Does the policy process affect the quality of foreign policy decision making? A common theme of these two books is that rationality is too demanding a standard for foreign policy decision making, given lack of information and time constraints. Accordingly, the process by which policymakers search for available information, formulate alternatives, and evaluate them affects what is decided.

In Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen offer a comprehensive survey of psychological, group, domestic, and environmental factors that influence foreign policy decisions. In contrast, the focus of Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow in Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations is limited to group structures and processes, and in particular those identified in Irving Janis's Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions (1972). While Janis's theory has been enormously influential, his book has been criticized for exhibiting circular reasoning, in that Janis knew the outcome of each case and could look for corroborating evidence that groupthink was operating.

Both books adopt procedural rationality as a benchmark for evaluating the decision-making process—meaning a reasonably comprehensive survey of objectives, extensive information search, and systematic comparison of alternatives in terms of costs and benefits. The more difficult issue concerns the definition of a high-quality decision, or, in other words, substantive rationality. Rather than define the term, Schafer and Crichlow asked a panel of experts to rate the outcome of a series of decisions on their contribution to the short-term national interest and effects on international conflict.

According to Mintz and DeRouen, because human beings are incapable of meeting the rational ideal, they exhibit predictable cognitive biases and errors. These include focusing solely on short-term benefits, locking in on one alternative, wishful thinking, relying on past experience, focusing on a narrow range of policy options, groupthink, overconfidence, ignoring critical information, and focusing on only part of the decision. These biases are, for the most part, taken from the applied decision-making literature, rather than from cognitive psychology. There is no mention, for example, of the availability and representativeness heuristics that are central to the judgment and decision-making literature in psychology. (For a seminal work, see Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 1982.)

Limits on human cognitive capacities also lead to inadequate analysis of alternatives. To simplify, decision makers use noncompensatory decision rules, which eliminate alternatives that fail to meet a threshold on a particular dimension, whereas rationality entails evaluating each alternative on all dimensions and summing up the result, so that a high score on one dimension may compensate for a lower score on another. Without fully examining each option, policymakers may fail to choose the alternative that is best overall.

Mintz and DeRouen present six decision-making models: rational actor, bureaucratic politics, organizational politics, prospect theory, poliheuristic models, and cybernetic models. New to most readers is the poliheuristic model, based on experimental research carried out by Mintz and his colleagues (see, e.g., Alex Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 [February 2004]: 3–13). In the poliheuristic model, the policymaker in the first stage excludes a decision alternative because it does not meet a threshold on some critical dimension, usually domestic political viability, but then makes a rational calculation of costs and benefits of alternatives in the second stage (pp. 78–79). Mintz and DeRouen illustrate the models by using each in case studies of the 1991 U.S. decision not to overthrow Saddam Hussein and the 2003 U.S. decision to invade Iraq. This is a useful heuristic device for students. Omitted is any discussion of how the decision-making models relate to each other. Are they complementary, focusing on different aspects of the decision process, or competing? Are there any guidelines for use of one model rather than another?

While the decision-making models of Mintz and DeRouen largely concern individuals, Schafer and Crichlow investigate the impact of group structures and processes on the quality of decisions, using case studies to identify causal factors and statistical analysis of a larger set of cases to determine their representativeness. They hypothesize that the leader's personality traits affect the management of information by groups (see Margaret Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” International Studies Review 3 [Summer 2001]: 47–82).

Schafer and Crichlow provide well-written and thoroughly researched case studies of four low-quality decisions and three high-quality decisions in the Carter, Ronald Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations, including Reagan's decision to fund the Contras and Bush's 2002 decision to impose steel tariffs, as well as the Carter administration's decision not to intervene in the Ogaden crisis and the Clinton administration's handling of the 1999 Kargil conflict over Kashmir. Each case is scored on variables related to leader traits, group structural flaws, and symptoms of defective decision making. They supplement qualitative methods with statistical analysis of 39 U.S. and some Israeli decisions, using the same methodology whereby they rate the independent variables and experts rate the outcome of the decision. The authors found that the individual-level variable of distrust contributed most to structural flaws in the decision-making process and to international conflict, but their explanation of this finding is not well developed (pp. 201, 205–6). Schafer and Crichlow conclude that the group structural faults identified by Janis, such as insulation of the group, lack of methodical procedures, gatekeepers, and illusion of vulnerability, do have a detrimental impact on the quality of decisions, but that Janis's explanation in terms of concurrence seeking brought about by group cohesiveness and stress does not seem to be valid.

Both books maintain that the decision process preceding the 2003 war against Iraq was deeply flawed. Mintz and DeRouen assert that there was biased processing of alternatives, overconfidence in the U.S. ability to defeat the Iraqis, wishful thinking about the U.S. ability to build democracy in Iraq, and groupthink as reflected in lack of opposition to President Bush. They argue that the poliheuristic model best explains the decision to go to war against Iraq in that President Bush excluded the option of pursuing terrorists without full-scale use of force because it was not “visible” enough for U.S. public opinion, which favored continuing the “war on terror.” In contrast, Schafer and Crichlow attribute the Iraq war decision to the lack of methodical decision-making procedures, insulation of Bush and his advisers from expert advice, and an absence of teamwork. The question is whether a group level of analysis is applicable given the lack of full-scale meetings to debate the decision. Instead, the decision to go to war seems to have been made by President Bush, largely acting alone. It is possible that Bush would have made the same decision even if he had received a more thorough and objective briefing of the prospective risks and costs, given his strong predispositions and propensity to rely on his “gut.”

In addition to evaluating the process, it is also necessary to consider the outcome. The notion of “bias” implies a rational baseline from which to identify deviations. While it is easy to establish rational guidelines in the laboratory, it is more problematic for real-world decisions. Such concepts as “overconfidence” and “wishful thinking” are difficult to operationalize. How do we know what is the appropriate level of confidence without falling victim to hindsight? Some psychologists have questioned whether heuristics should be termed “biases.” Under uncertainty and complexity, heuristics and decision rules may lead to better decisions than a futile effort at comprehensive rationality (see, for example, Gerd Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty, 2008).

Both books rely on secondary sources and memoirs to study the decision-making process. Secondary sources are written with knowledge of the outcome, so that the author's selection of evidence may be influenced by the desire to explain why the decision turned out as it did. There is a tendency in secondary accounts to overrationalize the decision process, to make it seem less messy and disorganized. This criticism applies more to Schafer and Crichlow, since they are trying to build theory. In Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision Making, it would have been useful to have at least one case study of group decision making that drew on minutes of meetings or personal memoranda. But in Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, Mintz and DeRouen could also have looked for documentary evidence illustrating the poliheuristic model, showing that a leader excluded an option for domestic political reasons. As it is, we have no way of knowing whether Bush decided to invade Iraq for domestic political reasons or because he had strong beliefs or schemas about the best means of eradicating terrorism or wanted to outdo his father, President George H. W. Bush.

The two books could be used within the same class to provide a complementary view of the decision process from different levels of analysis. The volume by Mintz and DeRouen provides a concise synthesis of a large body of research on foreign policy decision making. It also adds a useful domestic political perspective by adducing evidence on the influence of the electoral cycle and the marketing of decisions to the public through framing. They supply interesting illustrations from decision making in various countries other than the United States, such as Israel, New Zealand, Cuba, and Britain. Noteworthy is a series of case studies showing how U.S. and Cuban decision makers used historical analogies from their previous interaction, with often disastrous results.

Schafer and Crichlow present a highly readable and engaging account of group decision structures and processes that distills more than 30 years of research on group decisions. Their case studies from the Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and Bush administrations would be of value to practitioners and academics because they highlight methods of managing the policy process that are under policymakers' control and might improve the quality of decisions.