Religious participation skyrocketed in many Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, enabled in part by Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost, which had eased the radical anti-religion policy of the Soviet Union. However, this resurgence of religious consciousness and institutions had already emerged as early as the 1980s in countries such as Poland, where the Catholic Church was traditionally strong. Religious traditions in Eastern Europe had resisted pre-Gorbachev policy, which unsuccessfully sought to eradicate religious consciousness and to promote in its place a fully secular socialism. From the beginning of the Soviet Union the Bolsheviks thought of socialism as rational and science-based and therefore promoted the application of science and technology to the project of creating a secular socialist society. Though Stalin pursued a rigid policy of secularization, Communist leaders and educators realized after his death that religious traditions persisted among the population. By the late 1960s and the 1970s it was generally understood by Communist politicians that religion was a power that had to be taken seriously and should be investigated scientifically. This was the moment when sociology and the psychology of religion became more popular topics of research. This volume seeks to elucidate this incomplete project of secularization through an investigation of the relationships among science, religion and Communism in the Soviet Union and its satellites before and during the Cold War.
Though one might assume that this is a widely researched topic, Cold War historiography has paid scant attention to the role and power of religion, despite the fact that ‘religion was fundamental to the Cold War from the very beginning across the Cold War divide’ (p. 277). In fact, as the Soviets sought to radically secularize their state after 1945, the protection of Christian belief became central to the anti-communist policies of Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. The lack of research on this topic is even more surprising because, according to contributor Catriona Kelly, the fact that ‘religious belief and practice, and ideologies of secularisation, have interacted and transformed each other over the last 250 and more years is now the informed consensus among sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and historians’ (p. 228).
The eleven chapters of this volume present highly original research covering the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, in the process making two valuable interventions. First, in contrast to the previous literature on this topic, the chapters focus less on state repression, on collaboration between churches and the respective regimes, or on the role of religion in fostering political resistance, and more on the experience of believers and the agency of individuals engaged with either religious movements or anti-religious policy. Second, this volume focuses on the role of science and scholarship in anti-religious policy in the Eastern bloc, the most neglected area of research.
Jim Bjork opens the volume with an essay on ‘Social science and Polish debates about secularization in the 1960s and 1970s’. According to Bjork, three ideological backgrounds determined the direction of Polish social scientists’ investigations: Marxism, Catholicism and nationalism, which mediated between a Marxist world view and Catholic consciousness. Although there was much disagreement among social scientists in the 1960s and 1970s about how far modernization forwarded de-Christianization, Bjork shows that both clerical and secular scholars tended to work within the broad framework of secularization theory. Polish scholars thought of traditional rural communities as inherently religious and modern urban life as corrosive of religious belief. In Yugoslavia, by contrast, social scientists employed empirical sociological methods more intensively. As Patrick Hyder Patterson demonstrates in his chapter on Yugoslavia and Hungary, Yugoslavian social scientists explicitly referred to Western methods and theories in investigating religious traditions and consciousness. The application of Western sociology was much more established in Yugoslavia, where sociologists were allowed to distance themselves from orthodox Marxist theory more than scientists could in Hungary.
Zsuzsánna Magdó sheds light on the development of a new generation of specialized atheists and researchers in Romania in the course of Nicolae Ceauşescu's programme to transform the spiritual lives of socialist citizens during the 1960s and 1970s. Magdó shows for Romania, and James T. Andrews for the Soviet Union, that Communist functionaries considered the eradication of religious consciousness to be an impossible task. Instead they intended to replace religion with a secular science-based belief system thought of as a socialist spiritual culture in Romania, and a znanie (knowledge) society in the USSR.
Heléna Tóth argues in her chapter on socialist rites of passage in Hungary that the process of translating the atheist state ideology into everyday practice largely failed, because ‘everyday socialist culture rarely received the institutional support the official rhetoric suggested’ (p. 202). Felix Robin Schulz's chapter on thanatology in East Germany makes a similar argument. In Schulz's view, East German thanatology, characterized by scientific materialism, struggled with the nature of tragic or lonely death, for which Marxism could not offer any solution.
Asif Siddiqi demonstrates in his chapter on Russian cosmism that science was not necessarily opposed to belief systems such as mysticism. The Russian cult of science and technology that was inspired by writers such as Jules Verne, Camille Flammarion and H.G. Wells became enormously popular after the launch of sputnik in 1957. Monica Black's chapter focuses on two representatives of the GDR's and the FRG's fight against superstition and occultism, Otto Prokop and Johann Kruse. Black demonstrates that despite differences in their ideological backgrounds, these scientists cooperated and developed similar ideas about how to educate the public.
Catriona Kelly investigates churches as architectural heritage in Leningrad, demonstrating that conservators of churches represented an influential group of professionals who rejected early Soviet propaganda against religious architecture and, at the same time, took a theological attitude towards the Church. In an opposite vein, Igor J. Polianski's chapter concentrates on anti-religious museums in the Soviet Union. According to Polianski, museums of atheism were characteristic landmarks in every major city of the USSR until the 1980s. Whereas in the 1920s the main concern of anti-religious museums had been to desacralize sacred ideas, so-called ‘positive atheism’ was decisive for Soviet policy in the 1970s. With this policy, the Soviets intended to offer a secular substitute for religion.
In the final chapter Paul Betts uses the 1949 Cardinal Mindszenty show trial to demonstrate how deeply politics in Eastern and Western Europe were entangled during the early Cold War. According to Betts, the trial played an important role in the creation of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, which was closely bound with the moral reconstruction of Christian, democratic Western Europe. The case of Mindszenty helped ‘forge the intimate relationship between human rights and anti-communism’ (p. 294).
The shared narrative of this volume's chapters that the more Communists dictated to scientists and scholars how to interpret their research, the less valuable that research turned out to be – as was the case during Stalin's reign – is highly biased. Historical materialism appears in many chapters of this volume as a world view (though science-based) and not as a truly epistemological concept, whereas Western empirical social science and functional–structural theory are treated as scientific instruments in service to countering ideology. But the Western, and particularly the American, system of science and scholarship referring to Mertonian norms (communitarianism, universalism, disinterestedness and organized scepticism) arguably was highly ideological, as a result of an anti-totalitarian mindset developed during the Second World War and the early Cold War. Further research will have to tackle this question and investigate from a historical–epistemological perspective not only the relationships among science, religion and Communism, but also the interlinkages between knowledge and ideology on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
