“It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest,” opined Woodrow Wilson in 1913. “It is not only unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions … I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek an additional foot of territory by conquest” (118).
One can hem and haw about whether Wilson obeyed the letter of that law, but he undoubtedly gave its spirit a thorough working over. Wilson's presidency saw the annexation of the Virgin Islands, the inauguration of a nineteen-year occupation of Haiti, similar though shorter occupations of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, and a brief invasion of Mexico. Nor were the Wilson years unusual in that respect. Throughout the twentieth century, Presidents trumpeted the United States as uniquely uninterested in domination. And yet the torrent of annexations, occupations, coups, and other interventions was nearly unending.
When faced with this apparent contradiction between the professed principles of the leaders of the United States and their actions, historians have tended to scrutinize the principles a little more closely. Noel Maurer approaches the problem from the other side. Bringing economic analysis to bear on a subset of foreign interventions – those designed to protect the economic interests of US citizens – he asks how the government was impelled to action. Maurer takes pronouncements such as Wilson's at face value and then asks why even Presidents who were visibly and justifiably reluctant to intervene abroad nevertheless did so.
His first conclusion – not a surprise, but helpful to have established in a systematic way – is that they almost always did so. In the first seven decades of the twentieth century, whenever foreign investments or loans were in peril, US Presidents intervened, even when they had to be “dragged kicking and screaming” (4). Who did the dragging? Investors and creditors. Maurer has exposed a truth that has receded in the consciousness of US historians: the US state was not a unified actor bent on empire but an arena for competing interests. And when it came to foreign intervention, a small economic elite nearly always got its way.
A vicious circle was at play. The more investors came to expect their government to intervene, the more they invested abroad, and then the more forcefully they demanded intervention. This was the “empire trap,” which Maurer dates to Teddy Roosevelt's promulgation in 1904 of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Interestingly, politicians at the time, keenly aware of the dangers of elite capture (they presumably thought of the railroads), saw the empire trap coming. In the most intriguing and clarifying chapter in an intriguing and clarifying book, Maurer explains how Congressional opponents of empire (often motivated by racism) managed to cripple the Philippines as a site of overseas investment from the very start, precisely to prevent the creation of a Philippine lobby.
But once the empire trap was set, it operated inexorably. Those with business overseas simply had no other recourse when foreign governments threatened to confiscate their property or default on debts. And so they pressured their own government to defend their interests, nearly always receiving compensation at market prices for property lost – Maurer has the numbers. The cost was borne by the targeted countries, whose fiscal conditions, Maurer argues, were rarely improved by US intervention. It was also borne by the US government, which repeatedly imperiled its own recognized strategic interest to go to bat for this small but powerful constituency. It would not be until the 1980s that the advent of international arbitration would give investors ways to protect their interests without dragging the US government into it.
This is not a book with much to say about ideology; the empire trap appears to have worked no matter what relevant actors thought of it. Maurer also says little about the major historical inflection points in the twentieth century – the ascent of the United States to global hegemony, the public disavowal of racism, the rise and fall of formal empire – which also apparently left the trap intact.
There is something refreshing about Maurer's accountant's-eye view of things. Like the best of economic historians, Maurer casts familiar episodes in an unfamiliar light, revealing heretofore hidden aspects. This is a formidable work that students of US foreign relations will have to take seriously. One suspects policymakers would benefit from reading it as well.
