As he notes: “For example, the focus on the conventional aspects and informational struggle, cognitive-psychological and digital-technological, which gained prominence during the last decade, did not come at the expense of the nuclear capabilities, which not only were not devaluated but have accelerated in parallel” (39).

Second, the author uses the concept of strategic culture in a creative way to explain Russian approaches to deterrence. His analysis highlights three kinds of factors that impact the Russian style of deterrence: cultural, ideational, and historical legacies. An illustration of the significance of these factors is provided in Adamsky’s discussion of the Russian concept of reflexive control, which seeks “to manipulate the adversary’s picture of reality, misinform it, and interfere with the decision-making processes of individuals, organizations, governments, and societies, and to shape their strategic choices and operational behavior” so that the opponent will do something adverse to their own interests (68). This seminal concept of Soviet and now Russian military theory is related to deterrence because both deal with perceptions management, but reflexive control differs from deterrence in that the object of persuasion in reflexive control is unaware of being manipulated or coerced.

Third, Adamsky provides important insights into the relationship between Russia’s views of conventional compared to nuclear deterrence, including specific discussion about the likelihood of Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine. He judges that there is a higher likelihood of Russian escalation from conventional into nuclear war if NATO’s military actions threaten Russia’s existence and territorial integrity. If Russia gets to the stage at which its conventional military options have been exhausted and its nuclear rhetoric is futile, the probability of crossing the nuclear threshold rises. But prior to a decision for nuclear first use, Russia will probably draw from its “cross-domain coercion cocktail” and engage in nuclear muscle-flexing. Nuclear muscle-flexing means gradually more visible strategic “gestures” or coercive signaling in order to communicate capability and resolve to climb the ladder of escalation. Examples of such gestures are the increasing of alert levels, transporting of nuclear containers closer to their delivery systems, or additional numbers of military patrols away from bases. In sum: “The Kremlin is unlikely to skip up the escalation stairs, but will advance through this phase incrementally to generate maximum effectiveness” (107).

The preceding discussion only touches upon some of the important concepts and arguments in this path breaking study. It is a work not only of policy analysis, but also of military-strategic thinking and analytic philosophy. The author’s command of dominant ideas in Russian military thought, their historical legacies, and their contextual interrelationships is of benefit to readers specialized in Russian history and military theory, and to others who are seeking greater understanding of these issues in order to read Russia from the outside-in rather than the inside-out: including US and allied NATO policy makers and military planners.