Message on the Occasion of India Republic Day

As the people of India and people of Indian origin in America and around the world celebrate Republic Day on January 26, I send the warmest greetings of the American people to the people of India. Together, we celebrate our shared belief in democracy, liberty, pluralism, and religious tolerance.

Our nations have built broad and vibrant partnerships in every field of human endeavor. Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world's citizens as our scientists solve environmental challenges together, our doctors discover new medicines, our engineers advance our societies, our entrepreneurs generate prosperity, our educators lay the foundation for our future generations, and our governments work together to advance peace, prosperity, and stability around the globe.

It is our shared values that form the bedrock of a robust relationship across peoples and governments. Those values and ideals provide the strength that enables us to meet any challenge, particularly from those who use violence to try to undermine our free and open societies. As the Indian people celebrate Republic Day all across India, they should know that they have no better friend and partner than the people of the United States. It is in that spirit, that I also wish Prime Minister Singh a quick recovery.

Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an overview of challenges facing the Department of Defense and some of my priorities for the coming year. In doing so, I am mindful that the new administration has only been in place for a few days and new or changing policies will likely arise in coming months. Later this spring, I will present President Obama's defense budget, and, at that time, will be better equipped to discuss the details of his vision for the Department. On a personal note, I want to thank many of you for your very kind farewell remarks at my last hearing. I assure you that you are no more surprised to see me back than I am. In the months ahead, I may need to re-read some of those kind comments to remind myself of the warm atmosphere up here as I was departing. Seriously, I am humbled by President Obama's faith in me, and deeply honored to continue leading the United States military. I thank the committee for your confidence in my leadership and your enduring, steadfast support of the military. I'd like to start by discussing our current operations before moving on to my ongoing institutional initiatives.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan. As you know, the United States has focused more on Central Asia in recent months. President Obama has made it clear that the Afghanistan theater should be our top overseas military priority. The ideology we face was incubated there when Afghanistan became a failed state, and the extremists have largely returned their attention to that region in the wake of their reversals in Iraq. As we have seen from attacks across the globe— on 9/11 and afterwards—the danger reaches far beyond the borders of Afghanistan or Pakistan.

There are more than forty nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, development banks, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and more, involved in Afghanistan—all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, a thriving drug trade fueling corruption, a ruthless and resilient insurgency, and violent extremists of many stripes, not the least of which is Al Qaeda. Coordination of these international efforts has been less than stellar, and too often the whole of these activities has added up to less than the sum of the parts—a concern I'm sure many of you share.

Based on our past experience in Afghanistan—and applicable lessons from Iraq—there are assessments underway that should provide an integrated way forward to achieve our goals.

As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan. But it is also clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas—a vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the Taliban. That is why the U.S. is considering an increase in our military presence, in conjunction with a dramatic increase in the size of the Afghan security forces. Because of the multi-faceted nature of the fight—and because of persistent ISAF shortfalls for training teams— all combat forces, whether international or American, will have a high level of counterinsurgency training, which was not always the case.

In the coming year, I also expect to see more coherence as efforts to improve civil-military coordination gain traction— allowing us to coordinate Provincial Reconstruction Teams in a more holistic fashion, both locally and regionally. And there will be an increased focus on efforts at the district level, where the impact of both our military and rebuilding efforts will be felt more concretely by the Afghan people, who will ultimately be responsible for the future of their nation.

While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can attain what I believe should be among our strategic objectives: an Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for Al Qaeda, reject the rule of the Taliban, and support the legitimate government that they elected and in which they have a stake.

Of course, it is impossible to disaggregate Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the porous border between them. I do believe that the Pakistani government is aware of the existential nature of the threat emanating from the FATA. The U.S. military knows firsthand how difficult it is to wage counterinsurgency with a force designed for large-scale, mechanized warfare—a fact complicated by Pakistan's recent tensions with India. Pakistan is a friend and partner, and it is necessary for us to stay engaged—and help wherever we can. I can assure you that I am watching Pakistan closely, and that we are working with State, Treasury, and all parts of the government to fashion a comprehensive approach to the challenges there.

Iraq after SOFA

As you know, the Status of Forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraq went into effect on January 1st. The agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June, and all troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011, at the latest. It balances the interests of both countries as we see the emergence of a sovereign Iraq in full control of its territory. Provincial elections in just a few days are another sign of progress.

The SOFA marks an important step forward in the orderly drawdown of the American presence. It is a watershed—a firm indication that American military involvement is winding down. Even so, I would offer a few words of caution. Though violence has remained low, there is still the potential for setbacks—and there may be hard days ahead for our troops.

As our military presence decreases over time, we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come—assuming a sovereign Iraq continues to seek our partnership. The stability of Iraq remains critical to the future of the Middle East, a region that multiple presidents of both political parties have considered vital to the national security of the United States.

North Korea, Iran, and Proliferation Beyond these operations, one of the greatest dangers we continue to face is the toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, and nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. North Korea and Iran present uniquely vexing challenges in this regard. North Korea has produced enough plutonium for several atomic bombs; Iran is developing the capabilities needed to support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea's conventional capability continues to degrade as it becomes more antiquated and starved—in some cases literally—for resources and support. Both countries have ballistic missile programs of increasing range and a record of proliferation.

The regional and nuclear ambitions of Iran continue to pose enormous challenges to the U.S. Yet I believe there are non-military ways to blunt Iran's power to threaten its neighbors and sow instability throughout the Middle East. The lower price of oil deprives Iran of revenues and, in turn, makes U.N. economic sanctions bite harder. In addition, there is the growing self-sufficiency and sovereignty of Iraq, whose leaders—including Iraqi Shia—have shown they do not intend for the new, post-Saddam Iraq to become a satrapy of its neighbor to the east. This situation provides new opportunities for diplomatic and economic pressure to be more effective than in the past.

On North Korea, the Six-Party Talks have been critical in producing some forward momentum—especially with respect to North Korea's plutonium production— although I don't think anyone can claim to be completely satisfied with the results so far. These talks do offer a way to curtail and hopefully eliminate its capacity to produce more plutonium or to enrich uranium, and reduce the likelihood of proliferation. Our goal remains denuclearization, but it is still to be seen whether North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear ambitions entirely.

Russia and China

Even as the Department of Defense improves America's ability to meet unconventional threats, the United States must still contend with the challenges posed by the military forces of other countries— from the actively hostile, to rising powers at strategic crossroads. The security challenges faced by other nation-states is real, but significantly different than during the last century.

The Russian invasion of Georgia last year was a reminder that the Russian military is a force to be reckoned with in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. We should not, however, confuse Russia's attempt to dominate its “near abroad” with an ideologically driven campaign to dominate the globe—as was the case during the Cold War. The country's conventional military, although much improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. Saddled with demographic and budget pressures, the Russians have concentrated on improving their strategic and nuclear forces, but recently have begun to devote more attention to their conventional capabilities.

As we know, China is modernizing across the whole of its armed forces. The areas of greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber- and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Modernization in these areas could threaten America's primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them.

We have seen some improvement in the U.S.-Chinese security relationship recently. Last year, I inaugurated a direct telephone link with the Chinese defense ministry. Military to military exchanges continue, and we have begun a strategic dialogue to help us understand each other's intentions and avoid potentially dangerous miscalculations.

As I've said before, the U.S. military must be able to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum—including the armed forces of other nations. On account of Iraq and Afghanistan, we would be hard pressed at this time to launch another major ground operation. But elsewhere in the world, the United States has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the capacity to defeat any adversary that committed an act of aggression— whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Taiwan Strait. The risk from these types of scenarios cannot be ignored, but it is a manageable one in the short- to mid-term.

Wounded Warrior Care

Apart from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, my highest priority as Secretary of Defense is improving the outpatient care and transition experience for troops that have been wounded in combat.

Since February of 2007, when we learned about the substandard out-patient facilities at Walter Reed, the Department has implemented a number of measures to improve health care for our wounded, ill, and injured service members. We have acted on some 530 recommendations put forth by several major commissions and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. Notable progress includes:

Working closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs to better share electronic health data and track patients' long-term recovery process;

• • Dedicating new facilities, with the help of private partners, such as the national intrepid centers in Bethesda, Maryland, and San Antonio, Texas; and

• • Improving overall case management through programs such as the Army's “Warrior Transition Units” that shepherd injured soldiers back to their units or help them transition to veteran status.

More than 3,200 permanent cadre are now dedicated to soldiers assigned to warrior transition units, and they have cared for more than 21,000 men and women thus far. I have personally visited these units at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Post-traumatic stress, traumatic brain injury, and associated ailments are, and will continue to be, the signature military medical challenge facing the Department for years to come. We have made some strides to reduce the stigma associated with the scars of war, both seen and unseen. For instance, last February, the Army Inspector General identified a disturbing trend: Troops were hesitant to get help for mental health because they were worried about the impact on their security clearance, and perhaps their career. To resolve this problem, we worked with our interagency partners to change “Question 21” on the government security clearance application so that, as a general matter, it excludes counseling related to service in combat, including post-traumatic stress. Put simply, mental health treatment, in and of itself, will not be a reason to revoke or deny a security clearance.

We have invested more than $300 million in research for Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. The Department created a comprehensive TBI registry and thus now has a single point of responsibility to track incidents and recovery. In the last year, we've added more than 220 new mental-health providers to treatment facilities across the country.

The Services are doing more to address mental health needs. The Marine Corps is, for instance, embedding Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) teams in front-line units to better channel medical attention to those who need help quickly. All the services have 24-hour “hot lines” available to troops. Health-care providers are being trained to better identify the first signs of psychological trauma.

We are addressing PTSD and related injuries on a number of fronts and have made much progress. But not every servicemember returning from Iraq and Afghanistan is getting the treatment he or she needs. I believe we have yet to muster and coordinate the various legal, policy, medical, and budget resources across the Department to address these types of injuries.

Considerable work remains as we institutionalize what has been successful and recalibrate what still falls short. The Disability Evaluation System is a useful example. In November of 2007, a pilot program was launched to streamline the Disability Evaluation System (DES) by providing a VA rating to be used by both DoD and VA. Approximately 900 service-members are currently enrolled in the pilot program, and it has enabled us to reduce the time required to determine their disability rating and, more importantly, to alleviate some frustration caused by a needlessly complex process.

Overall, I remain concerned that our wounded warriors are still subjected to a system that is designed to serve the general military beneficiary population—the overwhelming majority of whom have not been injured in combat. Earlier this month, we implemented a policy that allows the secretaries of the services to expedite troops through the DES who have combat-related illnesses or injuries that are catastrophic. Nonetheless, we must give serious consideration to how we can better address the unique circumstances facing our servicemembers with combat-related ailments.

As long as I am secretary of defense, I will continue to work to improve treatment and care for every single wounded warrior.

Ground Force Expansion and Stress on the Force

In an effort to meet our nation's commitments and relieve stress on our force and their troops' families, the Department continues to expand the end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps—growth that began in 2007 and will continue for several years.

The Army exceeded both recruiting and retention goals for FY 2008, and is on path to achieve its goal of an active duty end-strength of 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year. It will continue to increase the number of active Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with a goal of moving from 40 to 42 BCTs this year and towards an end goal of 48 BCTs.

Despite having fallen 5 percent short of its retention goal, the Marine Corps is on track to meet its end-strength goal of 202,000 by the end of this fiscal year.

In all, the Army and Marine Corps are undergoing the largest increase to their active ranks in some four decades. The expectation is that, with a larger total force, individual troops and units will, over time, deploy less frequently with longer dwell times at home. The goal for the Army is two years off for every year of deployment. The expected reduction of American troops in Iraq could be offset by proposed increases in Afghanistan, so it may take some time before we reach that goal. The Services are carefully managing their growth to ensure that it is consistent with the high standards expected from an all-volunteer force.

National Guard

As a result of the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the National Guard in America's defense has transformed from being a strategic reserve to being part of the pool of forces available for deployments.

In view of the National Guard's growing operations and homeland security responsibilities, and to elevate the Guard in deliberations over policy and budget, I am pleased to say that the chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a full general. Another senior Guard officer recently became Northcom's deputy commander, also a historic first that I hope will pave the way for a Guard officer to one day head that command.

One of the challenges we face is to see that, to the extent possible, the Guard's critical domestic responsibilities do not suffer as a result of its operational missions. The demand for Guard support of civil authorities here at home remains high: For example, the “man-days” that Guardsmen have spent fighting fires, performing rescue and recovery, and other duties increased by almost 60 percent in 2008 as compared to 2007. With the support of the Congress, the Department has substantially increased support for America's reserve component—the Guard and Reserves—which for decades had been considered a low priority for equipment, training, and readiness.

Today, the standard is that the Guard and Reserves receive the same equipment as the active force. For FY 2009, the base budget request included $6.9 billion to continue to replace and repair the National Guard's equipment.

The panel created by Congress four years ago, the Punaro commission, has been a useful spur to the Department's efforts to ensure that both reserve components are better trained, manned, and equipped for this new era. We have taken, or are taking, action on more than 80 percent of the commission's recommendations. For example, the panel suggested a combined pay and personnel system to fix problems stemming from the shift from the reserve pay system to the active duty pay system. The Department is now launching that integrated system.

Since taking this post I have tried to ease, to the extent possible, the stress on our reserve components by implementing mobilization policies that are more predictable and conducive to unit cohesion. We have provided greater predictability as to when a Guard member will be deployed by establishing a minimum standard of 90 days advance notice prior to mobilization. In practice, on average, the notification time is about 270 days.

There is no longer a 24-month lifetime limit on deployment, but each mobilization of National Guard and Reserve troops is now capped at 12 months. The goal is five years of dwell time for one year deployed. We have made progress towards this goal but are not there yet. For example, the ratio of dwell time to mobilization for the Army National Guard this fiscal year is just over 3 to 1. Reliance upon the reserve component for overseas deployment has declined over time. For example, the percentage of Army soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan who are Guardsmen or Reservists is about half what it was in summer 2005.

Nuclear Stewardship

I continue to believe that as long as other nations have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must maintain an arsenal of some level. The stewardship of that arsenal is perhaps the military's most sensitive mission—with no margin for error.

That there should be any question in that regard is why recent lapses in the handling of nuclear weapons and material were so grave. They were evidence of an erosion in training, expertise, resources, and accountability in this critical mission. And they brought severe consequences, starting at the unit level and reaching up to the top leadership of the Air Force.

Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings of the past, I do believe the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable. The Air Force has taken significant steps to improve its nuclear stewardship by:

Streamlining the inspection process for nuclear material to ensure that it is all handled properly;

Standing up a new headquarters office—Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration—that concentrates on policy oversight and staff integration for nuclear programs. The office's leader reports directly to the Air Force chief of staff;

Creating a Global Strike Command, which has brought all of the Air Force's nuclear-capable bombers and ICBMs under one entity; and

Reassigning the supply chain for nuclear programs to the complete control of the Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, which is being overhauled and expanded.

A task force headed by former Energy and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has now reported. It has identified many trends, both recent and long-term, that may warrant corrective action. Among its recommendations:

• • A new assistant secretary of defense for deterrence to oversee nuclear management; and

Develop and maintain a strategic roadmap to modernize and sustain our nuclear forces.

I will be evaluating all of the Schlesinger Commission recommendations along with the new service secretaries and defense team.

Defending Space and Cyberspace The full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities on land, sea, and air now depend on digital communications and the satellites and data networks that support them. Our communications, navigation, weather, missile warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems rely on unfettered access to space. At the same time, more nations—about 60 in all—are active in space, and there are more than 800 satellites in orbit. The importance of space defense was highlighted during my first year in this job when the Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite weapon.

In an effort to maintain our technological edge and protect access to this critical domain, we will continue to invest in joint space-based capabilities such as infrared systems and global positioning systems. Air Force Space Command has nearly 40,000 personnel dedicated to monitoring space assets and is training professionals in this career field.

With cheap technology and minimal investment, current and potential adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage to DoD's vast information grid—a system that encompasses more than 15,000 local, regional, and wide-area networks, and approximately 7 million IT devices. DoD systems are constantly scanned and probed by outside entities, but we have developed a robust network defense strategy. We will continue to defend our systems against network attacks, intrusions, and other incidents.

It is noteworthy that Russia's relatively crude ground offensive into Georgia was preceded by a sophisticated cyber attack. The massive cyber attack suffered by Estonia in 2007, which I discussed with our partners during a recent visit there, illustrates how quickly malicious hackers can bring even a technologically-sophisticated government to a standstill. To learn from this experience and share technological know-how, the U.S. government is co-sponsoring the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

Wartime Procurement

When we are at war, I believe the overriding priority of the Defense Department and military services should be to do everything possible to provide troops in the field everything they need to be successful. To place our defense bureaucracies on a war footing with a wartime sense of urgency, I have accelerated procurement of a number of capabilities, notably:

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—specifically, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs); and

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles—or MRAPs.

UASs have become one of the most critical capabilities in our military. They give troops the tremendous advantage of seeing full-motion, real-time, streaming video over a target—such as an insurgent planting an IED. Last April, I launched a Department-wide taskforce to speed additional UASs to theater and to ensure we were getting maximum use out of the assets already there. Since then, the Air Force has:

Increased Predator air patrols by nearly 30 percent;

Opened a second school to train personnel on UASs;

Created a career track for UASs; and

For the first time, allowed non-rated officers to operate UASs.

We've also seen how relatively low cost, off-the-shelf technology can have a huge impact on the battlefield. The Army's Task Force Odin resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of full-motion video available to commanders in Iraq. We are in the process of trying to replicate those successes in Afghanistan. As part of the effort to increase ISR, we are fielding more than 50 turboprop aircraft outfitted with sensors.

In Iraq, the majority of our combat deaths and injuries have been a result of road-side bombs, IEDs, and explosively formed penetrators. The casualty rate from an attack on an MRAP is less than one-third that of Humvees, and less than half that of an Abrams tank. In May 2007, I directed the Department to make MRAPs our top acquisition priority, and, with extraordinary help from the Congress, the Department has sent more than 12,000 MRAPs to theater. The Army is currently developing a lighter version of the MRAP better suited for the difficult terrain of Afghanistan.

The MRAP and ISR experiences raise a broader concern about wartime acquisition. In the past, modernization programs have sought a 99 percent solution over a period of years, rather than a 75 percent solution over a period of weeks or months. Rather than forming ad hoc groups to field capabilities like UASs and MRAPs, we must figure out how to institutionalize procurement of urgently-needed resources in wartime.

One option is to continue to spin out components of large-scale, long-term modernization projects in real time for early field testing and use in ongoing operations, then fold the results into longer-term product development. We are doing so in Afghanistan and Iraq with Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles, a component the Army's Future Combat Systems used to clear caves, search bunkers, or cross minefields. Such field testing ensures that a program like FCS— whose total cost could exceed $200 billion if completely built out—will continue to demonstrate its value for both conventional and unconventional scenarios.

Defense Acquisition

As I focused on the wars these past two years, I ended up punting a number of procurement decisions that I believed would be more appropriately handled by my successor and a new administration. Well, as luck would have it, I am now the receiver of those punts—and in this game there are no fair catches.

Chief among institutional challenges facing the Department is acquisitions— broadly speaking, how we acquire goods and services and manage the taxpayers' money. The Congress, and this committee in particular, have rightly been focused on this issue for some time. The economic crisis makes the problem even more acute. Allow me to share a few general thoughts.

There are a host of issues that have led us to where we are, starting with longstanding systemic problems:

Entrenched attitudes throughout the government are particularly pronounced in the area of acquisition: a risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability, and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense and between DoD and other parts of the government.

• • At the same time, acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress—making any sort of long-term procurement strategy on which we can accurately base costs next to impossible.

• • Add to all of this the difficulty in bringing in qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years, for example, the Department of Defense has operated with an average percentage of vacancies in the key acquisition positions ranging from 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force.

Thus the situation we face today, where a small set of expensive weapons programs has had repeated—and unacceptable—problems with requirements, schedule, cost, and performance.

While the number of overturned procurements as a result of protests remains low in absolute numbers—13 out of more than three and a half million contract actions in FY 2008—highly publicized issues persist in a few of the largest programs. The same is true of cost over-runs, where five programs account for more than half of total cost growth. The list of big-ticket weapons systems that have experienced contract or program performance problems spans the services: the Air Force tanker, CSAR-X, VH-71, Osprey, Future Combat Systems, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, Littoral Combat Ship, Joint Strike Fighter, and so on.

Since the end of World War II, there have been nearly 130 studies on these problems—to little avail. I mention all this because I do not believe there is a silver bullet, and I do not think the system can be reformed in a short period of time— especially since the kinds of problems we face date all the way back to our first Secretary of War, whose navy took three times longer to build than was originally planned at more than double the cost.

That said, I do believe we can make headway, and I have already begun addressing these issues:

First, I believe that the FY 2010 budget must make hard choices. Any necessary changes should avoid across-the-board adjustments, which inefficiently extend all programs.

• • We have begun to purchase systems at more efficient rates for the production lines. I believe we can combine budget stability and order rates that take advantage of economies of scale to lower costs.

• • I will pursue greater quantities of systems that represent the “75 percent” solution instead of smaller quantities of “99 percent,” exquisite systems.

• • While the military's operations have become very joint—and impressively so—budget and procurement decisions remain overwhelmingly service-centric. To address a given risk, we may have to invest more in the future-oriented program of one service and less in that of another service—particularly when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.

• • We must freeze requirements on programs at contract award and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior.

• • I feel that many programs that cost more than anticipated are built on an inadequate initial foundation. I believe the Department should seek increased competition, use of prototypes, and ensure technology maturity so that our programs are ready for the next phases of development.

• • Finally, we must restore the Department's acquisition team. I look forward to working with the Congress to establish a necessary consensus on the need to have adequate personnel capacity in all elements of the acquisition process. On that note, I thank you for continuing to give us the funding, authorities, and support to sustain our growth plan for the defense acquisition workforce.

Conclusion

As we look ahead to the important work that we have in front of us, I would leave you with the following thoughts.

I have spent the better part of the last two years focused on the wars we are fighting today, and making sure that the Pentagon is doing everything possible to ensure that America's fighting men and women are supported in battle and properly cared for when they return home.

Efforts to put the bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my view, revealed underlying flaws in the institutional priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment—a set of institutions largely arranged to plan for future wars, to prepare for a short war, but not to wage a protracted war. The challenge we face is how well we can institutionalize the irregular capabilities gained and means to support troops in theater that have been, for the most part, developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.

This requires that we close the yawning gap between the way the defense establishment supports current operations and the way it prepares for future conventional threats. Our wartime needs must have a home and enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and procurement process. Our procurement and preparation for conventional scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries, and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources.

The choices we make will manifest themselves in how we train, whom we promote, and, of course, how we spend. As I mentioned, President Obama will present his budget later this spring. One thing we have known for many months is that the spigot of defense funding opened by 9/11 is closing. With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department.

But for all the difficulties we face, I believe this moment also presents an opportunity—one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity. To critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements—those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead.

As I've said before, we will not be able to “do everything, buy everything.” And, while we have all spoken at length about these issues, I believe now is the time to take action. I promise you that as long as I remain in this post I will focus on creating a unified defense strategy that determines our budget priorities. This is, after all, about more than just dollars: It goes to the heart of our national security.

I will need help from the other stake-holders—from industry, and from you, the members of Congress. It is one thing to speak broadly about the need for budget discipline and acquisition reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about specific weapons systems and defense priorities based solely on national interests. And then to stick to those decisions over time. The President and I need your help as all of us together do what is best for America as a whole in making those decisions.

I have no illusions that all of this will be solved while I am at the Pentagon. Indeed, even if I am somewhat successful on the institutional side, the benefits of these changes may not be visible for years. My hope, however, is to draw a line and make systemic progress—to put the Department on a glide path for future success.

I look forward to working with each of you to gain your insight and recommendations along the way. Once more, I thank you for all you've done to support the Department of Defense and the men and women wearing our nation's uniform.

I look forward to your questions.

Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Q. You know, what I think everybody is intrigued by is how this is all going to work, because you have a lot of very powerful personalities dealing with foreign policy, with diplomacy, et cetera— Biden, Gates, Jones and you, and the President.

Secretary Clinton. And the President, of course.

Q. Not to forget him. So how is it going to work? Some are saying tug of war—

Secretary Clinton. Oh, no, no. I think we have already established a collegial, effective working relationship. Maybe it's because the people you've just named— the Vice President, National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and I are committed to the same goal, and that is to ensure that the President's policies are effectively carried out.

It is a tremendous honor to be the Secretary of State. But it is a great personal privilege to be the Secretary of State in this Administration, because the goals that have been set and the approach to the world is one that we know is in the best interests of our country going forward. And I've had that reinforced time and again with all of the phone calls that I've been making. There's a great exhalation of breath going on around the world as people express their appreciation for the new direction that's being set and the team that's put together by the President to carry out our foreign policy goals.

And as I said when I came here last week, you know, we view defense, diplomacy, and development as the three pillars of American foreign policy. That's not rhetoric. That is our commitment. That's how we are proceeding. It was significant that the President and the Vice President came on my first day and their second day in office to reinforce that message. I had breakfast this morning with the Vice President, who is an old and dear friend. I was with the President yesterday at the White House, with Senator Mitchell as we had our, you know, pre-departure meeting. I don't think that you can really conclude anything other than, this is a united effort. We have a lot of damage to repair, Jill.

Q. Do you—when you talk about this great exhalation of breath—

Secretary Clinton. Right.

Q. Is that pretty much universal or do you get—are you hearing it from— more from certain quarters than you are from others in the—when you make your calls? And why is there this exhalation of breath? Are people—

Secretary Clinton. Right.

Q. Were people really that fed up with the previous administration?

Secretary Clinton. Well, I think it's a recognition on two counts: one, that where continuity is appropriate, we are committed to doing that. I just got off the phone with the President and Foreign Minister in Iraq to reinforce our commitment to a democratic and sovereign Iraq, and the importance of their provincial elections. In areas of the world that have felt either overlooked or not receiving appropriate attention for the problems that they are experiencing, there's a welcoming of the engagement that we are promising. So it's not any kind of repudiation or indictment of the past eight years so much as an excitement and an acceptance of how we're going to be doing business.

Q. (Inaudible.)

Q. Madame Secretary, speaking of Iran, UN Ambassador Susan Rice talked about—yesterday said, we look forward to engaging in vigorous diplomacy that includes direct diplomacy with Iran. Is that the policy that's been arrived at? The President has spoken about coming up with a comprehensive policy toward Iran. How do you see it unfolding, and will there be someone delegated, such as a Dennis Ross or some other person, to take charge of Iran, in particular?

Secretary Clinton. Well, I think Ambassador Rice was reiterating the President's position, which has been very clear that he reserves the right to engage in whatever way he deems best, at whatever time he chooses to further American interests. And clearly, that is not limited to any one country. It is a broad statement of our approach. We are engaged ourselves in a vigorous policy analysis of a number of problems and challenges that we face around the world. And we will be, you know, rolling out ideas and plans as we go forward.

The President and I thought it was important that we, as quickly as possible, set forth our policies in the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan, because we knew we wanted to reengage vigorously from the very beginning in the Middle East. And, you know, we chose as an envoy someone who—we have great confidence in his ability to do that. And to carry the message from the President, from myself, from our government that, you know, we're going to be working on a series of short-term objectives with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian situation, but that we remain committed to the long-term objective of a comprehensive peace that provides security in the context of a two-state solution for the Palestinians.

With Afghanistan and Pakistan, there has been an ongoing review that was begun under the former administration that has put a lot of actions in motion. And we are engaged very vigorously in trying to assess what has been done before and what we are going to be doing. And we thought it imperative that we had a high-level representative—and in this case, Richard Holbrooke—to be guiding that process with us.

There will be other decisions made as we go forward. But I don't think anyone should be surprised by our willingness to engage, to be active in existing forums, to look for other ways of reaching out on behalf of this new Administration.

Q. Madame Secretary, on Iran, could you—

Q. Madame Secretary, I follow up on Pakistan? Can we follow on Pakistan just to—

Secretary Clinton. We've got one, two—okay.

Q. One of the things in this building—and I know you can't talk about intelligence or these strikes in Pakistan, but one of the things in the building was that people were concerned that that was a great tactical move, getting rid of people along the border, high-value targets, but strategically, because civilians were often hit and it angered some of the Pakistanis, that that was a bad move.

It is clear to people here or people in Pakistan that there were strikes after President Obama was sworn in. Can you just tell us generally how you view something like that? And I know he said—he talked about striking high-value targets if they were there. But is that something you may re-look at because of diplomatic problems with that?

Secretary Clinton. Well, I think your preface to your question was the right one. I am not prepared to talk about that. I think that, as I mentioned, we are looking very broadly and comprehensively at the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and along our borders. I have personally expressed to both President Karzai and President Zardari our concern about civilian casualties. That is an area that, you know, we are following closely. And it will be as we move forward, certainly, a part of our assessment. But there's little doubt in anyone's mind that the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan are a source of instability for Afghanistan, for Pakistan, and far beyond the borders of those two countries. So there will be more to report about our views as to how we're going to proceed in the future.

Q. Can you give sort of a general view about—

Q. Secretary Clinton, on—you talked about looking for other ways to engage. On North Korea, in your testimony, you described the Six-Party process as a vehicle, implying that there were others. Are you looking at possibly a more intensive, direct U.S.-North Korean negotiation as a way to try to move forward?

And on Iran, President Obama in his interview with Al Arabiya last night, according to the transcript, said—you know, he echoed the clenched fist, open hand. But he said specifically, you know, as Iran opens its—unclenches its fist, it will find an open hand. That sounded almost as if the ball was in their court. And I wonder if you can give us any sense of how you will judge whether Iran is willing to engage in some kind of a negotiation with the United States. Do you want to do that informally? Do you want to do that through third parties? Do you want to do that through non-officials like Mr. Pickering, for example, who has contacts with the Iranians to some degree? Or do you actually think it's—you're going to have to have an official gauge that?

Secretary Clinton. Well, you have raised a number of questions that we are in the process of assessing ourselves. With respect to North Korea, I think the Six-Party Talks are essential. They've not only been a useful forum for the participants to deal with the challenge of North Korea's nuclear program and the other issues that are part of the North Korean agenda, but within the Six-Party Talks there have been bilateral meetings. And we are going to pursue steps that we think are effective. And I think I'll leave it at that. But it is important that I underscore what we see as the significance of the Six-Party Talks. They've been useful not only vis-à-vis North Korea, but among the participating nations on related matters in the region.

With respect to Iran, there is a clear opportunity for the Iranians, as the President expressed in his interview, to demonstrate some willingness to engage meaningfully with the international community. Whether or not that hand becomes less clenched is really up to them. But as we look at the opportunities available to us, we're going to have a very broad survey of what we think we can do. The P-5+1 talks, which will reconvene next week, I believe, are an already existing vehicle that we will again monitor. And there's just a lot that we are considering that I'm not prepared to discuss.

Q. Madame Secretary, in your confirmation hearings, you signaled that you plan to engage Syria, and you were talking about being in touch with the chargé d'affaires on the ground there to see about engaging. Do you see talking to Syria as an initial, kind of, step that, possibly within the context of George Mitchell's mission, can you start bringing Syria in on an Israel-Palestinian front and possibly start engaging that way?

And also, both you and the President in the wake of the Israeli-Hamas conflict have talked a lot about the plight of Palestinians while recognizing Israel's right to self-defense, but you've put a lot of emphasis on the Palestinian plight. And I was wondering if you think that the Israeli campaign, given the fact that Hamas is still in control of Gaza and still on the ground and not completely decapitated, do you think that that was a counterproductive mission?

Secretary Clinton. You know, I think we've said all we're going to say about the Israeli-Palestinian situation as we send our envoy out. I think we want to give him the opportunity to listen and bring back his impressions and information. And we are at this moment focused only on the Israel-Palestinian track. And I think it's important to put the emphasis where it rightly belongs. We have, as I said, some short-term objectives such as a durable ceasefire, which as you know has receded somewhat today because of the offensive action against the IDF along the border.

But of course, we're concerned about the humanitarian suffering. We're concerned any time innocent civilians, Palestinian or Israeli, are attacked. That's why we support Israel's right to self-defense. The rocket barrages, which are getting closer and closer to populated areas, cannot go unanswered. And it's, you know, regrettable that the Hamas leadership apparently believes that it is in their interest to provoke the right of self-defense instead of building a better future for the people of Gaza.

We are supporting the efforts by the Palestinian Authority under President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad to try to support the humanitarian efforts. We will participate with our own contributions. The United States is currently the single largest contributor to Palestinian aid, and we will be adding even more because we believe that it's important to help those who have been damaged and suffering.

But again, this is one of those situations that we're going to await the report of our envoy. I mean, that's why we chose Senator Mitchell. We have a lot of confidence in his knowledge of the area and his political ear, so you not only hear what people say but what the meaning behind the words might be. So we're going to wait and let him report back to us about the way forward.

Mr. Wood. Mark, last question. Please make it brief.

Q. And Syria—

Mr. Wood. Mark's last question.

Q. Madame Secretary, your colleague—now your colleague, Tim Geithner, raised some eyebrows with comments he made about China in his written testimony to the Senate. And I know that you are interested in the State Department having a robust role in economics as well as diplomacy. My question is about China. Should we read anything broader into what he said? Could we expect the Administration to have a slightly more vigorous diplomacy toward China? And also, what role do you see for the State Department in that relationship? Would you like to see State be the central player? I know under Mr. Paulson, he sort of consolidated a lot of that at the Treasury Department.

Secretary Clinton. Well, Mark, we need a comprehensive dialogue with China. The Strategic Dialogue that was begun in the Bush Administration turned into an economic dialogue, and that's a very important aspect of our relationship with China, but it is not the only aspect of our relationship.

So we're going to be working together in the government across our agencies to design a more comprehensive approach that we think will be more in keeping with the important role that China is playing and will be playing as both a regional and international player on so many important issues.

So I look forward to working with my colleagues in government, in the White House, Treasury Department, and elsewhere, in forging such an approach. And I look very much forward to working with my counterparts in the Chinese Government, because I think there is—there are many opportunities for us to cooperate going forward.

And given the current global economic crisis, you know, we have to work our way through that with the minimum amount of damage to global capacity to restart the economy. You know, obviously, our economic problems here at home mean that people are being laid off not only here in America, but also in China.

And so the economy will always be a centerpiece of our relationship, but we want it to be part of a broader agenda, and that's what we're working to achieve.

Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed by the New York Times in Washington, DC

Q. Well, thank you so much for giving me a couple of minutes. The goal is a really nuanced, substantive profile of Special Representative Holbrooke. Boy, that's a mouthful.

Secretary Clinton. Yes.

Q. You know, that gets—that doesn't so much do a retread of his past, but really talks about the match between man and mission, and how he—what he's done for the last eight years, how he's approached this particular job. And so a lot of the story is about your relationship with him, and so all—pretty much all of the questions are geared to that.

The first thing I wanted to ask you about, though, is to tell me, in as much detail as you can, about the origins of your idea for some sort of special envoy or representative to this region. I understand that it was a trip to the region in '07 and a series of meetings with leaders there that gave you the idea.

Secretary Clinton. Well, thanks, Jodi, and I'm really happy to talk with you about all of this. I do believe, in general, in the utility of special envoys. I have seen the importance of zeroing in with all tools at our disposal on problems from the Irish Troubles to the Balkans, and I knew that the use of special envoys can be very helpful.

In 2007, I went as a senator to Iraq and Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, with two of my colleagues, Senator Bayh from Indiana and Representative McHugh from New York. And we had a series of meetings in both Afghanistan and Pakistan that illustrated dramatically the breakdown in communications between President Karzai and President Musharraf, between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

And it was clear to me that there was a great deal of animosity that could lead to problems between them, and with us as well, in what we were attempting to do. I had a long conversation with both President Karzai and President Musharraf, where each complained at length about the other, and it raised alarm bells in my mind. And when I got back to Washington, I called the White House and I spoke to Steve Hadley, the National Security Advisor, and strongly recommended that the President consider assigning someone to be focused on the area and to interact with the leaders in the two countries.

And that was just not an idea that the Bush Administration thought was worth pursuing. And later, they did appoint General Doug Lute to oversee the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that's not what I was advocating. And I was convinced from '07 on that so long as we remained involved in Afghanistan, and so long as Pakistan would impact what we could do in Afghanistan and also had implications for our security and policies in the region, that having an envoy made a lot of sense.

So when President Obama—President-elect Obama asked me if I would be Secretary of State, I told him in the very first conversation that I can recall that I had some ideas if I were to accept the job that I thought would be important to explore, and among those were the idea of immediately moving on someone for the Middle East and someone for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was positive about the idea. He told me to pursue it, work it up, get back to him.

And after I accepted the position and began looking at the broad array of problems that we were going to inherit, I put the Middle East, Pakistan-Afghanistan, among others, at the very top of the list, and began the process of, you know, recruiting people for both of those posts.

And you know, it took some time, and I talked to a lot of people.

But I must confess that from the beginning, I recommended that Richard Holbrooke be the person that I and the President would send to Pakistan and Afghanistan. And I was, you know, delighted when the President agreed and we were able to work the necessary preliminaries from, you know, early—really, late December to mid January so that we could be in a position—because I wanted to nominate our two envoys for the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan as soon as possible. And I explained to the President why I thought that would be an excellent way to, you know, get started and make a statement about what our priorities were, and he agreed. And as you know, we were able to accelerate the process and make the announcements, you know, on the second day of my—you know, of his tenure and the first day of mine.

Q. Sure. And I would love—I mean, aside from the completely obvious parts—his achievements in the Balkans, et cetera, et cetera, his immense, long experience—can you talk a little bit about the specific match between man and mission? You said that immediately you sort of knew that Ambassador Holbrooke was the right person for this particular job. And you know, some of that is completely obvious to me, but since he was such a close advisor of yours so long—for so long, I'm curious about what qualities you saw in him that matched particularly well with the Af-Pak situation.

Secretary Clinton. Well, as I have said many times, and as the President has reaffirmed, you know, we have to make diplomacy and development at the center of our foreign policy and national security. And I have said, we have got to be smarter about how we exercise our power, and at the heart of smart power are smart people. And as he has proven many times over his long career in service to our country, they don't come any smarter or more capable than Richard Holbrooke.

You know, at his introduction ceremony, both the President and I emphasized that nowhere is the need for a vigorous diplomatic approach more apparent than in the two regions that epitomize the nuance and complexity of our interconnected world than the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan. Richard represents the kind of robust, persistent, determined diplomacy that the President intends to pursue, and that I'm honored to help him fulfill.

And when I think about what we're facing in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I believed that, you know, Richard brought a lifetime of experience. He's passionate about securing peace in situations where it does not exist. He has seen the cost of conflict in terms of human lives with his own eyes going back to the early 1960s in Vietnam. He is single-minded in his desire to make the world a more peaceful place. And I know from many, many hours of conversation, going back many years, that he has a preexisting concern for Afghanistan. As a young diplomat, he traveled through Afghanistan. During the last eight years as he pursued his many interests, and particularly his work on behalf of the Asia Society, he returned to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the neighbors.

And the best way to know how somebody will handle a difficult situation is to look at what they've done in the past. And I've known of Richard Holbrooke for decades. I watched him up-close in the Clinton Administration. I admire deeply his ability to shoulder the most vexing and difficult challenges. And he does bring relentless focus and energy. He can wear you out, but it is necessary to keep everybody, you know, on point about what we're trying to achieve.

Q. Okay, great. And talk—let me just finish typing that quote, to keep everybody—can you talk a little bit about the art of managing Richard Holbrooke? I mean, this is a guy who even his closest friends admit that he is loving—you know, and they say this lovingly, that he can be overbearing, that he's this enormous force of nature, that he can break a little crockery in the process of doing some very noble things. Can you talk a little bit about—since you are his boss—a little bit about, over the years, the best ways you've found to direct and focus him?

Secretary Clinton. Gee, I'd never heard that he could be any of those things before. You know, personally, because I do know him so well, I understand what drives him and, you know, how mission-oriented he is. He's a consummate professional, and he is always looking for ways to advance the real and lasting solutions that are in pursuit of American interests and values. And obviously, you know, like any, you know, really focused and passionate person, occasionally he has to be, you know, brought down to earth and reined in so that he, you know, doesn't levitate or, you know, levitate the rest of us.

But he is someone who, you know, is really such a dedicated public servant that I, you know—I am, you know, really grateful he took on this responsibility. It takes—you know, it takes a big change in his life to be able to relocate and do this. But I think that, you know, many—you know, many people who have worked with Richard over the years know that he's someone who, you know, just doesn't quit, is always trying to be creative and flexible, but without losing sight of what's most important. He's not somebody who gets—you know, loses the forest for the trees. He wants to count every tree, but at the end of the day, he wants to try to, you know, create the conditions that will lead to peace.

Q. Okay. Yeah, well, let's do a couple of sort of fact-checky type things. These are things that I've been reporting that I would love your read on. Can you explain a little bit how control of the embassies in Islamabad and Kabul will work? I mean, does—essentially, does he have direct control over those embassies? Or will they work through the regular State Department machinery?

Secretary Clinton. Oh, you know, they'll work through the regular State Department machinery, but in collaboration. You know, we have many Foreign Service and Civil Service professionals, you know, at State and in the countries, who have been and will continue to be, fully engaged on Afghanistan and Pakistan. You know, they are among the best we have. There are a lot of people of deep experience and expertise. They've been dedicated, often at great peril and personal sacrifice, and they're going to be the underpinning of everything that our government does to achieve peace and stability in the region.

Obviously, I expect everyone to work together. And you know, we're going to be, you know, looking to, you know, Richard to provide, you know, leadership. But we also will be, you know, seeking out the advice and opinions of others who have roles that are important in helping us determine our way forward.

Q. Mm-hmm. Okay, great. Now, this is definitely something I want to check with you because it involves a pretty private conversation. Someone—not Richard, I should note—told me, obviously second or third hand, that when the President first approached you about the Secretary of State job, that your sort of initial, immediate reaction had been to say, I really think Richard Holbrooke might be the best Secretary of State. You know, I just wanted to run that by you before we even think of putting it in the paper.

Secretary Clinton. Well, I never comment on conversations with presidents. I started that when my husband was president, and I'm going to continue it now—

Q. Okay.

Secretary Clinton.—working for President Obama.

Secretary Robert Gates and General James E. Cartwright delivered these remarks in Arlington, VA

Secretary Gates. Before taking your questions, I'd like to just say a few words about where we are with the budget process.

In recent weeks, we've been working with the Office of Management and Budget to prepare for the submission of the president's fiscal year 2010 Defense budget. The discussions have been cordial and productive.

Irrespective of what the budget top line ultimately is, as I indicated in my congressional testimony last month, this department faces difficult choices among competing priorities and programs. I believe we must make those choices. In doing so, we will be looking at the budget in terms of efficiencies to be realized, programs with serious execution issues, and strategic reshaping to make sure the budget reflects the need to balance current and future capabilities and the president's priorities.

With respect to supplemental appropriations, Congress has made clear its desire that the department should migrate as much as the predictable war cost as possible into the base budget. The department's budget proposal put together last year with a much higher top line was an attempt to begin this process.

It is now clear that with today's economic realities, we are unable to place as much as the war cost as we would have liked as soon as we would have liked into the base budget. Nonetheless, there is broad agreement that that's the direction we should go, and I'm confident that over time we will get there.

In closing, I want to thank the Senate for acting on the confirmation of three senior Department of Defense officials: Michele Flournoy as undersecretary for policy; Jay Johnson as general counsel; and Bob Hale as the Defense comptroller. They reported for work this morning and are hard at it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the president today ordered an interagency policy review on Afghanistan and Pakistan ahead of the April NATO summit. And I'm just wondering—this is one more review on this issue, and I'm wondering, do you foresee additional U.S. brigades on the ground in Afghanistan before that NATO summit?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think the president will have several options in front of him, and I think he will—he will make those decisions probably in the course of the next few days. I think that there is a realization that some decisions have to be made before the strategic review is completed, if—if only because if he does decide to send at least an additional brigade combat team, even just one, the next one to go would need to be notified pretty quickly. So I think there will be a need for decisions before the strategic review is completed, but he has several options in front of him.

Q. Have you made a recommendation to the president?

Secretary Gates. I have, and that has been a—those recommendations have been the subject of discussion by the principals and by the deputies committee. I think it's a very constructive, deliberative process. This is—this is the first time that this president has been asked to deploy large numbers of troops overseas, and it seems to me a thoughtful and deliberate approach to that decision is entirely appropriate.

Q. A question for both of you.

The president said last night that the central government in Afghanistan seems detached from what's going on there. Is it your view that the right choice for the U.S. going forward is a strategy that essentially bypasses the central government in favor of more local contacts?

Secretary Gates. I have felt since I took this job that—that we needed to focus not just on the central government, but also on the provincial and district governments; that—that—that these have always played an important role in Afghan history. That doesn't mean we walk away from efforts to help build a more effective—help the Afghans build a more effective central government, and one that provides services and security, but I think it does mean also that we focus our attention also on government in both the—at both the district and the provincial level. I don't think it has to be one or the other.

General Cartwright. And I'd just add that just going one way or the other makes you very predictable. You'd like to get at both ends of the spectrum, so to speak, here: get a presence out there that allows you to establish local security as well as work the central government piece, and then start working them toward each other.

Q. I have a budget question, since you opened up with that. What was your initial reaction when OMB came back to you with this $527 billion top-line figure? Were you disappointed, accepting, happy about it?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think it was a place to begin a dialogue. We have had that dialogue. There are questions of definitions—does—do certain things belong in the supplemental or do they belong in the base budget? Where do certain kinds of health costs go?

So that's been sort of the thrust of the dialogue over the last couple of weeks. And as I said, I think it's been a constructive one. I'm certainly satisfied with the process.

Q. One follow-up. Is it fair to anticipate that the (2)010 budget will have some program terminations versus cuts or reductions? You implied some programs that weren't executing properly—I mean, program cut kills versus just cuts?

Secretary Gates. I think I would leave it the way I did in my opening statement, that one of the three areas we will be looking at as we develop the details of the '10 budget is programs that are having difficulties being executed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you about the nagging case of next-war-itis that continues in the building. In this morning's Washington Post, there was a full-page, full-color ad calling—by the builders and unions of the F-22 to continue production of that plane, to keep the country safe. Nearly half the Congress has written to President Obama, saying we need to keep buying this plane and 183 is not enough. You yourself have said 183 is about the right number. How do you convince these folks that you're right and they're misguided?

Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, there have been no decisions made in this building about the F-22. It's obviously one of the programs that, along with a number of others—many others—that we will be looking at.

It is my hope that we can present a budget to the president and then to the Congress that addresses all three of the areas that I talked about: efficiencies, in terms of reducing cost; dealing with programs that are being poorly executed or having execution problems; and then strategic shaping to ensure the balance between current and future needs.

My hope is that if we present a coherent whole, a holistic approach to the budget that demonstrates seriousness of purpose, that people will see the logic in what we've put together and conclude that it's in the best interests of the country as a whole. But that doesn't—I don't want to foreshadow any of the decisions I'm going to make. But the strategy is to approach it from all three of these avenues and try and make a compelling case that as a—what serves the nation best is this combination of measures in all three of these areas.

Q. Can we talk about—just go back to the numbers of troops in Afghanistan, which I'm sure you think we're obsessed with. But I know Admiral Mullen mentioned 30,000, and that would be about it. I think you've been careful to talk in terms of brigades. Is 30,000 accurate? And if so, if you'd explain again, why stop there?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think, first of all, there is no cap, and—but what I have said is that—and I think it is better to focus on units and capabilities as we talk about this. But I have said, and I said as recently as the testimony two weeks ago today, that—that once we had—if the president agreed to—ultimately to satisfy the standing request from General McKiernan, I would be deeply skeptical about further troop deployments beyond that.

I worry a lot about the size of the foreign military footprint in Afghanistan. And so, you know, I don't want to get into the specific numbers, but once we have satisfied General McKiernan's request, if that is the president's decision, then I think—and I hope that the strategic review that's under way will sort of point a path forward in terms of what we think the right number or the right size of the— of the foreign military presence in Afghanistan should be, depending on the conclusions of the review.

Q. And the goal of those troops is what?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think in the short term, the goal of those troops is—is to—at least the initial ones that would deploy—is to bring greater security in places like Helmand by being a permanent presence there—by being a long-term presence rather than flying out by helicopter for a day's operations or a couple of days' operations and then flying back to their base, they would be a continuing presence, and thereby, along with their Afghan partners, enhance the security of the population. I think that's important in terms of particularly the elections coming up. But in terms of the mission for those troops long term, I think that's what will be recommended by the strategic review.

General Cartwright. I would just add, you know, in addition to the local security are the local Afghan forces and the Afghan army, and bringing them into the mix, training them in the area, getting their proficiency up. That's what's going to relieve the stress on our forces. The sooner we can do that, the sooner our forces can come down.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has reached out officially to President Obama and asked for a meeting with President Obama. Can you confirm that that has occurred through official channels or that the Iranians have reached out to other senior American officials at this time?

And, General Cartwright, how concerned are you about the satellite launch? How close are the Iranians to having a ballistic missile capability? Is there any potential for a military-to-military relationship with the Iranians in the near future?

Secretary Gates. Any kind of official outreach from Ahmadinejad to the president or to other senior U.S. officials is news to me.

General Cartwright. The space launch that occurred—a space program and the technologies associated with a space program are technologies that are compatible with/commensurate with an intercontinental ballistic missile-type capability. So we have to worry about the transfer of that technology or the use of that technology for ballistic-missile-type capabilities that in range could basically range the United States and many of the European allies and the regional partners that we have. So you have to be concerned about that.

That's not an automatic. It doesn't happen in a day or two. And the work that they have done thus far is, at best, rudimentary—very low orbit, very minimal energy to get up there. This is not a longrange missile, but it is the path toward that, so we have to worry about that.

Q. And military-to-military relationship, any potential in the near future that you see as an icebreaker potentially?

Secretary Gates. With Iran?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Gates. Not at this point.

Q. The other half of the Afghan buildup is the Iraq drawdown. How close is the president to making decisions on either his 16-month withdrawal plan or some of the other options that you've presented to him?

Secretary Gates. I think that the review of options for Iraq—well, the review of options for Iraq has not really begun yet. The focus so far has been on Afghanistan. I expect that to—that review to take place fairly soon. I think that the situation on the ground in Iraq allows us to make the next series of decisions with respect to Afghanistan with greater flexibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night the president said that the White House will was in the process of reviewing the Pentagon's policy on the return of remains to Dover, in conversations with the Pentagon. Clearly, over your two-year tenure, you have maintained the policy of allowing no coverage of the return of remains at Dover. Can I ask you why that is, since it's been seen in the past? After all these years of the war, why not let Americans see this ceremony and the final full measure?

Secretary Gates. I actually asked about possibly changing the policy at Dover probably a little over a year ago. The answer that I—that I got back—and partly it was the result of contacts with the families—is that if the news media were at Dover, many of the families would feel compelled to be there for those ceremonies for their fallen hero. And for some families, this would delay the return of the remains home. For others, it would be a financial hardship to get to Dover. And there were some privacy concerns.

I think that looking at it again makes all kinds of sense. I have asked that we review it again, in response to the president's interest and the president's statements. And we will do so, and I've put a fairly short deadline on that effort.

Q. Can we ask you a little more? Did you ask for that today, since the president—subsequent to the president making his remarks last night?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Q. When will you—when have you asked for an answer by? And can you envision any method in which Americans could be allowed to see this?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think—you know, from a personal standpoint, I think, if the needs of the families can be met and the privacy concerns can be addressed, the more honor we can accord these fallen heroes, the better. So I'm pretty open to whatever the results of this review may be.

Q. Have you ever been up there to see one of these?

Secretary Gates. Actually, I was scheduled to go and had to cancel.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the president has outlined, at least in very broad strokes, a very aggressive arms control agenda going forward. Can you say whether or not you have been a participant in discussions with him on this sort of series of things that he wants to do, not just with the Russians but a fissile cutoff treaty, perhaps stopping development of a new nuclear warhead? The list goes on. Have you talked to him about it? And what do you see as your role here in the Pentagon in helping to execute that very aggressive, ambitious agenda?

And perhaps, General Cartwright, you could comment on it, too.

Secretary Gates. Well, I think what you've laid out is an agenda. It's not surprising that, three weeks into the administration, serious reviews of these issues has not yet begun. This department will be an integral player in those discussions, as it has been ever since we started arms control with the Russians. And it'll be our job to identify pros and cons of various proposals and identify—and help identify options for the president with the risks and benefits of each of those options for his decision. But we clearly will be an integral player.

General Cartwright. And I would—I would just add, there—as you say, there are some trigger events that are coming— START and some of the other treaties— that need to be looked at. But to look at this in isolation would not give us the best look.

So again, going back to the three principles the secretary laid out of our reviews, doing this in the context of our conventional forces, of our irregular warfare responsibilities, what's the appropriate balances? How does this fit? How do these bilateral treaties fit in a global construct—all of those questions need to be addressed this time around?

Q. Mr. Secretary and General, do you think that General McKiernan needs all the troops that he's asked for, regardless of what strategy is adopted? And if not, what strategies are under serious consideration that might allow him to get by with fewer troops?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think that's exactly the purpose of the strategic review, is to identify what those—what those alternatives might be.

Within the framework of the mission that he currently has, as I have done with the commanders in Iraq, I give great deference to the commander in the field as to what he needs. And it's my job to try and satisfy those needs. If his mission changes, then the number of troops or the capabilities that he would need, would change one way or the other as well. So I think we just have to wait until the conclusion of the strategic review in terms of the—of the strategies going forward.

Q. But briefers have suggested that regardless of the strategy, you need to improve the security, which you said would be the goal—the primary goal with the troops. So is there some strategy out there that would not require that?

Secretary Gates. That's what the strategy review is about, is to find—it seems to me, is to find that out. What are the options open to the president in terms of our longer-term approach in Afghanistan?

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talked about the president is expected to make a decision in the next few days, is that for all the troops you recommended going to Afghanistan or a portion of them?

Secretary Gates. I think it—it—the options before him give him several ways of going forward, including the pacing of troops going to the—going to Afghanistan. So the answer to your question will depend on the decisions he makes.

Q. Well, as a quick follow up, it's getting warmer in Afghanistan. In a month it will get even—you will get to the point where there's the seasonal uptick in attacks. How many troops—or what is the thought of putting as many troops as possible in Afghanistan ahead of the fighting season?

Secretary Gates. Well, I'm not going to prejudge the decisions that the president's going to make. We've laid out the options, we've discussed them, and he'll make his decisions.

Q. Just in December, you were in Kyrgyzstan speaking about what an important transit point Manas Air Force Base is. We haven't heard anything official, but it seems pretty apparent it's going to close in the next six months or so. Can you talk a little about whether you see—how you see this impacting Afghanistan, any possible other transit locations that are under negotiations right now?

Secretary Gates. Well, I would say that Manas is important, but not irreplaceable. We are looking at alternatives. We have not foreclosed the possibility that Manas would remain open. We're looking at whether, given the importance that Manas plays and the likely growing importance of Manas, whether there is something we ought to do differently in terms of compensation.

By the same—by the same token, we're not prepared to stay there at any price. And so, as I say, I think we're exploring a variety of options, and I think we have some alternatives. But clearly Manas is important to us.

Q. Do you still—or do you consider the negotiations still open at this point?

Secretary Gates. I think so, yeah.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

As you know, North Korea seems to be ready to fire Taepo Dong missile, capability to reach West Coast of the United States. What do you think their intention is?

Secretary Gates. Well, since the first time that they launched the missile—it flew for a few minutes before crashing— the range of the Taepo Dong II remains to be seen. So far, it's very short.

I'm not going to get into intelligence reports, but it would be nice if North Korea would focus on getting positive messages across to the—to its negotiating partners about verification and moving forward with the denuclearization.

Q. Mr. Secretary and General, when you launched the surge and increased deployment lengths to 15 months, that was done so at the risk of potentially overstretching or overstressing an already strained force. We've still seen indicators throughout the times since then—divorce rates, suicide rates and so forth being up—that there are strains in the military. What's your assessment of the health of the force since you've taken—taken the office? And, General, you too; I'd like your comments as well, since you took over and from that point forward to now.

Secretary Gates. Well, there's no question in my mind that the 15- month tours were very, very hard on our troops and on their families. And I think we moved to get back to 12 months deployed just as quickly as we could.

My hope is that we will begin to see a lengthening of the dwell times beyond a year, perhaps toward the latter part of this year. And I think it will incrementally lengthen over time. We won't go straight from one year deployed to two years at home; we'll more likely go from one year deployed to 15 months at home to 18 months at home and so on.

And I think with the growth in the end strength of both the Army and the Marine Corps, the draw downs likely to come in Iraq that we will see that situation improve over the next couple of years. We have put a lot of effort—the services have put a lot of effort into efforts to help the families, particularly in the last two or three years, and to address some of the stresses that we're dealing with.

I think that part of problem in terms of the strains that you describe, whether its divorce rates or suicides—or I would say PTSD—that these are a manifestation also of repeated tours. It's not just the length of the tour, but the fact that so many have gone back for two and three and even four rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I think it's a combination of all of those things.

I think that the force as a whole is incredibly resilient and their families incredibly strong. But there's no doubt that there is additional stress.

General Cartwright. I would just add, one, having experienced, when I was younger, 15-month tours—and they are very, very difficult—it's very different— very difficult to be sitting in a tent and realize that next year you'll be there too. That's first.

And second, even though we have stopped the 15-month tours—we're not doing those anymore—not all of them have come home yet.

So the cumulative effect is very important to understand, number one. And number two, we aren't done with the 15-month tours. They're not home yet. And so that's another benchmark that we've got to cross before we can expect to see some of this work—some of these rates start to move in a positive vector.

But I think the bigger issue here is the cumulative effect. We've got to start to understand, whether it's 12 months or 16 or 15 months, what's the cumulative effect, how many of these tours, and when do we start to cross? Is it 15 months at home versus a year deployed? Is it two years?

We've got work to do there to understand this long term. And we're watching this very closely. The services are watching it very closely.

Q. General, what's your assessment of the current state of readiness of the force?

General Cartwright. A great force— resilient, motivated. Every time I go to the theater—and that probably shouldn't be a benchmark because when somebody like me shows up, they're going to show you the best face they can—but when you talk to the families, when you close the doors, you still get a very strong, very resilient force.

The uptick most recently in the suicide; very troubling. We're trying to understand that, for the Army. This is the first time that the Army has come up to the level of its counterpart, the civilian sector, so to speak. And so we're trying to understand, is this cumulative? Is there—is there something that is a trigger event here? And we're working with several agencies on the national health side to try to understand this.

But I believe the force is very resilient and very much ready to do the job.

Q. Okay. The last time the North Koreans tried to shoot a Taepo Dong, the missile defense system was put on alert and the U.S. was prepared to shoot it down if it came in the direction of American territory. Do you intend to do the same if the North Koreans proceed with their preparations?

Secretary Gates. I certainly intend to make sure that my colleagues—the secretary of State, national security adviser, president and vice president—understand what our capabilities are, and that that's an option out there should—should we deem it necessary.

On Afghanistan

There is no more solemn duty as President than the decision to deploy our armed forces into harm's way. I do it today mindful that the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan demands urgent attention and swift action. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and al Qaeda supports the insurgency and threatens America from its safe-haven along the Pakistani border.

To meet urgent security needs, I approved a request from Secretary Gates to deploy a Marine Expeditionary Brigade later this spring and an Army Stryker Brigade and the enabling forces necessary to support them later this summer. This increase has been requested by General McKiernan and supported by Secretary Gates, the Joint Chiefs and the Commander of Central Command. General McKiernan's request for these troops is months old, and the fact that we are going to responsibly drawdown our forces in Iraq allows us the flexibility to increase our presence in Afghanistan.

This reinforcement will contribute to the security of the Afghan people and to stability in Afghanistan. I recognize the extraordinary strain that this deployment places on our troops and military families. I honor their service, and will give them the support they need.

This increase is necessary to stabilize a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has not received the strategic attention, direction and resources it urgently requires. That is why I ordered a review of our policy upon taking office, so we have a comprehensive strategy and the necessary resources to meet clear and achievable objectives in Afghanistan and the region. This troop increase does not pre-determine the outcome of that strategic review. Instead, it will further enable our team to put together a comprehensive strategy that will employ all elements of our national power to fulfill achievable goals in Afghanistan. As we develop our new strategic goals, we will do so in concert with our friends and allies as together we seek the resources necessary to succeed.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Minister Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Clinton. Good afternoon. I was very pleased to welcome the minister and his delegation here to the State Department. As you know, we are consulting very closely with the Government of Pakistan on our strategic review of our way forward. And I'm very grateful for the minister's advice and counsel, and I look forward to further discussions and to having him back here tomorrow night for dinner along with his counterparts from Afghanistan. Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Foreign Minister Qureshi. Thank you.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you. It was a pleasure. Thank you all very much.

Q. Mr. Minister, do you have any concerns that the 17,000 troops announced by President Obama going into southern Afghanistan will push the Taliban further into areas of Pakistan like Baluchistan? And Secretary Clinton, did you assure the minister that you'll work with Pakistan on that?

Secretary Clinton. Well, we're going to save our comments for when we have something to say about the results of our joint efforts. And there is a very open and fully consultative—a full consultative process which we will be working on, and many of these issues will be discussed among us.

Thank you all very much.

Foreign Minister Qureshi. We had an excellent meeting. There's a convergence between us, there's a willingness to work together, and I see a lot of hope in the new Administration, the new leadership. And Pakistan is willing to work with the American Administration to fight extremism and terrorism. We are determined to defeat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Clinton. Well, I want to speak on behalf of the United States Government in thanking the delegations led by the foreign ministers for coming to Washington for these three valuable and unprecedented days of trilateral United States-Pakistan-Afghanistan talks. These have been in-depth, very specific, open, forthright, and I believe extremely useful.

Our basic purpose was to exchange views on the strategic issues now being reviewed in our policy review by the Obama Administration. That goal has been amply fulfilled.

Now, these meetings would have been valuable even if they had simply been bilateral. If we had met with our Pakistani friends, if we had met with our friends from Afghanistan, that would have been important. But what makes these last three days especially meaningful is that they were trilateral. We have all been working together. There have been numerous meetings, including the full delegations, a dinner last night, and of course, this meeting today.

I therefore am very pleased to announce that we will continue this new trilateral format on a regular basis. Our next meeting is tentatively scheduled for late April or early May.

I thank my friends and colleagues. Both ministers have been extraordinary, eloquent, making very important statements. The representatives from both the civilian and military sectors of both governments have been not only forthcoming, but very receptive, listening one to the other. And I thank you for these talented delegations and for your participation and support.

Our three nations have a common goal, a common threat, and a common task. And my government commits itself to our friends and to the success of this common endeavor.

Thank you all very much.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Clinton. I want to thank Minister Spanta and the delegation from Afghanistan for a series of excellent meetings. They have been, as you know, meeting with the—our government and with the Pakistani delegation. I have just finished a very productive discussion. There will now be a trilateral meeting between our government and the delegations from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I thank the minister. Thank you so much.

Foreign Minister Spanta. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to express sincere gratitude and appreciation to Secretary Clinton. Afghanistan is proud of its strategic partnership with the United States of America. Together, over the past seven years, we've come a long way in our joint efforts to combat terrorism and achieve stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and in the region.

Afghanistan is grateful for President Obama's personal commitment to Afghanistan. His decision to review U.S.-Afghanistan policy is a clear sign of his determination to see Afghanistan's success as we move forward in consolidating our past achievements and tackling challenges at this time.

Discussion will result in cementing our bilateral relations and our partnership. Madame Secretary, I thank you very much again, to give us this opportunity to come together with our Pakistani friends and brothers to discuss the problems of security in our region. I can ensure you Afghanistan is committed with you to address the menace of terrorism and to work together, closely together on democratization of Afghanistan and its stability.

Secretary Robert Gates and Minister Hervé Morin delivered these remarks in Arlington, VA

Q. Well, I would like to speak to Mr.

Gates. Mr. Gates, a few weeks or months ago you mentioned the efforts made by 20 countries in Afghanistan, and are you a little disappointed by the fact that France is not contributing additional troops?

And if you will allow me, I'd like to ask a second question. Mr. Morin yesterday suggested we set a date for the withdrawal of international troops in Afghanistan. Is that also something that you wish—withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan? Thank you.

Secretary Gates. Well—the problem with two-part questions is, I always forget the first part.

Q. I don't mind asking that same question again. I was just reminding you that not too long ago—

Secretary Gates. I got it. The—first of all, I think it's important to recall that France has over 3,000 troops in Afghanistan at this point and so is making a significant contribution.

I think that my focus, particularly beginning at the Krakow meeting, was really more to encourage our partners to consider civilian experts. This is an area where we have very limited additional capacity in the United States, and so my focus at Krakow for all of our partners was really more on what could be done in terms of civilian capacity, whether to help governance or police training or economic development and so on. And so that was—to the degree we discussed it, that's pretty much what we talked about.

With respect to a date, I think that one of the—we would all like to have a situation in which our mission in Afghanistan has been completed and we can bring our troops home. I do not see that happening any time in the near future. And I think it's impossible to put a date on when you might firmly say all the troops are coming out.

I think that the objectives that we have and milestones, in terms of measuring achievement of those objectives, is really a principal focus of the strategy review that is under way, on the American side, and where we have been consulting with our partners. And I think we will have a much better idea of the way forward, at least as far as the United States is concerned, when that review is complete. Andrew.

Minister Morin. I never mentioned a withdrawal date per se. What did I say? What I said is that we will stay as long as necessary. And so I've been able to note that every time I talked, with a partner, we were able to underscore the capacities and the talent of the French military in this operation.

Also the president often mentioned that we do not want to stay forever. And that is the work that we are doing today, in order to try to see to it that Afghanistan can have security and sovereignty.

Regarding the processes, we viewed it as taking place within the Obama administration—(inaudible)—NATO. What we were both saying, during our meeting, is that we need a process which is military and civilian.

We need a development process. We need means and capacity to make it possible for Afghanistan to really take control of its own security in its many facets. And we also needed to set objectives, goals. We needed to set milestones for ourselves, with goals that are clearly defined, for the different topics.

Thereby we would be able to who public opinion that these mid- term goals are being met and that as this takes place, we have an avenue, a perspective which is defined and which is presented to public opinion. And we are able to see that one day, we will be able to indeed withdraw from Afghanistan.

That is what I explained yesterday and which I can repeat today. We will stay as long as necessary. As the president of the republic said, and as we all say here, we do not want to stay forever.

Thirdly, with regards to what is going on at an American administration level or within the alliance, we need qualitative and quantitative goals, as well as intermediary steps. This makes it possible to define a perspective and tell our public [watching us] that one day we will, indeed, be able to let the Afghans manage their country. That is what I said. And what I was actually seeing is that this was perfectly in line with the thinking of the American administration—objectives and milestones, right?

Secretary Gates. Andrew?

Q. Mr. Secretary, question for each of you on Afghanistan. First of all, for you, Mr. Secretary, Minister of Defense Wardak, who was here last week, as you know, said that the increased talk in the United States of modest goals of [luring] expectations from Afghanistan worried Afghans, reminded them of the 1990s, when they were abandoned. What do you say to that criticism of this increasing talk from you and others of being more modest about your goals?

And then for the minister, following on from the secretary's discussion about increased civilian help for Afghanistan, are you willing to offer more civilian help, such as a provincial reconstruction team, which I believe France doesn't have in Afghanistan at the moment?

Secretary Gates. When I met with Minister Wardak last week, he raised this concern. And I think that his—and by the time I talked to him, which was—actually, I didn't talk to him until Monday—yesterday. And I think that the conversations that he had here in Washington last week provided considerable reassurance to him that nobody was talking about abandoning Afghanistan, but rather we were trying to come up with shorter-term goals where we could measure progress. And I think that he was considerably reassured by that.

Minister Morin. I don't really have anything to add. What is our objective? I have said this yesterday. There's really a simple objective. Our objective is for Afghanistan to be a sovereign nation that can provide for its own security over the long term, provide for the security of the Afghan people, that the Afghans can live in peace.

Q. (Off mike.)

Minister Morin. I've already answered that question a number of times. We have already contributed an additional 1,000 troops over the past 12 or 18 months, 250 or 300 within the framework of OMLT; that is, training of the Afghan army. And that's exactly what we're talking about over lunch. For us to be able to leave Afghanistan one day, we need to have an emergence of all those elements which are indeed factors for the sovereignty of a country. We made an effort vis-a-vis the Afghan army. We also need—that a significant effort is necessary for the Afghan police. We know that there are significant shortcomings there.

Now, France contributed almost 300 people for training purposes, and almost 1,000 troops within the framework of our new responsibilities in the eastern region, in the Kapisa Valley. So this is something which is actually unmet by any other European country. There's no other European country that made such an effort over the course of the past 18 months. And so we feel that we have already done part of our job, if you will.

As far increasing civilian means, it is an avenue that the European Union should explore. And this actually is evidence of the potential for complementarity between NATO and the European Union.

Sir?

Q. I wanted to ask you, back on Afghanistan, about Hamid Karzai, your concerns now that he has called for early elections. Everyone virtually says it will be very difficult, because you can't register Afghans, and that security will be problematic if he wants elections by April 21st.

Can I ask for your assessment, your assessment about Karzai right now? What do you think he is up to? And do you still agree with President Obama's last statement, that the Afghan leadership appears disconnected from what's going on in their country?

Secretary Gates. Well, I would just say this. I think that President Karzai is trying to deal with the reality that the Afghan constitution says that his term of office is over on May 22nd. And he is very concerned, as best I can understand it. He is very concerned about, if he remains as president, after that time, a concern about the appearance, at least the appearance if not the reality of illegitimacy in that office.

Now, you have the international elections group as well as ourselves saying that we think it would be difficult to arrange a fair and free election and a relatively secure election, in Afghanistan, before August. And so I think what is in— what is happening here is an effort to try and figure out what is the best way to bridge the period from May 22nd to an election in August.

And I think it's a legitimate concern on the president—on the part of President Karzai. And I think the international community, as well as the different elements in the Afghan government and parliament, are trying to figure out the right way forward here.

Q. (Off mike)—just a few weeks away. Are U.S. troops going to be fighting in a country when we're not really sure who's running the country? Do you think if he stays past April 21st, he will have a legitimate government? What's the U.S. position on this?

Secretary Gates. I believe that—I believe that there will be a government in Afghanistan after May 22nd that has legitimacy and has support for that legitimacy from different elements of the country and government.

Thank you all.

Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in Brussels, Belgium this. And you know, what can the State Department really do, given that you have to work through intermediaries in dealing with Iran?

And on a side issue, do you foresee Iran as being part of that conference on Afghanistan that you're suggesting for later this month?

Secretary Clinton. I am very concerned about this young woman. She is an Iranian-American. She has been living in Iran. She has worked as a journalist, including for NPR. And she has been in prison in Tehran, or elsewhere in Iran, for the last month. We have been working through our intermediaries, the Swiss Government, to request information from the Iranian Government concerning her well-being, her whereabouts, and the charges that are being used to confine her. We have pressed very hard. We will continue to do so.

We believe there is only one outcome to this matter, and that is for her to be released as soon as possible to return home to her family in North Dakota. And we hope and expect that we will receive an affirmative response along those lines from the Iranian Government.

It is frustrating since we do not have any direct contacts with Iran that we must work through intermediaries, but I want to thank the Swiss for the assistance that they have provided us in this and other matters.

I want to extend my deepest concern to her family and her friends, and hope that this matter will be resolved quickly.

With respect to the meeting that we discussed today at the ministerial, we presented the idea of what is being called a big tent meeting with all the parties who have a stake and an interest in Afghanistan. That would obviously include NATO members, ISAF members—many of whom are not NATO members—donors, nations that have regional, strategic, and transit positions vis-à-vis Afghanistan, international organizations.

And we have presented this idea, which is being discussed—nothing has been decided—as a way of bringing all the stakeholders and interested parties together. If we move forward with such a meeting, it is expected that Iran would be invited as a neighbor of Afghanistan.

Q. Madame Secretary, to—about this conference about Afghanistan, I know that you make a link between Afghanistan and Pakistan, speaking of the same problem. Are you afraid that somehow both are going to have the same kind of problems? And the other question is: Why so close visits to NATO—you, and next week, the Vice President? Are you going to express different points of view or—

Secretary Clinton. No. We take this very, very seriously, and it shows our intense commitment not only to NATO and our partnership with NATO, but to our shared commitment with respect to Afghanistan.

Today's ministerial was an important opportunity for me to represent the United States and express the direction that we are headed in our policy review about Afghanistan and Pakistan. But there wasn't time, and we knew there wouldn't be time, for one-on-one meetings with very many of the countries that are here. In fact, we hardly had time to catch a breath today.

We wanted the Vice President to come immediately after my visit to both continue the conversations, which are ongoing, but also to be able to meet in a bilateral way with members, as well as with the NATO leadership, to explore in depth some of the ideas, some of the questions—the potential contributions —that could be put on the table leading up to the summit in April.

I think that the whole question about Afghanistan and Pakistan is one that we've given a great deal of thought to. It is clear that the border areas between the two countries are the real locus of a lot of the extremist activity. It's becoming obvious that Pakistan faces very serious internal threats, and that Afghanistan faces continuing external threats that emanate out of Pakistan.

Last week I met, along with a number of members of our Administration, with delegations from both countries in the first of what will be a continuing trilateral engagement. I believe that both countries

Q. Thank you, Madame Secretary. NPR and ABC News today are appealing to Iran to release information about this freelancer, Roxana Saberi, who has been imprisoned in Evin prison. I'm wondering what you've learned through Swiss intermediaries about recognize that they share common threats, and even common adversaries. The tragic events the other day in Lahore with the attack on the Sri Lanka cricket team, which was a very eerie replica of the attack in Mumbai, demonstrate the ongoing threats that Pakistan faces.

Of course, we know what Afghanistan confronts, so it made sense to us in our country to look at both nations' concerns together. Because we think that there has to be more cooperation between them, as well as with NATO and others in order to hopefully tackle successfully—on both a military and a civilian strategic basis—the threats that they face that spill over to other countries in a very dangerous way.

Secretary Robert Gates was interviewed by NPR

Q. We start this hour with an interview with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. I spoke with him earlier today at the Pentagon about Iraq and mostly about Afghanistan.

More U.S. troops are bound for Afghanistan. Vice-President Biden today asked the NATO allies to provide more help, and President Obama has said it's possible the U.S.might reach out to some elements of the Taliban. Those facts raised questions about the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.

Is the mission still to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban or is it to gain a strong enough position to cut a reasonable deal with the reasonable elements of the Taliban?

Secretary Gates. Well the specific mission is clearly one of the subjects under review by the administration right now and I think we have to wait until that's done to have real clarity on that. But I would say that at a minimum the mission is to prevent the Taliban from retaking power against the democratically elected government in Afghanistan and thus turning Afghanistan potentially again into a haven for al Qaeda and other extremist groups.

Q. Is it realistic to count on NATO committing any more combat troops to Afghanistan or is that ultimately going to be a U.S. role?

Secretary Gates. I think that they are committing additional troops to provide security for the election. I'm not sure that they'll be there for a prolonged period of time, but they certainly would be there through the August elections. I'll leave it to them to make the announcements but I think others—that they are going to send more troops. You know, the allies have sent all the troops that they have committed to send. It hasn't been that they have failed to follow through on their commitments. It's that the need is greater than the commitments that have been made to this point. And so we would like more help, but I would say that really where we need the help is on the civilian side, whether it's agricultural specialists or people who can help with governance, economic development and so on.

Q. Just like you to elaborate on a phrase that you used in Senate testimony when you dismissed the idea of transforming Afghanistan, an extremely poor country, into some kind of central Asian Valhalla—your phrase. One interpretation of that is, “look, so long as they don't harbor terrorists, or they don't harbor people that menace other countries, so be it. They may remain tribal, they may remain misogynist, they may remain not very democratic, that's OK with us.”

Secretary Gates. What I was really referring to was that we need to have goals at least in the near to mid term that are achievable and where there are some benchmarks where we can measure whether we are actually making progress and getting to a better place in Afghanistan in terms of security, in terms of credibility of the government and so on. How are we doing in our partnership with the Afghans, both the government and the people. So really what I was trying to differentiate was goals that are 10 or 20 or 30 years in the future in terms of a completely democratic, corruption free, fully economically developed ally—

Q.—that's the Valhalla you were talking about.

Secretary Gates.—that's the Valhalla, and I think that's a little ways in the distance.

Q. But it seems very late in the game in Afghanistan to even use the phrases “short term versus mid term gains.” Isn't this already the long term?

Secretary Gates. Well, we've been there close to, I guess, seven years at this point. But the reality is that this situation really began to go downhill again about 2005, 2006, as the Taliban began to take advantage of their safe haven on the Pakistani side of the border to begin to reinfiltrate into Afghanistan and create security problems. And we've really just been responding to that.

Q. So you would see this more as two different acts here, two different phases of the war in Afghanistan: the relatively successful first phase and then the resurgence of the Taliban after that?

Secretary Gates. I think that's reasonably fair.

Q. And Act III is now supposed to commence, at least containing the Taliban or pushing them back?

Secretary Gates. Well I don't know whether it's Act III or just the prolongation of Act II, but clearly we all still have our work cut out for us.

Q. I'd like to ask you about Iraq. In his speech at Camp Lejeune, President Obama said this: “Under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iarqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.” And later that day you said we should be prepared to have some very modest sized presence for training and helping them with their new equipment and providing perhaps intelligence support and so on. Do you believe that all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011, and are you and the President on the same page here?

Secretary Gates. Well, we certainly are on the same page. The fact is that if there is no new agreement with the Iraqis there will be zero U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of 2011. What I was alluding to is that I think it's at least possible that the Iraqis in 2011 will come and say, “We need some logistical support; we need some intelligence support. Can you provide us some very limited help?” I don't know whether that will happen. That's pure speculation on my part. But the President's statement is absolutely clear and it conforms to our current commitments. And that is according to the agreements we've signed we will have everybody out of Iraq at the end of 2011. And unless something changes that's exactly what will happen.

Q. And something would have to change on the Iraqi side, their desire to have us stay on?

Secretary Gates. I think it would have to be at the Iraqis' initiative. And we would have to determine whether, the President would have to determine whether he wants to do that.

Q. I want to ask you a little bit about intelligence. In two huge jobs that you've held in Washington, you've encountered the issue of bad intelligence. When you were at CIA, you've been faulted for having not foreseen the collapse of the Soviet Union, having overestimated perhaps their strengths. Here you've been part of the cleanup brigade after Iraq where there were many intelligence misjudgments. Where does this leave you in terms of your thinking about intelligence, about going to war and about the wisdom that we have about the world?

Secretary Gates. Well, if intelligence has its flaws, and it does, so does most of the writing about intelligence. As, for example, the fact that the Agency missed the collapse of the Soviet Union—

Q. You dispute that analysis—

Secretary Gates. At length, and I think that the record demonstrates that we were preparing for the collapse of the Soviet Union at least two or three years before it actually happened. But I think that a big part of the issue is how intelligence is used by policymakers. Intelligence—and this has always been a difficult message to convey to intelligence professionals—do a so-so job of predicting the future. They really do a very good job of telling you what's going on right now around the world. But forecasting—the truth of the matter is they're not a lot better than anybody else. And I think policymakers need to understand that.

Q. Right now, do you think we're getting a good picture of what is happening in Iran, say, the country that many of us are very concerned about?

Secretary Gates. Well, obviously some targets are much more difficult than others. Iran is a very difficult target, North Korea is a very difficult target. Cuba has been a very difficult target. I mean, the truth of the matter is, for decades our intelligence hasn't been terrific on some of these places. I think there's a lot of effort to try and make it better. But there's still a lot of uncertainty out there.

Q. Secretary Gates, thank you very much for talking with us today.

Secretary Gates. My pleasure.

Q. There have been debates in Washington for forever over whether we are capable of waging two wars at one time, whether we have a military large enough for that, having inherited this situation when we were at war in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What's the lesson, is two wars at once perhaps biting off more than we can effectively chew even if we're willing to spend a trillion dollars at it?

Secretary Gates. Our military planning for a number of years has—and I would say going back at least 20 years—has been to have the ability to fight two major combat operations simultaneously. One where it would be an aggressive effort and another where you might have to hold for a while and then finish the job. I think one of the central questions that this department will face in the Quadrennial Defense Review, which will begin shortly, is whether that model makes any sense in the 21st century and whether what may have fit in a Cold War environment or an immediately post-Cold War environment really has application to today's world.

Q. And the experience of the past few years suggests some rethinking is need there in terms of what our doctrines are?

Secretary Gates. I think so.

President Barack Obama delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

President Obama. Good morning. Please be seated.

Before I begin today, let me acknowledge, first of all, Your Excellencies, all the ambassadors who are in attendance. I also want to acknowledge both the civilians and our military personnel that are about to be deployed to the region. And I am very grateful to all of you for your extraordinary work.

I want to acknowledge General David Petraeus, who's here, and has been doing an outstanding job at CENTCOM, and we appreciate him. I want to thank Bruce Reidel—Bruce is down at the end here—who has worked extensively on our strategic review. I want to acknowledge Karl Eikenberry, who's here, and is our Ambassador-designate to Afghanistan. And to my national security team, thanks for their outstanding work.

Today, I'm announcing a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And this marks the conclusion of a careful policy review, led by Bruce, that I ordered as soon as I took office. My administration has heard from our military commanders, as well as our diplomats. We've consulted with the Afghan and Pakistani governments, with our partners and our NATO allies, and with other donors and international organizations. We've also worked closely with members of Congress here at home. And now I'd like to speak clearly and candidly to the American people.

The situation is increasingly perilous. It's been more than seven years since the Taliban was removed from power, yet war rages on, and insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Attacks against our troops, our NATO allies, and the Afghan government have risen steadily. And most painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war for American forces.

Many people in the United States—and many in partner countries that have sacrificed so much—have a simple question: What is our purpose in Afghanistan? After so many years, they ask, why do our men and women still fight and die there? And they deserve a straightforward answer.

So let me be clear: Al Qaeda and its allies—the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11 attacks—are in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban—or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged—that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.

The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan. In the nearly eight years since 9/11, al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This almost certainly includes al Qaeda's leadership: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They have used this mountainous terrain as a safe haven to hide, to train terrorists, to communicate with followers, to plot attacks, and to send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the American people, this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world.

But this is not simply an American problem—far from it. It is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it, too, is likely to have ties to al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at stake.

For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people—especially women and girls. The return in force of al Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.

As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future. We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and our allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists.

So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That's the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: We will defeat you.

To achieve our goals, we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy. To focus on the greatest threat to our people, America must no longer deny resources to Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq. To enhance the military, governance and economic capacity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we have to marshal international support. And to defeat an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war, we must recognize the fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan—which is why I've appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who is here, to serve as Special Representative for both countries, and to work closely with General Petraeus to integrate our civilian and military efforts.

Let me start by addressing the way forward in Pakistan.

The United States has great respect for the Pakistani people. They have a rich history and have struggled against long odds to sustain their democracy. The people of Pakistan want the same things that we want: an end to terror, access to basic services, the opportunity to live their dreams, and the security that can only come with the rule of law. The single greatest threat to that future comes from al Qaeda and their extremist allies, and that is why we must stand together.

The terrorists within Pakistan's borders are not simply enemies of America or Afghanistan—they are a grave and urgent danger to the people of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and other violent extremists have killed several thousand Pakistanis since 9/11. They've killed many Pakistani soldiers and police. They assassinated Benazir Bhutto. They've blown up buildings, derailed foreign investment, and threatened the stability of the state. So make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within.

It's important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in going after al Qaeda. This is no simple task. The tribal regions are vast, they are rugged, and they are often ungoverned. And that's why we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. And after years of mixed results, we will not, and cannot, provide a blank check.

Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders. And we will insist that action be taken—one way or another—when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets.

The government's ability to destroy these safe havens is tied to its own strength and security. To help Pakistan weather the economic crisis, we must continue to work with the IMF, the World Bank and other international partners. To lessen tensions between two nuclear-armed nations that too often teeter on the edge of escalation and confrontation, we must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan. To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and the Pakistani people. And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting opportunity.

A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. Al Qaeda's offers the people of Pakistan nothing but destruction. We stand for something different. So today, I am calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorizes $1.5 billion in direct support to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years—resources that will build schools and roads and hospitals, and strengthen Pakistan's democracy. I'm also calling on Congress to pass a bipartisan bill co-sponsored by Maria Cantwell, Chris Van Hollen and Peter Hoekstra that creates opportunity zones in the border regions to develop the economy and bring hope to places plagued with violence. And we will ask our friends and allies to do their part—including at the donors conference in Tokyo next month.

I don't ask for this support lightly. These are challenging times. Resources are stretched. But the American people must understand that this is a down payment on our own future—because the security of America and Pakistan is shared. Pakistan's government must be a stronger partner in destroying these safe havens, and we must isolate al Qaeda from the Pakistani people. And these steps in Pakistan are also indispensable to our efforts in Afghanistan, which will see no end to violence if insurgents move freely back and forth across the border.

Security demands a new sense of shared responsibility. And that's why we will launch a standing, trilateral dialogue among the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our nations will meet regularly, with Secretaries Clinton and Secretary Gates leading our effort. Together, we must enhance intelligence sharing and military cooperation along the border, while addressing issues of common concern like trade, energy, and economic development.

This is just one part of a comprehensive strategy to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the al Qaeda safe haven that it was before 9/11. To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban's gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government.

Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy. Our civilians have made great sacrifices. Our allies have borne a heavy burden. Afghans have suffered and sacrificed for their future. But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq. Now, we must make a commitment that can accomplish our goals.

I've already ordered the deployment of 17,000 troops that had been requested by General McKiernan for many months. These soldiers and Marines will take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east, and give us a greater capacity to partner with Afghan security forces and to go after insurgents along the border. This push will also help provide security in advance of the important presidential elections in Afghanistan in August.

At the same time, we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. That's how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our own troops home.

For three years, our commanders have been clear about the resources they need for training. And those resources have been denied because of the war in Iraq. Now, that will change. The additional troops that we deployed have already increased our training capacity. And later this spring we will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security forces. For the first time, this will truly resource our effort to train and support the Afghan army and police. Every American unit in Afghanistan will be partnered with an Afghan unit, and we will seek additional trainers from our NATO allies to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner. We will accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011—and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward.

This push must be joined by a dramatic increase in our civilian effort. Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. The people of Afghanistan seek the promise of a better future. Yet once again, we've seen the hope of a new day darkened by violence and uncertainty.

So to advance security, opportunity and justice—not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces—we need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers. That's how we can help the Afghan government serve its people and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs. And that's why I'm ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. That's also why we must seek civilian support from our partners and allies, from the United Nations and international aid organizations—an effort that Secretary Clinton will carry forward next week in The Hague.

At a time of economic crisis, it's tempting to believe that we can shortchange this civilian effort. But make no mistake: Our efforts will fail in Afghanistan and Pakistan if we don't invest in their future. And that's why my budget includes indispensable investments in our State Department and foreign assistance programs. These investments relieve the burden on our troops. They contribute directly to security. They make the American people safer. And they save us an enormous amount of money in the long run— because it's far cheaper to train a policeman to secure his or her own village than to help a farmer seed a crop—or to help a farmer seed a crop than it is to send our troops to fight tour after tour of duty with no transition to Afghan responsibility.

As we provide these resources, the days of unaccountable spending, no-bid contracts, and wasteful reconstruction must end. So my budget will increase funding for a strong Inspector General at both the State Department and USAID, and include robust funding for the special inspector generals for Afghan Reconstruction.

And I want to be clear: We cannot turn a blind eye to the corruption that causes Afghans to lose faith in their own leaders. Instead, we will seek a new compact with the Afghan government that cracks down on corrupt behavior, and sets clear benchmarks, clear metrics for international assistance so that it is used to provide for the needs of the Afghan people.

In a country with extreme poverty that's been at war for decades, there will also be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies. Now, I have no illusion that this will be easy. In Iraq, we had success in reaching out to former adversaries to isolate and target al Qaeda in Iraq. We must pursue a similar process in Afghanistan, while understanding that it is a very different country.

There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who've taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course. And that's why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province. As their ranks dwindle, an enemy that has nothing to offer the Afghan people but terror and repression must be further isolated. And we will continue to support the basic human rights of all Afghans—including women and girls.

Going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable. We'll consistently assess our efforts to train Afghan security forces and our progress in combating insurgents. We will measure the growth of Afghanistan's economy, and its illicit narcotics production. And we will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals.

None of the steps that I've outlined will be easy; none should be taken by America alone. The world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos or al Qaeda operates unchecked. We have a shared responsibility to act—not because we seek to project power for its own sake, but because our own peace and security depends on it. And what's at stake at this time is not just our own security—it's the very idea that free nations can come together on behalf of our common security. That was the founding cause of NATO six decades ago, and that must be our common purpose today.

My administration is committed to strengthening international organizations and collective action, and that will be my message next week in Europe. As America does more, we will ask others to join us in doing their part. From our partners and NATO allies, we will seek not simply troops, but rather clearly defined capabilities: supporting the Afghan elections, training Afghan security forces, a greater civilian commitment to the Afghan people. For the United Nations, we seek greater progress for its mandate to coordinate international action and assistance, and to strengthen Afghan institutions.

And finally, together with the United Nations, we will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region—our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia, India and China. None of these nations benefit from a base for al Qaeda terrorists, and a region that descends into chaos. All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development.

That is true, above all, for the coalition that has fought together in Afghanistan, side by side with Afghans. The sacrifices have been enormous. Nearly 700 Americans have lost their lives. Troops from over 20 countries have also paid the ultimate price. All Americans honor the service and cherish the friendship of those who have fought, and worked, and bled by our side. And all Americans are awed by the service of our own men and women in uniform, who've borne a burden as great as any other generation's. They and their families embody the example of selfless sacrifice.

I remind everybody, the United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan. Nearly 3,000 of our people were killed on September 11, 2001, for doing nothing more than going about their daily lives. Al Qaeda and its allies have since killed thousands of people in many countries. Most of the blood on their hands is the blood of Muslims, who al Qaeda has killed and maimed in far greater number than any other people. That is the future that al Qaeda is offering to the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan—a future without hope or opportunity; a future without justice or peace.

So understand, the road ahead will be long and there will be difficult days ahead. But we will seek lasting partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan that promise a new day for their people. And we will use all elements of our national power to defeat al Qaeda, and to defend America, our allies, and all who seek a better future. Because the United States of America stands for peace and security, justice and opportunity. That is who we are, and that is what history calls on us to do once more.

Thank you. God bless you, and God bless the United States of America.

Secretary Robert Gates was interviewed by Fox News

Q. Let's start with President Obama's mission statement Friday on the new strategy in Afghanistan. Here it is:

“That we have a clear and focused goal—to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

President Bush used to talk about building a flourishing democracy. Has President Obama narrowed our mission and, if so, why?

Secretary Gates. I think the near-term objectives have been narrowed. I think our long-term objective still would be to see a flourishing democracy in Afghanistan.

But I think what we need to focus on and focus our efforts is making headway in reversing the Taliban's momentum and strengthening the Afghan army and police and really going after al Qaeda, as the president said.

Q. I'm going to pick up on that. The president said that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks against the U.S. homeland. Does al Qaeda still have that kind of operational capability to plan and pull off those kinds of attacks?

Secretary Gates. They certainly have the capability to plan and, in many ways, they have metastasized, with elements in North Africa, in the Levant, in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere.

And they aren't necessarily directly controlled from al Qaeda in western Pakistan, but they are trained there. They often get guidance from there and inspiration from there.

So I think they do have those capabilities. They clearly have been inhibited by all the things that have been done over the last six or seven years.

Q. When you say they still have those capabilities to pull off an attack on the U.S. homeland, do you still regard them as a very serious threat?

Secretary Gates. I still regard them as a very serious threat, yes.

Q. U.S. commanders in the field wanted more combat troops than the 17,000 that President Obama committed. Why did he decide against committing all of those additional combat troops, and will there be enough for the kind of counterinsurgency living among the population, protecting the population, that was so key to the success of the surge in Iraq?

Secretary Gates. Well, let me be very clear about this. The president has approved every single soldier that I have requested of him. I have not sent any requests for units or troops to the president so far that he has not approved.

Now, the reality is I've been at this a long time, and I don't think I've ever, in several decades, run into a ground commander who thought he had enough troops. That's probably true in all of history.

But we have fulfilled all of the requirements that General McKiernan has put down for 2009. And my view is there's no need to ask for more troops, ask the president to approve more troops, until we see how the troops we—he already has approved are in there, how they are doing, what the Europeans have done. And we will be reviewing that, come the end of the year.

Q. And are there enough for the kind of counterinsurgency tactics, living in the population, protecting the population, that we saw so successful in Iraq?

Secretary Gates. Well, based on the requirements that have been levied by General McKiernan for 2009, that would be his view, I think.

And the reality is there already are a lot of troops there. This will bring us, when all is said and done, to about 68,000 troops plus another 35,000 or so Europeans and other partners.

Q. What kind of long-term commitment has the president given you? Has he promised you that he will stay in Afghanistan until the Taliban, in fact, are—and al Qaeda—are defeated?

Secretary Gates. He has clearly—he clearly understands that this is a very tough fight, and that we're in it until we're successful—that al Qaeda is no longer a threat to the United States and that we are in no danger of either Afghanistan or the western part of Pakistan being a base for al Qaeda.

By the same token, I think he's been clear—and, frankly, it was my view in our discussions that we don't want to just pursue—settle on this strategy and then pursue it blindly and open-endedly.

And that's why I felt very strongly that toward the end of the year or about a year from now we need to reevaluate this strategy and see if we're making progress.

Q. But the strategy is subject to review. The commitment to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban, is that subject to review?

Secretary Gates. I don't think so.

Q. That is the commitment?

Secretary Gates. Certainly to defeat al Qaeda, and make sure that Afghanistan and western Pakistan are not safe havens for them.

Q. There were reports this week that elements of Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, are providing the Taliban and other extremists with money, supplies, even tips on allied missions against them.

One, is it true? And two, if so, can we stop it?

Secretary Gates. Well, the way I would answer is to say that we certainly have concerns about the contacts of—between the Pakistani intelligence service and the—and some of these groups in the past.

But the reality is the Pakistanis have had contacts with these groups since they were fighting the Soviets 20 or 25 years ago when I first was dealing with the Pakistanis on this. And, I must say, also helping make sure that some of those same groups got weapons from our safe haven in Pakistan.

But with people like Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and the Hakani network, the Pakistanis have had contacts with these people for a long time, I think partly as a hedge against what might happen in Afghanistan if we were to walk away or whatever.

What we need to do is try and help the Pakistanis understand these groups are now an existential threat to them, and that we will be there as a steadfast ally for Pakistan, that they can count on us, and that they don't need that hedge.

Q. There's a NATO summit coming up next week in Europe. Have we given up on the idea of getting our allies to send more combat troops to fight alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan?

Secretary Gates. No, we haven't. And in fact I think some of our allies will send additional forces there to provide security before the August elections in Afghanistan.

But I think what we're really interested in for the longer term from our partners and the allies is helping us with the civilian surge in terms of experts in agriculture and finance and governance and so on, to help us improve the situation inside Afghanistan and give a sense of forward progress on the part of the Afghan people.

Also, police trainers. The Carabinieri, the Guardia Civil, these various groups in Europe are really very good paramilitary-type police. And I think they could do a good job in the police training, so those will be probably the principal focus of our request.

Q. New subject. North Korea says that it will launch a communications satellite some time in the next few days. They have, in fact, even moved a missile out to the launch pad.

Several questions. Why are we so troubled by an activity that the North Koreans say is civilian?

Secretary Gates. I think that there—I don't know anyone at a senior level in the American government who does not believe this technology is intended as a mask for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Q. Do we believe that they now have the ability to put a nuclear warhead on top of a missile, as the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Maples, suggested?

Secretary Gates. I think that we believe that that's their long-term intent. I personally would be skeptical that they have the ability right now to do that.

Q. The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Keating, says that we are, quote, “fully prepared to shoot down this missile.”

Are there any circumstances under which we will do that?

Secretary Gates. I think if we had an aberrant missile, one that was headed for Hawaii—that looked like it was headed for Hawaii or something like that, we might consider it. But I don't think we have any plans to do anything like that at this point.

Q. What if it were headed for the West Coast, for Alaska?

Secretary Gates. Well, we—I don't think we believe this missile can do that.

Q. And what about the Japanese? Obviously, they have some of our technology. Do we believe they're going to prepare to shoot this down?

Secretary Gates. Well, again, based on what I read in the newspapers, what the Japanese are saying is that the—if that missile fails and it looks like it's going to drop debris on Japan, that they might take some action.

Q. Is there—you're basically discussing this, Mr. Secretary, as if it's going to happen.

Secretary Gates. The launch?

Q. Yeah.

Secretary Gates. I think it probably will.

Q. And there's nothing we can do about it?

Secretary Gates. Nope.

Q. And what does that say to you?

Secretary Gates. Well, I would say we're not prepared to do anything about it.

Q. There are reports—well, let me—I want to stay with that.

What does that say to you about the North Korean regime, that we and the rest of the world can all say that this is a provocative act, and unlawful act, and they thumb [thei]r noses and we're not going to do anything about it?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think it's very troubling. The reality is that the six-party talks really have not made any headway any time recently. There has certainly been no—

If this is Kim Jong Il's welcoming present to a new president, launching a missile like this and threatening to have a nuclear test, I think says a lot about the imperviousness of this regime in North Korea to any kind of diplomatic overtures.

Q. There are reports that the Obama White House has asked you to cut $2 billion from the next budget for missile defense, roughly 20 percent. Is this president less committed, is he less convinced that this program will work than President Bush was?

Secretary Gates. Well, I don't know about the comparison. I would say—I would tell you that I have not received any specific requests from the White House in terms of our budget.

We'll be talking about that. We have the top-line number. We received what we call a pass-back from the Office of Management and Budget, but I considered the suggestions that they made, simply those suggestions. I've taken some of them, and some of them I haven't.

Q. But do you regard there is a new skepticism in the part of the White House towards missile defense?

Secretary Gates. I think that—I think one of the things that we need to do is sit down and go through the capabilities that we have, the tests that we've been through, and focus on where we need to sustain development, where we need to sustain a commitment to have a capability.

Q. So it sounds like that's under review.

Secretary Gates. I think so.

Q. There are so many trouble spots around the world that I want to do a lightning-round tour of the horizon. I know this not your thing, Mr. Secretary, but let's try to do quick questions, quick answers.

Iraq: Do you see any development so far that might cause you to have to slow down President Obama's time line to pull out of the major cities by this summer and to get our combat troops out by August of 2010?

Secretary Gates. I haven't seen anything at this point that would lead me to think that there will be a need to change the time lines.

Q. Iran: You said recently—you said recently that they are not close to a nuclear weapon. Admiral Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, says that they have enough material to make a bomb.

Is there a contradiction there?

Secretary Gates. No. What they have is probably enough low-enriched uranium from their centrifuges at Natanz to give them the capacity, should they then enrich it more highly, to proceed to make a weapon.

They don't have the capability at this point to enrich. We are suspicious they may be building one clandestinely. We do not believe they are doing enriching beyond a low level at Natanz, and the IAEA is in there, so we will know if they tried to do that.

So I guess the point, the bridge between what Admiral Mullen said and what I've said is they do have enough low-enriched uranium that if they should then proceed to enrich it more highly, they could build a weapon.

Q. You expressed, I think it would be fair to say, extreme skepticism about the ability of diplomacy to alter the behavior of the North Koreans. Do you feel the same way about the Iranians?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think—I think, frankly, from my perspective, the opportunity for success is probably more in economic sanctions in both places than it is in diplomacy.

Diplomacy, perhaps, if there is enough economic pressure placed on Iran, diplomacy can provide them an open door through which they can walk if they choose to change their policies.

And so I think the two go hand in hand, but I think what gets them to the table is economic sanctions.

Q. Couple more questions for the lightning round.

Mexico: The Pentagon issued a report in November on the growing drug violence there that said this, “An unstable Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States.”

Mr. Secretary, how likely is that scenario, that the Mexican government loses control of part of the country?

Secretary Gates. I don't think that's a likely scenario at this point. I think that a lot of the violence is among or between the cartels, as they strive for control of certain areas in Mexico.

I think President Calderon has acted with enormous courage and forcefully in sending troops in to try and get control of that situation. And I think that—

As I think Admiral Blair testified just in the last couple of days, I think that the chances of the Mexican government losing control of some part of their country or becoming a failed state is—are very low.

Q. In January, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs gave a one-word answer, yes, when asked if this president is going to end the policy of don't ask/don't tell for gays in the military.

Where does that stand, and why is there currently money in the 2010 budget to keep enforcing that policy?

Secretary Gates. Well, it continues to be the law. And any change in the policy would require a change in the law. We will follow the law, whatever it is. That dialogue, though, has really not progressed very far.

At this point in the administration, I think the president and I feel like we've got a lot on our plates right now, and let's push that one down the road a little bit.

Q. And finally—and we have just a minute left—President Bush used to talk about the global war on terror.

This administration, this White House, seems to steer away from that. In fact, in his speech on Friday, President Obama talked about a campaign against extremism.

Beyond the words, is there a strategic difference between the way these two presidents see the fight?

Secretary Gates. I think that they both see al Qaeda as a threat to the United States, al Qaeda and its extremist allies. And I think they both have made clear their determination to go after it.

We have the opportunity now that perhaps we did not have before to apply the kind of resources, both military and civilian, against it, and a broader kind of strategy that we did not have before.

Q. But the difference between saying war on terror or campaign against extremism?

Secretary Gates. I think that's people looking for differences where there are none.

Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed by CBS

Q. So on the conference today, the Afghan delegation and some of the people that we've heard from the Afghan delegation were talking about the fact that President Karzai didn't stay to have a press conference as had been suggested he was going to do. I noticed that in his speech, he thanked almost everybody, except Ban Ki-moon before he thanked the U.S. He mentioned everybody else's contribution. And there was no mention particularly of U.S sacrifices. And it just—it seems that the U.S. relationship with President Karzai is at an all time low, and that's certainly what's coming across from the Afghans. How do you feel about that?

Secretary Clinton. I just don't feel that at all. I think that every signal we've had, both before coming here and here at the conference in the public statements as well as in our private meetings have been very positive. We've gotten a lot of reinforcements for the strategic review for the goals. And as we have begun to talk through how we're going to implement the strategy—a lot of cooperation. I wouldn't read too much into anything.

Q. Is there a headline out of the conference today? Is there one particular thing that you felt especially gratifying that you've achieved?

Secretary Clinton. I think the conference itself was a big success. The fact that over 80 countries and organizations came together to pledge support to this new strategy and to ensuring that Afghanistan has a chance to be stable and secure and that we root out al-Qaida and their terrorist allies.

Q. I know it's probably kind of annoying to have the focus so much on Iran when you're trying to have a conference about Afghanistan, and that Iran is not the whole issue. But given that there is so much interest in it, you mentioned the letter. There are a lot of questions about it. Did you sign it? Was it on official letterhead? Who delivered it? Was it Ambassador Holbrooke? Was it at the conference?

Secretary Clinton. It was a letter to the Government of Iran. And the content was, as I have described it, seeking both information and assistance about our three American citizens. And it was delivered directly to the head of the Iranian delegation by a member of our extended delegation. And we hope to hear something positive.

Q. Not delivered by Ambassador Holbrooke?

Secretary Clinton. No.

Q. And did you sign it?

Secretary Clinton. No, it wasn't signed. It was an aide-mémoire, so it did not have to be signed.

Q. On the subject of Iran, there's also an American FBI agent that is missing.

Secretary Clinton. Robert Levinson. He was mentioned in the letter—in the aide-mémoire, which I had prepared. We haven't heard anything about him or from him for two years, I think, now, is the last count. His family is extremely worried and anxious. And on a humanitarian level, I hope that the Iranians will assist us in acquiring information so that we can tell his family what happened and where he is.

Q. On the subject of North Korea, you mentioned that Japan has a right to defend itself from North Korea. A reaction to Japan's statement is somewhat inappropriate. Are you prepared to condemn the missile launch by North Korea?

Secretary Clinton. Oh, we have said it's both provocative and in violation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. We have been very clear about that. They can call it a satellite launch. There is no substantive difference between that and a missile launch. It takes a missile to send up either a warhead or a satellite.

We have no doubt that they are violating the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolution. And we hope that there is still time for them to reconsider their statement that they plan to launch it.

Q. But no one says or thinks that they're going to reconsider doing it?

Secretary Clinton. I don't know. You never know with them. You have no way of predicting their behavior. And at this point, it's regrettable because obviously they have incurred a very legitimate amount of reaction from South Korea, from Japan. Both China and Russia have tried to intervene. We have certainly been very clear. There will obviously be consequences if they do proceed with this.

Q. On the subject of Russia, you hinted in your remarks that there had been some significant meetings in preparation for the meetings of the two presidents. I'm hearing that on the range of issues that the Obama Administration wants to address with Russia, there has been significant progress, short of an agreement right now, but that this is a major step forward in U.S.-Russian relations. Can you—without upstaging the President—can you tell me something more?

Secretary Clinton. What I can tell you is that I personally have had two very productive meetings with Foreign Minister Lavrov—the second, obviously, here at the conference. And that our respective staff have been working diligently for the last several weeks, since my first meeting in Geneva, to prepare an agreed-upon joint statement that our presidents would issue after their meeting to look at what we intend to do to negotiate arms control, the START agreement—which has to be renewed before the end of the year—and to come up with an action plan on the full range of issues.

Now, there are areas where we are going to be able to agree with the Russians and work cooperatively together. Then there is the area of disagreement and we hope to narrow that, so that's why we're working so hard. And we have a real plan. It's not just have a meeting, sit across the table, you say something, I say something, then we go our way.

We're really trying to get into the substance of these issues. And everywhere we can agree or narrow the disagreement, we're going to. And where we disagree, we're going to stand our ground and try to continue to keep talking.

So I think tomorrow's meeting should be a very productive one.

Q. Have they come further and faster than you had thought the Russians would?

Secretary Clinton. Well, I think on both sides there's been an openness to resetting the relationship, and there's been an enormous amount of work that has given real substance to those words.

Q. So this is a major change?

Secretary Clinton. We hope that it will lead to very positive actions. I mean, it is still at the planning stage. But I'm very, very pleased about where we are.

Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in the Hague, Netherlands

Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Minister Verhagen, and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Special Representative Kai Eide, President Karzai, Minister Spanta, friends and colleagues, I want to thank all of you, and especially the United Nations and the Government of the Netherlands for hosting us. I also want to acknowledge the extraordinary contribution of the government and people of the Netherlands to the mission in Afghanistan.

And I want to also acknowledge President Karzai, who fills a critical leadership role in his nation, and whose government helped to shape the shared comprehensive and workable strategy that we are discussing today.

We are here to help the people of Afghanistan prevail against a ruthless enemy who poses a common threat to us all. Afghanistan has always been a crossroads of civilization, and today we find our fate converging in those plains and mountains that are so far and yet so near in this interconnected world to all of us.

Thanks to the efforts of the international community, the perpetrators of the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11—attacks which killed citizens from more than 90 countries—were driven from Afghanistan, and the Afghan people made a promising start toward a more secure future. But since those first hopeful moments, our collective inability to implement a clear and sustained strategy has allowed violent extremists to regain a foothold in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and to make the area a nerve center for efforts to spread violence from London to Mumbai.

The range of countries and institutions represented here is a universal recognition that what happens in Afghanistan matters to us all. Our failure to bring peace and progress would be a setback not only to the people of Afghanistan, but to the entire enterprise of collective action in the interest of collective security. Our success, on the other hand, will not only benefit Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region, but also the blueprint for a new diplomacy powered by partnership and premised on shared interests.

So as we recommit ourselves to meet our common challenge with a new strategy, new energy, and new resources, let us be guided by an ancient Afghan proverb, “patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.”

The plan I outline today is the product of intensive consultations with nations that have donated troops and support; Afghanistan's neighbors and international institutions that play a vital role in Afghanistan's future. The results of these consultations are clear: Our strategy must address the challenge in Afghanistan and Pakistan; it must integrate military and civilian activities and support them with vigorous international diplomacy; and it must rest on the simple premise that while we can and will help, Afghanistan's future ultimately rests with the Afghan people and their elected government. Security is the essential first step; without it, all else fails. Afghanistan's army and police will have to take the lead, supported by the International Security Assistance Force.

President Obama has announced that the United States will deploy 17,000 more soldiers and 4,000 additional military trainers to help build up Afghan security forces. The international community will also have to help. We should provide every army and police unit in Afghanistan with an international partner that can provide training and help build capacity. Our collective goal should be standing up an army of at least 134,000 soldiers and a police force of at least 82,000 officers by 2011. These steps will provide the people of Afghanistan with an opportunity to fight and win their own battle for their nation's future.

We must also help Afghans strengthen their economy and institutions. They know how to rebuild their country, but they need the raw material of progress— roads, public institutions, schools, hospitals, irrigation, and agriculture. The United States is supporting the Government of Afghanistan's National Development Strategy, the National Solidarity Program, and other initiatives that help Afghans improve their lives and strengthen their own communities.

In consultation with the Afghan Government, we have also identified agriculture—which comprises 70 percent of Afghanistan's economy—as the key for development. In the 1970s, Afghans exported food to their neighbors. They were often called the garden of Central Asia. Today, this sector lags far behind, and its problems feed the deadly malignancy of the narcotics trade. The United States is focusing its efforts on rural development in provinces near the Afghan-Pakistan border, and we hope that others gathered here will heed the United Nations' and Afghan Government's call for help throughout the country with job creation, technical expertise, vocational training, and investments in roads, electrical transmission lines, education, healthcare, and so much else.

As we work with the Afghan people to supply these building blocks of development, we must demand accountability from ourselves and from the Afghan Government. Corruption is a cancer as dangerous to long-term success as the Taliban or al-Qaida. A government that cannot deliver accountable services for its people is a terrorist's best recruiting tool.

So we must work with bodies such as Afghanistan's Independent Directorate of Local Governance to ensure that the government at all levels is responsible and transparent. The international community, gathered here, can help by providing auditors and governance experts and training a new generation of civil servants and administrators.

To earn the trust of the Afghan people, the Afghan Government must be legitimate and respected. This requires a successful election in August—one that is open, free, and fair. That can only happen with strong support from the international community. I am, therefore, pleased to announce today that to advance that goal, the United States is committing $40 million to help fund Afghanistan's upcoming elections.

We must also support efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to separate the extremists of al-Qaida and the Taliban from those who joined their ranks not out of conviction, but out of desperation. This is, in fact, the case for a majority of those fighting with the Taliban. They should be offered an honorable form of reconciliation and reintegration into a peaceful society if they are willing to abandon violence, break with al-Qaida, and support the constitution.

Just as these problems cannot be solved without the Afghan people, they cannot be solved without the help of Afghanistan's neighbors. Trafficking in narcotics, the spread of violent extremism, economic stagnation, water management, electrification, and irrigation are regional challenges that require regional solutions.

The United Nations has a central role in this effort to coordinate with the Government of Afghanistan and neighbors in the region to make sure that programs are properly prioritized and well focused. We are committed to working with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and UN Special Representative Kai Eide to achieve that goal. The United States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, will lead American efforts as we move forward, and we welcome the appointment of special representatives by other countries.

If we are to succeed, we will need the help of all the nations present here. As President Obama has pointed out, “the world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos.” While there is great temptation to retreat inward in these difficult economic times, it is precisely at such moments that we must redouble our effort. And as we make commitments and contributions, we must ensure they are flexible enough to respond to immediate needs and evolving opportunities. And we all must be willing to coordinate those efforts together.

The challenge we face is difficult, but the opportunity is clear if we move away from the past. All too often in the past seven years, our efforts have been undermanned, under-resourced and underfunded. This goal is achievable. We know we have made progress where we have made adequate investment and worked together.

The status of Afghanistan's army, the lives of women and girls, the country's education and health systems are far better today than they were in 2001. So if all of us represented here work with the government and people of Afghanistan, we will help not only to secure their future, but ours as well.

Now the principal focus of our discussions today is on Afghanistan, but we cannot hope to succeed if those who seek to reestablish a haven for violence and extremism operate from sanctuaries just across the border. For this reason, our partnership with Pakistan is critical. Together, we all must give Pakistan the tools it needs to fight extremists within its borders.

The Obama Administration has made a strong commitment through our support for legislation called the Kerry-Lugar assistance program. And in a few weeks, we will have a chance to join together in Tokyo for a meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan to provide the support that the Pakistani Government and people need. I urge the nations here today in support of Afghanistan to join us in Tokyo on April 17th to help the people of Pakistan.

This effort has already required great sacrifice and it will require more. But in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we face a common threat, a common enemy, and a common task. So let us use today, this conference, to renew and reinvigorate our commitment and our involvement, and to lay a firm foundation for a safer region and a safer world. It is in the interests of all of the people who we represent as we sit around this conference table here in The Hague, and for the kind of world that we wish to help create.

Thank you very much.

Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in the Hague, Netherlands

Secretary Clinton. Well, good afternoon. This has been an important day because of the emphasis that the world community has placed on Afghanistan. And this conference has achieved everything we hoped it could. It has rallied and united the international community against al-Qaida, it has strengthened the United Nations, and it has increased our commitment to cooperate with every country represented here as we work to address our common challenge.

We have listened to leaders from around the world. We have heard them speak with a single voice. We all recognize the need to support the people of Afghanistan as they build up their security services, strengthen their economy and institutions, and work with their neighbors to build a safer region.

For the people of Afghanistan, I hope that this conference marks a new beginning. We are extremely grateful to the Dutch Government for organizing and hosting this event, and for the people of the Netherlands for their sacrifice and commitment to this mission. The United Nations has played a critical role today, as it does every day, and we support the United Nations in assuming even more responsibility going forward.

Over the course of the day, I've had a series of bilateral meetings that have opened up a number of opportunities that we will pursue. I met with President Karzai, who plays a critical role in providing leadership for his country. We discussed how we will work together to implement the recommendations of the strategic review that was recently completed at the direction of President Obama.

I met with Foreign Minister Qureshi of Pakistan and General Pasha and their delegation. As I said earlier, Pakistan's fight against violent extremism is an integral part of the challenge that we all face in Afghanistan. The work we began here in The Hague will continue at the Pakistan donors meeting in Tokyo on April 17th.

I also met with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in preparation for the meeting between our two presidents tomorrow in London. We are very pleased at the progress that we have made on a range of issues that will be discussed, including Afghanistan, between our presidents.

I also met with Foreign Minister Nakasone of Japan. Again, we discussed Afghanistan and the donors conference that Japan will host on April 17th for Pakistan. And we spent time, as you might guess, discussing our joint efforts to promote security on the Korean Peninsula.

We emerge from this conference even more committed to the common task of helping Afghanistan prevail against a ruthless enemy, and even more united in our efforts to address the broad agenda facing the international community.

So again, we thank the Dutch Government and people for their warm and gracious hospitality. This conference came together in just a little over three weeks, which is a real tribute to both the efficiency and the flexibility of the Government of the Netherlands.

So with that, I'd be happy to take your questions.

Q. Yes, Madame Secretary, can you describe your interactions, if any, with the members of the Iranian delegation here, those of other U.S. officials, and whether you see any hope for cooperation in Afghanistan with the Iranians?

Secretary Clinton. Well, let me start by saying that today was an important day for Afghanistan, and we did make a lot of progress toward our commitment to achieve success and security. And the fact that we had a broad attendance by the international community, including neighbors, was central to the success of this conference.

As I said coming into this, the United States, Iran, and all of the nations who were here today have mutual interests in a stable and secure Afghanistan. And the intervention by the Iranian representative set forth some very clear ideas that we will all be pursuing together.

In the course of the conference today, our Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke had a brief and cordial exchange with the head of the Iranian delegation. It did not focus on anything substantive. It was cordial, it was unplanned, and they agreed to stay in touch.

Separately, at my direction, a letter was delivered to the Iranians focusing on three U.S. citizens currently unable to return to the United States from Iran: Robert Levinson, Roxana Saberi, and Esha Momeni. In the letter, we asked Iran to use all of its facilities to determine the whereabouts and ensure the quick and safe return of Robert Levinson. We also asked that Iran grant the release of Roxana Saberi and permission to travel for both Roxana Saberi and Esha Momeni. These acts would constitute a humanitarian gesture by the Islamic Republic of Iran in keeping with the spirit of renewal and generosity that marks the Persian New Year.

Q. Thank you. Madame Secretary, can you tell us in your interactions in Ambassador Holbrooke's meeting, was it clear to you how Iran can be helpful in drug trafficking and reconstructing Afghanistan while disagreeing fundamentally with President Obama's new plan and the increase of American troops on the ground?

If you can also indulge me with a quick North Korea question, given that you just met with the foreign minister of Japan, do you—are you concerned about the fact that North Korea just said today that if Japan were to intercept the missile to be launched, that would be the beginning of a war?

Thank you.

Secretary Clinton. Well, first let me underscore that I, myself, did not have any direct contact with the Iranian delegation. I described to you the two contacts, the one by Special Representative Ambassador Holbrooke and the other the delivery of the letter. But I did think that the Iranian intervention this morning was promising. The questions of border security and in particular the transit of narcotics across the border from Afghanistan to Iran is a worry that the Iranians have which we share, and we will look for ways to cooperate with them. And I think the fact that they came today, that they intervened today, is a promising sign that there will be future cooperation.

I think, too, on the response by North Korea regarding the Japanese right to defend itself, it is an unfortunate and continuing example of provocation by the North Koreans. We have said repeatedly that their missile launch violates UN

Security Council Resolution 1718, and there will be consequences certainly in the United Nations Security Council if they proceed with the launch. But Japan has every right to protect and defend its territory from what is clearly a missile launch that could very well be aimed at their nation and cause some consternation among the Japanese Government and public.

Q. Mrs. State Secretary, this morning you said that we should reach out to the moderates in the Taliban. But isn't that the same as negotiating with terrorists, which clearly has not been a U.S. policy so far? Thank you.

Secretary Clinton. No, it isn't. I mean, what I said is the policy of the Government of Afghanistan and a recognition by a number of nations that the Taliban consists of a hard-core of committed extremists with whom there is not likely to be any chance of any kind of reconciliation or reintegration. But it is our best estimate that the vast majority of Taliban fighters and members are people who are not committed to a cause so much as acting out of desperation.

And therefore, an offer of not only reconciliation, but a chance for them to be reintegrated into Afghan society, to perhaps have employment, to get help with their property in terms of preparing it for agricultural production, we think that there are a number of people who are currently in the Taliban who would accept such an offer.

Now, it has to be proven that they are willing to walk away from the Taliban. We did see quite a bit of this in Iraq, where people who had taken up arms against the United States and against the coalition and against the elected Iraqi Government decided to walk away from their involvement in return for the position in society and a job that was offered to them. And I think that this is very likely the course that we can take with respect to members of the Taliban, too.

Q. Okay. Sorry, we don't not speak English, but (inaudible).

What's the plan for the Afghan women in new strategy for their improvement? Because as we've seen the past, there were some—there were just some (inaudible) for the women in Afghan society. Is there new changes in the new strategy?

Secretary Clinton. Well, there's a continuing commitment to women and girls, to their well-being, to their education, their healthcare, to their full integration into society that I am very committed to, as is President Obama. So this is an area of absolute concern on the part of the United States. We're looking for ways that can produce even more opportunities for women and girls in Afghanistan.

I've briefly met with some of the women parliamentarians who are here at the conference. And my message is very clear: Women's rights are a central part of American foreign policy in the Obama Administration; they are not marginal; they are not an add-on or an afterthought.

I believe, as does President Obama, that the roles and rights of women in any society is a key indicator as to the stability and potential for peace, prosperity, and democracy of that society. So I would be committed to women's roles and rights because of my lifelong concern about women. But as Secretary of State, I am equally committed because it's absolutely the smart strategy for the United States and other nations to pursue.

You cannot expect a country to develop if half its population are underfed, undere-ducated, under cared for, oppressed, and left on the sidelines. And we believe strongly that that's not in the interests of Afghanistan or any country, and it certainly is not part of our foreign policy or our strategic review. So we will continue to work very hard on behalf of women and girls in Afghanistan and around the world.