Written by one of the most prolific scholars on contemporary China, David Shambaugh's China Goes Global delves into what he calls “the big story of our era.” The value of the volume lies, again as he characterizes it, in depicting not so much China's rise as its spread on a global scale.
Chapter one sets out the book's argument: China's presence is broad but not deep. Hence, it is a partial power. Chapter two provides a spectrum of China's multiple and often conflicting global identities, which range from nativist and realist to global South and globalist. Chapter three depicts China's diplomatic presence around the world as strong and enmeshed but, at the same time, ambivalent and strained. Chapter four evaluates China in the realm of global governance as a “selective multilateralist” (p. 126), since it wants respect but not responsibilities. Chapter five assesses China's economic presence as a global powerhouse, a trading super-state and workshop of the world. As a result, the author summarizes, “China is certainly more than a partial power in the economic realm” (p. 309). Chapter six appraises China's cultural presence and, expectedly, concludes that “China's soft power remains very soft” (p. 266). Chapter seven characterizes China's military presence simply as “not yet gone global” (p. 269). Finally, chapter eight offers the conclusion that China is not ready for global leadership, that it has only limited international impact, and that we must avoid the error of overestimating China.
Shambaugh's goal in writing this book is to explain China to a non-specialist audience (ix). This goal – providing a big picture of its rise – has been accomplished. The book actually goes further, as it also provides useful and updated discussions and materials (with 940 footnotes) for specialists. Discussions about the Central Foreign Affairs Office (pp. 64–65) and Chinese multinational corporations (pp. 174–202) are particularly interesting. The brief discussion that “China makes an important contribution to global governance by effectively governing itself” (p. 132) also provides plenty of food for thought.
As far as the core argument of the book – that China is a partial power – is concerned, however, nothing is really new. Of course, there are a few who argue that China is already at the top, but mainstream China specialists rarely concur with them. The crucial question then comes down to what partial power really means. Unfortunately, Shambaugh never supplies concrete definitions of the term. So, questions arise. Was the Roman Empire a total power (if this is an antonym of partial power) even though it effectively ruled only one-fifth of the world population? Was Great Britain during the Pax Britannica a total power even though it was never able to single-handedly rule the European continent? Is the US a total power, given the Lehman Brothers debacle, anti-American sentiments around the world, the surprising unfolding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Ukraine problem, and so on? Perhaps Washington is only less partial than Beijing and even that gap may be narrowing by the day.
The problem is that the overall criteria for assessment seem to be absent. It is not clear, for instance, how Shambaugh places China's different global identities along his spectrum on p.27 (i.e. how you actually compare “global South” and “Asia first”). The section on pp. 72–120 deals with China's diplomatic presence by looking at Beijing's relations with the US, Russia, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. But the discussions here are overly descriptive, making it difficult for the reader to come to their own conclusion on China's global diplomatic presence. The author writes that “the two sides [China and the US] find themselves at loggerheads” (p. 78). Does this make the US a partial power or, alternatively, does it put China on a par with the US?
Shambaugh states that “this study grows out of my frustration with the academic China field” (x), whose “studies of progressively more micro-level phenomena” and an “increasing obsession with social science theories and methodologies” have created impediments to understanding (ix). Yet, on the contrary, this volume lacks systematic criteria for appraising China's “presence” – qualitatively or quantitatively or both – in key domains of international relations.
As far as the assessment of China today is concerned, there is no quarrel about China being defined as a partial power (or a power that is more partial than the US). But, given the developmental trajectory of China for the last four decades, readers must be keen to know the author's assessments of its future prospect. Yet, Shambaugh offers little in terms of where China is headed. Where he does, however, he is not so optimistic about China's future and sticks with the “partial power” thesis. Here, many specialists may beg to differ. Descriptions, explanations and evaluations of the current presence of China in various domains do not automatically guarantee any valid extrapolation about China's future as a partial power. After all, America was a very partial power during the 1870s (often characterized as “imperial under-stretch”), even after its GDP surpassed that of Great Britain. Seventy years later, however, Washington became the centre of the world, with its invincible military and the Bretton Woods system.
Several reprints of this book appear guaranteed, given its extensive coverage and in-depth discussions of China's rise and spread worldwide. When the author decides on another edition, however, he could correct several typos and misspellings (e.g. the Chinese characters of liangge on p. 64; the pinyin of guoji xingxiang on p. 211; the spelling of Yu Xintian on p. 325, n25) as well as the placement of some headings.
This book should indeed command a wide-ranging audience. Both undergraduate and graduate courses may benefit a lot from it. Non-specialist readers can gain a big picture from it, while specialists can take advantage of the extensive notes.
