Iraqis are still perplexed at how Saddam Hussein, one of the twentieth century's most ruthless dictators, was able to maintain power for 35 years. Although the exact numbers will never be known, Saddam's forces are estimated to have killed between 2 and 3 million Iraqis, perhaps as much as 15% of the population. Even today, mass graves continue to be discovered throughout the country. In addition to liquidating a large percentage of the population, the Ba'thist regime initiated two disastrous wars, the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War. What explains Ba'thist policies and the thought processes and motivations behind the regime's behavior, especially those of the ultimate decision maker, Saddam Hussein?
In this well-written and extensively researched volume, Joseph Sassoon attempts to answer these questions. Having analyzed a large amount of documents and audio tapes seized after the Gulf War and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, he provides critical insights into the functioning of the Ba'thist party and regime. Deftly analyzing the party's internal structure, intelligence organizations, and relationship with the military, as well as Saddam's personality cult, patterns of control and resistance, and bureaucracy and civil life under the Ba'th, the author weaves a fascinating narrative of social control and repression.
What do these extensive archives tell about the Ba'th Party? First, it built a well-oiled political machine that documented its members' every move. The Ba'th maintained a firm grip on power by ruthlessly eliminating anyone seen as a threat or suspected of disloyalty. While it was efficient in controlling party members' behavior, the author demonstrates the highly irrational side of a would-be totalitarian regime. Enormous amounts of energy were devoted to social control that could have been channeled into more productive activities, such as development projects.
The author's analysis of Iraq's intelligence agencies is fascinating. Many security services were not created by the Ba'th but much earlier in the twentieth century under the Hashimite monarchy (1921–58). Not only did the multiple security services monitor Iraqis both inside and outside Iraq, but they monitored each other as well. Designed to create a sense of fear, insecurity, and unpredictability, the security apparatus was central to the Ba'th Party's ability to control Iraq for such a lengthy period of time.
From earlier studies in English and Arabic, the broad contours of Ba'thist oppression are well known. However, the Ba'th Party's inner workings have never been documented in such minute detail or analyzed with such depth. The party's excessive concern with its members' loyalty and its extensive surveillance of the Iraqi populace is chilling. In light of Iraq's tradition of coups d'état (having experienced the Arab world's first military coup in 1936), it is well known that the party infiltrated the army to prevent such a recurrence.
Still, the Ba'th Party was not always the paragon of efficiency as portrayed by its enemies. For example, when I first arrived in Baghdad in May 1980 for a two-month research visit, no official was present to meet me at the airport. Neither was any government representative present on a subsequent trip. On both occasions, hours of telephone calls to Iraq's United Nations Mission were required to ascertain who I was and why I was in Baghdad.
This study's great strength is its extensive analysis of the Ba'th Party's inner workings. Its weakness is the failure to situate the party in a larger sociopolitical, cultural, and economic context, especially problematic for readers who are not specialists in Middle East politics.
First, this reader would have liked more information on the attitudes, motivations, and behavior of ordinary Ba'th Party members. Such information, amply available in the archives the author studied, would have given the regime a more human face. Although the author offers a depiction of a party member named Muhammad (pp. 57–61), additional examples would have provided more insights into the motivations of Ba'th Party members. Many Iraqis joined the party not out of duress but to benefit their careers or to gain employment. The ability to differentiate among true believers, opportunists, and those forced to join the Ba'th Party against their will would have addressed the question raised earlier, namely, how the party was able to remain in power for 35 years.
Second, Ba'thism, the regime's core ideology, is never defined. In countless Iraqi bookstores I visited during the 1980s, classic Ba'thist texts lay in corners gathering dust. Never did I hear Iraqi intellectuals or party officials discuss the substance of Ba'thist ideology. Indeed, one of the Ba'thist regime's weaknesses was its lack of ideological consistency. The regime's emphasis on Pan-Arabism during the 1970s changed to a thinly veiled anti-Shiite sectarianism during the 1980s when it confronted the Islamic Republic in neighboring Iran. During the 1990s, it emphasized religion and tribalism following the massive uprising (Intifada) of March 1991. In light of Ba'thism's thin ideological veneer, what social and political glue held the party together?
Between 1968 and 1973, the party was too concerned with internal power struggles to develop a coherent ideology beyond its strident anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist rhetoric. In 1973, the ideological waters were muddied when the party formed a national front with its historic nemesis, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). However, this move was largely vitiated by a shift to the right, especially evident in a change in economic policy, at the Eighth Party Congress in 1974.
How did the party mobilize its members when its ideology and policies were constantly in flux? The author says little about what Iraqi sociologist Faleh Jabar calls the “family party state” (dawlat hizb al-usra), namely, the clan and tribal structure that populated the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy and security apparatus. This tribal network was key to Saddam's ability to thoroughly dominate the party and the state. By 2003, the author argues, Saddam had built a “shadow state” in which he and a small group of trusted advisers were making all major political decisions. While an excellent insight, how did this “shadow state” reflect clan and tribal connections?
Third, the study fails to explain how the Ba'th was able to solidify its power, especially when there were only a few hundred party members in Iraq during the late 1960s. Regime consolidation requires an analysis of Iraq's political economy during the 1970s, which was driven by the twentyfold increase in oil revenues between 1972 and 1980, from $1 billion to $26.1 billion.
While oil is briefly discussed (pp. 238–39), the author fails to account for the critical role it played in enabling the Ba'th Party to consolidate its rule. Oil wealth allowed Saddam to purchase the best repressive security system money could buy, as well as to co-opt large segments of the middle and professional classes. He used oil wealth to create a massive indoctrination project called the Project for the Rewriting of History. Unlike prior regimes, the Ba'th was able to exploit the massive increase in oil revenues to institutionalize its power between 1972 and 1980.
Fourth, the book's “presentism” neglects a diachronic analysis that would explain how the Ba'th Party was able to seize power. Clearly, the party and the regime it created did not emerge fully formed. Yet this book is unclear as to how the party acquired its repressive power and was able to dominate Iraqi society. The profound political instability that followed the July 1958 Revolution, which overthrew the Hashimite monarchy, facilitated the party's seizure of power in July 1968. The constant coups and countercoups throughout the 1960s, culminating in the Iraqi army's dismal performance in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, led many Iraqis to welcome the strong leadership provided by the new regime.
The author also neglects the highly contentious identity politics of the pre-1968 period, which pitted Pan-Arabists against local “Iraqist” nationalists. While the former sought to make Iraq part of a larger Arab state, the latter's vision of Iraq was a social democratic state that would celebrate the country's ethnoconfessional diversity. While the Sunni Arab minority, especially army officers, supported Pan-Arabism, the majority of Iraqis supported the democratically inclined nationalist movement, whose origins extended back to the 1920s. To ignore Iraq's identity politics is a failure to comprehend the dynamics that shaped Iraqi politics prior to the 1968 Ba'thist coup, and which continue to shape Iraqi politics today.
Finally, Sassoon offers excellent comparisons between the Ba'th Party and other single-party authoritarian states throughout his book. However, such comparisons would have been much more effective if presented in a structured fashion in the concluding chapter.
A number of shortcomings notwithstanding, Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party will remain the definitive study of Iraq's Arab Socialist Ba'th Party for the foreseeable future. As the Arab world confronts the demands for democratization articulated by the Arab Spring, we need more knowledge of the impediments to democratization in the Middle East. In helping us better understand the dynamics of authoritarian rule under the Ba'th Party, Sassoon has provided such knowledge in this insightful and timely study.
