It is unusual for a book on military affairs to be suffused with optimism, but this one is optimistic as well as interesting. It consists of papers presented at a Conference at the US Naval War College in December 2007, with some added later. The authors and editors do a good job of integrating and relating subsequent events up to March 2010. Even so, sad to say, the prospects for military maritime co-operation appear far less promising in mid-2011 than they did in early 2010.

Perhaps the main reason for the book's optimism is the favourable Chinese response to the October 2007 announcement of the official new US Maritime Strategy. The Strategy proposed a “Global Maritime Partnership” of all the world's navies to unite for search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and fisheries enforcement, and against common concerns like piracy and smuggling. A key passage of the Strategy states that, “No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain … Partnerships of common interests are required to counter … emerging threats.” The Chinese found this admission, and the Strategy generally, a welcome contrast to the usual perceived American arrogance.

Unfortunately, aggressive Chinese assertion in 2010 of their maximum sovereignty claims vis-à-vis their neighbours, in the East and South China Seas, and the American declaration of interest in the latter have since dampened enthusiasm for maritime co-operation. So did the US “Air-Sea Battle” doctrine of 2011 that clearly envisions China as the prospective enemy.

Many of the papers focus on “nontraditional security” issues that allow states to sidestep the traditional security dilemma. There is plenty of room for “nontraditional security” co-operation, and there have been some successes. If you read only one chapter, make it Bernard Moreland's fascinating account of US Coast Guard co-operation with China. It would no doubt be even more effective if there were a true Chinese Coast Guard, rather than the five competing bureaucracies described by Lyle Goldstein. Citing a study by the Border Guards Maritime Police Academy, Goldstein writes that, “The balkanization of maritime enforcement entities in China has severely inhibited the coherent development of Chinese coast guard entities.”

Although the first chapter, by Zhuang Jianzhong, is mostly Beijing boilerplate, he endorses the US Maritime Strategy. Like most of the Chinese contributors, he is admirably brief and concludes that successful co-operation depends entirely upon American behaviour; Chinese actions, of course have been and will always be purely defensive, peaceful, non-threatening and transparent!

Gabiel Collins devotes his chapter to a fact emphasized by virtually every contributor: China is increasingly dependent upon the “maritime commons.” That could lead either to increased conflict or co-operation: “China's choices on how to deal with its dependence on the global maritime commons will shed light on Beijing's broader world view.”

Good intentions and pieces of paper are not enough. David Griffiths, among others, notes that China and the US had a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in place in 1998, intended to prevent incidents at sea and to provide communications if they occurred. The MMCA failed completely during the April 2001 EP-3 incident. Griffiths recommends an updated version of the US–Soviet Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement of 1972, which worked reasonably well. The MMCA was negotiated by diplomats, whereas INCSEA was worked out by professional military seafarers who shared an international culture and experience. The key is to allow military professionals “political space” to negotiate, communicate, and review incidents. Routine military to military relations help reduce misperception, which Griffiths sees as a basic problem in most incidents.

Erickson writes that Chinese ports that are the source of 42 per cent of US-bound containers now participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), to both countries’ demonstrable benefit. China is formally and actively participating in a bevy of international agreements, initiatives and systems. The key is demonstrable mutual benefit and respect. Goldstein and William Murray provide the fascinating example of the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office agreement of 2004. Zhu Huayou's admirably brief chapter on Southeast Asia provides a whole list of international agreements and mechanisms involving “non-traditional security” to which China is a state party.

Julia Xue Guifang provides an excellent discussion of “China and the Law of the Sea.” Chinese interpretations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are contrary to those of most other signatories, especially with respect to passage of warships and various activities in China's Exclusive Economic Zone. Her concise argument for China's claims in the South China Sea is the most cogent and logical I have seen.

Peter Dutton follows with a discussion of legal differences from the American viewpoint. Dutton and Xue mostly identify the same points of agreement and disagreement, highlighting the different perspectives of a developing coastal state versus those of an established maritime power. Eric McVaden and Su Hao both point out the mutual benefits to be gained through co-operative disaster relief and humanitarian operations. McVaden also covers intelligence collecting in the EEZ and military to military relations.

Michael Green concisely cuts to three fundamental problems: “First, maritime co-operation is not insulated from capricious political actions.” Second, paper agreements like the MMCA are not being exercised or tested. “Third, U.S. congressional frustration with lack of reciprocity is a continuing danger.” American authors refer repeatedly to the regrettable way Sino-American military-to-military relations have been frozen by one or the other government in retribution for various crises du jour.

James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara depart from the focus on the South China Sea with their essay on the Indian Ocean. They foresee trouble in US–Indian as well as US–Chinese relations. Meanwhile, China is beginning to consider what the Indians have “cried wolf” about for decades: establishing a naval presence, including bases, in the Indian Ocean.

Yu Wanli's penultimate chapter is one of the best in the book; frank, clear, and straightforward. Acknowledging that Chinese strategic thinking is dominated by a land power military culture, he describes the current debate in China over issues of sea power and national strategy. Like all the Chinese contributors he believes that rising Chinese sea power will inevitably provoke “contradiction and conflict” with the US, but still shares in the book's optimism that it can be handled.

Yang Yi ends the volume with a brief, fairly optimistic, view of the prospects for non-traditional security co-operation. He admits that “China must move beyond a ‘victim mentality’ and move toward a more confident and open-minded approach in the face of new ideas” like the Global Maritime Partnership. But there remain problems of trust, which are entirely the fault of (surprise!) the US.

One drawback of the book is that many chapters are repetitive and verbose (the American contributors are the worst offenders by far). However, undergraduates, graduate students, and most China scholars will find this book interesting and informative.