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What is Asian security architecture?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2010

WILLIAM T. TOW and
BRENDAN TAYLOR
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Abstract

‘Architecture’ has emerged as the new catchphrase in Asian security politics. Despite its growing centrality, insufficient attention has thus far been given to defining the term, often leading to its imprecise usage. This article seeks to redress that shortcoming. It reviews the ways in which various scholars and practitioners have employed the term ‘security architecture’ and highlights the anomalies that their often differing employment has created. The article proposes a set of guidelines to aid conceptualisation and application of the term. In so doing it establishes criteria to ascertain what ‘security architecture’ actually exists in the Asian region, and must ultimately exist to assure regional security.

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Type
Research Article
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Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , January 2010, pp. 95 - 116
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

Introduction

The beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right name.

Chinese proverb

‘Architecture’ has become the new catchphrase when discussing Asian security politics. The recent proliferation of multilateral security diplomacy and institutions in this region has spawned a burgeoning scholarship employing this term. Policymakers have likewise embraced the architectural metaphor. Yet there has been little systematic effort to define explicitly what ‘security architecture’ means. Accordingly, scholars and practitioners of Asian security have ended up using a common term to describe a range of structures and processes related to cooperative activity.

This outcome is not altogether surprising, as similar difficulties have been encountered in achieving consensus on such key International Relations (IR) concepts as ‘order’, ‘institution’, and ‘power’. Both IR theorists and policy practitioners often use particular terms as shorthand descriptors of their preferred visions for security politics. Yet various scholars and analysts have justifiably observed that concepts so employed are often ‘theoretically underdeveloped and methodologically imprecise.’Footnote 1 In a security context, recent studies discussing ‘pathways’ to Asian security order, the normative role of institutions in Asian security politics and power as exercised through ‘regional security complexes’ (RSCs) are admirable, but constitute only incomplete explanations of those long-contested concepts.Footnote 2 There has been no commensurate body of work yet offered that comprehensively defines or explains ‘security architecture’ theoretically or which describes how that concept is generally applied to Asian security politics.Footnote 3

Overcoming the conceptual gap related to ‘security architecture’ is becoming increasingly important to understanding the dynamics of Asian security politics. This is because policy-making elites in the region are using the term with increasing frequency to justify their visions for how security should be managed. Until greater consensus is derived over what ‘architecture’ really means, however, that term is destined to remain an amorphous and thus a less utilitarian concept than it could otherwise be. At the theoretical level, consensus on the concept of ‘security architecture’ would give us a basis for comparison between competing perspectives on the politics of regional security and provide understanding of their differences and their potential linkages.Footnote 4 In an empirical context, it could clarify regional visions of security organisation and facilitate the adoption of principles and infrastructures conducive to realising those visions. Without refining such visions and building consensus over the tools needed to fulfil them, prospects for regional security in Asia will be reduced and any applicability of Asia’s model to security-building in other regions will remain limited. This would be unfortunate at a time when clearer visions and better tools to implement them are needed to infuse stability in an international security environment riddled by economic uncertainties and multi-polar division.

This article, then, seeks to enhance our understanding of the term ‘architecture’. It first examines the explanations of architecture offered to date and how such explanations have been applied theoretically and empirically. We then assess these explanations’ relative utility to arrive at our proposed guidelines for building more rigour into the concept of architecture. In the remainder of the article, we discuss how each of our proposed guidelines can be used to conceive and apply the ‘architecture’ concept more effectively. By drawing from these guidelines in this manner, we offer a preliminary definition of ‘security architecture’ for consideration: an overarching, coherent and comprehensive security structure for a geographically-defined area, which facilitates the resolution of that region’s policy concerns and achieves its security objectives.

We seek to develop and refine the idea of ‘security architecture’ as a viable instrument for the management of regional security and to demarcate geographic, structural and functional criteria for its conceptual application. We relate this analysis to an Asia-specific context where the ‘architecture debate’ is currently predominant.Footnote 5 In doing so, we recognise that by relating such criteria to a specific region as a means to differentiate it from the European experience (which is all too often applied to the Asian context), or those of other regions, a universal interpretation of ‘security architecture’ may still be elusive. Cross-comparing how security is built or managed in separate regions, in any case, has generated substantial volumes on the subject but is beyond the scope of this specific enquiry.Footnote 6 We conclude, however, that a set of guidelines can be derived for conceiving and applying the term ‘security architecture’ which have sufficiently ecumenical appeal to scholars and practitioners alike, while at the same time are rigorous and nuanced enough to exhibit genuine conceptual substance and regional specificity.

Theoretical issues

The term ‘security architecture’ rose to prominence following the ending of the Cold War. The demise of the Soviet Union transformed global strategic politics, giving rise to efforts in Europe and Asia to construct viable and sustainable new security environments. Perhaps due to the post-war legacy of the US role – a country that Hanns Maull terms the ‘master builder’ of Western European security – the logic and applicability of the term ‘architecture’ to post-Cold War Europe was apparent.Footnote 7 The concept was applied to describe early post-Cold War efforts by Washington to broaden the missions and geographic coverage of existing and nascent European organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Community (EC). It was also applied to the process of co-opting new member countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and from Western Europe itself.Footnote 8

It is therefore hardly surprising that the earliest attempts to apply the idea of ‘security architecture’ to Asia were consistent with its usage in relation to these European developments. Amongst Asian analysts, the eminent Indonesian scholar Jusuf Wanandi pioneered usage of the architectural metaphor in a paper delivered to the Eighth Asia-Pacific Roundtable in June 1994.Footnote 9 However, its rise to prominence in the lexicon and discourse of Asian security politics was inspired primarily by calls during the late 1990s to reform the international financial ‘architecture’ – described by Barry Eichengreen very simply as institutions, structures and policies – in the aftermath of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis.Footnote 10 As often occurs in Asian security politics, strategic thinkers borrowed directly from their economic counterparts.

The subsequent decade has seen a veritable plethora of books, edited volumes, refereed journal articles, policy briefs and academic conferences embrace the architectural metaphor. Yet despite the popularity of its usage, only rudimentary efforts have been expended amidst this flurry of intellectual activity to defining explicitly what the term ‘security architecture’ actually means, especially within an Asian regional context. As the following review of the literature demonstrates, when employing the architectural allegory many leading scholars of Asian security tend not even to formally define the terminology or to consider whether their implicit understanding of ‘security architecture’ is consistent with how others are using it. There appear to exist within the broader scholarly debate several clusters of assumptions as to what the term connotes.

First, differences have emerged regarding the economic and security dimensions of regional architecture. Some analysts, for instance, refer to an over-arching regional or institutional ‘architecture’, but do not clearly distinguish between its economic and security components.Footnote 11 Others specify an over-arching regional architecture, but one having two distinct – economic and security – ‘pillars’ or ‘legs’.Footnote 12 Yet another perspective views trade and security arrangements as distinct components of a broader Asian institutional architecture, but considers the ‘strategic interaction’ between them.Footnote 13 Some analysts refer to Asian security architecture as a separate and largely distinct construct.Footnote 14

Second, ‘security architecture’ is often employed as one and the same term, but with reference to quite different geographic ‘layers’ or ‘levels’ of collaborative security arrangements. The term has been used in a broad sense, to describe the overarching architecture across an entire region. The question of where such boundaries can and should be drawn geographically, however, remains unclear. Some refer, for instance, to an ‘Asia-Pacific security architecture’, some to an ‘Asian security architecture’, whilst others refer to an ‘East Asian security architecture’. The Singapore-based scholar Mely Caballero-Anthony even uses the terms ‘Asia’ and ‘East Asia’ interchangeably when referring to one and the same ‘regional security architecture.’Footnote 15 These trends reflect the contested nature of the concept of ‘Asia’ itself.Footnote 16

Compounding this problem, some scholars assume the existence of ‘architectures’ within an overarching regional security architecture. David Shambaugh, for instance, suggests that ‘the US-led alliance system remains the predominant regional security architecture across Asia.’ Yet Shambaugh also goes on to refer to an emerging ‘multilateral institutional architecture that is based on a series of increasingly shared norms about interstate relations and security’ and suggests that regional security architecture can be likened to a complex ‘mosaic’ of actors and factors.Footnote 17 Similarly, Barry Desker writes simultaneously of ‘Asia’s security architecture’ and ‘the Northeast Asian security architecture’.Footnote 18 Adding to the confusion, scholars seem unable to agree as to whether the architectural terminology should be employed in the plural or the singular sense. Highlighting this, Nick Bisley’s recent contribution to the National Bureau of Asian Research’s annual Strategic Asia series is entitled ‘Asian Security Architectures’, whilst referring to ‘Asian Security Architecture’ in the singular throughout the piece.Footnote 19

Finally, and perhaps most problematically, ‘security architecture’ is often used interchangeably with other terms. Tsinghua University Professor Chu Shulong, for instance, uses the term ‘security architecture’ interchangeably with ‘mechanism’ and ‘framework’.Footnote 20 Hanns Maull exhanges the term with what he considers the more ‘appropriate’ descriptor ‘security arrangements.’Footnote 21 Along similar lines, while referring to the US-led alliance ‘system’ as ‘the predominant regional security architecture across Asia’, Shambaugh depicts an Asia-Pacific security architecture that is embedded within an imprecisely defined Asian regional ‘system.’Footnote 22 In so doing, he would appear to have blurred the distinction between the terms ‘architecture’ and ‘system’ to the point where they become almost indistinguishable.

None of these anomalies related to identifying or defining ‘security architecture’ are insurmountable in a theoretical sense. They collectively, however, reflect an all too common plight faced by scholars in their attempts to achieve consensus on how to derive the best analytical frameworks for understanding key concepts of international relations. The problem can be equated to that described by John Duffield in his discussion of ‘institutions’ – another contested and broadly applied term in the IR literature: ‘the term is frequently used to refer to distinctly different empirical phenomena […] and the findings of most studies of “international institutions” apply to only limited sets of institutional forms.’ Moreover, such work may be flawed because of its ‘failure to recognize the various distinct forms that international institutions can take’.Footnote 23 The term ‘security architecture’ is similarly employed to describe any or all patterns of regional security interaction without yielding any distinct or precise criteria or typologies to usefully inter-relate a preferred idea or specific concept of architecture to understanding specifically how and why those patterns evolve in certain ways.

Applications of regional security architecture

There has been no shortage of efforts by key policymakers to advance their visions of ‘security architecture’. As with scholars of Asian security, however, ambiguity and imprecision is equally apparent when practitioners employ the term. To support this proposition, we now examine how the post-Cold War era’s contending regional ‘security architects’ – the US, China, Japan, Australia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – have presented and utilised the terminology. As will become apparent, the discrepancies which often emerge when these ‘security architects’ invoke the metaphor is not simply a product of their competing architectural visions. Rather, the fact that they each continue to present such inconsistent depictions of regional ‘security architecture’ also suggests that these discrepancies are a manifestation of the lack of clarity surrounding the concept. There are at least three ambiguities that are central in cross-comparing the American, Chinese, Japanese, Australian and ASEAN cases: (1) how ‘security architecture’ is defined? (2) who actually belongs or should belong to such an entity? and (3) what purpose(s) is it intended to serve?

The American case

The first area of ambiguity relates to the question of what actually constitutes regional ‘security architecture?’ In line with the structure that America erected during the 1950s – the so-called ‘San Francisco System’ of bilateral alliances, named in honour of the city where it originated as part of the Japanese peace treaty – US policymakers have been relatively steadfast in depicting this set of alliance relationships as forming the core of any regional ‘security architecture’. This network is often designated as the ‘hub and spokes’ system of US alliance politics in the Asia-Pacific. Alluding directly to the architectural metaphor, for instance, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently linked the US hub and spokes alliance system to other Asian security mechanisms by labelling the former as the ‘cornerstone’ of peace and security in Asia.Footnote 24 Employing similar terminology, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg afforded a privileged position to the American alliance structure in recent remarks addressing the subject of regional architecture. In his terms:

There’s no question that institutions play a critical role in building the capacity to address transnational challenges […] At the same time, we continue to believe that strong bilateral relationships form the cornerstone of stability in the region, beginning with our vibrant alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia.Footnote 25

Beyond the centrality assigned to this system, however, US policymakers have offered little further definition of Asian ‘security architecture.’ In 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker writing in Foreign Affairs speculated about an ‘emerging architecture for a Pacific Community.’Footnote 26 Indeed, Baker’s article echoed the language he used in two earlier, oft-cited speeches outlining the George Bush Snr. administration’s vision for a new post-Cold War architecture of the Euro-Atlantic community.Footnote 27 While Baker’s characterisation demonstrates that Washington has been clearly open to the possibility that multilateral institutions can also form part of such a structure, their role is overwhelmingly depicted as supplementary to America’s Asian alliances. One respected observer has succinctly characterised the US posture as prioritising and preserving bilateralism by viewing and applying multilateralism as a supplementary asset: ‘while supporting the establishment of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, the US continues to assign great significance to its alliances in the region. Seen from Washington’s perspective, multilateral organizations in Asia ought to complement and reinforce the US alliance network and facilitate regional integration as in Europe.’Footnote 28 Contesting this view, an eminent American analyst has recently observed that the US view of alliance primacy over Asian multilateralism is now (at least tacitly) shifting, with ad hoc multilateralism gradually superceding institutionalised mechanisms, such as alliances, in Washington’s policy circles because increasingly ‘“the mission defines the alliance” rather than the reverse’.Footnote 29 Remarks made by Secretary Gates to the June 2009 gathering of the Shangri-la Dialogue lend some credence to this claim. Yet they also explicitly reaffirm the continuing import of America’s bilateral Asian alliances in US strategic thinking. In Gates’ terms:

For decades after World War II, Asia’s security architecture mostly reflected a “hub and spokes” model, with the US as the “hub” and the “spokes” representing a series of bilateral alliances with other countries that did not necessarily cooperate much with each other […] Moving forward, we would like to see a good deal more cooperation among our allies and security partners – more multilateral ties in addition to hubs and spokes. Let me be clear: This does not mean any weakening of our bilateral ties, but rather enhancing security by adding to them multilateral cooperation.Footnote 30

That said, American enthusiasm for multilateralism eventually leading to a more formal regional ‘security architecture’ does appear to have grown under the Obama administration. America’s signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) at the July 2009 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) perhaps best illustrates this, driven as it was largely by an American desire to seek membership in the East Asia Summit.Footnote 31 Responding to Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s September 2009 proposal for an East Asia Community, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell also revealed in a subsequent interview that ‘We have made clear to our Japanese friends […] that we are grateful for Japan's desire to make sure that we are closely coordinated or included in any important new multilateral institutional initiatives.’Footnote 32 Speaking in Beijing the following month, Campbell again reflected this renewed sense of enthusiasm for multilateralism by reporting that ‘one of the important discussions that we had with Chinese interlocutors was about next steps in multilateral architecture in Asia. The truth is we have so many initiatives underway. Kevin Rudd has an important idea. We have the ASEAN Regional Forum. We have APEC. We have the East Asia Summit.’Footnote 33 Obama initially rejected North Korea’s entreaties for direct bilateral talks with the US on resolving differences on nuclear issues, instead demanding that Pyongyang participate in the Six Party Talks from which it had withdrawn in May 2009 after it faced international condemnation of a long-range missile test.Footnote 34

Like their academic counterparts, US policymakers remain unable to settle upon precisely which geographic demarcation to employ when referring to regional ‘security architecture’. Unlike scholars, however, the central issue for practitioners in this second area of ambiguity is essentially a political one. It relates to the degree of inclusiveness which any such structure should permit and, more specifically, to a demarcation that includes the US as a Pacific power. For geographical reasons, for example, US policymakers have traditionally advocated an ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’ regional ‘security architecture’ and have therefore preferred the broader ‘Asia-Pacific’ designation.Footnote 35 They understand that elements of geography and political cohesion can substantially influence how the contours of an architectural design are shaped and how they evolve over time to give that design greater meaning.

A third area of uncertainty surrounding the use by US policymakers of the term ‘security architecture’ relates to the ‘purpose’ or ‘function’ of such a structure. Washington has usually conceived of regional ‘security architecture’ in highly material terms. American officials’ judgements as to its utility and future viability are overwhelmingly centred upon the ‘outcomes’ the US is able to produce, particularly in the area of crisis management. A recent Congressional Research Service report reiterates this judgement. The report observes that ‘regional security meetings tend to be attended by foreign affairs ministers or their representatives rather than by defense chiefs, and they often result in ‘talk and photo-ops’ rather than in actual problem solving or confidence building.’ The report then goes on to call for a political/security structure for Asia ‘that is less process-oriented (meetings) and more directed towards functions and achieving concrete results.’Footnote 36 This reflects an American tendency to prioritise the realisation of short-term policy outcomes in contrast to such Asian approaches as the ‘ASEAN way’ where style and process often trump explicit policy substance. Although more sympathetic toward multilateralism than his recent predecessors, President Obama has continued this ‘results orientation’ in cultivating relations with ASEAN during his first year in office by, for example, sustaining and intensifying US support for the Indonesian military's key counter-terrorism unit (Special Detachment 88), authorising his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to sign the TAC, inaugurating a US engagement policy toward Myanmar and chairing the first US-ASEAN summit convened in Singapore during mid-November 2009 as part of a general American effort to lobby for a US-ASEAN free trade pact.Footnote 37

Asian cases

As America's closest Asian allies, it should come as little surprise that similarities with the US are apparent when Japanese and Australian policymakers invoke the architectural metaphor. On the first question of what constitutes regional ‘security architecture’, for instance, Japanese and Australian policymakers typically afford prominence to the US-led bilateral alliance system. In his ‘New Fukuda Doctrine’ address of May 2008, the-then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda employed language almost identical to that used by his American counterparts when he described the Japan-US alliance as ‘an instrument for the stability of Asia and the Pacific as a whole’ and ‘the cornerstone for Asian prosperity.’Footnote 38 Likewise, notwithstanding speculation that the US-Japan alliance will come under increasing strain – most notably over the issue of relocating the US military base in Okinawa – following the August 2009 election victory of the Democratic Party of Japan, Prime Minister Hatoyama recently also described, during his first meeting with President Obama, the US-Japan alliance as the ‘cornerstone’ of Japanese foreign policy.Footnote 39 In similar vein, Australian Prime Minister Rudd in an equally well-publicised speech outlining his vision for an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ described the US-Australia alliance as ‘the first pillar of our foreign policy.’ Unlike his American counterparts, however, Rudd went on to afford greater prominence to formal multilateral institutions when referring specifically to the question of regional architecture. In his words:

When APEC started, we spoke about the gradual evolution of regional architecture. And that architecture has evolved in the intervening 20 years. We have APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus Three and, most recently, the East Asia Summit. Each has its own positive role to play. But the core question is what should the long-term vision for our region’s architecture be?Footnote 40

Such similarities and differences are also apparent in relation to the second area of ambiguity – who belongs or should belong to a regional security architecture? While our major concern is defining and understanding the security architecture concept, the demarcation of participants is an important subsidiary question here given these two countries’ long-standing security affiliation with a traditional superpower sceptic of multilateralism. It is therefore important that both Japan and Australia have shown some willingness to join regional groupings which explicitly exclude the US, namely the East Asia Summit (EAS) and, in Japan’s case, the ASEAN-Plus-Three (ASEAN + 3) process. There has also been intense speculation as to whether new Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s ‘East Asian Community’ proposal – which is somewhat ambivalent on the question of American involvement – will also exclude the US.Footnote 41

Although membership in various regional organisations can only be negotiated among participating states, the decision to affiliate with a particular organisation has clear implications for the comprehensiveness and cohesion of any pan-regional architectural vision that may command the support of any given organisation’s participants and non-participants alike. In this vein, and similar to their American counterparts, Japanese and Australian policymakers have typically favoured an ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’ approach to organisational constructs that spills over to a commensurate preference for egalitarian visions of architecture. As Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Hamada argued in June 2007 ‘it is important that we do not attempt to make regional cooperation fit into an overly rigid framework from the start with regard to its composition of members or its structure. It is instead necessary for us to envision a highly flexible architecture through which relevant countries can make the best use of their individual characteristics to contribute to regional development.’Footnote 42 Likewise, Australian policymakers when referring to regional security architecture have tended to favour the more ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’ connotations associated with the ‘Asia-Pacific’ designation.Footnote 43

However, while Japanese and Australian policymakers have advocated an ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’ architecture, their motives for so doing are distinctly different. For Australian policymakers, the fear of exclusion from a more narrowly conceived (that is, East Asian) regional ‘architecture’ provides the primary motivation for their embrace of the Asia-Pacific demarcation. Australia, as Samuel Huntington observed, is a ‘torn country’ which has traditionally faced an uphill struggle in its efforts to engage with the Asian region.Footnote 44 For Japan, by contrast, the preference for a more open and inclusive regional architecture has been geared towards checking the growing power and influence of China in this part of the world. The clearest manifestation of this desire was apparent in Tokyo’s overwhelmingly successful efforts – contrary to Chinese wishes at the time – to support Australian, Indian and New Zealand participation in the inaugural EAS of December 2005.Footnote 45

Convergence and divergence between Japanese and Australian policymakers is also apparent in relation to the third area of ambiguity – what specific purpose(s) does a ‘security architecture’ serve? Like their American counterparts, Australian policymakers tend to conceive of regional security architecture in highly material terms, focusing upon the concrete outcomes it is able to produce, particularly in the areas of conflict management and avoidance. As Prime Minister Rudd recently observed:

We need to have a vision for an Asia Pacific Community, a vision that embraces a regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action [emphasis added] on economic and political matters and future challenges related to security. The purpose is to encourage the development of a genuine and comprehensive sense of community whose habitual operating principle is cooperation. The danger in not acting is that we run the risk of succumbing to the perception that future conflict within our region may somehow be inevitable. At present none of our existing mechanisms as currently configured are capable of achieving these purposes.Footnote 46

Japanese policymakers, by contrast, have seen the construction of regional security architecture as a longer-term process. It is a process which they perceive can be advanced through functional co-operation in discrete issues areas such as disaster relief, counter-terrorism, maritime security and developmental assistance.Footnote 47 The ultimate objective of this process, however, remains largely unspecified. As Deputy Press Secretary of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tomohiko Taniguchi, noted during a press conference in December 2007:

on your question, ‘what sort of architecture’ […] I cannot say much at the moment […] over time, you will see that the high-level Economic dialogue between the ministers is going to play an increasingly important role to form wider architecture that is going to be necessary in the East Asia scene.Footnote 48

Japan by adopting this longer-term, process-oriented perspective is arguably making a virtue out of necessity given the obvious constraints which ‘problems of history’ continue to place upon Tokyo’s ability to assert regional leadership and to emphasise so-called ‘hard’ security issues as appropriate functions for regional security architecture. As Ralph Cossa observes, it remains ‘difficult for Japan to emerge from the shadow of its own past, even as it seems to be entering into the shadow of China, the region’s emerging new giant.’Footnote 49

Somewhat ironically given China’s growing power and influence in Asia, Chinese policymakers appear decidedly more reticent than their American, Japanese and Australian counterparts when it comes to invoking the architectural metaphor. Reference to a separate and distinct regional security architecture is typically only made in joint statements or declarations with other Governments.Footnote 50 Chinese policymakers instead refer more frequently to ‘global collective/global security architecture’, centred around the United Nations and associated instruments, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).Footnote 51 Chinese policymakers ostensibly regard Asia as part of this ‘global security architecture.’ As the senior diplomat Sha Zukang characterised this view in August 2000, Asia is regarded ‘as a crucial part of the global security architecture, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is intertwined with the global security situation, and hinges upon the global strategic balance and stability.’Footnote 52

Two concerns appear to underpin Chinese reticence towards referring to a separate and distinct Asian regional security architecture. First, the term ‘architecture’ from a Chinese perspective refers to a structure which is largely static and relatively fixed. At a time when Chinese power and influence in the region is still on the rise, Chinese policymakers are therefore reluctant to set in stone a regional security architecture reflecting the power relativities of today, rather than those of tomorrow which, if current trends persist, are likely to be even more in China’s favour. Second, the term ‘security architecture’ is also interpreted by many if not most Chinese policymakers as code for the San Francisco System of bilateral alliances. Indeed, this is the primary reason why Chinese policymakers privilege other descriptors such as ‘security framework’ [anquan jiagou/kuanjia], ‘security model’, [anquan moshi], or ‘security mechanism’ [anquan jizhi] over ‘security architecture’ when referring specifically to the Asian regional context.Footnote 53

The American, Japanese, Australian and Chinese tendency to acknowledge alliances as key components of regional ‘security architecture’ stands in stark contrast to the composite elements of such a structure as described by senior ASEAN officials. This is one of the primary reasons why ASEAN is often presented as the most formidable competitor to the US as a regional ‘security architect’ in that it offers the most sophisticated and distinct alternative architectural blueprint.Footnote 54

In contrast to the traditional American privileging of alliance relationships as the core of any regional ‘security architecture’, ASEAN depictions have typically afforded pride of place to formal multilateral institutions – namely ASEAN-led processes such as the ARF and the EAS. This trend was justified by ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan during a recent address to the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations: ‘In the past 40 years, we have been able to generate many other architectures in the region, including APEC, including ARF, including ASEM, Asia-Europe meeting, including ASEAN plus Three, including ASEAN Plus One Plus One Plus One, now Plus Six in the East Asia Summit.’Footnote 55 ASEAN’s emphasis upon formal multilateral institutions as the key ingredient of regional architecture was also recently reflected in the Chairman’s statement from the 15th ASEAN Summit, which observed that the Association ‘looked forward to discussing with our Dialogue Partners on the future direction of regional architecture with the ASEAN Community serving as its core.’Footnote 56 According to Amitav Acharya, this preference for formal multilateral institutions largely reflects a desire to resist US dominance in the shaping and management of regional architecture. In his terms, ‘Southeast Asian governments continue to view the US role and its approach to Asian community building with some ambivalence […] From the perspective of ASEAN states, the limited US interest and engagement in broader, longer-term institutions […] has worked to the advantage of the lesser powers, especially ASEAN itself, which does not want great-power dominance in the regional order-building process.’Footnote 57

However, the picture becomes much less clear in relation to the second area of uncertainty – who belongs or should belong to a regional security architecture? As Chin Kin Wah correctly observes, ‘While it may be possible to identify a “corporate” viewpoint as articulated by say, the ASEAN Secretariat (the public, corporate face of ASEAN), on any major issue, there remains obviously a range of strategic perspectives and national interests among the ASEAN states themselves on the patterning of a desired regional architecture.’Footnote 58 To be sure, ASEAN officially supports a regional ‘security architecture’ that is open and inclusive. In practice, though, intramural tensions persist in ASEAN over the question of whether this formula or a more narrowly conceived ‘East Asian security architecture’ is preferable.

Consistent with this, Acharya has identified the existence of two main ASEAN perspectives regarding the question of membership of any emergent security architecture. On the one hand, he points to a ‘narrower’ perspective – rooted in the thinking of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad who proposed the exclusive East Asia Economic Group (later called the East Asia Economic Caucus) during the early 1990s, championed still by Malaysia and supported by China – which advocates an exclusively East Asian (that is, limited to ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea) architectural blueprint. Juxtaposed against this ‘narrower’ perspective, according to Acharya, is a more ‘open’ model – advocated by Indonesia and Singapore with strong backing from Japan – which calls for a non-exclusionary approach to regional architecture and which, most importantly, favours American involvement.Footnote 59 This dichotomy was certainly present at the inaugural EAS of December 2005. Malaysia (supported by China) advocated a more distinctive and exclusive ‘East Asian’ arrangement, while its ASEAN partners, Indonesia and Singapore (backed by Japan), lobbied for a more open and inclusive grouping which incorporated Australia, India and New Zealand.Footnote 60 The inclusion of these latter three countries was regarded by those affiliated with the more ‘open’ architectural camp as compensation of sorts for the fact that the US was to be excluded from this gathering.Footnote 61 Such tensions over the degree of inclusiveness supported by various Asian states and factions become even more apparent when ASEAN policymakers employ the architectural metaphor. Speaking to the Asia Society a few months prior to the 2005 EAS meeting, for instance, Singaporean Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong recognised that melding the US into an ‘East Asian architecture’ would be adopting a relatively liberal geographic interpretation of what East Asia is but that an ‘East Asian architecture’ without the US acting as a balancer would be inherently unstable.Footnote 62

How ASEAN resolves this dichotomy matters for the way ‘architecture’ is conceived and operationalised in Asia. If exclusivity proves to reign supreme over more unrestricted visions of architectural membership, a primary element found within our definition of architecture – its overarching reach – becomes seriously compromised and support for any cohesive architectural vision becomes more difficult.

ASEAN preferences are much clearer vis-à-vis the third area of ambiguity – what specific purposes(s) does a regional ‘security architecture’ serve? In contrast to their American and Australian counterparts who conceive of regional security architecture in highly material terms and focus on the concrete outcomes it is able to produce, ASEAN officials tend to present regional ‘security architecture’ more as a means to an end, rather than as an end in itself. From their perspective, the process of building a ‘security architecture’ is much more important than the tangible outcomes which any such structure might initially be expected to generate. This is because the sense of trust generated and the communal norms and understandings established by virtue of this process might eventually even negate the need for a formal ‘security architecture’. For this reason, ASEAN countries have tended to base their efforts to construct regional architecture around so-called non-traditional security issues such as infectious disease, terrorism, transnational crime and disaster relief/mitigation. This is not only because these kinds of trans-border challenges are increasingly pressing and potentially affect the region as a whole, but also because they tend not to raise the same level of sensitivity that more traditional security issues are apt to generate. In the words of a recent report produced under the auspices of The Network of East Asian Think Tanks ‘addressing non-traditional security issues, pandemic threats and environmental issues is not only important in itself, but also crucial to nurturing trust and promoting community building in East Asia.’Footnote 63

It would easy to dismiss these disparities in the presentation and use of the term ‘security architecture’ as a product of the competing visions advanced by the region’s most prominent ‘security architects’. Yet the fact that these disparities are evident within as well as between American and Asian policy circles makes this argument difficult to sustain. Such intra-mural differences are exposed most vividly in the statements of US officials referring to the (supposed) regional security architecture’s current state of development. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for instance, suggests that the American alliance system has been the ‘cornerstone’ of Asia’s security architecture ‘for more than a generation.’Footnote 64 By contrast, Gates’ predecessor, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, speculated about ‘Asia’s Emerging Security Architecture’, implying that such a structure had yet to materialise.Footnote 65 In similar fashion, the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently invoked the architectural metaphor in an overarching sense to describe the totality of institutions and alliance relationships in the broadly conceived ‘Asia-Pacific’ region. One month later, however, Rudd’s Foreign Minister Stephen Smith used the term ‘architecture’ to describe individual institutions, such ASEAN and APEC.Footnote 66

The disparities identified in the construction and utilisation of the term ‘security architecture’ entail more than merely sifting through competing architectural visions or blueprints. The fundamental problem is that little systematic effort seems to have been expended to define precisely what the term ‘security architecture’ actually means. As Thomas Wilkins has asserted: ‘though many consider the meaning of the term “security architecture” to be self-evident, upon closer inspection it becomes more problematic.’Footnote 67 Some would argue that it is the very flexibility offered by the concept of ‘security architecture’ which has appealed to practitioners who, for political reasons, might regard it as advantageous to retain at least some definitional ambiguity surrounding the term. The persistence of ambiguity around such a central analytical concept is highly problematic from an intellectual perspective, however, given the importance of conceptual clarity to scholarly communication and the advancement of knowledge. The following set of guidelines seeks to resolve this dilemma.

Regional security architecture: a user's guide

Because there has been little systematic discussion or debate about the precise nature of security architecture in the existing IR literature, we must be largely inductive in shaping an approach to the concept. In this section, we therefore draw from and apply the most critical aspects of the preceding review of what theoretical and empirical perspectives have emerged about security architecture to advance and develop selected guidelines for drawing up a security architecture paradigm. We have derived seven such guidelines which can be briefly summarised as follows:

(1) the term ‘security architecture’ should only be employed in an over-arching macro-analytical sense rather than used interchangeably with other descriptors such as ‘institutions’ or ‘arrangements’, nor should these be described as ‘architectures’ in their own right; (2) a ‘security architecture’ should be geographically delineated at the regional level of analysis; (3) it should embody a sense of coherence; (4) it should be the product of intelligent design; (5) it should be functionally oriented (serving specific purposes and/or fulfilling specific policy tasks); (6) it should be sufficiently broad to accommodate the ‘comprehensive’ understandings of security so distinctive to the Asian region; and (7) the terminology should not be used as a mere synonym for multilateral security institutions. In discussing these guidelines we will apply theoretical and empirical justifications for nominating them as security architecture criteria.

The first guideline relates to how the term is used. We argue that ‘security architecture’ should only be employed in an over-arching, macro-analytical sense. It should not be used interchangeably with other descriptors such as ‘institutions’, ‘arrangements’, ‘networks’ or even ‘systems.’ Nor should these other descriptors be referred to as ‘architectures’ by themselves. Certainly terms such as ‘institutions’ and ‘arrangements’ can be used to describe the various components which come together to comprise an over-arching ‘security architecture.’ However, our contention is that ‘architecture’ should be seen as conceptually presiding over these components. This, by association, also suggests that the term should be used in the singular (that is, architecture) rather than in the plural sense (that is, architectures).

This approach originates, in part, from a description of Asia-Pacific security architecture offered by Desmond Ball nearly a decade ago which still resonates today. He envisioned a ‘three-tiered structure with very fluid outlines’ that connected around twenty regional actors (mostly states) in an array of bilateral relationships of different types and strengths. But these actors and the dyads that connected them were also penetrated by ‘a relatively thin fabric of multilateralism, woven from a multiplicity of different organizations and processes, and of problematic strength.’Footnote 68 We have opted to move on where Ball left off: envisioning a more distinct and effective integration of the state-centric, bilateral and multilateral structures in the Asia-Pacific but one underwritten by an over-arching blueprint or mechanism that works to fuse these disparate components into a more coherent whole.

Second, we propose that the term be used with reference to a clearly delineated and largely self-contained geographical area. This does not preclude the possibility of extra-regional powers contributing to the regional ‘security architecture’. To speak of regional ‘security architecture’ without referring to a particular geographic referent, however, constitutes a misnomer. As Buzan and Waever observed in their seminal work on RSCs: ‘any coherent regionalist approach to security must start by drawing clear distinctions between what constitutes the regional level and what constitutes the levels on either side of it.’Footnote 69 To draw upon the architectural metaphor, to do otherwise is akin to conceiving of a building without walls or other similar supporting structures.

Third, and following our initial criterion, we propose that the term ‘security architecture’ should primarily be used with reference to a coherent, unifying structure. Like the real-world practice of architecture itself – the art or science of designing and constructing structures – we posit that ‘security architecture’ should embody a sense of coherence. This aspect of our guidelines is partially concerned with how the various components of ‘security architecture’ are arranged. Some analysts such as Ellen Frost argue that in the absence of both a clear balancing mechanism and a nascent collective security entity, Asia’s existing organisations might best represent some form of ‘architecture’ if they are viewed as a concentric circles model that ‘laps outward and recedes, depending on political circumstances and diplomatic opportunities.’ She thus envisions ‘circles within circles’ (ASEAN within ASEAN + 3 within the EAS) together constituting what she labels as an ‘Asia Major’ or core Asian geography (ASEAN + 3) moving to project and strengthen an ‘Asia-Pacific’ sense of identity and cohesion by including India, Australia and New Zealand in deliberations on how Asia bridges its interests and influence in the wider world.Footnote 70

Whether Frost’s proposed model is the optimum one is less important than understanding that a collaborative structure which minimises duplication and overlap – qualities which we would argue are central to any genuine ‘security architecture’ – will not only exhibit greater elegance in design, but is also likely to be more efficient in practice. Absolutely central to this issue of performance, of course, is how the various components of the ‘security architecture’ relate to one another. This latter dimension is particularly important because one of the defining features of any ‘security architecture’, we would argue, lies in its capacity to produce synergistic effects. By this we refer to the inter-relationships between the architecture’s various components and their ability to produce desirable overall effects that would not naturally occur in the absence of that interaction. In other words, we see ‘security architecture’ as being something much more than simply the sum of its parts.

Fourth, and flowing from the third criterion just discussed, we propose that ‘security architecture’ should be the result of ‘intelligent design’. This precondition that ‘security architecture’ be (or as if) the result of a conscious act could be interpreted as rigidly implying a structure that is meticulously planned and the work of a single ‘master builder.’ The aforementioned analysis of Maull is pertinent to this concern, and the RSCs’ of Buzan and Waever at least envision a largely self-contained and relatively concrete complex of regional interaction that resembles a grand design. Yet, we certainly recognise that the process of architecture building is not always inherently neat and tidy. Our suggested guidelines therefore leave open the possibility that ‘security architecture’ can emerge from the work of two or more competing architects and can be worked out on a ‘bottom-up’ basis over time. The experience of ASEAN’s security discussions eventually morphing into the ARF as a means of engaging great power regional interests and agendas illustrates this point. Frost offers the metaphor of a ‘jumbled’ Asian architectural construct to which numerous conference rooms are allotted ‘to help tame the many bilateral rivalries that are in the region’ and that facilitates a ‘variable geometry approach’ of countries participating only in those deliberations that are most critical to their own national security concerns.Footnote 71

Fifth, the term ‘security architecture’ should only be used with reference to a structure that addresses specific functional needs. The range of functions that ‘security architecture’ might conceivably perform – including collective defence, collective security, crisis management and the protection of members against non-military security challenges – can be quite broad. Under the terms of our guidelines, the composite elements of ‘security architecture’ should certainly interact in such a way that collectively and coherently contributes to specifically designated policy objectives. It is possible that a range of different functions may be assigned to various components of the architecture – a division of labour that has been characterised by analysts of European regional security politics as ‘functional differentiation’.Footnote 72 Our suggested guidelines also do not overlook the possibility that the purpose and function of ‘security architecture’ can evolve over time, both as a consequence of changing internal architectural preferences or in response to significant shifts in the regional and/or global strategic environment. Nevertheless, we suggest that ‘security architecture’ cannot exist simply for ‘security architecture’s’ sake, and that the embodiment of purpose ought to be regarded as an indispensable feature of any structure to which the terminology is legitimately applied.

Sixth, although the purpose or function of ‘security architecture’ ought to be security-related, this does not mean that its various components need necessarily be limited to security mechanisms. This observation is especially pertinent to the Asian region, where understandings of security have tended to be comprehensive and where economic institutions are so often used for security ends. The APEC process, for example, is ostensibly a vehicle for trade facilitation but began with an oblique security function – that of ‘enmeshing’ and ‘tying down’ the region’s great powers – and has taken on additional security functions as it has matured. Vinod Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo have characterised this process as creating ‘impetus’ for organisational transformation in response to external shocks to the region that generate pressure for change.Footnote 73 In APEC’s case, the pending end of the Cold War and intensifying prospects of US strategic retrenchment from Asia spilled over to create institutional impetus for APEC to embody security agendas in addition to economic ones.

Finally, the term ‘security architecture’ should not be used merely as a shorthand description for the totality of multilateral institutions in any given region. The task of differentiating ‘institutions’ from ‘architecture’ is not altogether straightforward, given that ‘institution’ is itself a slippery concept which is often left undefined and allowed to mean all things to all people.Footnote 74 While acknowledging its multiple interpretations, our understanding of the term ‘institution’ is consistent with its traditional definition as ‘a formal international organisation’.Footnote 75 Although we seek to avoid cross-regional comparison here, the distinction between ‘institution’ and ‘architecture’ is, again, best illustrated with Maull’s references to the European ‘security architecture’, where formal international organisations or ‘institutions’ such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO come together in synergistic fashion to form a distinct, coherent, multi-dimensional and over-arching regional ‘security architecture’. Because this structure is built around a combination of shared interests, values, and threat perceptions, however, it is also evidently much more than merely an amalgam of these ‘institutions.’Footnote 76

The same is true of Asia. We would argue that ‘security architecture’ in this part of the world must also connote something greater than just the totality of the region’s security institutions. The synergistic qualities and the embodiment of purpose and function that our guidelines incorporate means that, both in material and in normative terms, a genuine Asian ‘security architecture’ must necessarily also constitute much more than simply the sum of its parts. At the same time, however, we assert that it is also in some respects something less than the totality of the region’s multilateral institutions, precisely because of the requirements of ‘coherence’ and ‘intelligent design’ that our proposed guidelines envisage. It would, for instance, be virtually impossible for each of these latter features to genuinely be present in a structure comprising the several hundred individual ‘institutions’ which are the product of the startling growth in regional multilateral activity which has occurred in Asia since the beginning of the 1990s.

Towards Asian security architecture?

Measured against each of the above criteria, it cannot be said that an authentic Asian security architecture currently exists. It is hardly inevitable that any such architecture will materialise in that region any time soon. First, definitions of what does or should constitute ‘region’ in this part of the world remain fluid and highly contested. Efforts to circumvent this problem by referring to sub-regional ‘security architecture’ – as has been suggested in the case of Northeast Asia – are unhelpful given the high level of economic and strategic interdependence which is such a defining feature of security politics across Asia. This can only intensify with the continuing global financial crisis. Likewise, although geographic location does not necessarily determine the capacity of a state to contribute to a region’s security architecture, we also regard the notion of an exclusive East Asian security architecture as highly problematic because of the very deep engagement of a number of extra-regional players – namely the US, Russia and, increasingly, India. Relaxing the definitional parameters still further to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific region provides one obvious solution to this latter problem. However, this proposition in turn is likely to be highly unpalatable to China, particularly as its economic and strategic weight in Asia continues to increase. Quite where the boundaries are to be drawn around any future regional ‘security architecture’, therefore, remains to be seen. Unless and until this critical issue is resolved, however, we would argue that regional ‘security architecture’, in the true sense of the terminology, simply cannot exist.

Second, the problem of geographical delineation is likely to be compounded by the growing number of aspiring regional ‘security architects.’ As the volume of regional security institutions and activities has grown, so too has the number of actors seeking to participate in shaping their design and future development. As the preceding review of policy statements demonstrates, Japan and Australia each strive to play the role of ‘architectural entrepreneur’ they assumed with a sense of renewed purpose at the conclusion of the Cold War. Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s aforementioned proposal for an ‘East Asian Community’ advanced at a late September 2009 bilateral summit meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao at UN Headquarters in New York is illustrative.Footnote 77 So too are ongoing efforts by Australian Prime Minister Rudd to promote his ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ proposal. Initially advanced in a June 2008 address in Sydney, this initiative has since been promoted by taking soundings from potential regional collaborators over the following year and by convening a Track 1.5 summit (again in Sydney) at the end of 2009 to shape a comprehensive approach for pursuing this idea.Footnote 78 Since the late 1990s – flowing from its apparent embrace of multilateralism – China has also played a leading role in the establishment of a number of high profile regional institutions including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Boao Forum for Asia and the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT). India too has become an increasingly involved and accepted player in such leading mechanisms as the EAS and the SCO, and as a preferred political partner of ASEAN.Footnote 79 ASEAN remains an established ‘security architect’ and has now incorporated its earlier (1976) Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) into a more comprehensive ASEAN Charter that not only envisions how its member-states will shape their own intra-state relations but also how they will condition outside powers to relate to them collectively.Footnote 80 Recent proposals out of Indonesia to develop a G8-type arrangement for East Asia have also seen this country join the ranks of the region’s aspiring architects – a development with potentially damaging consequences for ASEAN itself as one of its larger and more influential members opts to take an increasingly independent posture in the architecture debate.Footnote 81

Third, this proliferation of ‘security architects’ has, in turn, exacerbated the problem of institutional ‘overcrowding’ in the region. Many channels for security dialogue now exist at the official (Track 1) level, including such leading regional security institutions as the ARF and the SCO. More ad hoc, but still substantial, multilateral initiatives have also been undertaken regarding specific issues such as the Six Party Talks concerning security on the Korean peninsula. The growth in institutions and dialogues at the unofficial (or Track 2) level has been even more profound, with in excess of 200 such channels now estimated to exist.Footnote 82 Predictably enough, as institutions elbow for attention and relevance in this increasingly crowded field – often by seizing upon the most visible and contentious issues of the moment – their agendas are exhibiting an increasing degree of overlap. This duplication is most apparent in the case of APEC and the EAS. The considerable degree of overlap in the design of Rudd’s ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ initiative and Hatoyama’s ‘East Asian Community’ proposal is also indicative of this trend.Footnote 83

Purists might argue that there is little reason for concern here and that there can be no such thing as ‘too much talk’ on any issue of pressing concern.Footnote 84 Pragmatists would assert that this trend toward duplication will remain deeply entrenched due to the ‘phenomenon called “institutional stickiness” – in layman’s terms, the tendency of organisations to resist doing themselves out of a job.’Footnote 85 From an architectural standpoint, however, this ‘hyper-institutionalism’ remains problematic in that it essentially does nothing more than to generate an overabundance of groupings without reconciling the countervailing national interests their members bring to the table. If so, the requirements such as ‘coherence’, ‘purpose’, ‘function’ and ‘intelligent design’ which our proposed guidelines for conceiving and applying the concept of ‘security architecture’ call for may not be able to be met.

The extent to which as yet unresolved countervailing national interests have perpetuated this problem of ‘institutional stickiness’ should not be underestimated. The broad menu of institutional choices allows the region’s great powers to make their presence felt within those institutions with which they feel most comfortable and with which they have the most influence – Beijing in ASEAN + 3 and the SCO; Moscow in the SCO; Washington in APEC and through its own ad hoc mechanisms such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Proliferation Security Initiative; and Tokyo through the ARF and, potentially, the EAS as it strives to check China’s growing influence in the ASEAN + 3 process. In short, this remains one of the great ironies of the remarkable growth in regional multilateral institutions and activities which has occurred since the beginning of the 1990s: that their emergence has raised as many problems as it has potentially addressed in terms of forging architectural consensus.

Conclusion

Critics of the guidelines we propose in this article might argue that our conception of ‘security architecture’ is unduly rigid and thereby not well suited to the dynamics of the highly variegated Asian region.Footnote 86 There is merit to this observation. However, the assertion that ‘the Asia-Pacific region has too many regional organisations, yet they still cannot do all the things we require of them’ illustrates the need for a more disciplined architectural ideal embodying the seven characteristics assigned within our guidelines. In this context, the guidelines provided here contribute to realising that ideal because they promise to facilitate more effective scholarly communication, facilitate more effective interaction between scholars and practitioners of Asian security and, most importantly, establish clear criteria for ascertaining what (if any) ‘security architecture’ actually exists in the Asian region. Given our judgment that there is actually no overriding Asian ‘security architecture’ in place, coupled with the proposition that one may not even emerge in the foreseeable future, these criteria will enable us to better differentiate the all too often illusory rhetoric associated with the frequent and casual use of the term ‘architecture’ from substantive measures for truly achieving such an entity in Asia. They provide a clear yardstick for deciphering if and when authentic regional ‘security architecture’ actually comes into being.

Our intention in establishing such criteria is not to set the bar so high as to make the realisation of regional ‘security architecture’ unattainable. Indeed, we would argue that the need for a viable ‘security architecture’ in Asia is more pressing than ever. This region’s strategic environment is becoming more demanding and complex as the persistence of traditional security concerns – such as WMD proliferation, regional flashpoints and the prospect of a destabilising arms race – has been complicated by the increasing range of non-traditional security challenges including international terrorism, environmental issues and disease-based threats. Ultimately, this environment promises to generate a myriad of crises requiring trans-boundary policy management in both the traditional and non-traditional sectors. Yet unless and until practitioners of Asian security are first able to agree upon what they actually mean by the term ‘security architecture’, the urgent task of devising and implementing an effective region-wide structure to cope with this highly fluid and treacherous strategic environment will remain an elusive one. Achieving a greater consensus on what a ‘security architecture’ actually is and how to build one is thus a critical ‘building block’ for attaining a viable and enduring regional security environment.

References

1 Yuen Foong Khong, ‘The elusiveness of regional order: Leifer, the English school and Southeast Asia’, The Pacific Review, 18 (March 2005), pp. 23–41.

2 On institutions in Asia see Amitav Achayra, ‘Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power and the Prospects for Peaceful Change’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 210–40; on institutions in general see John Duffield, ‘What are International Institutions?’, International Studies Review, 9 (2007), pp. 1–22; on order see Yuen Foong Khong, ‘The elusiveness of regional order’; on power see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 20–6.

3 Buzan has attempted to link the security architecture concept to the regional security complex in ‘Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels’, The Pacific Review, 16 (2003), pp. 143–73 but does not treat the ‘architectural’ element itself as a separate or dynamic element in that interplay.

4 A point raised by John Duffield in the context of defining ‘institutions’ but equally applicable to the problem of defining and understanding ‘security architecture’ considered here. See Duffield, ‘What are International Institutions?’, p. 2.

5 Rudimentary efforts have been made to apply the architectural metaphor to regions other than Asia and Europe including Africa, the Americas, and the Middle East. However, this relatively sparse body of literature is primarily empirical and makes no attempt to explicitly define the concept of ‘security architecture’. For further reading see Joseph McMillan, Richard Sokolsky, and Andrew C. Winner, ‘Toward a New Regional Security Architecture’, The Washington Quarterly, 26 (2003), pp. 161–75; Joseph R. Nunez, A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2002); and Benedikt Franke, ‘Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities’, Cooperation and Conflict, 43 (2008), pp. 313–40.

6 See, for example, Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (eds), The Defence Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

7 Hanns W. Maull, ‘The European Security Architecture: Conceptual Lessons for Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation’, in Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh (eds), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), p. 254.

8 See, for example, ‘Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)) (‘The Rome Declaration’)’, Rome, 8 November 1991.

9 Jusuf Wanandi, ‘The Future of ARF and CSCAP in the Regional Security Architecture’, Paper prepared for the Eighth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1994.

10 Barry J. Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical post-Asia Agenda (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1999), p. 1. See also Nick Bisley, ‘Asian Security Architectures’ in Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (eds), Strategic Asia 2007–2008: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy (Seatte and Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), pp. 342–3.

11 See, for example, Nirav Patel, ‘Value Cooperation, Not Antagonism: The Case for Functional-based Cooperation’, Policy Dialogue Brief, The Stanley Foundation, August 2008.

12 See, for example, Dick K. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and US Policy, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 18 September 2006.

13 Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo (eds), Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving Structures for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations (Berlin: Springer, 2008).

14 See, for example, Desmond Ball, ‘Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific: Official and Unofficial Responses’, in Annelies Heijmans, et al. (eds), Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 48; and Barry Desker, ‘New Security Dimensions in the Asia-Pacific’, Asia-Pacific Review, 15 (2008), pp. 56–75.

15 Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture?’, Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, June 2007, pp. 1–3, 8, 10.

16 Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 10.

17 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Original Order’, International Security, 82 (2004/05), pp. 66, 95–96.

18 Desker, ‘New Security Dimensions in the Asia-Pacific’, pp. 56–58, 62, 70.

19 Bisley, ‘Asian Security Architectures’, pp. 341–69.

20 Chu Shulong, ‘Beyond Crisis Management: Prospects for a Northeast Asian Regional Security Architecture’, in Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Security Through Cooperation: Furthering Asia Pacific Multilateral Engagement, CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2007, pp. 8–11.

21 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Security Cooperation in Europe and Pacific Asia: A Comparative Analysis’, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, XIX (2005), p. 69.

22 Shambaugh, ‘The Evolving Asian System’, pp. 2–3.

23 Duffield, ‘What Are International Institutions?’, p. 1.

24 Reproduced in US Fed News, ‘Defense Secretary Gates Delivers Speech at Sophia University’, 9 November 2007.

25 James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State, ‘Remarks Before the 18th General Meeting of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council’, Washington DC, 12 May 2009, pp. 3–4.

26 James A. Baker III, ‘America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community’, Foreign Affairs, 70 (1991/1992), pp. 1–18.

27 See James A. Baker III, ‘A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era’, Speech to the Berlin Press Club, 12 December 1989; and ‘The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East’, speech to the Aspen Institute, Berlin, Germany, 18 June 1991.

28 Mohan Malik, ‘The EAC and the Role of External Powers: Ensuring Asian Multilateralism is not Shanghaied’ in Aileen S.P. Baviera (ed.), Regional Security in East Asia: Challenges to Cooperation and Community Building (Quezon City, Philippines: UP Asia Center, 2008), p. 178.

29 Ralph Cossa, ‘Evolving US Views on Asia’s Future Institutional Architecture’ in Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (eds), Asia’s New Multilateralism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 34.

30 Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defence, United States of America, ‘America’s Security Role in the Asia-Pacific’, First Plenary Session, The Shangri-la Dialogue, 30 May 2009, p. 4.

31 Signing the TAC is one of the principal requirements for governments seeking membership of the East Asia Summit. See Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, ‘Press Availability in Beijing, China’, Beijing, China, 14 October 2009, p. 7.

32 Anne Davies, ‘Obama searches for common ground on first trip to Asia’, Sydney Morning Herald (2 November 2009).

33 Campbell, ‘Press Availability in Beijing, China’, p. 7.

34 US Department of State, ‘Daily Press Briefing’, Washington DC, 6 October 2009. {http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/oct/130308.htm#northkorea} accessed on 5 November 2009.

35 See, for example, Gates, ‘America’s Security Role in the Asia-Pacific’.

36 Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and US Policy, p. 2.

37 One respected Southeast Asian analyst notes that ‘the US sees its current engagement of ASEAN as a way of indirectly engaging China as well, because given the existing regional security architecture, East Asia is very much ASEAN centred, ASEAN based.’ See the commentary of Tan See Seng cited in Victoria Jen, ‘US to develop closer trade ties with ASEAN at upcoming summit’, channelnewsasia.com, 3 November 2009. {http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1015449/1/.html} accessed on 5 November 2009. An ASEAN free trade area with China came into force in January 2010.

38 Speech by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, ‘When the Pacific Ocean becomes an ‘Inland Sea’: Five Pledges to a Future Asia that “Acts Together”’, 14th International Conference on The Future of Asia, 22 May 2008, p. 5.

39 Cited in Kenneth McCallum, ‘Hatoyama Calls Meeting With Obama “Warm”’, The Wall Street Journal, 24 September 2009, p. A5.

40 Prime Minister of Australia Hon Kevin Rudd, ‘It's time to build an Asia-Pacific Community’, Address to the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre, Sydney, 4 June 2008, p. 4.

41 See, for example, Takashi Shiraishi, ‘Japan-US ties crucial for E. Asia’, Daily Yomiuri, 1 November 2009, p. 4.

42 Address by Mr. Masayoshi Hamada, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Occasion of the East Asian Roundtable, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU), 2 June 2007.

43 See, for example, Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Australia, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific’, Speech to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 18 July 2008; and Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister, Australia, ‘Key Note Address’, The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 29 May 2009.

44 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 151–4.

45 See Patrick Walters, ‘Beijing plays spoiler on Asia summit’, The Australian (6 April 2005).

46 Rudd, ‘It’s time to build an Asia-Pacific Community’, p. 4.

47 See Fukuda, ‘When the Pacific Ocean becomes an “Inland Sea”’.

48 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Press Conference, 4 December 2007.

49 Ralph A. Cossa, ‘East Asia Community-Building: Time for the US to Get on Board’, The Stanley Foundation, Policy Analysis Brief, September 2007, p. 4.

50 See, for example, ‘Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit’, Beijing, 28 November 2007.

51 See, for example, ‘Strengthening International Cooperation, Safeguarding World Security’, Speech by Mr. Liu Jieyi, Director-General of Arms Control and Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, at the Twelfth Annual International Arms Control Conference Sponsored by Sandia National Laboratories, 19 January 2002; and Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hu Xiaodi at the First Committee of the 57th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1 October 2002.

52 ‘Some thoughts on Establishing A Regional Security Order’, Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang at the East-West Center’s Senior Policy Seminar, Honolulu, 7 August 2000.

53 This analysis is drawn from author interviews (Taylor) conducted with Chinese scholars and officials, Beijing, April 2007. The authors are also grateful for research assistance provided by Jiang Yang.

54 See, for example, Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘Pax Asia-Pacifica? East Asian Integration and Its Implications for the US’, The Washington Quarterly, 30 (2007), pp. 67–77.

55 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘A Conversation with Surin Pitsuwan’, 14 May 2008.

56 Chairman’s Statement of the 15th ASEAN Summit, ‘Enhancing Connectivity, Empowering Peoples’, Cha-Am Hua Hin, Thailand, 23–25 October 2009, p. 5.

57 Amitav Acharya, ‘The Strong in the World of the Weak: Southeast Asia in Asia’s Regional Architecture’, in Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (eds), Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 180–1.

58 Chin Kin Wah, ‘Emerging East Asian Regional Architecture: ASEAN Perspectives’, in William T. Tow and Chin Kin Wah (eds), ASEAN, India, Australia: Towards Closer Engagement in a New Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 23.

59 Acharya, ‘The Strong in the World of the Weak’, p. 179.

60 See Walters, ‘Beijing plays spoiler on Asia summit’.

61 Acharya, ‘The Strong in the World of the Weak’, p. 181.

62 Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister, ‘Constructing East Asia’, Speech at the Asia Society Conference, Bangkok, 9 June 2005.

63 The Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) Working Group on ‘Overall Architecture of Community Building in East Asia’, Final Report, 2006, p. 5.

64 US Fed News, ‘Defense Secretary Gates Delivers Speech at Sophia University’.

65 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, ‘The US and Asia’s Emerging Security Architecture’, Paper presented at the Shangri-la Dialogue, Singapore, 3 June 2006.

66 Rudd, ‘It’s time to build an Asia-Pacific Community’, p. 4.; and Smith, ‘Australia, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific’, p. 22.

67 Thomas S. Wilkins, ‘Developing Regional Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific’, Asia:NZ online, {http://www.asianz.org.nz/our-work/track-2/opinions-essays} accessed on 5 November 2009.

68 Desmond Ball, ‘The Evolving Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper no. 340 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1999), p. 25.

69 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, p. 27.

70 Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), pp. 131–2.

71 Ibid., p. 148.

72 See Carsten Tams, ‘The Functions of a European Security and Defence Identity and its Institutional Form’, in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (eds), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 80–103.

73 Aggerwol and Koo (eds), Asia’s New Institutional Architecture, p. 14.

74 For further reading see Duffield, ‘What are International Institutions?’.

75 See, for example, Lisa L. Martin, ‘Credibility, Costs and Institutions’, World Politics 45 (1993), pp. 406–32.

76 Maull, ‘Security Cooperation in Europe and Pacific Asia’, pp. 70–6.

77 ‘Hatoyama pushes East Asian community’, Asahi Shimbun (English language edition), 23 September 2009.

78 Rudd, ‘It’s time to build an Asia-Pacific Community’; and Adam Gartrell, ‘Rudd pushing Asia Pacific Community plan’, Sydney Morning Herald (25 October 2009).

79 See C. Raja Mohan, ‘India and the Balance of Power’, Foreign Affairs, 85 (2006), pp. 22–3.

80 For further reading see Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security, 32 (2007/08), pp. 113–57.

81 See Jusuf Wanandi, ‘Remodeling Regional Architecture’, PacNet, 13, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 18 February 2009.

82 See Japan Center for International Exchange, Towards Community Building in East Asia, Dialogue and Research Monitor Overview Report, 2005.

83 For further reading see Amitav Acharya, ‘Competing Communities: What the Australian and Japanese Ideas Mean for Asia’s Regional Architecture’, PacNet, 70, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 27 October 2009.

84 See, for example, Anthony Milner, Region, Security and the Return of History (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).

85 Allan Gyngell, ‘Design Faults: The Asia Pacific’s Regional Architecture’, Policy Brief, Lowy Institute for International Policy, July 2007, p. 10.

86 Ibid., p. 8.