We are still in the early days of the relationship between cyberspace and international law. In many respects, it is a relationship off to an unsteady and uncertain start. But a slow and sporadic trickle of governmental efforts to express or even to shape that relationship has emerged.Footnote 1 To date, the most significant multinational clarification from states has been the deceptively modest concession that international law applies fully to cyberspace.Footnote 2 States have at least made clear that the novelty and seemingly virtual nature do not exempt cyberspace from existing in international law.
Meanwhile, a flood of private efforts has attempted to lend further clarity. Scholarly articles, books, and dissertations on the international law of cyberspace have proliferated at an astonishing pace. To date, the most comprehensive of these efforts might be the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Tallinn 2.0).Footnote 3 As its title suggests, Tallinn 2.0 is an update to a previous work. Like its predecessor, Tallinn 2.0 is intended to provide a snapshot of existing international law—lex lata. Also like its predecessor, its primary audience is government lawyers, states’ legal advisors. But in terms of input and coverage Tallinn 2.0 is a far broader product than its predecessor.
First, the composition of contributors and reviewers is significantly more diverse by background and experience. The Tallinn 1.0 group was, by design, drawn from scholars and practitioners from NATO member states. The Tallinn 2.0 contributors reflect a far more diverse cross-section of geography and legal traditions. The second Tallinn project also enjoyed far more extensive review and feedback from states. A series of meetings at The Hague, Netherlands, convened representatives from over fifty foreign ministries, international organizations, and private groups to provide comments on drafts, many of which directly influenced the content of Tallinn 2.0.
The second, and frankly far more significant, respect in which Tallinn 2.0 differs from its predecessor is in the scope of cyber operations and international law covered. Where Tallinn 1.0 focused on cyber-activities above the international law thresholds of use of forceFootnote 4 and armed conflict,Footnote 5 Tallinn 2.0 examines a nearly complete spectrum of cyber operations from the minimally intrusive to the most destructive. As a result, Tallinn 2.0 addresses nearly the entire spectrum of public international law, from that applicable to peace to that governing war, and the legal regimes applicable to land, air, sea, and space. The quantity and quality of reports and scholarship addressing law that regulates international relations below the threshold of the use of force is growing quickly. In this respect, Tallinn 2.0 is certainly reflective of a broader trend in the focus of international lawyers addressing cyberspace.Footnote 6 There is in legal practice, debate, and scholarship a far greater focus on low-intensity cyber operations as a matter of concern.
Low-intensity cyber operations are prevalent and worthy of attention for technical, economic, political, and even legal reasons.Footnote 7 Low-intensity cyber operations are attractive options for cyber tacticians because they are generally more feasible from a technical standpoint. They are attractive economically because they are easier to resource than their high-intensity counterparts. Low-intensity cyber operations are attractive politically because they are often likely to evade attribution or correlation. That is, low-intensity cyber operations are too insignificant in either scale or effects to be noticed or to be perceived as part of a concerted campaign against a victim state. Low-intensity cyber operations may also be too sporadic to provoke serious investigation and therefore may not provoke countermeasures from a victim state. And finally, low-intensity cyber operations are attractive to the extent that they may run below legal thresholds of application or better yet exploit perceived gaps or seams in the law.Footnote 8
While the attention Tallinn 2.0 devotes to the low-intensity end of the cyber operational spectrum improved the relevance and practical utility of the new manual, it led the authors into highly ambiguous realms of the international legal spectrum. Some areas of law are so ambiguous and elusive that they might easily challenge Lauterpacht's observation about the vanishing points of international law.Footnote 9 There isn't space in these introductory remarks to address these ambiguities. But I would like to address some methodological questions associated with application of peacetime international law regimes applicable to cyberspace.
Consensus on pure questions of law—efforts to identify and describe “black-letter” legal rules—was often easy to achieve at the Tallinn drafting sessions. In this respect, Tallinn 2.0 is a useful compendium or restatement of a great number of consensus positions on existing positive international law. The more difficult questions were mixed questions of fact and law. What split the authors—and what is captured in Tallinn 2.0 commentary sections and identified as majority or minority positions, or the positions of a “few” of the group—was usually our efforts to apply a rule of law to a cyber scenario.
For example, it was easy to agree on the existence and expression of the principle of sovereignty as a matter of public international law. Classically, sovereignty refers to “[i]ndependence in regard to a portion of the globe [and] is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”Footnote 10 But articulating exactly how sovereignty operates in cyberspace was far more difficult and consensus was elusive. Some authors were willing to apply the rule of sovereignty quite directly from noncyber contexts. For these members of the group, cyber contexts did little to change the expectation that states may not ordinarily violate sovereignty. These authors were willing to conclude that a state's interference with the independent and exclusive management of cyber infrastructure located on the territory of another state violated sovereignty and was an internationally wrongful act.Footnote 11
Other, minority views agreed that a rule of sovereignty applies but that it operates differently in cyberspace. These authors were less certain that every state interference with the management or integrity of cyber infrastructure in the territory of another state violates sovereignty in a legally meaningful way.Footnote 12 Still others expressed that it was unclear to them how sovereignty applies to cyberspace. These authors preferred to await state practice and expressions of opinio juris before committing to legal conclusions.Footnote 13
How best to resolve and, frankly, whether to resolve these ambiguities were the most difficult questions during the Tallinn process. In our approaches to these questions, the individual members of the group most clearly revealed their methodological and even theoretical colors. For the most part a predominantly conservative, almost literal application of existing law prevailed. However, other interpretive, including teleological, methods were employed by some authors. It was often clear that logic or practicalities commended alterations or accommodations to how the law operated in noncyber contexts. But it wasn't clear to what extent the authors were positioned to make these accommodations themselves. That is, with a firm commitment to restrict itself to lex lata or existing law, the group was reluctant to adopt novel or emerging models of application. And there was, frankly, even with the reviews and extensive input by states, little firm evidence that states had yet generated many of these alternative applications themselves.
A recurring question then was where to set legal baselines for mixed questions of fact and law. Taking states at their word with respect to application of existing international law to cyberspace, one might reasonably set that baseline at an unaltered, analogous application of the law. For instance, if sovereignty generally extends to and guarantees exclusive authority over territorial property. And if cyber infrastructure is found on sovereign territory. A straightforward baseline conclusion might be that as a general matter territorial cyberinfrastructure is inviolable by other states. If operational realities or state preference requires otherwise, states staking out that departure bear a burden of persuasion and development of a new norm. Through decades and even centuries of practice and codification, such departures have been recognized in other domains such as the law of the sea transit and innocent passage regimes. The near future may see such efforts by states to identify exceptions to sovereign exclusivity with respect to the cyber domain.
A competing baseline, of course, is that there is no law. In the absence of significant state practice and especially lacking clear expressions of opinio juris, one might conclude either that a Lotus-inspiredFootnote 14 rule of permissiveness operates or that there is simply no rule of conduct with respect to sovereignty in cyberspace at all. These are difficult propositions to reconcile with the now nearly unanimous starting point that international law applies to cyberspace. That conclusion, or concession if one prefers, becomes quite hollow if the answers to mixed questions of fact and law reflect a blank slate.
The Tallinn 2.0 description of the current relationship between cyberspace and international law surely declines to express the adaptations and concessions to novelty that some would have liked to see. An important substantive and methodological question then is whether and how states will develop these adaptations and evolutions. If Tallinn 2.0 manages to prompt or even goad movement from states in this regard, efforts to more clearly define and describe the relationship between cyberspace and international law, it will have been in some respects successful.
