Introduction
During the prime ministership of former Shinzo Abe from December 2012 to September 2020, international relations between the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea) and Japan deteriorated significantly. In July 2019, Japan’s imposition of export restrictions on three chemicals essential for South Korea’s electronics sector, particularly in the production of smartphone displays and chips (Dooley Reference Dooley2019), marked a significant escalation in tensions between the two nations. This move, followed by the additional measure of removing South Korea from its trade Whitelist in August 2019 (Dooley and Choe Reference Dooley and Choe2019), was widely interpreted as retaliatory action against a ruling by the South Korean Supreme Court in October 2018 (Choe Reference Choe2018). The Court’s decision held Japanese companies responsible for compensating individuals subjected to forced labor during Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. These events precipitated a deepening crisis in Korea–Japan relations, straining diplomatic ties and triggering economic repercussions felt across the region. In public, Abe always maintained that South Korea was an important neighbor of Japan and the country wished to have a future-oriented relationship with South Korea. A series of Japanese trade retaliatory measures against South Korea were in stark contrast to his words. As important allies of the United States, South Korea and Japan should work together to jointly address the challenges of China in the Indo-Pacific region (Lin et. al. Reference Lin, Chase, Blank, Cooper, Grossman, Harold, Jennifer, Morris, Ma, Orner, Shih and Kim2020) and North Korea’s nuclear weapons threats in Northeast Asia. Abe’s revisionist nationalist policy plunged Japan back into its past imperialist legacy, and its claims of sovereignty over the Korean territory, Dokdo, further strained South Korea–Japan relations.
Abe’s territorial claim over Dokdo is connected with his revisionist historical viewpoint, which denies Japan’s imperialist rule. Japan claims to incorporate Dokdo as terra nullius, even though it forcefully seized Dokdo from the Korean Empire during the colonial period. Moreover, the Abe cabinet articulated these territorial claims over Korea’s Dokdo, potentially escalating the situation into a territorial dispute with Korea. While referring to Dokdo as “Takeshima,” Japan has made efforts to assert that Korea’s occupation of Dokdo is illegal, both domestically and internationally. Since “Dokdo is an integral part of Korean territory, historically, geographically and under international law” (The Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022), former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had to develop a Japanese specific counterargument over Dokdo in order to discard the widely accepted historical fact of Korea’s ownership of Dokdo. Following Abe’s elaborate plan, the cabinet had implemented various measures to solidify its territorial claim over Dokdo (Kwon and Benham Reference Kwon and Benham2016) investing extra budget resources to make its untrue claim to Dokdo credible.Footnote 1 In order to provide a plausible argument for Japanese territorial claim to Dokdo, Abe strategically and organizationally distorted historical facts of Korean ownership of Dokdo.
Thus, this article focuses on how Abe sought to utilize various measures to challenge Korean sovereignty over Dokdo internationally and to fortify his territorial claims to Dokdo domestically. Through a series of speeches discussed at Japanese National Diets among Abe cabinet ministers and members of the Diets, this article investigates how and by what policy instruments the Abe cabinet revitalized Japan’s territorial claims over Dokdo and persuaded the Japanese people of those claims. The main arguments of this article are summarized as follows. Abe’s territorial claim over Dokdo is based on his revisionist viewpoint on the history of Japanese imperialism. Abe took advantage of the Dokdo issue in order to strengthen his domestic political position, rallying like-minded rightwing politicians and others. As a way to provide a plausible argument for a Japanese territorial claim on Dokdo, Abe strategically and organizationally distorted the historical facts relating to Korean ownership of Dokdo. Abe implemented a range of systematic and strategic initiatives to bolster Japan’s territorial sovereignty claim over Dokdo. These measures included establishing a government agency and a research institution focusing on territorial issues. Additionally, revisions to school textbooks, augmented budgets for disseminating Japan’s stance on disputed territories and efforts to enhance public awareness through exhibition halls, and international public relations campaigns were all part of this concerted effort. The overarching aim was to furnish a credible foundation for Japan’s claim while also shaping the perceptions of the Japanese populace, with a particular emphasis on influencing future generations.
This article aims to answer the following research question. How was the Dokdo issue discussed in Japan’s National Diet amid tumultuously changing Korea–Japan relations? What major policy measures did Abe’s cabinet implement in fortifying its territorial claims of Dokdo? What policy goals and measures did the Abe cabinet pursue regarding its territorial claim over Dokdo? Following this introduction, the next section of the article surveys existing literature on Dokdo and presents the research methods of this article. A following section discusses the various theoretical perspectives on Abe’s Dokdo agenda. The author then investigates the Dokdo issue from the perspective of Korea–Japan relations, with representative views on the islets in the Diet and the Abe cabinet’s policy measures solidifying its territorial claims. Next, the author examines the political and economic background of the Abe cabinet’s policy on Dokdo, and the conclusion, summarizes the main arguments of this article with some policy suggestions on the Dokdo issue.
Academic viewpoints on Dokdo/Takeshima and research methods
Japan has distorted existing historical evidence to its advantage (Naito Reference Naito2008), and thus, when the general public read both South Korea’s and Japan’s official viewpoints on Dokdo, which Japan calls Takeshima (The Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2022), without critical perspectives based on history and international law, it can lead to a lot of confusion about which governments are correct or wrong. Differing from Japan’s official position on Dokdo, almost all academic research results have concluded that the territorial sovereignty of Dokdo belongs to Korea from both historical and international law perspectives. It may seem redundant to introduce academic research on the territorial ownership of Dokdo, but Han Key Lee (Reference Lee1998), and Hee Kwon Park and Jong-In Bae (Reference Park and Jong-In2008) conducted comprehensive and thorough investigations into Korea’s sovereign ownership of Dokdo, considering both the ancient and modern history of Korea and Japan and the principles and precedents of international law. As one of the conscientious Japanese scholars opposing the distortion of historical facts by the Japanese government, Seichu Naito (Reference Naito2008) demonstrated that Dokdo is Korean territory based on historical records. He provided ten critical points of research refuting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s claim of sovereignty over Dokdo. Several scholarly works have demonstrated Korea’s territorial sovereignty over Dokdo from the perspective of international law. Among them, Jon M. Van Dyke (Reference Van Dyke2007) examined the territorial ownership of Dokdo by considering relevant precedents of the International Courts of Justice (ICJ) alongside a historical overview of Dokdo. Nico J. Schrijver and Vid Prislan (Reference Schrijver and Prislan2015) also analyzed recent ICJ jurisprudence regarding sovereignty over Dokdo. Additionally, Laurent Mayali and John Yoo (Reference Mayali and Yoo2018) investigated the territorial dispute over Dokdo, focusing on three broad legal principles: evidence from the map, resolutions of earlier disputes by international tribunals, and the claim of terra nullius status.
As for scholarly works related to the Dokdo sovereignty controversy in the negotiation process of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Seokwoo Lee and Jon M. Van Dyke (Reference Lee and Van Dyke2010) compared several different draft versions which included or excluded Dokdo as for returning Japanese occupied colonial territory to Korea. Lee and Van Dyke (Reference Lee and Van Dyke2010), and Kimie Hara (Reference Hara2012) concluded that the United States’ concern about South Korea potentially falling to the North Korean regime might have led to Dokdo being excluded from the Treaty. Thomas Schwartz and John Yoo (Reference Schwartz and Yoo2019) reached a firm conclusion that the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not grant sovereignty over Dokdo to Japan after conducting in-depth research on the background of the Treaty using US presidential and department archives. Joshua Castellino and Elivir Dominguez Redondo (Reference Castellino and Redondo2015) further affirm that the title to Dokdo belongs to Korea, based on international legal principles such as Uti Possidetis, Terra Nullius, and the Critical Date governing territorial ownership.
Several scholarly works have been published on the Dokdo issue, from diverse perspectives. Sung-jae Choi (Reference Choi2005) and Alexander Bukh (Reference Bukh2016) examined the Dokdo issue through the symbolic value of Korean national identity within the context of Japan’s colonial legacy. They also identified contributions from civil society movements to the decision-making process of the Korean government in domestic politics. From an international politics perspective, Min Gyo Koo (Reference Koo2005) examined a cyclical pattern of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, in which the economic interdependence of the two states prevented the Dokdo issue from escalating into a diplomatic crisis. Chinsoo Bae (Reference Bae2012) conducted comparative research on the United States, Japan, and Korea, identifying an interesting pattern regarding Dokdo. Applying utility theory, Jinman Cho, Hee Min Kim, and Jun Young Choi (2009) argued that the territorial dispute between Korea and Japan cannot be resolved by a mutually acceptable solution, because Dokdo symbolizes national pride and serves as a reminder of the Japanese colonial torment for the Korean people. Investigating a similar perspective symbolism Dokdo holds for Korea, Krista Wiegand (Reference Wiegand2015) emphasized that the territorial dispute over Dokdo between Korea and Japan functioned as a symbolic barrier in Korean politics to overcome Korea’s antagonistic national feeling against Japan. Consequently, Korean leaders would be less inclined to pursue close international cooperation with Japan. Edward Kwon’s (Reference Kwon2016) comprehensive quantitative and contents analyses of over seventy years of speeches by members of Japan’s National Diets related to Dokdo revealed general behavioral patterns. It was found that Japanese ruling parties often use the Dokdo issue to bolster cabinet approval ratings or navigate challenging socioeconomic situations. Wonjae Hwang, Wonbin Cho, and Krista Wiegand (Reference Hwang, Cho and Wiegand2018) identified similar behavioral patterns in Korean politics, showing that the Dokdo issues not only tend to increase national cohesion in Korea, but also boost the approval rating of Korean presidents. A volume by Paul Huth, Sunwoong Kim, and Terence Roehrig’s (Reference Huth, Kim and Roehrig2021) delved into the Dokdo dispute from various research perspectives, including the possibility of a peaceful resolution, education and cultural aspects, and United States policy toward the disputes. Edward Kwon and Liza Abram Benham (Reference Kwon and Benham2016) revealed that Shinzo Abe employed an artificial three-step strategy to challenge Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo. However, the scope of their research was limited to the midpoint of Abe’s tenure until 2016.
This article holds significant importance in verifying and complementing Kwon and Benham’s research by covering the entire duration of Abe’s cabinet (excluding his first term), from December 2012 to September 2020, as the scope of the research. This article analyzed a total of 474 Dokdo-related speeches from the National Diet (国会, Kokkai) records of both the House of Representatives (衆議院, Shūgiin) and the House of Councillors (参議院, Sangiin) over an eight-year period. These speeches, which were accessed through the Diet Minutes Search System, were delivered by a prime minister, ministers, and members of the Diet.Footnote 2 The Minutes encompass current issues, results of policy implementation, and future policy measures concerning Dokdo, along with diverse policy opinions and evaluations expressed by key officials, lawmakers, and territorial policy experts. These discussions are captured through a series of questions and answers between ministers and members of the Diet. Using content analysis and quantitative research methods, this article examines various discussions on Dokdo-related issues. By analyzing the opinion of key decision-makers regarding Dokdo-related matters, we can infer the diverse goals and directions of Japan’s territorial policy, as well as the intentions of decision-makers involved in the policy-making process.
The quantitative research methods analyze relationships between Dokdo-related speeches and various events, along with other factors in Japan and Korea. The two dependent variables are (1) the average intensity of Japanese officials’ speeches; and (2) Dokdo-related events in Korea and Japan. The dependent variable, the degree of intensity of Dokdo-related speeches, is coded on a five-scale feeling thermometer, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). The coding work, which assessed the degree of intensity of speeches, was manifested in the overall speech tones categorized as negative, neutral, and positive, along with the analysis of recurring usage of specific words and phrases. For instance, terms such as ‘plunder, extortion, depredation, or pillage’ in relation to Dokdo were labeled with a negative code, while terms like ‘peaceful, future-oriented, bargaining, negotiation, or sustained diplomatic effort’ for resolving territorial disputes were assigned a positive code. The latter dependent variable counted various Dokdo-related events that occurred in both Korea and Japan. Dokdo events in Korea include visits to Dokdo by Korean lawmakers, defensive drills conducted by the Korean army to secure the islets, the Dokdo Ceremonial Day, important statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, and so on. Dokdo events in Japan include Japanese territorial education activities, various Dokdo surveys, the Ceremony of Takeshima Day, the opening of the Territorial and Sovereign Exhibition Hall, official Japanese government documents describing Dokdo (such as the Defense of Japan, White Paper, and the Diplomatic Blue Book), and important statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
The independent variables included (1) The monthly employment and unemployment rates of Japan collected by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, (2) Approval Rating for the Cabinet collected by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (NHK, Monthly Survey of Political Attitude), TV Asahi’s Opinion Poll, and Jiji Press Data, (3) right-wing politicians in Japanese political parties, operationalized as each Diet member’s political viewpoint and attitude toward domestic and international political issues, (4) Korean Presidents, operationalized by a dummy variable selecting President Moon’s period, and (5) Security Threats from North Korea due to several nuclear weapons experiments and missile test fires.
Theoretical perspectives on Shinzo Abe’s Dokdo agenda
Why did Shinzo Abe challenge conventional wisdom, historical record, and international legal perspectives, all of which all favor Korea’s territorial sovereignty, on the Dokdo issue? Unlike any previous prime minister, Abe consistently and methodically harnessed the longstanding territorial dispute between Japan and Korea. He actively leveraged the Dokdo issue to stoke Japanese nationalism, emphasizing the symbolic significance of Japanese identity and the recovery of the islands. Through the widespread dissemination of information about the practical initiatives undertaken by the Abe cabinet to reclaim Dokdo, Abe adeptly leveraged this issue to both cultivate political support among the Japanese population. Additionally, he used it to shift public dissatisfaction away from his insufficient policy responses to the prolonged economic stagnation and the persistent security concerns posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile test launches over Japanese territory.
Abe’s pursuit of Japan’s territorial claims over Dokdo can potentially be explained by a range of theories, encompassing utility theory, rally-around-flag theory, diversionary theory, and elaborated plan theory. First, according to subjective expected utility theory, decision-makers engaged in evaluating outcomes and assessing their choices based on utilities and subjective probabilities derived from their beliefs and favorable tests in the decision-making process to pursue a specific policy (Karni Reference Karni, Machina and Viscusi2014, 1–39). Japan has been involved in three major territorial disputes with neighboring countries: Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima, China over Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands, and Russia over the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands. Among the three territorial disputes, Japan seems to perceive that the utility of Dokdo is inferior to the disputes involving China and Russia (Cho, Kim, and Choi Reference Cho, Kim and Choi2009, 371). Historically, Japan has approached South Korea four times (in 1954, 1962, 2004, and 2012) to resolve territorial disputes over Dokdo through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Kwon Reference Kwon2016, 238), while the country never approached China and Russia to resolve their disputes through the ICJ resolution. As Japan effectively controls the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoytai Islands and believes the Northern Territories/Kuril Islands are lost territories resulting from the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the country does not want to risk any negative resolutions from the ICJ. Thus, Japan aims for a winning position based on a nothing-to-lose-mindset due to the perception that Dokdo is less valuable compared to the disputes with China and Russia (Park and Bae Reference Park and Jong-In2008, 161).
Second, the “rally-around-the-flag” theory posits that people tend to support government leadership positively during a crisis or national emergency (Muller Reference Muller1970; Oneal and Bryan Reference Oneal and Bryan1995). Abe may anticipate that his territorial claim over Dokdo and his revisionist policy would evoke a rally-around-the-flag effect. Kwon’s study proved that the territorial dispute over Dokdo tends to boost the lukewarm approval ratings of various prime ministers, as well as easily mobilize citizens and conservative right-wing politicians to support the ruling parties (Kwon Reference Kwon2016, 257–61). According to this research, the Abe cabinet had discussed the Dokdo issue more than any cabinet in Japanese history. Abe’s historical perspective and territorial claims over Dokdo fostered national unity, while presenting a revised narrative of Japanese military actions during wartime. This recontextualization influenced young generations in Japan, altering their understanding of history and exacerbating tensions in international relations with South Korea.
Third, the diversionary theory explains that leaders sometimes foster conflict situations with other countries as a way to promote domestic cohesion, diverting attention from social, political, or economic crises or instability (Levy Reference Levy and Midlarsky1989, 259–88; Tarar Reference Tarar2006). Since the 1990s, Japan has experienced chronic longer-term stagflation, known as the “Lost Decade of the 1990s.” Suffering from stagnant economic growth and recession with rising unemployment, Abe attempted to find a new breakthrough with his ambitious economic stimulus program, called Abenomics. Additionally, the Abe cabinet deliberately escalated the conflict situation caused by minor issues with South Korea, such as the inclusion of Dokdo on the Korean Unification Flag for the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics (Siripala Reference Siripala2018) and on a dessert serve served to Kim Jong Un during the inter-Korean summit (Gittleson and Trotter Reference Gittleson and Trotter2018). Abe’s cabinet took advantage of these incidents to divert people’s gloomy mood from economically stressful conditions to secure supporters for the conservative ruling party.
Finally, an elaborated plan theory means that a policy-maker elaborately refines the direction of policy and prepares various policy measures in order to achieve its desired policy goals. Kwon and Benham’s (Reference Kwon and Benham2016, 56–58) article divides Abe’s elaborated plan to consolidate its territorial claim over Dokdo in a three-step strategy. In the short-term, the cabinet tried to publicize territorial disputes over Dokdo both domestically and internationally. In the middle-term, Abe developed a sophisticated logic of Japanese territorial claims over the islets contending with the South Korean government’s possible reactions. In the longer-term, Abe cabinet aimed to instill Japanese territorial claims over Dokdo in future generations, challenging the historical evidence supporting South Korean sovereignty over the islets.
Dokdo agenda in South Korea–Japan relations
Overview of South Korea–Japan relations under Abe’s various terms
Based on the theoretical approaches to analyze Abe’s territorial claim over Dokdo, this study investigates the stenographic records of the National Diet. On December 16, 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won a landslide victory in the national parliamentary election, allowing Abe to secure his second term as a prime minister (Fackler Reference Fackler2012). Abe had a clear vision of how to address various historical issues regarding Japanese colonial rule and territorial disputes with neighboring nations. During the election campaign, Abe announced several policy proposals in his commitments in the LDP Comprehensive Policy Collection (LDP 2012). According to “IV. Diplomacy and Security, item 3. Territory and Sovereignty in the J-File,” the LDP proposed the establishment of a new government institution, tentatively named the Headquarters for Countermeasures on Territorial Sovereignty Issues, to address territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Additionally, a new research institute will be established to conduct historical and academic research on Dokdo, the Northern Territories, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoytai Islands, and to formulate countermeasures toward various post-war compensation trials, such those regarding forced laborers or comfort women (LDP 2012, 41). In organizing the cabinet, Abe selected hardline conservative politicians, including Taro Aso (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), Yoshitaka Shindo (Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications), Itsunori Onodera (Minister of Defense), and Hakubun Shimomura (Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology).Footnote 3 Abe’s revisionist historical views, which denied Japan’s imperialism and the colonial atrocities inflicted on neighboring nations, was leading to diplomatic friction with South Korea and China.
In the early days of Abe’s second term, Abe and Fumio Kishida, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had outwardly maintained an amicable attitude toward South Korea’s Park Geun-hye government. In a response to a Diet member’s question on the Dokdo issue in May 2013 Abe replied that South Korea is an important neighbor sharing basic values and interests. Regardless of past historical issues and territorial dispute over Dokdo, Japan wished to cooperate with newly elected President Park in order to maintain regional peace and stability.Footnote 4 In February 2013 Fumio Kishida also intimated that Japan intended to build a future-oriented relationship with South Korea promoting trade, investment, and regional security. Observing that the Dokdo issue would not be resolved quickly, Kishida said he would continue to convey Japan’s position to South Korea.Footnote 5 In the fiftieth anniversary year of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan, Park and Abe held their first summit, on November 2, 2015. During the summit, the two leaders exchanged opinions on several sensitive issues that have hindered South Korea–Japan relations, including comfort women, the South China Sea, and the indictment of the former Seoul bureau chief of the Sankei Shimbun(Gil and Kim Reference Gil and Kim2015). Abe and Park reached an initial compromise on the sexual slavery issue that could have extended the amicable relationship between both countries. Almost two months later, on December 28, 2015, South Korea and Japan resolved the comfort women issue in a manner described as “final and irreversible,” addressing a major stumbling block between the two countries (Choe Reference Choe2015). At the time, the Comfort Women Agreement was met with extensive criticism in South Korea, because it was a secret and hasty agreement that did not seriously consider the position of the victims. During the presidential election campaign following the impeachment of Park, presidential candidate Moon Jae-in pledged to renegotiate the Agreement with Japan.
Korea–Japan relations had gradually deteriorated when the new President, Moon Jae-in, was inaugurated in South Korea. In fact, even before Moon became president, Japanese lawmakers seemed to have a negative perception of him. In March 2017, a Deputy Director General of the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported to the Cabinet Committee of the House of Councillors that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Moon’s (as a member of the National Assembly at the time) visit to Dokdo with another representative on July 25, 2016.Footnote 6 The thorny issue of sexual slavery emerged again when newly elected President Moon received a congratulatory phone call from Abe on May 11, 2017, a day after Moon’s inauguration. During the telephone conversation, Abe insisted to Moon that the agreement signed by the Park government should be honored under the new Moon government. However, President Moon replied to Abe that “the reality was that most Korean people could not accept the agreement over the sexual slavery issue” (Yonhap News Reference News2017). President Moon’s decision to revoke the agreement (Suk, Ogura, and Wakatsuki, Reference Suk, Ogura and Wakatsuki2017) stemmed in part from the force of the demands by the Korean public. But as a long-serving human rights lawyer, Moon would also have been keenly aware of the fact that the agreement lacked acknowledgment of the basic human rights and wishes of the victims. The conflict over the agreement was eventually concluded on September 25, 2018, at the summit of the two leaders in New York during their attendance at the United Nations General Assembly (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). In response to Abe’s reference to the comfort women and the ongoing case of the Korean forced laborers, Moon replied that he would not nullify or demand renegotiation of the Comfort Women Agreement. However, he stated that the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation established by the agreement would disband, because it was ineffective and faced heavy public opposition. Regarding the case of the forced laborers, Moon mentioned that the Korean government would respect the judiciary’s decision according to the principle of the separation of powers (Republic of Korea Cheongwadae 2018).
In addition to the conflict over the Comfort Women Agreement, many other issues exacerbated tension between Korea and Japan, including Japan’s decision to not participate in the International Fleet Review hosted by South Korea in October 2018 (Lee and Takenaka Reference Lee and Takenaka2018). Additionally, the South Korean Supreme Court’s ruling on forced laborers in October 2018 (Choe Reference Choe2018) intensified the discord, while radar disputes in December 2018 (Miller Reference Miller2019) added further strain to the already fragile relationship. In January 2019, a Japanese military aircraft threatened to fly close to a South Korean warship (Yonhap News Reference News2019) escalating tensions. Japan’s export restriction on three chemicals to South Korea in July 2019 (Dooley Reference Dooley2019) exacerbated the situation, and Japan’s removal of South Korea from its Whitelist in August 2019 (Dooley and Choe Reference Dooley and Choe2019) dealt another blow to Korea–Japan relations.
From October 10 to 14, 2018, South Korea hosted the International Fleet Review on the southern island of Jeju. South Korean authorities requested Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force to raise its national flag instead of the “Rising Sun” flag, as the latter reminded the Korean people of the symbol of imperialist Japanese rule. However, Japan denied the Korean request, citing the Rising Sun flag’s recognition as the country’s naval ensign, and eventually decided not to participate in the event. In October and November of the same year, the Supreme Court of South Korea finally ruled that Japanese companies (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal) should compensate Korean laborers who were forcibly mobilized and worked for these companies by the Japanese colonial authority. Japan’s assertation that such compensations had already been completed by the 1965 Korea–Japan TreatyFootnote 7 further strained Korea–Japan relations. Amidst deteriorating relations, on December 20, 2018, Japan accused a South Korean naval vessel, Gwanggaeto, of aiming its radar at Japan’s patrol aircraft. Korea responded by stating that it was a warning issued because the aircraft was dangerously close to the vessel. Subsequently, on January 13, 2019, Japan’s provocative flight threatened the South Korean destroyer, Daejoyeong.
The conflict between the two countries escalated further when Japan imposed a series of export bans on South Korea in July and August of 2019. On July 1, 2019, Japan implemented regulations on the export of chemicals crucial to Korea’s electronic industry. Additionally, Japan passed a bill in a cabinet meeting on August 2, to remove South Korea from its Whitelist, effective from August 28, 2019. While Japan claimed these trade restrictions were for its own security, it was evident that they were retaliatory measures against the South Korean Supreme Court’s ruling on the forced laborer (Harding, White, and Song Reference Harding, White and Song2019). In response, Korea announced plans to remove Japan from its Whitelist on August 12, 2019 (Kim Reference Kim2019). Subsequently, Korea filed a complaint over Japan’s trade regulation with the World Trade Organization on September 13, 2019 (Jin Reference Jin2019). On August 22, 2019, South Korea also terminated the intelligence-sharing pact with Japan (GSOMIA: General Security of Military Information Agreement) concerning North Korea’s military and nuclear activities (Kim Reference Kim2020). Korea suspended these countermeasures, in response to pressure from the United States, and Japan made efforts to resolve its trade regulations through diplomacy at the last minute in November 2019 (Yoo and Park Reference Yoo and Park2019). Underlying Abe’s decisions to implement drastic trade sanctions toward South Korea was his calculation that the Moon government would push the Supreme Court to delay or withhold rulings on forced laborers, as the Park government did. Additionally, Abe may have considered that South Korea’s high demand for and dependence on importing resource materials from Japan could seriously harm the country. However, Abe miscalculated, as South Korea sought to find various alternative trading partners and develop its own independent technology to substitute Japan’s chemicals. Moreover, many Korean people have engaged in extensive boycotts of Japanese products.
Representative Views of Members of the Diets about Dokdo
The sharp conflicts between South Korea and Japan are manifest in discussions concerning Dokdo within the National Diet of Japan among cabinet ministers and lawmakers. As shown in Table 1, the average intensity of speech regarding Dokdo increased during Abe’s successive terms (the second term: 4.65, the third: 4.86, and the fourth: 4.97). The average intensity is also recorded as high toward Korean President Moon (4.97 in Table 2). According to the cross-tabulation analysis between Abe’s terms by Dokdo-related issues, the territorial sovereignty issue of Dokdo is the most frequently mentioned, while territorial education on Dokdo is the second most frequent topic during Abe’s second term (27 cases, 14.1 percent). The second highest frequency of the Dokdo issue in Korea–Japan relations (33 case, 27 percent) during Abe’s third term reflected the numerous conflict situations between the two countries (see Table 3). Table 4 further supports this observation, demonstrating that members of the Diet, particularly those affiliated with political parties, are deeply concerned about Korea–Japan relations when addressing the Dokdo issue in the Diet.
The average intensity of Dokdo speeches by Abe’s term
F-value: 51.257, p-value = .000.
The average intensity of Dokdo speeches by Korean presidents
F-value: 29.919, p-value = .000.
Dokdo related issues by Abe’s term
Chi-square value: 51.844, p-value = .000.
Dokdo related issues by major political parties
Chi-square value: 36.034, p-value = .004.
As shown in Table 4, the majority of Diet members raised the issue of the territorial sovereignty (315 cases, 66.5 percent), while also considering the relationship with South Korea (66 cases, 13.9 percent) and Dokdo education (39 cases, 8.2 percent) during discussion on Dokdo. Many of the remarks by Diet members regarding Dokdo appeared to express their frustration that South Korea has effectively controlled the islets since the time of former President Rhee Syngman, whereas previously they were under Japanese colonial rule. Several members of the Diet criticized President Rhee’s inclusion of Dokdo in the Peace Line, asserting it as Korean territory, which they deemed illegal under international law.Footnote 8 Some Diet members also criticized President Rhee for occupying Doko on January 18, 1952, before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on April 28, 1952. They pointed out that the Dokdo territorial dispute and the issue of sexual slavery were not resolved by the Korea–Japan Treaty. These members assumed that Korea appeared to launch a diplomatic offensive against Japan regarding the Japanese military sexual slavery issue in order to divert attention from the Dokdo dispute.Footnote 9 Several members of the Diet called for the Dokdo case to be brought to the ICJ. Encouraged by the South China Sea arbitration between the Philippines and China under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),Footnote 10 a member asked if the Doko issue would follow the same course. In this arbitration, the proceedings on the treaty do not require the consent of the other party, unlike general ICJ litigation.Footnote 11 Later, the member called upon the minister of foreign affairs again to bring the Dokdo case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.Footnote 12
A Diet member stated that the only way to regain territories, such as Dokdo, the Northern Territories, or Paracel Islands, which are effectively controlled by other countries, is to employ the use of force in international politics.Footnote 13 In reference to China’s construction of military runaways in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, a radical Diet member questioned whether Japan would use military force if Korea were to do the same in Dokdo.Footnote 14 A member of the Diet raised a concern about whether the United States would defend Japan, as promised in Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, in case of a Chinese invasion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoytai Islands (Panda Reference Panda2017). The member questioned if the same level of commitment would apply to Dokdo.Footnote 15 In the territorial dispute between Korea and Japan, the United States has consistently upheld a resolute neutral position because both countries are crucial alliances in deterring potential aggression from China or North Korea, while also safeguarding US national interests in the region. A Diet member, who may understand the intricacies of the United States’ position on the matter, sought to express frustration over the perceived incompetence of the Japanese government in handling the issue. Several members of the Diet were curious as to why both Dokdo and the Northern Territories are not included in Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),Footnote 16 and why Japan’s administrative power does not extend to these territories.Footnote 17 The Diet members did not fully understand that the purpose of an ADIZ is early identification of aircraft intrusions. If Japan were to include these territories in its ADIZ, it would provoke strong diplomatic protests from Korea and Russia. Furthermore, due to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which renounces the use of military force as a means of settling international disputes, the Japan Self-Defense Forces could not be deployed to secure these territories.
While discussing the Dokdo issue, many Diet members also raised significant contentious matters that have triggered sensitive diplomatic conflict in Korea–Japan relations. These included the Moon government’s deliberation on the Comfort Women Agreement,Footnote 18 Japan’s absence from the International Fleet Review hosted by Korea,Footnote 19 a ruling from the South Korean Supreme Court about the forced laborer,Footnote 20 various military incidents between Korea and Japan on the high seas,Footnote 21 and the possibility of the Moon government terminating GSOMIAFootnote 22 (see Table 4).
Many members of the Diet urged that Takeshima Day, traditionally held under the supervision of Shimane Prefecture, be transformed into a government-led national ceremony. Many Diet members also called on the Abe cabinet to explore various methods, such as overseas promotions, videos, and pamphlets, to disseminate the Japanese perspective on the territorial ownership of Dokdo. They particularly emphasized the importance of including territorial education about the islets in student textbooks through revisions.
Abe cabinet’s Dokdo policy measures
During his second term in office, Abe implemented various policy measures concerning disputed territories with neighboring countries. To establish Japan’s historical and theoretical foundation, based on his revisionist view of history regarding disputed territories, and to disseminate Japan’s position to its citizens both domestically and internationally, Abe created a new ministerial position. This new role was the Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, responsible for managing disputed territorial issues within his cabinet. He also established a new organization, the Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty (OPPCTS), responsible for coordinating territorial policy with relevant ministries and agencies— a first in Japan’s history. According to the OPPCTS webpage, Japan “is determined to resolutely protect Japan’s territory,” and will “continue to respond to attempts against Japanese territorial integrity firmly and calmly, in line with the overall foreign policy.”Footnote 23 All ministries and agencies, including the OPPCTS, Northern Territories Affairs Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Ministry of Defense, Japan Coast Guard, and Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, collaborate to promote Japan’s firm position and response to other countries regarding disputed territories.
Abe appointed Ichita Yamamoto as the first Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs (Minister of State) in 2012. Yamamoto stated that his policy is to publicize Japan’s position and consistent foreign policy on the international situation related to Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands, both domestically and abroad, during a session of the Cabinet Committee of the House of Councillors in March 2013.Footnote 24 The Minister organized various Dokdo-related events to promote Japan’s position on the issue. In April 2013, Yamamoto held an expert meeting on the territorial issue to conduct a special survey on Dokdo and prepare a consultation plan. These initiatives involved opening a countermeasure office for territorial issues, creating a website for territorial issues, and producing an English-version pamphlet and video materials on Dokdo to advertise Japan’s position.Footnote 25 Under the supervision the OPPCTS, a special opinion survey on Dokdo was conducted four times in June 2013, November 2014, July 2017, and September 2019.Footnote 26 According to the survey questionnaire, respondents were required to read loaded information prior to answering questions about the Japanese perception of Dokdo/Takeshima, which stated that Dokdo/Takeshima is a Japanese territory illegally occupied by South Korea. Thus, the purpose of the surveys was to publicize the guided information on Japanese ownership of Dokdo rather than to collect public opinions. During Abe’s third term, Aiko Shimajiri, who served as the Minister of State, worked on the digitalization of various materials related to Dokdo and Senkaku Islands. In 2015, the office collected about 1,500 data points, of which 200 pieces were posted on various websites.Footnote 27
In January 2018, the Abe cabinet opened the Territorial and Sovereign Exhibition Hall in Hibiya, Tokyo, which is used to enhance territorial education and present materials on disputed territories, including Dokdo, Senkaku, and Northern Territories. Mitsuhiro Miyakoshi, the Minister of State during Abe’s fourth term, highlighted that the Exhibition Hall could serve as a “hub for domestic and foreign communication” regarding the Dokdo issue. The office introduced various exhibits such as a diorama, historical materials, expert lectures, stamp collections, and digital exhibition halls.Footnote 28 In January 2020, the Exhibition Hall was expanded and relocated (Cho Reference Cho2019).
Under Abe’s leadership, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) implemented changes to Japan’s education curriculum, which included a revised perspective on the country’s historical actions and territorial claims, those related to Dokdo (Kwon and Benham Reference Kwon and Benham2016, 57–58). During Abe’s second term, Shimomura Hakubun, the Minister of MEXT, stressed the significance of educating Japanese students about their country’s territory, aiming to prepare them for future challenges and responsibilities. In 2013, Hakubun announced a textbook authorization plan. Following the new Basic Law on Education, the Ministry established a prerequisite for the proper depiction of modern and contemporary history in the new Study Guideline. Specifically, territorial education on Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands would be revised to emphasize Japan’s territorial sovereignty of those territories. On January 28, 2014, the Ministry revised the Commentary to the Curriculum Guidelines for geography, history, and civic instruction in junior high and high schools, clearly asserting Japan’s inherent territorial ownership of Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands. New textbooks adhering to the Guidelines would introduced in junior high school from 2016 and in high school from 2017.Footnote 29 On February 14, 2018, the MEXT updated the High School Study Guideline to include information on Japan’s territorial sovereignty, following a similar process used for the 2017 revisions to the elementary and junior high school Study Guidelines, which were informed by a report from the Central Council for Education. Following those revisions, all textbooks clearly stated that Dokdo, the Northern Territories, and the Senkaku Islands are considered Japan’s inherent territories.Footnote 30
Territorial education was promoted to the national level through collaboration between the MEXT and other relevant cabinet offices, such as the OPPCTS and the Northern Territories Affairs Headquarter of the Cabinet Office. Many teachers across the country participated in various training programs focused on territorial education. Beginning with a nationwide conference of education board supervisors, territorial education was expanded to each prefectural board nationwide. In response to critical comments from a Diet member, who stated that Japan’s educational materials on Dokdo were inferior to those of Korea, the MEXT took steps to reinforce educational materials related to Dokdo. These efforts include contributions from Saitama or Shimane Prefectures, as well as other relevant ministries, according to Hayashi Yoshimasa, Minister of the MEXT during Abe’s fourth term.Footnote 31
The background of Abe’s Dokdo policy through regression analyses
Based on the results of content analysis of discussions related to Dokdo and an examination of various policy measures aimed at strengthening Japan’s claims to Dokdo, within the context of different theoretical perspectives outlined in Abe’s Dokdo Agenda, two regression analyses were conducted. These analyses aimed to provide insight into the broader political and economic backdrop that influenced Abe’s Dokdo-related policy. As the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ theory suggests, leaders tend to gain increased support during times of crisis or national emergencies. Abe’s pursuit of the Dokdo territorial claim and revisionist policies aimed to generate this effect. The ‘diversionary theory’ proposes that leaders sometimes provoke conflicts with other countries to divert public attention from domestic crises or economic instabilities. Given Japan’s prolonged economic challenges, known as the ‘Lost Decade of the 1990s,’ and the persistent security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile test launches, the Abe cabinet intentionally escalated minor territorial disputes and historical issues with South Korea to redirect public focus away from economic and security difficulties and secure support for the ruling party.
To substantiate Abe’s Dokdo initiative in boosting political support and diverting public discontent, two research hypotheses were formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The intensity of Japanese politicians’ discourse on the Dokdo issue is expected to be correlated with an increase in cabinet approval ratings, the active involvement of right-wing political parties, and economic sluggishness.
Hypothesis 2: Various Doko-related events in Japan are expected to be positively associated with cabinet approval ratings, the influence of right-wing political parties, and the Moon Government in South Korea, while exhibiting negative correlations with domestic economic challenges and the security threat posed by North Korea.
A regression model in Table 5 presents relations between the average intensity of Dokdo speeches in the Diet as a dependent variable and other independent variables. In the Model, the average intensity of Dokdo speeches has a negative relation with the unemployment rate, while it has positive relations with the approval rating of the Abe cabinet and right-wing members of political parties. The approval rating serves as an important index to measure the degree of political support from the people toward a ruling cabinet, holding significant meaning for the prime minister of Japan. In general, if the approval rating is too low, a prime minister should reshuffle their cabinet or step down to seek people’s support through a general election in the parliamentary political system. Thus, the prime minister, the cabinet, and the ruling party strive to enhance their popularity by addressing the demands and garnering the support of the people.
Regression analysis of the average intensity of Dokdo speeches
* sig < .05 and ** sig < .01.
The regression model indicates that Japanese politicians within the Abe cabinet utilized the Dokdo issue as a significant means to bolster the cabinet’s popularity. Their impassioned speeches on the Dokdo issue in the Diet garnered attention from the media, further enhancing their appeal among the populace. Particularly radical speeches from Diet members belonging to right-wing political parties served to solidify support from like-minded right-wing citizen groups in Japan, such as Nippon Kaigi and Zitokukai, thus proving evidence for the rally-around-the-flag theory. As the content analysis indicates, the Abe cabinet stands out as the most notable Japanese government to capitalize on various strained and conflictual situations in international relations with South Korea to enhance its popularity in domestic politics. The positive relationship between the average intensity of Dokdo speech and right-wing political parties substantiates the theory that remarks by right-wing politicians regarding Japan’s territorial claims to Dokdo and criticisms against South Korea could attract support from right-wing voters and foster nationalist sentiment. The negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the average intensity of Dokdo speeches may reflect the Abe cabinet’s efforts to revitalize Japan’s stagnant economic conditions. Abe’s ambitious economic stimulus strategy—Abenomics—initially led to a gradual decrease in the unemployment rate during his second and third terms, but it worsened again in his fourth term. The contentious remarks about Dokdo appear to be related to Japan’s economic conditions. The regression model provides support for the diversionary theory, suggesting that the Dokdo issue and strained relations with South Korea may divert the Japanese people’s feelings of unease and frustration about their underperforming economy.
The average intensity of Japanese politicians’ speeches regarding Dokdo shows a positive relationship with an upswing in cabinet approval ratings and the active engagement of right-wing political parties, while exhibiting a negative relationship with economic stagnation. Consequently, the regression outcome substantiates the first hypothesis.
Another regression model, in Table 6, presents the relationship between Dokdo events as a dependent variable and other independent variables. The model offers insights into the political and economic background of Japan concerning various Dokdo events. For instance, the Abe cabinet faced challenges in dealing with intermittent North Korean missile test fires and four nuclear weapons experiments, reactions from Korean President Moon regarding the Comfort Women Agreement, and the sluggish economic conditions. The Abe cabinet and members of the Diet thoroughly discussed all of these matters when addressing the Dokdo issue. The positive relation between the Dokdo events and the approval rating of the cabinet, right-wing political parties, and Korean President Moon’s reactions to Japan’s initiatives on Dokdo, Comfort Women, and export restrictions indicates the extent to which Japan has sensitively reacted to these political issues. From the viewpoints of Abe and conservative right-wing Japanese politicians, every Dokdo event presents a prime opportunity to promote their inaccurate territorial ownership claim over Dokdo. Whenever Korea engages in activities related to Dokdo, such as lawmakers’ visits to the Islets, mapping the Dokdo in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Pamphlet, or serving Dokdo shrimp at the dinner table for the President of the United States, several relevant ministers and conservative right-wing politicians tend to increase their criticism of South Korea. Those critical remarks also positively boost the approval rating of the Abe cabinet. The conflict in political and economic situations with South Korea tends to significantly contribute to diverting attention from the country’s uneasy domestic economic or political conditions. Additionally, the two negative relationships between the security threat from North Korea and the employment rate in relation to Dokdo events are connected with vital issues of the country’s survival and economic well-being. According to the Diet minutes, Abe, several ministers, and members of the Diet unanimously underscored the fact that Japan should have intimated cooperation with South Korea in order to cope with the dire security threats from several North Korean nuclear weapons experiments and long-range missile test fires. These dire security threats and the stagnant economic performance made Japanese politicians reduce their interest in Dokdo events.
Regression analysis of the Korean Dokdo events in Japanese domestic political economy
* sig < .05 and ** sig < .01.
Events linked to Dokdo in Japan demonstrate a positive relationship with cabinet approval ratings, the impact of right-wing political parties, and the South Korean Moon Government, and a negative relationship with domestic economic hardships and the security concerns posed by North Korea. Consequently, the regression findings uphold the second hypothesis.
Conclusion
This article examined Japanese decision-makers’ remarks, viewpoints, and major policy measures to solidify their territorial claim over Dokdo through a content analysis and quantitative research analysis on the Minutes of Japan’s Diet during the Shinzo Abe cabinet’s reign from 2012 to 2020. The Abe cabinet’s economic sanctions toward Korea resulted from the country’s Supreme Court decision on forced laborers, President Moon’s revaluation of the Comfort Women Agreement, and the Dokdo territorial disputes with Korea. All of these led to plummeting relations between South Korea and Japan at the time. These unprecedentedly strained South Korea–Japan relations also resulted from Abe’s revisionist historical viewpoints, which denied the atrocities committed by imperialist Japan against Korea. Since Dokdo was forcefully taken by imperialist Japan when Tokyo colonized the Korean Empire, many Koreans cannot forget such pain. Nevertheless, the former Abe and Fumio Kishida cabinets did not rescind their territorial claim over Dokdo.
Although it is somewhat unclear why the Abe cabinet and many Japanese truly believe that Dokdo is their territory despite clear evidence from history, maps, numerous precedents of international law, rulings of the international courts, as well as scholarly works in academia proving Korea’s inherent territorial sovereignty over Dokdo, the article clarified the background behind the Abe cabinet’s Dokdo agenda and South Korea–Japan relations. In order to develop Japan’s own logic and dispute Korea’s territorial sovereignty over Dokdo while publicizing their argument at home and abroad, Abe created the Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs in his cabinet. He also established a new organization, the OPPCTS. Several conservative right-wing ministers and members of the Diet actively promoted territorial claims over Dokdo through various policy measures under an elaborate plan of the Abe cabinet. The Abe cabinet made significant efforts to instill their claims of territorial sovereignty over Dokdo in young students through ongoing revisions of study guidelines. Following requests from members of the Diet and the Abe cabinet, several Dokdo surveys were conducted, which raised awareness of Japan’s position and distributed thousands of materials supporting Japan’s stance on Dokdo through the new Exhibition Hall and relevant Japanese Internet webpages.
Thus, the Dokdo agenda served as a political tool for the Abe cabinet to enhance its popularity and divert the Japanese people’s long-standing frustration over stagnant economic conditions. Since Dokdo holds little strategic value compared to the Senkaku and the Northern Territories, the Abe cabinet and many members of the Diet have maintained a firm position to resolve the issue through mediation or via the ICJ. When a large number of lawmakers in the Diet raised the Dokdo issue, they also questioned the Abe cabinet’s stance on the Comfort Women Agreement, forced laborers, the Statue of Peace, the possible termination of GSOMIA, and other related matters, further exacerbating tensions in South Korea–Japan relations.
The ANOVA analysis confirmed a growing trend in the average intensity of speech on Dokdo throughout Abe’s term. The cross-tabulation analysis revealed that the primary concern of Diet members regarding Dokdo-related issues included territorial sovereignty, South Korea–Japan relations, and territorial education on Dokdo. Two regression analyses further elucidated the background behind Abe’s Dokdo initiative. The average intensity of Dokdo speeches exhibited positive relationships with the approval rating of the Abe cabinet, Korean Dokdo events, and right-wing political parties. The Abe cabinet leveraged Dokdo events in Korea as a means to enhance its popularity and solidify like-minded right-wing citizen groups in Japan. Additionally, a negative relationship between the average intensity of Dokdo speeches and the unemployment rate confirmed that the Dokdo issue and tense Korean relations may divert Japanese people’s unease and frustration regarding their underperforming economy. Another regression model demonstrated that Japan’s concern about Korean Dokdo events is also influenced by the security threat from North Korea and the domestic economic situations. Otherwise, Korean Dokdo events have a positive relationship with increasing the approval rating of the Abe cabinet, which is also supported by the concern of right-wing politicians against anti-Korean sentiment during President Moon’s tenure.
In retrospect, Abe’s revisionist stance and his calculated Dokdo agenda have had many adverse effects on South Korea–Japan relations. The Abe cabinet had striven to persuade younger Japanese generations about its territorial claim over Dokdo through its elaborate policy measures. However, many conscientious Japanese people, scholars, and intellectuals are hesitant to accept the Abe cabinet’s claim over Dokdo as fact. The Abe cabinet wished the Moon government would change its policy toward past historical issues by utilizing a series of economic sanctions. On the contrary, Korea made full efforts to develop its own independent technology, substituting Japanese material resources and reducing its higher dependence on imports from Japan, which resulted in greater losses to the Japanese economy. As Abe himself declared, it is a critical time for South Korea and Japan to foster a future-oriented relationship. South Korea and Japan are important allies of the United States, which aims to maintain a peaceful regional order through a liberal world economic order and democratic values. This stance is crucial for confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea and the challenges posed by China in the Indo-Pacific region. Closer cooperation between South Korea and Japan is imperative to maintain regional peace in Northeast Asia.
The current South Korean President, Yoon Suk-yeol, has taken proactive unilateral actions aimed at fostering reconciliation and cooperation with Japan, and this has led to significant developments, including the third-party compensation plan for forced laborers and support for Japan’s plan to release treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, President Yoon has pursued a future-oriented constructive relationship rather than focusing solely on holding Japan accountable for its history. In response to President Yoon’s measures, former Prime Minister Kishida restored South Korea’s position on the Whitelist and strengthened constructive security cooperation with South Korea. However, Kishida maintains a somewhat reserved stance when it comes to resolving the historical and territorial disputes, including the issue of Dokdo. The efforts to establish cooperative relations between South Korea, Japan, and the United States have also led to joint naval and air military training, preparing for potential challenges from North Korea and China. Furthermore, the close economic cooperation among these three nations plays a crucial role in ensuring the stability of global supply chain networks.
On the domestic political front in South Korea, Yoon’s unilateral and groundbreaking concessions to Japan have not garnered widespread support from the Korean public, resulting in a decline in his approval ratings to around 30 percent. In the parliamentary election of April 10, 2024, the Democratic Party won a landslide victory over the ruling People Power Party of Yoon. The Democratic Party aligned more closely with public demands regarding concessions to Japan. Consequently, the sustainability of a constructive and cooperative relationship between Korea and Japan necessitates reciprocal actions that match the Korean government’s efforts. Kishida’s proactive and sincere engagement in addressing historical issues, along with his continuous efforts to avoid escalating territorial claims to Dokdo, could lay a solid foundation for establishing a reciprocal international relationship with South Korea.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to extend sincere gratitude to Dr. Krista Wiegand, Dr. Sojeong Lee, and several colleagues who reviewed the paper and provided thoughtful comments. The author also thanks the anonymous reviewers and Dr. Thomas Pepinsky, editor of the Journal of East Asian Studies.
Competing interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
