Since its creation in 1948, the UN has sent more than 70 peacekeeping operations around the world. About 50 of these were sent after the end of the Cold War, of which about 30 were in Africa. The scope of peacekeeping mandates shifted during this time. Although still interested in ending conflict and creating peace agreements, the program increasingly focuses on nation-building or peacebuilding. It is within this space that Peacekeeping, Policing, and the Rule of Law after Civil War provides an in-depth study of how one such focus—strengthening the rule of law—has fared when taken on by UN peacekeeping forces in the post–Cold War African context.

Peacekeeping, Policing, and the Rule of Law after Civil War addresses the question of how and when states embrace the rule of law (ROL) after civil war. This multifaceted and ambitious book emphasizes the importance of interlevel interactions in the process of embracing ROL. Throughout the book, Blair argues that UN peacekeeping missions act “as catalysts for state reform” (p. 5) across the macro (national), micro (local), and meso (between citizens and states) levels. For the ROL norm to be adopted, it is crucial that all levels be engaged and convinced of its importance.

The book begins with an historical overview of UN intervention and the rule of law after civil war (chapter 2), followed by the core theoretical contribution (chapters 3 and 4). Then, the ROL concept is applied to UN peacekeeping, making clear the UN’s role in revising state laws, disseminating information, and “sensitizing” citizens to the changes (chapter 4). The UN’s global legitimacy is a crucial tool enabling norm diffusion throughout the macro, micro, and meso levels after the conflict.

The second half of the book (chapters 5–8) is its analytical heart. Chapter 5 conducts a statistical analysis of 33 African postconflict settings where the UN deployed peacekeeping missions (macro). The nuanced contribution of this chapter is its presentation of the multidimensional measurement of peacekeepers and their functions. Blair makes a great case for working past a blunt measure of peacekeeping troops. His novel data collection, drawn from the UN secretary-general’s annual budget requests and program reports (p. 95), is especially convincing because it directly measures the extent to which UN resources are devoted to strengthening the ROL. Findings indicate that once peace is established, peacekeeping presence (when devoted to ROL tasks) is a significant indicator of improvements in numerous measurements of ROL.

The rest of the book examines the case of Liberia (chapters 6–8). Chapter 6 provides a rich historical case overview of Liberia from the 1800s through modern peacekeeping in the 2010s. After chapter 7 describes the research design, chapter 8 analyzes surveys conducted in 243 Liberian towns and 43 interviews (micro and meso levels). These analyses provide further support for his argument: together, they point to the importance of exposure to peacekeepers (particularly through patrols) in shaping individuals’ confidence in the Liberia mission and ROL, as measured by the self-reported likelihood to use formal rather than informal institutions in adjudicating criminal disputes.

Peacekeeping Policing, and the Rule of Law after Civil War contributes to the literatures on international peacekeeping, postconflict nation-building, and norm diffusion through its nuanced and layered unpacking of the ROL and its description of how full societal engagement through multiple layers is needed for change to occur. Blair’s contribution is conceptually rich and empirically rigorous. The framing of ROL as a more complex concept operating across levels is fruitful for application beyond the African context and even beyond peacekeeping contexts to broader literatures on norm diffusion when introduced by a foreign actor. The book’s generally optimistic findings speak to how effective the UN has been at peacekeeping overall and how effective it is in translating policy goals into meaningful changes in postconflict settings.

Even with these contributions, however, several questions arise and offer potential avenues for future research. First, other international actors are almost completely missing from the book. The book seeks to use UN peacekeeping as one example of international intervention and the advancement of the ROL, but it is left unclear how the UN compares with other international interventionists. There are brief mentions of NGOs’ presence (e.g., p. 169) and that some of the individual-level interviews were connected to NGOs. However, when it came time to explain ROL outcomes either through large-N (chapter 5) analysis or the survey of individual-level beliefs (chapters 6–8), neither NGOs nor other types of international influence are controlled for. The mean number of visits by NGOs was reported as higher than that of police (p. 170), yet we cannot tell whether NGO engagement contributed to, mitigated, interacted with, or related to individual-level views on the ROL. Can these actors also serve as catalysts for ROL change? In the conclusion, Blair generalizes the argument to the United States, although application to NATO may have been a more comparable extension. Blair might have considered that the US mechanisms for norm diffusion were drawing on power and strategic imbalances in different ways than those of the UN, given his argument that the UN’s legitimacy comes from its global scope and broad membership.

Second, a central part of the argument relies on individual-level interactions with UN personnel being net-positive in supporting the norm diffusion of the ROL. Unfortunately, repeated individual-level interaction with the UN may be a net-negative in some contexts. More research and a growing number of negative newspaper headlines make it clear that sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) have been part of UN peacekeeping. Blair does briefly acknowledge UN scandals but does not engage with their implications for his argument. It does not appear that any survey scenarios examined how UN scandals or distrust might shape the willingness of individuals to use formal institutions (p. 164). The increased role that the UN has assumed in interacting with individuals can contribute to more SEA and distrust of the UN (see Frédéric Mégret, and Florian Hoffman, 2003, “The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations’ Changing Human Rights Responsibilities,” Human Rights Quarterly 25 [2], 2003; and Carla Ferstman, International Organizations and the Fight for Accountability: The Remedies and Reparations Gap, 2017). SEA in Haiti combined with the cholera scandal contributed to distrust in the UN and a reluctance to work with the organization among Haitians (see, for example, Georgia Fraulin, Sabine Lee, and Susan A. Bartels, “They Came with Cholera When They Were Tired of Killing Us with Bullets: Community Perceptions of the 2010 Origin of Haiti’s Cholera Epidemic,” Global Public Health, 2021).

This area of research indicates that there are serious issues with UN personnel activities that undercut trust, confidence, and the willingness to interact with UN peacekeeping troops. Blair has not made clear how and when ROL advancement can overcome distrust from the scandals that UN personnel perpetrate. This may help explain why respondents viewed formal institutions and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) itself as corrupt after interaction with peacekeepers (p. 188). Blair offers an explanation for this finding—that UNMIL sent mixed signals about the corruption of the state, and hence the need for peacekeepers, with the signal to rely on formal state institutions. However, the real explanation may lie in peacekeepers’ behavior.

On a related issue, the book has a convincing argument that all three levels matter for norm diffusion, but it is unclear how knowledgeable and receptive individuals actually are to UN intervention. There is evidence throughout the book of the lack of understanding or knowledge (or even confusion) of the general population. How much does the average civilian know about what the UN is doing? The interviews admittedly did not aim to sample the general population: instead, “the goal throughout was to interview individuals who could speak knowledgeably about UNMIL and its role in Libera” (p. 161). However, that still leaves this question: What amount of public knowledge, support, and norm adoption enables substantive change?

In practical application, at what point can the UN’s entrance act as a catalyst? Or what is the threshold or tipping point? This aspect of the norm diffusion connection is undertheorized. UN peacekeeping may have repeat missions in locations after peace fails and new conflicts arise. Does the catalyst only work once, once per conflict, once per generation, or for a period after a certain influx of troops? Prior exposure to the UN after past conflicts may prime individuals, societies, and states to ROL norms or potentially predispose them against the norms if prior UN missions are perceived as failures. Liberia, for example, saw a prior mission in the 1990s. Haiti has had at least six missions since 1993. How might the UN ROL endeavors be received if done repeatedly?

Despite these queries, overall Peacekeeping, Policing, and the Rule of Law after Civil War is a strong contribution to the study of peacekeeping, postconflict studies, and institutional legitimacy that strengthens our understanding of how UN peacekeeping can make effective changes after conflicts have ended.