The Norwegian historian Finn Fuglestad condemns what he calls ‘Westernized’ African and other non-Western history. He complains that many historians of the non-West have accepted uncritically the Western definition of history that requires ‘purposive-movement’ instead of developing a new theory of history derived from their own research. He offers as an analogy of what should have been done – how historians of women developed gender theory, something that mainstream historians could not ignore in their own specializations.
Fuglestad was trained in Britain as an Africanist and wrote his first monograph about colonial Niger. It is not surprising that he devotes much of his latest book to Black (non-Muslim) Africa. This review, in contrast, foregrounds those parts of his argument most relevant to the readers of this journal. The gospel preached from Oslo has not converted this reviewer, but it is thought provoking and should be better known. Although the book was published in 2005, few libraries appear to have acquired it, so the review attempts a fair summary.
In the mid-1960s, when a specialization in African history had barely emerged, the British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper dismissed pre-colonial Africa as not worth scholarly study. He sneered that the African past consisted of nothing more memorable than ‘the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe’ (p. 10). Although mainstream historians avoided such blatant rudeness, they appear to have agreed with the curmudgeonly Trevor-Roper about historical significance. It required purposive-movement.
Fuglestad was frustrated by how African historians responded. Accepting the mainstream historians’ conception of history, they defended the study of Africa by trying to demonstrate that it had exhibited European-style purposive-movement. Not only Africanists did so, but other historians of the non-West too blundered by seeking to make the parts of the world that they study as much like Europe as possible, using European standards of what is historically significant. Fuglestad repeatedly returns to the Trevor-Roper controversy. For him it epitomizes a fatal error that cripples historical writing and makes history, arguably, an imperialist discipline. For most people outside the West, history lacked meaning until, say, the 1880s. He rejects history ‘heavily infused with originally Western values’ and repudiates the overlapping categories of purposive-movement history, evolutionary-ladder history, and ‘history as a championship [competition] between cultures and civilizations’ that reveals which were superior and which inferior (p. 138).
What makes ‘Westernized’ history Western is its sense of time as something linear. Christianity is the bedrock for Fuglestad’s West, although it also includes other revealed religions organized around linear time. Of course, this meant Judaism. It also meant Islam. Consequently, Fuglestad regards Muslims as part of the West. Unfortunately, he does not develop this argument. At one point, he contemplates putting Islam into a third category, different from both the Judeo-Christian world and the parts of the world lacking a linear sense of time.
Despite the religious bias in favour of linearism, a cyclical conception of time and an identification of change with corruption prevailed even in the West until recently. History, as we define the discipline today, began only in nineteenth-century Europe. Although Fuglestad places the development of the historical discipline late in his story, he situates the beginning of the cultural changes that made it possible surprisingly early. The Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century underlay other, more famous European turning points such as the Industrial Revolution. In 1999 and in a revised edition in 2004, Fuglestad published a Norwegian-language history of the Western world, 1347–1815, presented ‘in a global-comparative perspective’ (p. 3).
In contrast with the emphasis on economic production and trade that characterizes much recent scholarship in world history, Fuglestad looks to cultural and religious history for insights into the past. For him, sacred kingship provides the central theme for pre-colonial Africa and for most of the world. He thinks that historians are uncomfortable about incorporating the fact of religious belief into their analysis. For Europe, he takes as examples Joan of Arc and ‘heathen’ pre-Christian Norway.
Fuglestad can be represented as both Eurocentric and radically anti-Eurocentric. On the one hand, he considers the European economic and technological achievement unique and self-generated. He bluntly calls economic and technological development elsewhere as Westernization. For him, modernization is a euphemism for what happened.
On the other hand, as already indicated, he rejects what he considers ‘Europeanized’ non-Western history because it accepts Western values. This criterion produces evaluations that will raise eyebrows to the top of one’s scalp. For instance, he considers Kenneth Pomeranz’s influential Great Divergence as ‘fuelled by a Eurocentric view, in the sense that Pomeranz simply assumes that the Chinese wanted what the Europeans wanted, the only difference being that the Europeans were lucky, whereas the Chinese were not’ (p. 130). For Fuglestad, simply asking the question why did the Chinese or the Indians or the Muslims or the Africans not do what Europeans did is Eurocentrism.
He abhors the assumption that the different parts of the world are in competition with one another, that it matters, for instance, which part developed metallurgy first. He blames ‘Europeanized’ African history in part for the inferiority complex that has hindered Africa in the era of independence. By the way, he considers the Afrocentric history of Diop and Asante as ‘the most clear-cut case of “Westernized” history’. Fuglestad wants historians ‘to understand other cultures in the light of their own premises and values, etc., instead of judging them in the light of external and/or presentist standards (i.e., standards of the present time) disguised as universal ones’ (p. 93).
Fuglestad lacks enthusiasm for world or global history. It is progressively integrating Asia into what had been a European story but at the ‘rather heavy’ price of ‘the increased marginalization of the rest of the world’. As an illustration, he notes that Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank, ‘reputedly radical scholars’, virtually ignore Black Africa (p. 96).
Assessing this short, idiosyncratic book is not easy, especially for a non-Africanist. At the risk of sounding Eurocentric, I confess that I find it more provocative than persuasive.
