In this fresh political history of late nineteenth-century New York State, Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer introduces an important new framework for contemplating the Gilded Age nexus of capital, class, ambition, and partisanship. Although the book features acquisitive politicos manipulating nascent state powers, it is “not an examination of corruption” (19). Rather, the author uses “electoral capitalism” literally: a “category of entrepreneurship in which the capture of public office and the accumulation of private wealth are mutually reinforcing endeavors” (6). Hoary tales of bosses plundering taxpayers are thus supplanted by subtler subversions of popular government by “officeholding entrepreneurs” who “considered themselves squarely within mainstream norms of individual pluck and self-help” (21). Often provocative and consistently compelling, Broxmeyer’s highly analytical writing is dense but never abstruse, and balanced with welcome occasions of anecdotal whimsy. His book is an incisive contribution to the study of Gilded Age politics.
One of Electoral Capitalism’s many merits is the assiduous manner in which the author situates his scholarship as interdisciplinary, understanding that “a fuller view of political behavior requires exploring the meaning of people’s strategies and calculations as they are enmeshed within layers of social context.” By eschewing theoretical abstractions in favor of an intimate consideration of people’s behavior “in actual historical practice,” Broxmeyer renders his “electoral capitalism” framework far more beneficial to historians (5). The context in which electoral capitalism emerged was “the age of mass politics,” he argues, which “ushered a demographic revolution in officeholding in which lower-middle-class and working-class aspirants began to displace the ‘gentlemen class’ in positions of authority” (14), a “democratization of elected and appointed public office” that “was made possible through its commodification” (3, 9). These upstarts “were not independently wealthy,” so they pioneered “ingenious ways to tap the public treasury … and ride a wave of public debt” until the “profits from electoral capitalism coordinated by party leaders far outpaced the relatively modest streams of official income” (15). Partisans’ new priorities were profoundly consequential for American politics as “‘electoral capitalism’ became constitutive of the party system” (4): parties realized that “failing to win enough support meant losing the ability to auction public offices,” and politicos discerned that losing elections meant surrendering “profitable ventures” (10). The “material stakes” of elections became incredibly high, inspiring “fierce” electoral competition (10).
Electoral capitalism therefore emerged at the cacophonous intersection of institutional, economic, and demographic dynamism. Happily for readers, Broxmeyer avoids the potential pitfalls of this intimidating complexity by deftly navigating a series of studies that elucidate the many constituent pieces of his larger project. Each chapter presents a nuanced historical case of the practice of electoral capitalism in Gilded Age New York. The author’s gripping presentation, impressive archival work, and well-selected examples make the book especially exciting for historians of the Empire State.
The first two chapters present electoral capitalism from the perspective of the politicos. Chapter one offers a unique twist on the motivations of Boss Tweed and Tammany Hall with the story of Tammany’s brief but instructive foray into banking. The machine’s “nascent financial sector, chartered in the state legislature and buffeted with politically acquired deposits, allowed Tweed to finance party and business activities on a grand scale” (33). These banks “were not afterthoughts,” but instead evidence that the politicians were “ascendent electoral capitalists who appropriated democratic capital” in a system where “politics begets money” (30). In chapter two, Broxmeyer engages the Stalwarts, another legendary organization of Gilded Age New York. Beyond Roscoe Conkling’s notorious command of patronage through the Port of New York and the equally infamous internecine scuffles between Conkling and estranged deputies like Alonzo Cornell and Chester A. Arthur, Broxmeyer demonstrates that the Stalwarts “crafted policy congruence among the party, adjunct businesses, and the American state,” with the objective of “making their allies, and the party, rich” (58). The port story reveals “the logic of party-based accumulation in pure form,” since protectionism was key to Republican political economy (65); feuds among Stalwarts expose that “while the gilded party sought to temper its members’ appetites in the collective electoral interest,” realistically, “constraining personal greed proved challenging because of the overlap with policy stakes” (67). The heart of the chapter is the more enduring alliance between the Republicans and the firm of Morton, Bliss, and Company. Conkling enlisted his influence with President Ulysses S. Grant to gain the firm preeminence in floating government bonds, while the firm’s astute partners saw no distinction between corporate and partisan matters. Critics charged that Levi Morton ran for congress in 1878 “to represent his firm,” but the charge was only half correct: “Morton’s firm was the party” (78). Morton was “able to transcend” factional struggles between Stalwarts and rival Half-Breeds because “his firm’s financial services became indispensable to the circulation of capital through the entire Republican Party” (85).
Chapters three and four assess interactions between these politicians and the electorate. While historians have long noted the importance of spoils to Gilded Age partisans, Broxmeyer foregrounds “the lived experience of petty officeholders” to explore how electoral capitalism functioned at the grassroots level (93). Party networks became the “employer of last resort for the needy among the electoral crowd,” redistributing “some” of the wealth partisans had accumulated and fashioning a “de facto form of welfare” (11, 118). Yet this book is intended to complicate the legacies of Gilded Age partisans—not rehabilitate them. Patronage employment was “by definition capricious,” and ultimately the parties “greatly exacerbated the Gilded Age’s crisis of inequality … fusing party competition to the accumulation of wealth” (12, 116). Indeed, Broxmeyer indicts these “capital-acquiring leaders” and their “impressive” but “pathological” maneuvers to “flout democratic constraints” as a “Party Noir” (12).
In this critique, Broxmeyer does not echo elite-informed social-scientific denunciations of corruption, but instead adduces an alternative reform tradition in which “grassroots reformers sought to fundamentally restructure the link between public office and capitalism by decommodifying politics” (124). Chapter four chronicles various campaigns for “reform from below,” including those by Henry George, Typographical Union No. 6, and others during the Great Upheaval. Broxmeyer differentiates his own critique from the more familiar cries of privileged reformers by centering the analysis on a “shared belief that political parties were responsible for worsening inequality through fusion of electoralism with private property” (151).
There is far more richness and diversity to the author’s case studies. Readers will relish the intricate presentation and depth of analysis. Dr. Broxmeyer is to be applauded for this important revisionist contribution to the study of Gilded Age politics.
