It is undeniable that the Asian states, which largely represent a distinct oriental culture and vision, have actively participated in the universalization of international law. This is particularly so in international investment law [IIL], and the time may be ripe for an analysis of the general approach of Asian states to the development of this important area of law. This edited volume fills this gap by presenting a comprehensive review of the practice of international investment treaties in the Asian region. Both editors of the volume are IIL experts well versed in Asia through years of teaching and research in the region.

Part I sets out the key question of enquiry: whether and to what extent Asia has become a “rule-maker” instead of a “rule-taker” in contemporary IIL. The ensuing two chapters present an econometric analysis and a case-study of Thailand, which revealed no obvious correlation between investor state dispute settlement [ISDS] backed investment treaties and the inflow of foreign direct investment. Part II provides for individual studies on Southeast Asian states (and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] as a whole), indicating that certain small, capital-importing economies such as Vietnam and Cambodia remain rule-takers in their investment treaties. Meanwhile, other states, such as Thailand and Indonesia, have proactively sought to achieve their interests through investment treaties by adopting a more cautious and conservative approach to preserve their sovereign regulatory space (typical in an “ASEAN way” to investment law). Part III addresses the so-called “middle powers” and “big players” in Asia, including New Zealand, Australia, Korea, Japan, China, and India. For these states, which are largely both capital-importing and capital-exporting countries, the balance between the sovereign regulatory space and investors’ interests has great significance. In this sense, they constitute both rule-takers and rule-makers, by delicately negotiating safeguard provisions such as non-precluded measures and self-judging provisions while not lowering the standard of treatment for investors. India may be an exception in that its new Model Bilateral Investment Treaty tilts heavily towards the host state.

The survey has indicated that a significant number of Asian states are, to different extents, rule-makers. This proved the limitation of Poulsen's theory that Asian states tend to be rule-takers following Western treaty templates due to the so-called status quo bias.Footnote ¹ This volume makes a valuable contribution by telling this story from an Asian perspective, which is helpful in making the IIL project more inclusive. This is also evidence of Asia's growing confidence towards international law. However, ultimately the real question may not be whether Asian states are rule-makers or rule-takers, but how Asian states are prone to writing their investment treaties. The ISDS system will not be sustainable if the treaty is either overly pro-state or pro-investor. Asian states need to carefully weigh the benefits and costs of ISDS according to their particular circumstances, enabling them to make informed decisions. This is highly hopeful, given the growing sophistication of Asian states’ participation in IIL.