As Terrence Hutchison so aptly observed in his Before Adam Smith, the mercantilist literature was not the only, or even the most important, stream of economic thought in the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth:
There was another stream of ideas which eventually was to prove, arguably, of greater significance for the theoretical foundations of political economy. These were the ideas of the natural-law philosophers, which were of fundamental importance for the formation of the subject, not only because they introduced the concepts of natural order and of natural law but also for the nucleus of value and price theory which the writings of these philosophers contributed, a nucleus which had come down from Aristotle via the scholastics (1988, p. 5).
This is what Barry Gordon and I have referred to as the Protestant Natural Law Tradition (1992). It began with Hugo Grotius in 1625 and it runs through Samuel Pufendorf, Gershom Carmicheal, and Francis Hutcheson to Adam Smith (while in France it ran through Pufendorf, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and Auguste Walras to Leon Walras) (Hutchison p. 378). This filiation of ideas in the history of economic thought is well known and has been commented upon and analyzed quite extensively in the secondary literature.Footnote 1 Hutchison expresses a common attitude among historians that in Smith's hands value theory regresses compared to that on offer in the Pufendorf/Hutcheson tradition, and that this is particularly highlighted when one compares what Walras made of it with his subjective theory of value, rooted in utility and scarcity, compared to Smith's emphasis on cost factors (p. 376).
My purpose in revisiting this well-worn path is to view it as an early example of the integration of law, or moral philosophy when considered from a broader perspective, and economics. The value and price theory these authors developed is embedded in chapters concerned with oaths, obligations, promises, and contracts. As such, economic analysis is couched in a legal/moral discourse. I contend, therefore, that no history of the modern subdiscipline of law and economics is complete without a survey of the Protestant Natural Law Tradition.
In this paper I confine myself exclusively to value and price theory and an exploration of the extent to which Smith adopted, extended, refined, and/or dropped aspects of this theory that he would have originally learned in Francis Hutcheson's lectures. I will argue three points. First, much of his positive analysis of value and price builds directly on this tradition, especially Hutcheson's treatment of it. Second, contra Hutchison, Smith's emphasis on cost factors is indeed consistent with this tradition, and more significantly it shows that Smith's theory remains within the moral philosophical framework of the tradition in that cost elements can be seen as rooted in claims arising out of natural rights. Third, and last, while Smith's analysis of the market as a self-adjusting mechanism with utilitarian optimizing properties is generally seen as his trademark contribution, the fundamental theory of beneficial unintended consequences had already been worked out in an original way in Smith's moral philosophy and jurisprudence. I treat Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Smith in chronological order.
I. SAMUEL PUFENDORF
Among the leading lights of this tradition, Pufendorf and Hutcheson stand out because their treatments of value and price are much more extensive than those found in the writings of other contributors. I will, therefore, consider only their treatments here. As is always the case, every contribution to intellectual history has its antecedents. For Pufendorf these are found in the Aristotelian and Scholastic traditions in economics, although this is not immediately obvious from his references (Young and Gordon Reference Young and Gordon1992). The fullest account of Pufendorf's theory of value and price is in his magnum opus, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672/1934). While displaying his Scholastic roots, there are elements in the analysis that might be accounted novel and which foreshadow Smith's treatment of price. He begins by defining price as a “moral quality of things and actions in so far as they are understood to serve some purpose in common life” (p. 676). He goes on to explain that it is, of course, the social activity of commerce which gives rise to price. In explaining what he calls “ordinary price” (what we would call relative as opposed to money price), he first notes that usefulness is the foundation of ordinary price, by which he means the ability of a “thing or action … (to) mediately or immediately contribute something to the necessity of human life, or to make it more advantageous and pleasant” (p. 676). He then observes that some very useful things have no price at all, and here he distinguishes three categories:
(i) Those things, such as the air and open ocean, that “are and should be exempt from dominion”;
(ii) Those things removed from commerce by law and/or custom, such as sacred sites or articles;
(iii) Those things which “cannot be held separately” although they are accessory to things the price of which they influence, such as a beautiful landscape (pp. 677–78).
Subjective valuation is not the whole story. Scarcity also plays a role as, “the chief factor in high price is scarcity” (p. 680). Thus, “we observe that those things are cheapest which men are least able to do without” (p. 680), and “the overweening luxury of men has set enormous values upon things which they could very easily do without” (p. 681). In addition, cost factors play a role as “the price of labours and actions is raised by their difficulty, the dexterity required in them, their usefulness, necessity, the scarcity of workers, their renown or position, their freedom to work when they choose, and similar considerations” (p. 684).
Pufendorf then distinguishes three contexts in which price formation is to be considered. The first context is that of “a state of nature.” Here, it seems, exchange transactions can be regarded as isolated or discrete events, such that “the prices of all things are fixed by agreement between the parties concerned” (p. 686). The second context is that of “organized states” in which lawful authorities act to set prices by decree. The third context, also found in organized states, is one where prices are established “by the general valuation and judgement of men, with the further consent of those who are the parties to the bargain” (p. 686). In this context, the price which prevails is known as “common or natural price.”
Pufendorf goes on to associate natural price with just price, and he allows that in its determination, “consideration is to be given to the labour and expense which merchants undergo in importing and handling their wares, for this is the principle reason why a merchant is allowed to sell his goods for more than the purchase price” (p. 687; emphasis added). He then expands on the items of “expense”: “But merchants can include in their estimation the time they have spent, the plans they have formed, and the troubles they have met in acquiring, preserving, or distributing their merchandise, as well as all necessary expenses for the labour of their servants” (p. 688).
Interestingly, this is preceded by a list of expenses which a merchant may not incorporate into the price. These include breaking a leg or becoming seriously ill in the process of importing the goods, “provided, of course, such accidents did not contribute to the scarcity of wares” (p. 688). In concluding the point, Pufendorf writes: “it would surely be inhuman, and likely to destroy the industry of men, to try to allow a man for his business, or any other sort of occupation, no more profit than barely permits him to meet his necessities by frugality and hardships” (p. 688; emphasis added).
The merchant is even allowed to take into account the difference in prompt versus delayed payment, as the latter carries a higher opportunity cost, “since some further profit can be made of the money in the meantime” (p. 689). The text then goes on to discuss the use of money and the problems associated with its debasement, so I will leave Pufendorf at this point.
Three observations are in order before moving on to Hutcheson's treatment of the same topics. First, the chapter on price serves to introduce Book V of the work, which is mainly concerned with contracts. Book IV, which precedes it, is Pufendorf's account of property rights. The property rights basis of the analysis is particularly evident in the list of things that are useful but have no price. In two of the three cases it is because property rights are not defined. In the case of the open ocean this is because it cannot come under dominion and indeed it should not. The air and ocean were meant to be common, open to all. In the case of things accessory to something else, such as a beautiful landscape to a piece of land, the problem is that there is no extant way to separate the right to view the landscape from the right to own the land. Hence land with superior views will command a higher price. The point, though, is that the concept of price is a legal one, and the claims associated with buying and selling are grounded in property rights. These in turn are natural rights as they are seen to promote the common good.
Second, we can see this line of reasoning in the discussion of what sorts of expenses the merchant is “allowed” to recover in the sales price and what he is not allowed to include. Thus, the expense of his labor is allowable as are common business expenses, but he is not allowed to claim retribution for accidents unrelated to the scarcity or abundance of the goods. I take “allowable” in a legal sense, but the context also suggests that this is allowable not just in the positive law of existing trading nations, but also allowable in natural law. Moreover, he is allowed a profit out of humanitarian considerations and to prevent the destruction of “industry.” The claim of the merchant to make a profit is also rooted in natural rights as it serves the common good in a commercial nation.Footnote 2 This claim extends to include the opportunity cost of money by allowing the merchant to ask for a higher price when payment is delayed.
Third, the utility vs. scarcity approach to value and price clearly incorporates cost elements. Indeed, when these are seen as grounded in claims that themselves arise out of natural rights, we see that the consideration of the cost aspect is not only consistent with this tradition, it is in some sense inherent in it. Cost is simply shorthand for claims to compensation which ultimately rest on certain natural rights. While the perspective of natural rights is new to the Enlightenment thinkers, as Barry Gordon and I have shown, Pufendorf is simply carrying on the just-price tradition of the scholastics. Analytically, the threads of the theory, subjective utility, scarcity, and cost, are not woven together into a coherent theory of the market mechanism. This may be due to some extent to the philosophical frame of reference of the analysis. The market is viewed not as an impersonal mechanism, but as a social phenomenon embedded in a structure of property rights and legal restrictions. To the extent that these serve the common good, they have the sanction of natural law behind them. As I will argue below, Smith was able to successfully treat the market analytically as a mechanism without jettisoning the philosophical framework of natural law and natural rights. In this sense, then, he can be seen as furthering this tradition, not ending it.
II. FRANCIS HUTCHESON
Francis Hutcheson explicitly acknowledges his debt to Pufendorf's De Officio Hominis in the preface to his Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1747), thus showing the filiation of ideas from the Protestant natural lawyers to Smith. However, it is worth pointing out the important role of Gershom Carmichael in transmitting the natural jurisprudence tradition to the Scottish universities. As James Moore and Michael Silverthorne state:
It was … the notes and supplements which Carmichael appended to the text, and which Hutcheson considered of more value than the text itself, which supplied many of the moral and political ideas that lie behind numerous treatises, tracts and lectures on jurisprudence which were to prove such a fecund source of speculation on human nature and society in eighteenth-century Scotland (1983, p. 74).
Thus it was through Carmicheal that Francis Hutcheson was introduced to the works of Pufendorf, and “it was Gershom Carmichael's function to implant the Aristotle-Grotius-Pufendorf value tradition in the mind of Hutcheson” (Taylor Reference Taylor1955, p. 255).
Nearly identical statements of Hutcheson's account of value and price are found in the System of Moral Philosophy and in the Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy. Both are structured in terms of the natural law tradition. Included are chapters on “Of Values of Goods and of Coin,” and on “Of Several Sorts of Contracts.” Probably because of Carmichael's elaboration of Pufendorf, Hutcheson is no mere reporter of his celebrated predecessor, and there are distinctive features in his discussion of economic issues. Hutcheson explicitly employs the term “demand,” and he gives equal weight to demand and supply in price determination. He writes that “the prices of things will be in a compound proportion of the demand for them, and the difficulty in acquiring them. The demand will be in proportion to the numbers who are wanting them, or their necessity to life. The difficulty may be occasioned many ways” (1969, p. 209). Hutcheson's elaboration of the supply side, that is, “difficulty,” is of special interest, because he places emphasis on the relevance of the amount of labor expended. Hutcheson states:
The difficulty may be occasioned many ways; if the quantities of them in the world may be small; if any accidents make the quantity less than ordinary; if much toil is required in producing them, or much ingenuity, or a more elegant genius in the artists; if the persons employed about them according to the custom of the country are men in high account, and live in a more splendid manner; for the expense of this must be defrayed by the higher profits of their labours, and few can thus be maintained” (p. 209).
It is worth emphasizing that Hutcheson seems to view labor expended as subjective disutility in that he talks about “toil,” “ingenuity,” “genius,” and even the expense of status rather than a simple quantity of labor. Thus Skinner, in emphasizing the central role of subjective factors, explains Hutcheson's approach as resting on agents’ estimations of “the utility of the goods to be acquired and on the disutility of the effort needed to create the goods to be exchanged” (p. 120). Hutcheson goes on to underline the importance of the amount of effort expended (as compared with utility of commodities) in the determination of relative prices. He writes: “Some goods are of the highest use, yet have either no price or but a small one. If there's such plenty in nature that they are acquired almost without any labour, they have no price; if they may be acquired by easy common labour, they are of small price” (p. 210).
He also repeats much of what we saw above in Pufendorf regarding the inclusion of merchant's costs in price:
From what we said about the grounds of price, ‘tis plain that in estimating the values of goods in any place, we are not only to compute the disbursement made in buying, importing, and keeping them safe, with the interest of money thus employed: but also the pains and care of the merchant, the value of which is to be estimated according to the reputable condition in which such men live, and to be added to the other charges upon the goods. This price of the merchant's labour is the foundation of the ordinary profit of merchants
(Hutcheson Reference Hutcheson1969, p. 217).And he echoes Pufendorf's words in his list of exceptions that result in objects not having a price at all:
“Things … naturally destined for community”
“(things that) … cannot come into commerce but as appendages of something else”
“law natural or positive prohibits all buying and selling of them” (p. 210).
Note that the first two cases are clearly rooted in natural law, while the third may or may not be depending on the specific circumstances of the case.
At this point in the text Hutcheson brings up the concept of money, which is essentially beyond the scope of the present inquiry. However, he makes some observations here in his System that may be seen as having a direct bearing on Smith's treatment of real vs. nominal value. He notes that, as for any other commodity, the value of the precious metals is regulated by the interaction of demand and scarcity. However, in this case the demand is “universal” so changes in scarcity alone will cause changes in their value (1755, vol. 2, p. 57). But in common speech, when these monetary metals become more abundant and their value falls, we normally say “that the rates of labour and goods have risen” (1755, p. 58). He then goes on to suggest, in a manner similar to Smith, that in reality it is the value of the metals that has fallen; labor and goods have not changed:
But a days digging or ploughing was as uneasy to a man a thousand years ago as it is now, tho’ he could not then get so much silver for it; and a barrel of wheat, or beef, was then of the same use to support the human body, as it is now when it is exchanged for four times as much silver. Properly, the value of labour, grain, and cattle, are always pretty much the same, as they afford the same use in life, where no inventions of tillage, or pasturage, cause a greater quantity in proportion to the demand. ‘Tis the metal chiefly that has undergone the great change of value, since these metals have been in greater plenty, the value of the coin is altered tho’ it keeps the old names” (1755, p. 58).
Although Hutcheson's account has a more modern tone than Pufendorf's, it is nonetheless squarely in the Protestant Natural Law Tradition. Natural law has excluded some things from commerce, and Hutcheson's list of such things is, as we have seen, identical to Pufendorf's. Also, closely following Pufendorf, value and price theory are embedded in chapters dealing with the nature of contracts and obligations, which have been preceded by an account of the rights of property. Market phenomena are treated as embedded in social institutions, and exchange is a form of human interaction and cooperation. While Hutcheson is less obviously using a scholastic form of reasoning (he does not speak of merchants being “allowed” to recoup certain types of expenses in their price and not others), it is clear from his analysis of property rights that the claims arising out of the subjective disutility or “difficulty” are grounded in natural rights.Footnote 3
I believe this is evident in his account of property rights. He gives two reasons for their necessity. First, “Our sense of right and wrong … shews, that it must be inhuman and ill-natured, for one who can otherwise subsist by his own industry, to take by violence from another what he has acquired or improved by his innocent labours” (1747, p. 150). Seizing the fruits of another's labors without consent would offend the moral sense. Second, Hutcheson offers an explanation based on the utilitarian social implications of property rights: they stimulate industry. “Now no man would employ his labours unless he were assured of having the fruits of them at his own disposal: otherways, all the more active and diligent would be a perpetual prey, and a set of slaves, to the slothful and worthless” (1747, p. 150). Without such assurance there “can be no agreeable life” at all (1747, p. 151).
In Hutcheson's hands natural law value theory remains subjective, and the utility vs. scarcity approach is clear. However, Hutcheson, perhaps more so than any other, stresses the role of labor expended in regulating the scarcity side of the market. This does not alter the subjective nature of the value theory, as I have argued above that labor or “difficulty” should be interpreted as subjective disutility embodied in the object to be exchanged. As in the cost elements enumerated in Pufendorf, the claims for compensation for subjective disutility are grounded in the account of property rights. Thus, many of what I would consider the distinctive features of this tradition, its embedding value and price theory within a theory of property rights and the obligations associated with them, and its account of the factors determining price, are maintained in Hutcheson's account. Analytically, modern economists would recognize a rudimentary supply and demand theory in the scarcity/utility theory. However, in this tradition the normative evaluation of market processes rests not on efficiency criteria, but on the natural law of property and the just claims arising out of property rights. As such it bears more resemblance to the just price tradition of Aristotle and the Scholastics than to modern welfare economics. It also influences the development of the positive analytics by establishing a link between claims rooted in natural law and the enumeration of the factors affecting the supply price of labor and goods. To show that much the same can still be said about Smith is the subject of the next section.
III. ADAM SMITH
In this section I will argue that Smith incorporated the natural law tradition into his positive analysis of value and price, perhaps more thoroughly than commentators such as Hutchison realize. I shall also argue that even though Smith removed the analysis from its natural law home in a discourse about property rights, obligations, and contracts, his theory of property rights and justice in exchange nonetheless underpins his analysis. In particular, it is possible to argue that Smith's conception of the natural price can be seen as a sort of just price within his conception of justice, and that his focus on the cost elements, as in the case of Pufendorf and Hutcheson above, is grounded in claims that have the sanction of natural law. Lastly, I will suggest that the fundamental insight that is usually associated with Smith's economics—namely, his remarkable understanding of the market mechanism contained in the famous metaphor of the invisible hand—was actually already present in his theory of justice and property rights. Smith's economics, taken broadly, were thoroughly embedded in this tradition. The fact that the utility/scarcity approach to value theory and the institutional perspective of this tradition were lost in the era of the British Classical Economists was no part of his intention. In this I am in full agreement with Hutchison's assessment: “Therefore, that The Wealth of Nations played such an important role in establishing political economy as an independent subject is one of those felicitous, unintended and quite unplanned outcomes to which Smith himself assigned such an important, and often beneficent, role in human affairs” (Hutchison, p. 355).
For Hutchison the loss of the subjective utility/scarcity approach to value and price represents an important loss in this development. However, I will suggest that Smith did not lose sight of the subjective approach, and that a more significant loss was the separation of economics from its natural law home in moral philosophy and natural jurisprudence.
Andrew Skinner (Reference Skinner1996) has provided the most thorough and insightful account of the influence on Smith of the positive economics of the scarcity/utility theory found in the Protestant Natural Law Tradition. He makes a convincing case that Smith built on the theory he learned from Hutcheson both in his search for a measure of real value and in his analytics of relative price determination. The utility/scarcity theory of Pufendorf and Hutcheson, for example, is clearly evident in the famous diamond/water paradox. We have already seen how the basic idea of this is explicitly stated and solved in this literature. Useful things, such as water, will have little or no price because of their abundance. Skinner points out that Smith offers a two stage solution (p. 147). First, Smith explains “why two such goods have some value,” and, second why they have different values” (p. 147). Regarding the first, the point is that their utilities are qualitatively different: one, water, has a “practical” use, the other, diamonds, are beautiful (p. 147; The Wealth of Nations (WN) I.xi.c.32).
Turing to the rate of exchange Skinner notes that, “Smith introduced the second major element in the problem by observing that the rate at which the individual will exchange one good for another must be affected not only by the utility of the good to be acquired, but also by the ‘toil and trouble’ involved in creating the good to be exchanged” (p. 147).
At this point Smith relates the famous beaver and deer story to show that relative labor embodied can afford the only “rule” for exchanging the beaver and the deer in the early and rude state before land has been appropriated as property and capital accumulated. Smith did place the emphasis on the supply side, and so we are left to infer “that the rate of exchange he specified could obtain only where the perceived ratios of the utilities and disutilities are acceptable to the respective hunters” (Skinner, pp. 147–48). Skinner has thus shown very clearly that Smith did indeed operate within the natural law tradition in which rates of exchange depended upon the subjective evaluation of the goods to be received (demand or use) and the “difficulty” of acquiring the goods to be exchanged (scarcity).
This is also evident in Smith's treatment of real and nominal price. Smith's central idea was that a unit of labor could be assumed to have an invariant value. Given this, it would make sense to say that a person's real income has risen if a given quantity of his goods (giving a constant disutility embodied in the goods to be exchanged) now exchanges for a larger quantity of other goods (measured by their labor equivalent), giving a greater utility in the goods acquired. Indeed, we have already seen above that Hutcheson raised the subject of an invariant standard of value, and suggested that a unit of labor, wheat, or beef could be assumed to have invariant value, absent technical improvements.
I do not mean to imply that the Protestant natural law value and price tradition was the only influence on Smith's price theory. It was not. I do agree with Skinner, though, that Smith continued to work within this framework, especially in his first chapters on value and price. I think two conclusions are warranted at is point. First, Smith's value theory is not as “objective” as some commentators have made it out to be. I think a lot of this comes from reading Smith in the light of David Ricardo and Karl Marx. Second, the emphasis on labor embodied as a rule for exchanging goods can be seen as consistent with Hutcheson's greater emphasis on labor expended in his discussion of factors affecting the “difficulty.” In short, there was a bigger break in value theory between Smith and Ricardo than between Smith and Hutcheson.
More importantly, Smith also built on the normative framework of the Protestant Natural Law Tradition. Embedding the analysis of market processes within a property rights discourse showed that Pufendorf and Hutcheson are continuing the Aristotlian tradition of establishing the conditions for justice in exchange. As I argued above, this is evident, not only in the physical placement of economics in the text, but also in the association of the cost elements—particularly with claims grounded in natural law. While Smith changed the physical placement of the economics, I will argue that he did not thereby ignore, or leave aside, a concern for justice in exchange (or in distribution, but that is another matter). Far from leaving the natural law tradition behind, in this respect Smith was an important innovator and developer of it. I have previously argued that Smith's natural price can be viewed as a just price, given his conception of justice and its relation to his theory of the origin of property rights (Young Reference Young1986, Reference Young1997). I have also argued that Smith's component parts of price analysis can be seen as an offshoot of his theory of the origin and evolution of property rights (Young Reference Young1995, Reference Young1997). Thus, for Smith, as I argued above for Pufendorf and Hutcheson, cost elements can be seen as grounded in the just claims of property owners (including those who own only their own labor).
Time and space constraints do not permit repeating these arguments here, other than to state the conclusions. However, we might look at an aspect of this: the right to the fruits of one's labor. Recall the beaver and deer story Smith tells to explain the nature of exchange, “In that early and rude society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land” (WN I.vi.1). Just as we saw in Pufendorf and Hutcheson, things that have not been appropriated will not command a price. The legal framework must be specified because it affects price determination. Now the claim of the hunter to be rewarded for his labor—that is, to receive something in return—by implication must be based on a property right. We see this spelled out explicitly: “The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable” (WN I.x.c.12). This suggests that the fruits of one's labor would have been historically the first objects to which people attached rights of property. Thus, in the early and rude state there would be rights to the fruits of labor, but not to land or accumulated capital, and it is these rights which would be violated if exchange were not completely voluntary.
Smith also introduces the idea of “equity,” which we might fruitfully follow. In a number of places in the Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ), Smith uses terms such as “equity” and “natural equity” synonymously with a concept of natural justice. For example, “one who has been guilty of a crime frees himself from the obligation he is under to the offended person by submitting himself to the punishment which is to be inflicted on that crime, whether it be required by the law of nature and equity or by the civil law of the country” (LJ(A) ii.162; emphasis added). A similar expression appears in a discussion of the laws governing the repayment of debts: “Justice and equity plainly require that one should restore the same value as he received without regard to the nominal value of the money, and therefore he is to restore as much in the old coin or an equall value in the new as he receiv'd. But the civil government in all countries have constituted the exact contrary of this” (LJ(A) ii.80-81; emphasis added).
In addition, the prohibition under Charles II of the exportation of wool made this a capital crime. “This exportation was no crime at all, in naturall equity, and was very far from deserving so high a punishment in the eyes of the people” (LJ(A) ii.91; emphasis added). Here “equity” is defined for us as fitting the punishment to the crime in the eyes of the impartial spectator (LJ(A) ii.90). There are also “rules of Equity” by which some things—for example, wild beasts—cannot be made property (LJ(A) i.53). Lastly, “equity” is equated with “natural reason,” which is a basis for establishing a real right independently of “civil constitutions of states” (LJ(A) ii.28). In all of these cases the reference is to the operation of the impartial spectator prior to, or as a criticism of, civil government. In addition, many of these cases have in common that they are instances of retributive justice, either in a negative sense of paying evil for evil, or in a positive sense of fitting payments to the value received.
As D. D. Raphael has pointed out, Smith was one of the few to apply retributive justice to reward as well as to punishment (2001, p. 118). And it is in the former sense we find the concept of equity deployed in The Wealth of Nations, although Raphael criticizes him for neglecting it in his account of merit in Theory of Moral Sentiments (2001, p. 118). Thus, “The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompence or wages of labour” (WN I.viii.1). Similarly, in a famous passage Smith states:
Servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged (WN I.viii.36; emphasis added).
The claims of labor to a share of the product are clearly grounded in justice. This may seem obvious, but my point is that Smith explicitly uses the language of justice, “equity” and “recompence,” in this context. As I have argued elsewhere, Smith's theory of property rights extends beyond the rights of labor to its fruits (Young Reference Young1995). It also includes rights to scarce land and capital in more advanced states of society, and thus other claims arise, which Smith also recognizes as legitimate. The treatment of cost seems to have a clear natural law basis in which claims of justice underpin payments of wages, rents, and profits in commercial society.
In developing the analysis of cost in this way, Smith may not have departed so far from the tradition he inherited. Indeed, I would argue that he extended and improved it in important ways. In particular, he developed what has been called the spontaneous order theory in which the rules, conventions, and institutions that make society possible—namely, the virtue of justice—arise out of the interaction of people and their responses to their immediate sentiments. Thus, for example, in Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith shows how the virtue of justice, which is essential for the existence of society (TMS II.ii.3.3, p. 86), is originally grounded in the sentiments of resentment and retaliation. In explaining our abhorrence of murder, Smith talks about the agent's sympathy with the imagined resentment of the victim, and he then notes that: “Nature, antecedent to all reflections upon the utility of punishment, has in this manner stamped upon the human heart in the strongest and most indelible characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred and necessary law of retaliation” (TMS II.1.2.5, p. 71).
In general, Pufendorf and Hutcheson explain property and social order in terms similar to Smith's in that they all emphasize the fact that the human condition requires men to cooperate and live peaceably in society. For Pufendorf and Hutcheson, it is the common good that provides the standard for the law of nature. Thus, those practices and conventions which can be clearly seen as necessary for the social good, such as property, receive the sanction of natural law. However, they do not offer a theory of how these conventions might have actually developed, although Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense implied that these utilitarian considerations could not be the first grounds on which such rules were established. Recall the discussion above of Hutcheson's two grounds of property rights: our sense of right and wrong condemns violent seizure of what another has caught, and reflection on the utilitarian benefits to human society if each has title to the fruits of his labor. He never showed, however, how this immediate feeling might of itself lead to conventions of possession without any prior understanding of their ultimate social utility. This is what Smith did when he applied what he said about justice in Theory of Moral Sentiments, that it is grounded in feelings of resentment and retaliation, to property rights.Footnote 4
In the Lectures, Smith relates the two virtues of justice and benevolence to perfect and imperfect rights, respectively, thus linking his account explicitly to the natural law tradition of Hutcheson and Pufendorf (LJ(A) i.14). Smith separates his treatment of justice from that of property. The former is taken up in his general theory of the moral sentiments, while the latter is taken up as a category of natural rights, within the general concept of justice. Smith follows the traditional categories of occupation, accession, tradition, prescription, and succession, but his account of the origin of property falls within these categories. Smith accepts the proposition, common in the natural law writers, that scarcity is a prerequisite for property, as we see him noting, for example, that air, running water, and the sea cannot become property because “they cannot be lessened or impaired by use, nor can anyone be injured by the use of them,” but fisheries, being “not unexhaustible,” can legitimately be protected from encroachment (LJ(A) i.60, p. 63).
When Smith takes up the right of property in the Lectures, he begins by noting that Property, or dominium, is a right to a particular thing, or real right, by which “a man has the sole claim to a subject, exclusive of all others, but can use it himself as he thinks fit, and if he pleases abuse or destroy it” (LJ(A) 1.17). In taking up the origin and development of the institution of property, Smith first notes that property rights present:
the only case where the origin of naturall rights is not altogether plain … It does not at first appear evident that, e.g. any thing which may suit another as well or better than it does me, would belong to me exclusively of all others barely because I have got it into my power; as for instance, that an apple, which no doubt may be as agreeable and as useful to an other as it is to me, should be altogether appropriated to me and all others excluded from it merely because I had pulled it off the tree (LJ(A) i.25; emphasis added).
Property is a natural right, but not self-evidently so. It is not an innate idea or deducible from self-evident propositions. As in the case of the moral sentiments generally, the idea of property, or of an exclusive privilege, must first arise in the course of human experience. Smith makes this very clear with respect to a closely associated social phenomenon: “This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion” (WN I.ii.1). The principle applies to Smith's theories of justice and property.
Having thus explained acquisition of an exclusive right or privilege in an object for which another person may have a greater need, Smith goes on to discuss five ways in which a person may acquire property: occupation, tradition (that is, voluntary transfer), accession (by which minerals under the ground belong to the owner of the surface), prescription (“by which a thing that has been for a long time out of the right owner's possession and in possession of another, passes in right to the latter” (LJA i.26)), and succession (inheritance) (LJA i.25–26). Of these, occupation, “by which we get anything into our power that was not the property of another before” (LJA i.25), and accession deal with the origin of property and are the most relevant here.
In the hunting stage of society, property was only a very rudimentary concept attached to things immediately in a person's possession. In this stage, first possession or occupation is the origin of property rights. This is the right to the fruits of one's labor mentioned above. In his treatment of occupation, Smith states:
From the system I have already explain'd, you will remember that I told you we may conceive an injury was done when an impartial spectator would be of opinion he was injured, would join with him in his concern and go along with him when he defended the subject in his possession against violent attack, or used force to recover what had been thus wrongly wrested out of his hands … The spectator would justify the first possessor in defending and even in avenging himself when injured … The cause of this sympathy or concurrence betwixt the spectator and the possessor is, that he enters into his thoughts and concurs in his opinion that he may form a reasonable expectation of using the fruit or whatever it is in what manner he pleases … The reasonable expectation therefore which the first possessor furnishes is the ground on which the right of property is acquired by occupation (LJA i.36–37; LJB 150, pp. 181–82).
In this passage Smith explains that the rights people come to accord to the first possessor can be explained as an application of the theory of justice he developed in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith Reference Smith, Raphael and Macfie1976aTMS), which he taught prior to jurisprudence in his course. The spontaneous order theory developed in TMS applies equally to property rights. The right to the fruits of one's labor rests on the spectator's sympathy with the claim that expending “time and pains” (LJA i.37) creates a relation between a person and a thing such that the spectator would sympathize with the agent's resentment if the thing were taken without consent. It is the spontaneous order theory that went on to play such an important role in Smith's understanding of the market mechanism, but it was more fully spelled out in his earlier work.
IV. CONCLUSION
I hope to have shown that there was an early law and economics tradition which Smith inherited and built upon. It was a tradition in which market activity generally and value and price theory specifically were embedded in a discourse of natural rights, property rights, and obligations. While post-The Wealth of Nations, the market became increasingly analyzed as a mechanism detached from its legal and social moorings, this was not part of Smith's intention. His theory of value and price can be seen as falling within the Protestant Natural Law Tradition, both in its analytical features and in its association of cost elements with claims rooted in natural rights. Although the theory of spontaneous order has been justly associated with The Wealth of Nations, Smith actually first developed it in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and then applied it to jurisprudence. He was thus able to give a fuller, more consistent, account of justice and property rights than his predecessors. However, it still unmistakably bears the marks of the natural law tradition. Smith developed and improved the tradition. He was certainly not intending to end it.
