CSOS’ ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY

Civil society's role in a transition may hinge on its evolving organisational capacity and environment. More specifically, CSOs’ sway may depend on their structures, finances, networks, cohesion, legal environment and exposure to state repression. Zimbabwe's civil society experienced a mushrooming of secular non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and faith-based groups starting from the 1990s, so that by 2012, some 4,000 CSOs were operating in the country. Civil society's organisational capacity and clout peaked in the late 1990s, when a civic front challenged the ZANU-PF regime, drove a constitutional reform movement and launched the MDC. Although churches showed resilience, CSOs’ organisational strength subsequently declined due to the economic crisis and repression (Sachikonye Reference Sachikonye2012: 137–43; Chiroro Reference Chiroro and Raftopoulos2013: 118).

When the GPA was concluded, the oppositional Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which in the 1990s had constituted the most formidably organised CSO and counted 200,000 subscribers, had lost half of its membership owing to the economic crisis; a trend that could not be reversed in the GPA-period (Moyo 2013 int.; Raftopoulos Reference Raftopoulos2002: 272). Although formally employed workers stayed highly unionised and the introduction of a multi-currency system in 2009 halted hyperinflation that had eroded subscriptions, the loss of revenues compromised the union's functioning. Unable to sustain itself, the ZCTU relied on the support of mostly Scandinavian trade unions throughout the transition (Matombo 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.).

International partnerships also improved the ZCTU's political leverage. The ZCTU received support from African counterparts and, most importantly, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU was instrumental in profiling the ZCTU as Zimbabwe's official labour congress and gave credence to its campaign for democratic rights. According to ZCTU leaders, COSATU played a key role in lobbying the African National Congress (ANC) government, for instance when calling on President Jacob Zuma's mediation team to insist on the GPA's full implementation (Matombo 2013, int.; Moyo 2013, int.) Previously, COSATU's solidarity with its Zimbabwean counterpart had found expression in protest against repression in Zimbabwe and President Thabo Mbeki's policy of quiet diplomacy. In 2008, Durban harbour workers refused to unload a Chinese arms shipment to Zimbabwe (Nathan Reference Nathan2012: 81). The ZCTU also found support within the International Labour Organisation (ILO), whose commission of inquiry found in 2009 that Zimbabwean workers’ human rights were systematically violated (Matombo 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.).

Labour's clout was further reduced by a lack of cohesion. In the crisis, the formation of the ZANU-PF affiliated Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions and the departure of the Commercial Workers Union from the ZCTU had already triggered divisions and a wrangling over leadership positions (Gwavava 2013 int.; Kanyenze 2013 int.). The infighting intensified in the GPA period as the incumbent ZCTU leadership refused to concede defeat in the 2011 elective congress. The dispute resulted in the formation of two factions purporting to constitute the official ZCTU and the realignment of affiliated unions into two camps (Kanyenze 2013 int.; Khumalo 2013 int.). Whereas the infighting did not overly affect the ZCTU's bureaucratic capacity, the perception of disunity weakened its influence. The split not only upset the ZCTU's international partnerships, but strained relations with the MDC-T, its Minister of Labour and representatives of the losing faction in the party (Kanyenze 2013, int.; Matombo 2013 int.; Mpariwa 2013 int.). The split also affected the way labour engaged in the GPA process, as reflected by the divergent positions the factions took vis-à-vis the constitutional reform (Mwonzora 2013 int.).

As far as the legal environment and repression were concerned, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) that curtailed the freedom of assembly did not apply to trade unions. In the crisis, police nevertheless used POSA to curb unions’ anti-government protests. An amended version of POSA that affected CSOs in general remained in place throughout the GPA-period as MDC-T parliamentarians’ efforts to alleviate the Act proved unsuccessful. The ZCTU's rallying capacity was not only limited by the above constraints, but after its political ally, the MDC-T, entered government, the ZCTU largely refrained from staging protests (Kanyenze 2013 int.; Matombo 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.). In sum, labour's organisational strength further declined during the transition owing to a loss of members, dwindling revenues and lack of cohesion that diminished its political influence.

The democratic deficits and rights violations in the crisis were paralleled by the formation of advocacy groups and a recalibration of platforms to tackle these issues. Organisational constraints to a varying degree affected these groups’ ability to influence the GPA process. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), which had led the 1990s’ constitutional reform movement, was forced to dismiss its staff and limited to its Harare office. NCA cadres blamed the withdrawal of international donor assistance due to the NCA's opposition to the COPAC process rather than the lack of popular support for its position for the collapse of its structures (Chivasa 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; McCandless Reference McCandless2012: 47). The Bulawayo-based gender and human rights organisation Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) equally suffered funding restraints after the withdrawal of donors who presumably no longer condoned its confrontational protest strategy in the context of power-sharing. According to WOZA-leader Jenni Williams (2013 int.), the grassroots organisation nevertheless maintained effective structures allowing it to mobilise members for mass action.

Although their structures were affected by the economic crisis, civic platforms that accepted the GPA such as Bulawayo Agenda (BA), Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (Crisis), National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) sustained or enhanced their operational capacity owing to the continued support from development agencies, small non-governmental foundations and membership fees (Chisi 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.). BA and Crisis could improve their research capacity to respond to the GPA and, in part due to donor's demands for measurable results, professionalised their operations. Whilst the reliance on professionals diminished grassroots activism in these organisations, the dependence on donor support exposed CSOs to accusations of being western agents (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.).

Transnational partnerships other than with donors were an important means for the advocacy groups to amplify their messages. Owing to an informal division of labour amongst CSOs, Crisis in particular sought to institutionalise relations with human rights groups, media and foreign government representatives in the pivotal SADC region, across Africa and the West (Lewanika 2013 int.). The ZLHR that let global NGOs communicate matters it could not raise for security reasons also liaised with interstate organisations such as the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and made submissions to the UN Human Rights Council (Chimbgwa 2013 int.). Whilst NANGO prioritised humanitarian organisations due to its developmental focus, it served as a civic interface for the Kimberley Process and SADC Council of NGOs (Chisi 2013 int.).

Broad alliances among CSOs, such as the Save Zimbabwe platform, were pivotal to boost the democratic movement's clout in the crisis. In the transition, relations among civic umbrellas and their institutional members were strained over the strategic challenges posed by the GPA, especially in the case of the NCA that ran into conflict with allies over its rejection of COPAC (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.). WOZA withdrew from most networks as, according to Williams (int. 3013), relations soured over partisanship; attempts to co-opt WOZA, a lack of consultation; WOZA's marginalisation due to its radicalism; class divisions; and the divide between Harare and Bulawayo-based CSOs. NANGO's self-ascribed intermediary role between the state and civil society, meanwhile, was imperilled by the polarisation between member organisations from rival political camps (Chisi 2013 int.).

Despite tensions in the democratic movement, BA, Crisis and ZLHR, which fulfilled vital functions for each other, sought to maintain healthy relations with partners and find a coordinated response to the GPA (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.). ZLHR took on a coordinating role in the Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM), a network of 40 CSOs that was launched in response to JOMIC's lack of independence and designed to observe the power-sharing parties’ adherence to the GPA. In spite of methodological problems, CISOMM covered most aspects and produced reports that offered alternative views on the GPA's implementation (Chiroro Reference Chiroro and Raftopoulos2013: 131; Hofisi 2013 int.).

The advocacy groups’ operative space was to a varying degree constrained by state repression. Although the situation remained tense in the GPA's first months, most groups noticed a significant drop in crude repression including arrests, raids and disrupted activities. However, the improvements were deemed cosmetic as the authorities still seemed determined to limit civic space and relied on legal means instead. Public meetings were denied police clearance or surveilled by the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). Provincial authorities banned CSOs and efforts were made to introduce a regulatory NGO-bureau (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Chisi 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Hofisi 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.). WOZA did not experience any improvement as its activists, who vociferously protested against the GPA talks, continued to be detained (Williams 2013 int.).

Churches played a significant but ambiguous role in political struggles throughout Zimbabwe's history. By 2008, the religious sector entailed a myriad of confessional groups and ecumenical networks (Dorman Reference Dorman2002: 77–80; Chitando Reference Chitando2011: 43). The discussion focuses on the major umbrella organisations through which Christian groups engaged in politics, including the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC), Union for the Development of Apostolic Churches in Zimbabwe Africa (UDACIZA) and Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA).

The networks were to a varying degree affected by organisational constraints. Whereas the EFZ and UDACIZA remained strong grassroots organisations with a large membership, the ZCBC and ZCC maintained structures designed to promote issues of peace-building, human rights and governance. Owing to the professionalised Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the ZCC's Peace and Advocacy Unit, the churches commanded considerable research capacity and expertise (Dorman Reference Dorman2002: 81–5; Shana 2013 int.; Tsvakai 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.). The ZCA, which launched in 2006 as an ecumenical advocacy group with a substantive bureaucratic apparatus, transformed into a volunteer organisation due to financial constraints. The advocacy work of all networks profited from churches’ existing structures that allowed mobilising people with little additional resources (Sibanda 2013 int.).

As the networks depended on contributions from both congregations and international sister organisations, the crisis affected their ability to pursue activities to promote democratisation. Whilst the EFZ and ZCC recovered in the GPA despite continued financial constraints, the ZCBCs’ operations remained solid thanks to worldwide resources of the Catholic Church. (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Tsvakai 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.) According to Sara Dorman (Reference Dorman2002: 91), in the previous dispensation, the reliance on external funding fostered the pursuit of governance and human rights programmes and, thus, influenced church-NGOs’ approach towards the state. Owing to strong links to international churches, Ezra Chitando (Reference Chitando2011: 46) notes that the EFZ, ZCC and ZCBC helped keep international attention on the crisis, but were suspected of promoting regime change. The more activist ZCA established a branch in Britain and lobbied the global community through platforms such as the International Council of Churches (Sibanda 2013 int.).

Domestically, the churches were instrumental in launching secular advocacy groups during the crisis, but soon took distance from overtly politicised CSOs. In 2005, the EFZ, ZCC and ZCBC launched the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD) platform that henceforth served as the principal channel to develop a common agenda and engage the political parties, Inclusive Government and SADC-mediators (Shana 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.). In Chitando & Togarasei's (Reference Chitando and Togarasei2010: 160) analysis, previous to the GPA, the ZHOCD lacked visibility and unity. In the longer term, ZHOCD leaders were convinced that the platform joined by UDACIZA was instrumental in building concordance among the churches (Shana 2013 int.; Tsvakai 2013 int.).

Divisions amongst churches over their approach to the crisis were reflected in the tensions between the ZCA, which demanded a robust stance towards the regime, and the ZHOCD-umbrellas that sought a mediatory role (Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.). Yet, in response to the GPA's failure to establish an inclusive transitional justice mechanism, in 2009, the ZCA, ZHOCD and secular CSOs jointly set up the Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF) to draw up a template for a national healing and reconciliation programme. The CCSF was jointly governed by its members, administered by NANGO and served as an interface between civil society and the government's ONHRI (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.).

Divisions in churches and umbrellas nevertheless remained a major constraint. A rift between clerics who shared ZANU-PF's preoccupation with the country's hard-won sovereignty and a younger generation that prioritised the democratic concerns and launched the ZCA in part explained the guarded response to the governance crisis by the umbrellas that sought to avert a schism (Zwana 2013 int.). Whilst according to church representatives, these divisions had eased in the ZFC by the time of the GPA and never affected the ZCBC's institutions, in 2010, UDACIZA suffered the breakaway of the ZANU-PF-aligned Apostolic Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ) (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Tsvakai 2013 int.).

Although churches had always been quite free to operate, the ZHOCD was prevented from conducting public consultations in Matabeleland, clerics were sporadically arrested, and prayer meetings disrupted in the crisis and transition (Chitando 2011: 47; Chiromba 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.). Altogether, the faith-based networks nevertheless remained in a strong position to promote peace and democratisation owing to their solid structures, expertise and international ties. Yet, at least until the CCSF's formation that constituted a coordinated response to the GPA, divisions within and amongst churches constrained their ability to effectively engage in the political process.

CSOS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS

The impact of civil society on a transition, evidently, depends on the extent to which CSOs are allowed and seek to participate in the political process. It is thus necessary to examine CSOs’ strategies towards the transition, participation in official mechanisms and complementary activities.

After distancing itself from the regime in the 1980s, the ZCTU was instrumental in the protests against economic structural adjustment, the constitutional movement and launch of the MDC. Faced with aggressive attacks by the regime and structural decline, the ZCTU subsequently became strategically defensive, sought to reach compromises with government and led appeals for international interventions as its ability to mobilise faded (Dansereau Reference Dansereau2001: 406–12; Raftopoulos Reference Raftopoulos2002: 260–5). After the formation of the Inclusive Government, the ZCTU continued this approach and largely refrained from protests that could be seen as undermining the MDC-T in government. The union however warned the power-sharing executive that it would take to the streets if workers’ concerns were neglected (Matombo 2013 int.).

Despite appeals for an inclusive process, the ZCTU and with a few exceptions civil society more generally were shut out from the secretive power-sharing talks between the GPA-parties. In the reasoning of Frank Chikane (2014 int.), who was part of the facilitation team, SADC decided only to include negotiators from popularly elected entities. Moreover, after examining CSOs’ submissions, the facilitators concluded that the positions of the MDC-T and CSOs, with the exception of the churches, were essentially the same. Their positioning supposedly only diverged once the party made compromises during the negotiations. Whereas according to the MDC-T, the exclusion of CSOs from the negotiations was imposed by the Mbeki-mediation (Cross 2013b int.), the head of the SADC-team, Sydney Mufamadi (2014 int.), hinted that the political parties were opposed to the presence of CSOs in the talks. Thys Hoekman (Reference Hoekman2013: 904) has argued that the MDC-T-leadership consciously sidelined and misinformed CSOs about the course of the talks as they feared CSOs would turn popular sentiment against the pact. As the cases considered in this analysis show, the exclusion of civil society from the negotiations not only drove a wedge between the MDC-T and its civic allies but eroded the local ownership and, thus, popular support for the GPA, which is deemed vital for the success of post-conflict transitions (Belloni 2008: 189; Chiromba 2013 int.; Chisi 2013 int.; Chivasa 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.).

The ZCTU opposed the power-sharing talks and GPA, which it regarded as a bad deal that would save the Mugabe regime by offering it legitimacy, and decided not to directly participate in the transition. In the course of the GPA period, the new ZCTU-leadership, however, came to a more positive assessment and, although not actively participating in COPAC, submitted position papers. The faction of ousted president Lovemore Matombo, in contrast, refused to endorse the COPAC process throughout the transition (Matombo 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.; Mwonzora 2013 int.).

The rights and advocacy groups chose different approaches to the GPA. The NCA opposed the power-sharing talks, which it deemed undemocratic, instead calling for the (arguably unrealistic) installation of an independent technocrat authority pending a constitutional reform and new elections (Chivasa 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.). WOZA likewise protested the GPA talks that were feared to produce a repeat of the Unity Accord which had subjugated the Zimbabwe African People's Union. Yet, WOZA was among the few CSOs that could meet with Mbeki's facilitation team to present their views as, according to Williams (2013 int.), the SADC facilitator had an open ear for gender concerns.

Although being irked with their exclusion from the negotiations and divided over the outcome, most advocacy groups accepted the GPA as an opportunity to de-escalate the crisis (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Chisi 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.). According to Crisis director McDonald Lewanika (2013 int.), faced with the strategic choice of either taking a fundamentalist, idealistic stance, or seeking to promote democratisation by engaging the unelected interim government and participating in the envisaged transition, they chose to deal with the political reality and seize the opportunity to advance their reform agenda. The pragmatic CSOs thus from the onset raised awareness by printing a million copies of the GPA and explaining the envisaged process in popular education programmes (Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.). As Dorman (Reference Dorman2002: 82, 87, 91) notes, CSOs had already faced a similar strategic dilemma at the onset of the crisis.

In the transition, most advocacy groups carried on with their core competences, but recalibrated their programmes in response to the GPA. Crisis’ key functions comprised besides awareness campaigns the development of analyses and strategies to counter state propaganda. For this purpose, Crisis published literature, envisaged an action plan to bring about a democratic transition and provided periodic assessments of the GPA process. Crisis moreover laid greater emphasis on international advocacy, institutionalised relations with foreign partners and lobbying the SADC region to insist on the GPA's full implementation (Lewanika 2013 int.).

Given their displeasure with the design of the transition, the CSOs to a varying degree participated in GPA-programmes. The NCA refused to participate in any GPA-structures, although the co-chairs of COPAC, which owing to donors’ insistence required civil society participation, sought to woo the CSO to join the constitution-making process (Madhuku 2013 int.; Mkhosi 2013 int.; Mwonzora 2013 int.). The NCA rejected COPAC due to the (indeed) overwhelming influence of politicians as opposed to civil society (Chivasa 2013 int.). Consequently, whereas other CSOs made use of the limited political space provided by the Realpolitik of the GPA to achieve ‘incremental change’, the NCA chose to boycott COPAC as part of a strategy aimed at keeping their struggle for a ‘people-driven’ constitution alive (Madhuku 2013 int.).

During the transition, the NCA pursued one set of activities: to mobilise people against COPAC and highlight its inadequacies (Madhuku 2013 int.). The impact of the NCA's ‘no vote campaign’ was marginal, as only 6% rejected the COPAC draft in the 2013 referendum. Yet, according to the MDC-T's COPAC co-chair, Douglas Mwonzora (2013 int.), the NCA's opposition urged them to consider the demands of common constituencies during the drafting process. According to his ZANU-PF counterpart, when drawing up the COPAC constitution, they took into account the NCA's and other drafts produced since the 1990s (Mangwana 2013 int.). WOZA and ZLHR, although dissatisfied with the GPA parties’ prerogative to invite CSOs and limited role of civil society, chose to contribute to COPAC from the outside. WOZA ran an education programme on the constitution and put forward 93 demands that were mostly accommodated in the COPAC draft (Williams 2013 int.). The ZLHR provided technical advice by highlighting international best practice, making proposals and analysing drafted provisions, but refrained from making a voting recommendation in the referendum (Chimbgwa 2013 int.).

Albeit having the same reservations, BA, Crisis and NANGO engaged more directly in the constitution-making exercise and sought to exert influence by fulfilling several roles. Ahead of the COPAC-outreach, in which BA deployed activists to the teams that captured popular views, the CSOs conducted constitutional awareness programmes. BA and Crisis used civic education activities to popularise positions their research departments developed and deemed necessary to produce a democratic constitution. Given the NCA's boycott, Crisis and NANGO coordinated civic activities around the constitutional reform. In addition, Crisis organised a People's Convention and public discussions to stimulate debate about the constitution (Chisi 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.).

Whilst most GPA programmes did not provide for direct civic participation, the CSOs sought in various ways to influence or complement envisaged reforms. ZLHR screened candidates for the human rights and media commission and put forward several draft bills, including an amendment of POSA and a Human Rights Act (Chimbgwa 2013 int.). Owing to its participation in the Church and Civil Society Forum that dealt with transitional justice matters, BA liaised with ONHRI (Dube 2013 int.). WOZA, which rejected the ONHRI as obsolete, held independent consultations on transitional justice with members, many of whom were victims of Gukurahundi atrocities (Ndlovu Reference Ndlovu2009: 114; Williams 2013 int.).

Whereas the Zimbabwe Institute was instrumental in administrating JOMIC, civic involvement in the tripartite monitoring mechanism remained limited and attempts by WOZA to cooperate were rebuked (Chiradzva 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.). Although CISOMM included JOMIC representatives in community outreaches and briefed them about breaches, the two monitoring mechanisms refrained from deploying joint observer teams (Hofisi 2013 int.). Given the political nature and non-transparency of JOMIC, complementary civic monitoring efforts constituted vital sources of comparatively independent and accessible information about the GPA. CISOMM reports were distributed to political parties, SADC, libraries, CSOs, donors and the international community (Chiradzva 2013 int.; Chiroro 2013: 131).

The rights groups, including the NCA, also played a vital part in monitoring the 2013 elections as part of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) and other monitoring bodies. Moreover, the groups promoted electoral reforms and voter registration (Dube 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; ZESN 2013: 10–12). Thus, whereas a few advocacy groups chose to take a fundamentalist, idealist stance on the GPA and actively oppose its flawed processes, most CSOs in the sector took a pragmatic approach and sought to embrace the limited space provided by the transition to advance their democratic agenda.

Churches played a part in the developments that provoked the SADC intervention and power-sharing agreement. After the secular CSOs’ operational space was curbed and political rallies banned, the ZCA organised mass prayer meetings with opposition groups through the Save Zimbabwe campaign (Sibanda 2013 int.). The ZHOCD took a less robust approach by proposing reforms and national healing in the Zimbabwe We Want declaration. Unlike the ZCA that was shut out from the talks, the ZHOCD who promoted power-sharing were afforded the opportunity to offer input to the SADC facilitation up until the Inclusive Government's inauguration. The ZHOCD could also meet the leaders of the unity government, pleading with them to moderate and prioritise the national interest (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.).

Although being disgruntled with the marginalisation of civil society in COPAC, the CCJP and ZCA sought to further their transformative agenda by making submissions and deploying delegates, whom the CCJP later withdrew due to parties’ prerogative to invite CSOs (Chiromba 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.). Whilst the CCJP's preferences were generally considered in the new constitution, according to COPAC Co-chair Paul Mangwana (2013 int.), it took considerable efforts to prevent religious groups from opposing the constitution over issues of homosexuality and abortion.

Although they found that the government-controlled ONHRI was not suited to lead a national healing process, the mainstream churches partnered with the Organ through the CCSF that coordinated civic peace-building and transitional justice activities. Whilst carrying out public consultations on a prospective healing mechanism, the CCSF joined the ONHRI in promoting a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission that was enshrined in the constitution and meant to materialise in the post-GPA dispensation (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.). The ZHOCD intensified their peace-building efforts before the 2013 elections and set up the Ecumenical Peace Observation Initiative to monitor violence and coordinate prospective peace-building activities (Shana 2013 int.). The churches also participated in ZESN's election monitoring mission that was chaired by the ZCC's secretary general (News Day 30.7.2012).

Thus, whilst the robust strategy of the ZCA and its allies was decisive in bringing about a SADC intervention, owing to their cautious approach and special status the ZHOCD were among the few civic leaders that could provide input to the SADC-facilitated power-sharing talks. All major church networks seized the limited opportunities GPA programmes provided to advance their transformative agenda. Their joint efforts with secular CSOs towards national healing proved most critical given the political elites’ failure to establish a viable transitional justice mechanism.

CSOS’ RELATIONS WITH THE POWER-SHARING PARTIES

CSO's ability to sway the transition depends not least on their relationship and influence on the power-sharing parties. The evolving relations between CSOs and the GPA parties in turn hinged on factors like common or conflicting interests, reciprocal functions, civic-party mobility and access to cadres. Given that the ZCTU had been instrumental in launching the MDC and its president, Morgan Tsvangirai, became the party leader, the union maintained close relations with the party from the onset and their interests were largely congruent (Matombo 2013 int.; Raftopoulos Reference Raftopoulos2002: 284). Yet, differences arose over the influence of business interests in the party and the release of liberal economic blueprints. Whereas the ZCTU castigated the MDC-T's investor-friendly policies, workers continued voting MDC-T as they lacked a viable alternative (Kanyenze 2013 int.; Matombo 2013 int.).

This dynamic continued in the transition, whereby relations were further complicated by the ZCTU's factionalism. The ZCTU welcomed the Short Term Economic Recovery Plan introduced by the MDC-T's finance minister as it provided stability, but criticised its focus on growth without distribution. Unionists were pleased with the signing of the Kadoma Declaration that sought to improve relations among social partners but deplored the Tripartite Negotiation Forum's (TNF) inactivity under the MDC-T labour minister (Matombo 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.; Mpariwa 2013 int.). The rapport was particularly strained by the MDC-T's adoption of the liberal ‘Jobs, Upliftment, Investment Capital & the Environment’ party policy. Most importantly, the lack of consultation with labour and other CSOs fostered the ZCTU's alienation from the party (Cross 2013b int.; Kanyenze 2013 int.). Although the former ZCTU deputy-president Gibson Sibanda had joined the breakaway MDC-faction in 2005, the ZCTU never maintained significant relations with the MDC-N. ZANU-PF accepted the ZCTU as a TNF partner on government level, but continued to regard it as a hostile Western-backed organisation, so no significant rapprochement took place (Kanyenze 2013 int.; Matombo 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.).

In sum, labour's influence on its political ally already waned after the launch of the MDC that needed to balance worker's interests with those of other constituencies and funders, so that unionists felt increasingly marginalised. The marginalisation of labour and, thus, its ability to take influence on the transition through the party, intensified in the GPA period, when decision-making was largely confined to party leaders and ZCTU's split left the Matombo faction out in the cold. The estrangement in turn resulted in lukewarm support for the MDC-T's 2013 election campaign (Kanyenze 2013 int.; Matombo 2013 int.; Raftopoulos 2013 int.).

Advocacy groups chose different approaches in their dealings with parties and to a varying degree advanced their agenda through them notwithstanding sharing the concern for good governance, democracy, the rule of law, human and gender rights, as well as constitutional and legislative reform with the MDC. The NCA, Crisis, and to a lesser extent BA and ZLHR, entered a cooperation with the MDC during the crisis, whilst WOZA and NANGO guarded their independence (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Chisi 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.). Numerous civic activists took on positions in the MDC and personal ties with party officials could be leveraged from the onset. On the institutional level, activists that took on party posts were generally required to relinquish leadership positions in CSOs (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.).

CSOs provided services and logistics to the MDC that took long to bureaucratise. Crisis informally operated as the MDC's think tank and was instrumental in developing alternative policies for the opposition that was primarily based on the aspiration to dispose the authoritarian regime (Lewanika 2013 int.). In addition to legal aid for activists, the ZLHR offered the party technical assistance to develop bills, thus advancing its own legislative reform agenda (Chimbgwa 2013 int.). The NCA not only supported the MDC-T's international advocacy, but until 2008 actively electioneered for the party (Madhuku 2013 int.). The party also profited from CSOs’ campaigns that offered it a joint platform. By 2008 Crisis however ceased offering services to the MDC-T that had become bureaucratically self-reliant. CSOs became alert to being co-opted by parties and compromising their oversight role (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.). For their part, WOZA and NANGO rebuked MDC officials’ attempts to claim the support of or co-opt the CSOs (Chisi 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.).

Prior to the GPA, advocacy groups were already displeased with the MDC-T's failure to hold corrupt councillors to account, democratic deficits, poaching of activists and acceptance of elections before a constitutional reform. The 2008 election crisis had provoked renewed solidarity with the MDC-T (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.). Yet, by 2008, according to Crisis director Lewanika (2013 int.), they understood that the agendas differed and that, whereas they were in pursuit of ideals and changing the system, the MDC-T was in pursuit of power and capturing the state.

The GPA put tremendous strain on the MDC-T's relations with the civic movement that had brought it to life. As the entire parliamentary opposition joined government, civic allies sought to overcome the impression that they were embedded in the party and safeguard their independence to oversee the executive. More importantly, relations soured over the consistent lack of consultation with civil society during the negotiation and implementation process, the conduct and performance of MDC-T-government officials, as well as different understandings of democratic principles. Civic leaders who felt that their advice was no longer heeded found that some MDC-T government officials displayed arrogance, authoritarian traits and difficulty to accept criticism (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Cross 2013b int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.). The acceptance of luxurious perks by ministers, dubious financing of Tsvangirai's mansion and continued corruption by MDC-T councillors fostered perceptions that the party had joined the gravy train. Dissatisfaction with the MDC-T's sobering performance in government (that not least resulted from ZANU-PF's resistance) related to the failure to keep ZANU-PF in step, scrap repressive acts, advance security sector reform, effect the prosecution of perpetrators of violence, insist on comprehensive electoral reforms and ensure the Human Rights Commission's independence. Divisions over democratic principles and role of civil society became apparent in the party's connivance with its prerogative to select civic participants in COPAC, acceptance of disposed MDC-N President Arthur Mutambara's continued role as GPA-principal and political appointments to independent commissions (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Chivasa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.).

The disgruntlement over these matters, personality clashes between the MDC-T and NCA leaders and, most importantly, the NCA's fundamental opposition to COPAC led to a breakdown in relations (Cross 2013a int.; Raftopoulos 2013 int.). The NCA henceforth ‘dismissed the MDC as a key player for the democratisation agenda’ and a ‘fraud’ (Madhuku 2013 int.). In 2013 the NCA itself became a political party (Standard 29.9.2013). Crisis, ZLHR and BA, whose director, Gorden Moyo, left the CSO to represent the MDC-T in cabinet, in contrast, maintained good working relations with the party to use the MDC-T's access to the state as an avenue to advance their democratic agenda from within (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.).

Although advocacy groups sought to give parties equitable access to their public platforms and stepped up efforts to appear independent, Crisis was perceived to operate as an extension of Prime Minister Tsvangirai's office whilst BA and ZLHR continued to share information on constituencies and provide technical assistance respectively. The two MDC-formations equally benefited from Crisis’ distribution of 10,000 radio devices through their structures (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.). Thus, while the NCA shut itself out, the three rights groups maintained an avenue to advance their democratisation agenda through the party. According to Lewanika (2013 int.), their influence upon the MDC-T nevertheless waned in the GPA given the general lack of consultation.

As far as the MDC-N was concerned, after the 2005 schism most CSOs sought to take a formally non-partisan stance vis-à-vis the two MDC-formations. Yet, in reality the major, mostly Harare-based, rights groups remained closer and gave legitimacy to the more popular MDC-T (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.). Although several Matabeleland-based CSOs were deemed close associates of the MDC-N, BA was sympathetic towards the MDC-T and Bulawayo-based WOZA maintained no significant relations with the fringe party (Dube 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.). Consequently, relations between the MDC-N and the above CSOs remained strained until the eve of the GPA, to the detriment of joint campaigns (Lewanika 2013 int.). Whilst the MDC-N's relations with the major networks continued to be characterised by silence, its dealings with BA and Crisis improved in the GPA period. This was not least because the power-sharing arrangement gave the MDC-N unprecedented political weight and required equitable engagement. Crisis lobbied both MDC-formations equally to promote their positions on the Constitution and the MDC-N's participation in public platforms intensified as the party became a significant avenue through which CSOs sought to influence the transition (Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.).

The deep distrust most advocacy groups held towards ZANU-PF endured throughout the GPA period owing to its continued attempts to close down civic space. However, the party's approach towards the democratic movement markedly changed in the transition as far as ZANU-PF representatives followed invitations to engage in public debates and converse with activists (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Lewanika, 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.). Meanwhile, in the last phase of the GPA, the NCA, as Brian Raftopoulos (Reference Raftopoulos2013: 987) highlights, began to take positions closer to those of ZANU-PF and make use of nationalist rhetoric. In contrast to the above rights groups, NANGO shared a long history of cooperation with the ZANU-PF government, some of whose senior representatives had taken leadership positions in the organisation in the 1980s. During the crisis, NANGO remained in dialogue with the ZANU-PF rather than confronting it, and engaged the government over the repressive NGO bill which the President refrained from signing into law. Owing to its non-partisan approach, NANGO could converse with ZANU-PF government officials throughout the transition, but its privileged access did not translate into measurable influence on intransigent interlocutors (Chisi 2013 int.).

The polarisation between the democratic movement and liberation party in government put mainstream churches in an awkward position. The crisis drove a wedge between younger clerics, who welcomed change, and the old guard, who remained loyal to the liberation movement in government that had fought for their freedom and shared their concern for the country's sovereignty. Whilst individual ministers declared their support for political parties, the umbrella bodies avoided criticism despite their unease with human rights abuses and adopted a non-partisan position to prevent a schism and retain the ability to arbitrate. The attempt to remain neutral provoked claims by the MDC and ZANU-PF, which exerted pressure on clerics to stay out of politics or endorse its positions, that the churches had been co-opted by the adversarial side (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.).

In the transition, the ZHOCD sought a non-partisan stance by engaging the parties on an equitable basis and only sharing national platforms promoting social cohesion and involving all sides (Shana 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.). The GPA and the churches’ national healing activities that were welcomed by all parties changed the mainstream churches’ difficult relations with ZANU-PF in two respects. First, the transition facilitated dialogue between ZANU-PF and ZHOCD who enjoyed greater access to its leaders and even the ZCA that regularly conversed with party representatives through JOMIC and COPAC. Second, the power-sharing pact made it easier for the ZHOCD to level criticism at government without appearing to favour a party (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.).

For its part, ZANU-PF saw churches as a tool to promote its agenda and infiltrated the umbrellas. Whereas, in their leaders’ account, the major denominations retained their institutional independence, individual clerics from the mainstream churches and the apostolic sects in particular wilfully served as political commissars for ZANU-PF (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.). The most notable cleric who preached ZANU-PF's gospel was the ex-communicated Anglican Bishop Nolbert Kunonga, who for much of the transition feuded with his mother church over unduly appropriated properties (Herald 10.12.2012). Whilst UDACIZA retained a non-partisan stance, the rapport between ZANU-PF and the Apostolic and Zionist groups grew ever stronger as the party co-opted organisations such as ACCZ that came under the aegis of Vice-President Joice Mujuru. Partisan clerics who were presumably motivated by their liberation ethos but also by material benefits and power used religious gatherings to profile the party, promote its indigenisation policy and its promise of land for rural communities. Ahead of the 2013 elections, religious leaders declared on national television that God wanted ZANU-PF and Mugabe to win (Shana 2013 int.; Tsvakai 2013 int.). In the view of one ZANU-PF campaigner, indigenous churches assisted greatly in electioneering as people were so attached to their churches that an encouragement from a pastor could persuade them to follow a direction (Togarepi 2013 int.). Clerics who put themselves at the service of ZANU-PF were believed to be manipulated rather than having influence on the party. Major denominations like the Catholic Church, in contrast, were assumed to retain some authority vis-à-vis the ZANU-PF-leadership (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.).

The clergy's positioning vis-à-vis the MDC was equally challenging. Given that the MDC's human rights discourse and demand for truth and reconciliation resonated well with the social teachings of the church, at its launch the party enjoyed the sympathy of clerics from all major denominations; but the synergies with the opposition made it challenging for churches to articulate their concerns without appearing biased. Whereas the CCJP and ZCC distanced themselves from the constitutional movement they had been part of after the latter created the MDC and the umbrella bodies avoided institutional relations with the opposition, some church activists joined the MDC and took public office (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.). Relations with the party were strained because the MDC-T supposedly also sought to co-opt churches for campaign purposes, and because party cadres equated the churches’ refusal to endorse them to outright support for ZANU-PF (Zwana 2013 int.).

The GPA also facilitated the ZHOCD's dealings with the MDC-T since they could engage the party as a part of government. The ZHOCD's experience, however, mirrored that of secular CSOs in that the MDC-T leadership became less accessible, seemed overly comfortable with the situation and disgruntled clerics by accepting the marginalisation of civil society. Disagreements also arose over the inadequate ONRHI, homosexuality and retention of the death penalty in the Constitution (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.).

The ZCA, in contrast, that was founded by clerics who unambiguously opposed the regime, although avoiding double-membership, entered a close cooperation with the MDC-T in the Save Zimbabwe campaign, shared international platforms with its leaders, and was henceforth perceived to be working for the party (Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.). Whereas for the ZCA, the cooperation was based on the common goal of promoting constitutional reform, free elections, transitional justice and pro-poor policies, according to ZCA director Sibanda (2013 int.), both MDC-formations sought to gain political mileage and ‘hijack’ prayer meetings for campaign purposes. While the ZCA sought to distance itself from the MDC-T during the 2008 election campaign, it organised encounters between candidates and the public that benefited the opposition.

The ZCA's exclusion from the GPA talks that its leadership attributed to the Mbeki-facilitation marked the beginning of a rift between the network and MDC-T. Whereas the ZCA sought to exert pressure on the party to rigorously advance reforms regarding the constitution, security sector, national healing, human rights and electoral commission, it was dissatisfied with the MDC-T's perceived inaction in office. The MDC-T backed government policies that the ZCA did not endorse, but nevertheless represented the Alliance's interests in COPAC and transitional programmes. Ahead of the 2013 elections several ZCA activists left the organisation to run on an MDC-T ticket (Sibanda 2013 int.). By their own account, in the crisis the ZCA had considerable influence on the MDC-T policies on transitional justice, land distribution and poverty alleviation; a view that was not shared by external observers. The ZCA's influence and access to the leadership equally faded once the party joined government (Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.).

Thus, given the synergy of interests and mobility of activists between the churches and MDC-T, the party undoubtedly remained a viable avenue for the churches that continued to enjoy comparatively privileged access to the political establishment to promote their peace-building and democratisation agenda in the elite-driven transition. As far as the MDC-N was concerned, the churches’ relations with the party that was particularly receptive to transitional justice largely mirrored those of its sister party. Whilst the ZCA was suspected of favouring the MDC-T, the churches sought to engage them on an equitable basis (Chiromba 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.).

CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS TO CSOS’ IMPACT ON THE POWER-SHARING PROCESS

The purpose of the analysis has been to assess whether and owing to which conditions the discussed CSOs were able to promote peace-building and democratisation in Zimbabwe's transitional power-sharing process. It has been suggested that CSOs ability to sway a transition hinges on their organisational capacity, engagement in politics and relations with the power-sharing parties. In conclusion, it can be argued that the discussed CSOs were particularly constrained by organisational fragmentation and disunity, divergent strategies, diminishing access to political elites, the latter's refusal to permit greater civic involvement, and sustained repression.

CSOs’ organisational development, which varied from growth to collapse, depended on the availability of donor funds that in some cases correlated with their acceptance of the GPA. International networks were also a pivotal means to enhance CSOs’ reach and political leverage. Whereas CISOMM and the CCSF were vital in orchestrating CSOs’ engagement in the transition, the continued polarisation and strategic choices resulting from the GPA strained both relations among CSOs and their internal cohesion, preventing a more coordinated response to the pact. Although the level of state repression declined, security agents obstructed activities and limited CSOs’ operational space (Chimbgwa 2013 int.; Chiromba 2013 int.; Dube 2013 int.; Kanyenze 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; Moyo J. 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Williams 2013 int.; Zwana 2013 int.).

The political actors’ unwillingness to allow greater civil society participation in the negotiation and implementation process was, arguably, the greatest constraint on the CSOs' ability to advance peace-building and democratisation. CSOs’ exclusion drove a wedge between the MDCs and the civic democratic movement, and critically diminished the vital popular ownership of the transition. The extent to which CSOs made use of the limited space and their strategies towards the GPA varied greatly. Some pragmatically engaged in the flawed GPA programmes, where they provided significant input and could advance their democratic agenda, whilst others boycotted, de-campaigned or sabotaged the process. CSOs also contributed to the envisaged transition through complementary national healing and monitoring activities that were vital given the absence of adequate GPA mechanisms (Chiromba 2013 int.; Chisi 2013 int; Chivasa 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; Mangwana 2013 int.; Moyo 2013 int.; Mwonzora 2013 int.; Shana 2013 int.; Sibanda 2013 int.).

The democratic civic movement's relations with the MDC-T soured in the GPA due to a lack of consultation, failure to represent constituents’ interests, poor government performance and corrupt tendencies. While in some cases, the partnership with the MDC-T broke down completely, some CSOs maintained healthy relations with both MDC-formations to leverage their access to the state and use the parties as an avenue to promote their democratic agendas. Yet, CSOs’ influence on parties declined in the power-sharing period, which also allowed for limited dialogue between the democratic civic movement and ZANU-PF (Cross 2013b int.; Kanyenze 2013 int.; Lewanika 2013 int.; Madhuku 2013 int.; Matombo 2013 int).

Altogether, CSOs’ impact on the outcome of the GPA was limited. Yet, by articulating policy alternatives, creating local and international awareness of the transition, stimulating debate, laying the ground for transitional justice and monitoring the implementation, CSOs fulfilled significant functions and contributed to the relative achievements made in terms of peace-building and effecting minimal democratic reforms.