In this book, Marie Seong-Hak Kim provides an account of the history of the Supreme Court and the development of the judicial process in modern South Korea that is both nuanced and provocative. The main focus of the book is the Supreme Court's decisions during the Park Chung Hee government under the notorious Yusin Constitution from 1972 to 1979. The courts, especially the Supreme Court, have been criticized for upholding unjust laws under that regime and bolstering the power of the dictatorial government. Was it right for the Supreme Court to implement the unjust laws instead of challenging them? Constitutional Transition and the Travail of Judges is Kim's response to this question.

Throughout the book, Kim examines monumental decisions of the Supreme Court and provides an in-depth examination of how each case was adjudicated, giving detailed analyses of related legal issues and the opinions of judges, including minority opinions, with an assessment of the political stakes. Instead of brushing aside the Supreme Court decisions of the 1970s simply as political acquiescence, Kim provides a robust legalistic background for their actions: the judges in the Supreme Court were adhering to the position of legal positivism rather than natural law, envisioning themselves as enforcers, rather than writers, of the laws (p. 7). Their commitment to upholding the formal law was a historical product of the legal cultures of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) and the Japanese colonial period (1910–45), which emphasized a formalistic approach to the law. In addition, the ways in which the division of powers was structured in the early years of the republic further isolated the Supreme Court; the first Constitution (1948) placed the judiciary branch firmly under the legislative branch, with the specific objective of curtailing its capacity to review the constitutionality of laws (chapter 2).

The Third Republic and its 1962 Constitution, which strengthened the Supreme Court's power, is the focus of chapter 3. During that period, the Supreme Court “maintained judicial restraint” (p. 57) but withheld political pressure in adjudicating high-profile cases such as the Tongbaengnim case and “did not grant free rein to overzealous prosecutors wielding security laws as political weapons” (p. 72). The highlight of this chapter is the Supreme Court's 1971 decision to strike down the State Tort Claims Act—a decision that protected citizens’ property rights at the expense of the state's interest. The subsequent Yusin Constitution took away the Supreme Court's power to review the constitutionality of laws, and the Supreme Court applied laws that significantly compromised citizens’ rights. As a result, “the law was observed but human rights suffered” (p. 229). Even so, Kim argues that “the courts’ insistence to give effect to the will of the law, rather than their own, helped preserve the legal order as an antidote to authoritarian rule” (p. 159). Moreover, Kim notes, the Supreme Court made progress in areas related to private property rights and environmental issues (chapters 4–6).

In chapter 7, Kim turns to the 1980s, when the opportunity to review the constitutionality of Emergency Decree No. 4 from the Yusin era pushed the Supreme Court to manifest the first signs of judicial activism. Kim examines the impact of post-1987 democratization on the judicial process in chapter 8, focusing on the “transitional justice” that the judges participated in. In Kim's final assessment, “the judiciary has become more politicized . . . than ever before” (p. 308).

While Kim sets out to provide an “objective, historical analysis of the role of the courts” (p. 16), her affinity for the Supreme Court judges is palpable throughout the book. The repeated presentation of the predicaments and agonies of the judges, while helpful in illuminating the human dimensions of the Supreme Court and its decisions, contrasts sharply with the sheer lack of such sympathetic attention to the victims of those decisions. This might be a result, in part, of Kim's liberal use of the testimonies of the judges. While Kim faults the current criticism of the courts under the Yusin Constitution as skewed by hindsight, she does not seem to apply the same kind of discerning eye to the judges’ memoirs from the 1980s and 1990s.

Obviously, these points do not overshadow the contributions of the book. With the ability to place the case of Korean laws into the larger context of comparative legal history, Kim again makes an important contribution to the field of Korean legal history. In her rendition, the history of Park Chung Hee's authoritarian regime and how it was able to maintain power with the cooperation of the judiciary gains new significance in the context of comparative legal history. The concern that Kim expresses for the independence of the judiciary in present-day South Korea is also a timely issue that deserves to be taken seriously.