“Why now? Why present yet another book about interwar East Central Europe?” Sabrina Ramet introduces the book with this question—and she gives a thoughtful and convincing answer. As she points out, this is the first multi-authored book with each chapter written by experts in the field. The eleven authors come from universities in seven different countries; all are fluent in the language of the country they study. The last book on eastern Europe before World War II was published nearly two decades ago, by Ivan. T. Berend; so a work which now explores diverse interpretations and perspectives is more than appropriate. More importantly, Ramet suggests that in this time of global challenges, examining the factors which led to the failure of democratization in east central Europe might provide some valuable lessons.
The opening chapter by Ramet provides an overview and a framework for the more detailed analysis by individual scholars focusing on individual countries. These chapters appear to be organized geographical, based on border proximity. Thus the countries covered, in order, are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians (Yugoslavia), and finally Albania. An interesting omission is Austria. Ramet suggests that Austria does not share the general patterns of state failures. One could, however, argue that Austria shared border issues, challenges of linguistic minorities, and the failure of democracy, all factors found in the other seven states. Chapter 9 covers peasantries and peasant parties; these parties/movements were especially relevant and important for understanding interwar east central Europe. Finally, there is a summative afterword by Stefano Bianchini that attempts to synthesize the period.
In this first chapter, Ramet focuses on a number of commonalities and patterns, chief among which was the fact that not a single one of these states had the same boundaries in 1919 as in 1875; there were territorial winners and losers, which contributed to conflict. Furthermore, the borders were contested for several years after the war ended, so that implementing new governance structures was negatively affected. Compounding border issues were other problems that made political stability problematic, above all the position of minorities in the nation-building process. Tables found in this chapter and throughout the book provide valuable data on such factors, including a table on prominent political figures assassinated in the region between 1919 and 1940! The formation of these new or re-configured states was based as much on economic needs, geography, and history as on national identity. Thus as Ramet points out, the goal of the new states was to form governments that would reflect the role and vision of the state-forming nation—ethnic diversity was a problem to be solved, not embraced as a necessary component of the new borders. By 1929, Ramet identifies Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, and Yugoslavia as failed states; with Romania added (1930) and finally Czechoslovakia in 1938. This is examined in much greater detail in the chapters on the individual countries.
Both Bela Bodo (Hungary) and Christian Promitzer (Bulgaria) point out that the loss of territory shaped the interwar politics of these two countries; Promitzer terms this Bulgarian melancholy. Both focused on border revisionism, on the desire for an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation-state, which led both on the authoritarian path. Bernd J. Fischer, in his chapter on Albania, focuses on the power of the leader, namely Ahmed Zogu, later King Zog, and his relentless centralization of the state to forge a nation-state. In his analysis of Poland, M.B.B. Biskupski titles his chapter “The geopolitics of failure.” He contrasts the two visions of the Second Polish Republic: civic nationalism (Józef Piłsudski ideal) vs. national unity (Roman Dmowski). Biskupski asserts that Poland had too many minorities to be stable and democratic; he examines the role of Piłsudski in trying to integrate these challenges, leading to a more authoritarian approach. Romania faced a similar issue: expanded borders but a determination to maintain ethnic privilege as Roland Clark points out. Two countries, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later renamed Yugoslavia) and Czechoslovakia faced the problem of a state-forming nation that was not ethnically homogeneous. Stipica Grgic addresses the role of the ruling monarchy that first privileged Serbs and then emphasized “Yugoslav” identity as authoritarian rule was established. Czechoslovakia is often touted as the only democracy in the region during the interwar period. Sabrina Ramet and Carol Leff co-authored an insightful chapter and argue that this system was a “securitized” democracy (77) led by a “Czechoslovak” nation which privileged Czech leadership in dealing with German, Hungarian and later, expanding Slovak, challenges, which led to the failure of democracy. Nearly of these countries had a large peasant population and so agrarian movements and parties were key elements of political development. This is covered in an excellent chapter by Robert Bideleux, who examines the peasant/agrarian party programs in the region, both the commonalities of the agrarian movements and the constraints. In this regard, analysis of the Green International, co-founded by Milan Hodža of Czechoslovakia might provide more insight about the politics of the efforts. This book is a welcome addition for scholars and students of east central Europe.
