China's policies toward territorial disputes have regularly alternated between expressed inflexibility and a remarkable willingness to compromise. A whole series of disputes with the former Soviet Union, for example, that had nearly brought war in the 1960s were almost completely wrapped up by the 1990s. M. Taylor Fravel, a political scientist at MIT, makes a comprehensive and empirically grounded argument that Chinese decisions about whether to bring force to bear on disputes, or, by contrast, to compromise, are not products of shifts in the balance of power (so that, for instance, weakness in a neighbor would elicit a forward Chinese policy), or of the internalization of international norms (such that traditional Chinese understanding of interests is modified by a more cosmopolitan and globalist view), but rather, above all, of the state of domestic security. When the regime feels strong, it may refuse even to talk, let alone offer concessions. When it feels threatened, the same regime will compromise externally in order to make easier the keeping of internal order.
Strong Borders, Secure Nation is comprehensive: the first chapter gives real detail on the Qing borders, their current status, and the numbers and locations of peoples now living within them. A very useful appendix summarizes eighteen current disputes with good references. It is also highly theoretical: it poses questions, in ways beyond the scope of this review to examine, about nearly every other political science analysis, not only of Chinese border policy but also of international behavior in general.
Two core chapters deal with the 1960s and the 1990s. In both cases, we saw two very different Chinas turn away from international inflexibility toward compromise. In spite of regular offers to talk with its neighbors, China had until 1960 pursued compromise in only one of sixteen border disputes (Burma). By 1964, the country had reached compromise solutions in six and offered concessions in two more. These included disagreements with Vietnam, Laos, Nepal, and India, among others. Fravel argues that the 1959 revolt in Tibet explains the change; he is able to pin down official Chinese language from documents reproduced in a 1994 collection to support what is an eminently plausible case (p. 86). The 1990s likewise saw compromise with Russia, something seemingly unthinkable two decades earlier. Why? Fravel's answer is again teetering regime stability, a result of antigovernment demonstrations all over the country and the massacre at Tiananmen in 1989. As with the 1960s, the explanation is plausible. In this case, however, a lack of accessible materials means that Fravel is more prone simply to assert his position than to footnote a primary source.
In addition to foreign conflicts, Fravel also treats “homeland” disputes, where China asserts that the territory in question cannot be compromised because it is an inseparable part of the patrimony, even though it is not under Beijing's administration. Fravel discusses in particular detail the cases of Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Senkaku islands. Chinese resort to direct military action in these cases has been much less than might be expected, given the claim of sovereignty. Fravel argues that China uses force in these situations primarily when its claim seems in danger of losing strength: missile firings near Taiwan, for example, serve to remind all that China still has demands and means to compel.
All of these arguments make sense. A bit troubling to a historian reading the book is its intentionally “state-centered” treatment. China is China; its governing mechanism is depersonalized; it responds almost mechanically in the ways the author describes. As Fravel puts it, “Jiang and Deng would have used force … under the same circumstances as Mao. Deng would have compromised under the same circumstances as Mao and Jiang” (p. 310). This is a little too neat. Furthermore, we are never told the limits of the author's insights. Thus, for instance, if internal order in China really began to break down with, say, a split between the party and the military, would Beijing become an even more compromising seeker of foreign friends? Or might it stir up some irredentist trouble as a distraction?
Furthermore, China refrains from belligerency to some extent because war will not work. Thus, the Chinese regime has regularly claimed all the rocks, reefs, and other maritime odds and ends in the South China Sea. Yet China has not grabbed them all. What is the reason? A look at Fravel's wonderful chart (p. 279) would provide important clues: too many states hold too many bits for a sane China to make a bid for a sweep.
This is an impressive and well-researched work. At times, one feels that Fravel is a bit too intent on homogenizing China to fit his explanatory scheme. His insights remain, however, welcome, original, well documented—and not least, highly illuminating.
