I. INTRODUCTION
After Richard Kahn’s death and the opening of his carefully preserved archives in the early 1990s, many works Footnote 1 have reconstructed his activities and contributions to economic theory, which constitute landmarks in the economics of the twentieth century. Footnote 2 Although a complete biography has yet to be written, Kahn’s role in the making, dissemination, and defense of Keynesian ideas—but also his originality as “the propounder of new alternatives and ideas to suggest to others to develop” (Pasinetti Reference Pasinetti, Eatwell, Milgate and Newman1987, p. 2)—have already been investigated. However, there is still an important part of his activity in the 1950s—as both researcher and policy advisor to international organizations—which is practically unknown, in spite of the importance of the issue it addressed: the volatility of commodity prices, which remains significant today for its economic and social implications. Footnote 3 The development of proposals for the stabilization of the prices of primary commodities, to be presented in a book that was never published, kept Kahn busy for nearly a decade, but no thorough investigation has so far been dedicated to it. Gabriel Palma (Reference Palma1994), in the memorial issue of the Cambridge Journal of Economics devoted to Kahn, has the distinction of first drawing attention to part of the related material among Kahn’s papers, but his reconstruction is flawed by an erroneous understanding of the chronological order in which it was produced (see Appendix). I presented a short account of Kahn’s main ideas on the subject in Luca Fantacci et al. (2011), with the aim, however, of stressing both similarities and differences with John Maynard Keynes’s pre-war proposal of an international buffer stock as an instrument for avoiding ‘excessive’ price fluctuations (Keynes Reference Keynes1938), which was the focus of that article. What is still lacking is a complete reconstruction of Kahn’s views on the stabilization of commodity prices, of the context in which these views took shape, and of the way they tied in with other parts of his economic theory and were reflected in his assessment of the commodity international agreements of the time to limit fluctuations in the prices of primary products.
Here, I attempt this reconstruction, not only to fill a significant gap in our knowledge of Kahn’s activity, but also to improve our understanding of the debate on buffer stocks that took place in the years after the Second World War. Footnote 4 After recounting the troubled gestation of the unpublished book, which is revealing both of Kahn’s personality and of the difficulties met by attempts at international cooperation in the post-WWII years (sections II and III), this paper reconstructs Kahn’s analysis of the causes of price volatility of primary commodities (section IV). Section V presents Kahn’s scheme for the creation of buffer stocks managed, for each commodity in question, by a supranational authority. The scheme is entirely original, recommending extensive discretionary powers for the managers of a buffer stock, unlike the prevailing views of the times, which obliged them to intervene whenever the price of the commodity hit given limits. Kahn’s thorough understanding of the working of the commodities market, where he was active as a speculator himself, is reflected in his approach. Section VI reconstructs Kahn’s positive assessment of the only actual experience of international buffer stocks in the 1950s, as detailed in Kahn’s (unpublished) “Tin Report.” It shows that, even at the end of the 1950s, the actual working of the tin buffer stock was still reinforcing Kahn’s conviction of the superiority of this instrument in taming price volatility of primary commodities. Section VII concludes.
II. THE UNFINISHED BOOK
The fluctuations in the prices of primary products, their causes and consequences and how best to curb them, are the subject of a book that kept Kahn busy for nearly nine years, but which he never published. In his book Kahn advocates the creation of buffer stocks managed, for each commodity in question, by an “authority, endowed with suitable financial backing, which can buy the commodity when, in some sense or other, it is cheap—or appears to be so—can hold it in stock, and can then sell from its stock when the price appears to be relatively high” (RFK 2/12/2/1). Footnote 5
The book was never completed. Related notes and correspondence, and half-finished and completed chapters, make up five bulky files, which are preserved among Kahn’s papers. However, it is not easy to reconstruct the story of the book’s composition. There remain gaps that the available documentation does not enable us to fill.
There is evidence that Kahn began working on the book in 1952, on the invitation of the FAO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The FAO’s interest in the subject is not surprising. Ever since the Hot Springs conference convened in 1943 to promote its establishment, the FAO had always been concerned with the problem of stabilizing the prices of primary products Footnote 6 whose fluctuations deeply affected the income of producers in less-developed countries and impaired food provision. However, being more the creation of the “minds of experts and scientists” than the result of governmental action (Marchisio and Di Blase 1991, p. 4), the FAO was devoid of political power. Two of its most ambitious projects in the postwar years—the establishment of a World Food Board, which would have de facto managed the world agricultural economy; and an International Commodity Clearing House—had failed. In the early 1950s the FAO had relinquished any project of international governance of food provision and had confined its function to that of advising governments and providing non-binding recommendations. The FAO began to follow closely those few agreements that were being implemented on a commodity-by-commodity basis. There was rising concern that the aim of these agreements was more the allocation of the surplus production and the defense of the interests of producers than the stabilization of prices and the prevention of shortages of agricultural commodities. For this reason the FAO economics department, together with one of its most competent and active officers, Gerda Blau, chief of the Commodities Branch, decided to direct its research towards bringing price stabilization and production efficiency back to the forefront. In this endeavor, Gerda Blau turned to her Cambridge economist friends. Footnote 7
In January 1952 Blau went to Cambridge and visited Kahn, who had worked for the Ministry of Supply on the problem of the prices of raw materials during the war. She persuaded him to write a report. They agreed that the results of his work would appear as “a printed monograph, published under your [Kahn’s] name.” Footnote 8 The deadline was spring 1952, but Kahn asked for (and obtained) a postponement to July 1952, the first of many more to come. Intense academic activity (Blau refers to his “pressing duties” when she granted one of these postponements) Footnote 9 and difficulties in getting official documents and relevant information delayed Kahn’s work. Footnote 10 On top of this, we may add his renowned perfectionism, ever dissatisfied with what he had written. Gerda Blau gave Kahn all the material and moral support she could. She provided him with the help of a research assistant, who sent him relevant material and two lists of bibliographical references that cover practically all that had been published in English on the subject of buffer stocks. Footnote 11 However, it was only in the summer of 1953 that the first four chapters of the eleven listed in the provisional table of contents were sent to Rome. In this early version, following the indications of Blau, Kahn criticizes the interpretation of buffer stock schemes as a means to increase the income of producers by artificially absorbing a production out of proportion with demand. Although concerned with the disastrous effects of the low price of primary products on the income of developing countries, Kahn was very careful in keeping the main goal of buffer stocks—to reduce price fluctuations in the interest of consumers and producers alike—distinct from the more ambitious “ancillary objectives” of the fight against poverty, or the building up of stocks to relieve famine, which required other means. Kahn always acknowledged that price movements are necessary to balance supply and demand, but believed that their amplitude threatened the effectiveness of the market mechanism.
The four chapters were welcomed enthusiastically by Blau. She wrote, in a very optimistic mood, that
this paper, with some adjustment in presentation, may well turn out one of the best things that happened to FAO in a long time.… What I particularly like about it, is the fact that for once it will certainly not be a study which merely appeals to FAO’s standard clientele of Ministries of Agriculture and producers’ organizations who have been repeating their half-baked and ineffective exhortations re[garding] buffer stocks for so many years, but that instead its arguments will surely penetrate to, and rouse, some of the hard core of the much more hard-boiled and influential people in Treasuries and Boards of Trade. Footnote 12
The same enthusiasm was shared by another economist who had just joined the FAO staff, Henryk Tyszynski, an expert in commodities. Footnote 13 He prepared a summary of Kahn’s paper, Footnote 14 and confirmed that it was a “most valuable contribution to our study of international commodity policy.”
However, one year passed before two new chapters were sent to the FAO headquarters. Added to the revised and rearranged old material, they make up what Kahn named on the cover of the file as “the long version,” in five chapters and an appendix (RFK 2/12/2/1-163). This time they got a rather chilly reception in Rome, perhaps also as a result of the changed international political climate, which is well expressed by the final report of the Commission on Foreign Trade appointed by the US government (the so-called Randall Commission). In 1954 the report had concluded that all international commodity agreements had to be opposed in principle, since they were against the freedom of individual initiative, and in practice, since they were often a means to receive aid from the United States. Blau confessed to having many doubts about the practical workability of buffer stocks as described in Kahn’s paper. Moreover, she disagreed with Kahn’s choice to present his scheme as opposed mainly to laissez-faire policies. She found that the approach to be fought was not liberalism but nationalism and protectionism, however disguised. The real support for laissez-faire policies was indeed non-existent at the time. The surpluses of commodities that were being generated were not the result of slack demand, but of “very powerful national policies” that gave incentives to producers out of touch with the world trade situation. As long as these national policies were adhered to, “what can a buffer stock do about their effect?” Footnote 15 The scheme had other points she could not agree with—in particular, the discretion left to the managers of the Buffer Stock (Khan referred to his proposal for a buffer stock authority simply as “Buffer Stock”; I have used capital letters hereinafter when referring to his proposed authority; see below)—but she still hoped to publish the book under the auspices of the FAO as a contribution to the debate. She asked for a summary of the main arguments in order to sound out the reactions of her superiors, whom she expected to share her doubts.
More favorable comments came from Tyszynski, perhaps less concerned than Blau with the political implications of the proposal. He grasped the novelty of the scheme suggested. In his opinion the strongest argument in favor of buffer stocks, provided by Kahn and largely overlooked in previous discussions of the subject, was that this scheme not only stabilized prices better than the market forces of speculation could ever do, but simultaneously allowed for a more efficient organization of productive resources. A greater feeling of stability on the part of the producers would have kept their productive capacity in line with long-run demand, without being diverted by short-term price fluctuations. Footnote 16
We do not know whether Kahn ever prepared the summary Gerda Blau had requested. There is a gap in our reconstruction, since the relevant files in the FAO archives for the years from 1954 to 1959 appear to be missing. Footnote 17 We know that the project was resumed in 1956, when Kahn came back to Cambridge after spending one year in Geneva, where he had been working for the United Nations. In the Easter and Michaelmas terms of 1956, he devoted his course “Economics of Government Intervention” to the buffer stocks. However, by then the chances of publishing the results with the support of the FAO were almost nil. In fact, Blau wrote to Kahn to send her any new material in an envelope marked “personal,” “the buffer stock study having become a slightly delicate subject here—but I managed, hopefully, to save some printing money for it.” Footnote 18
Joan Robinson played an active part at this stage of the work, well beyond her usual role of preferred interlocutor for Kahn (Rosselli Reference Rosselli, Marcuzzo and Rosselli2005). The notes for one of his lectures are in her handwriting (RFK2/14/91-95), and she assembled cuttings from the “long version” to provide the “short version” of the book (RFK 2/12/1/4-101), which, however, was submitted in Kahn’s name. Although even this third version, by Kahn’s admission, still needed “a certain amount of patching up” (RFK2/13/57), it is the only one that resembles a complete book and was probably sent to Rome in the summer of 1957.
The revisions were never made, though. We do not have Gerda Blau’s reactions to the concise version of the book, which took a long time to arrive (Kahn was still anxiously asking for them on September 13). She may have submitted the typescript to her superiors without success or considered that it was not even worth trying. We know for sure that the FAO relinquished its rights to publication. Footnote 19 The changed political climate of the Cold War, so different from the enthusiasm for international cooperation of the last years of the war, is acknowledged by Robinson and Kahn in the “Introduction,” where it is admitted that the buffer stock concept “flourished in the idealist climate of opinion of those times” (RFK2/12/1/4). Nevertheless, Kahn did not immediately abandon his interest in the subject, or in the project of publishing a book. In 1958 he corresponded with James Meade, who read and commented on a chapter of the “long” version and expressed the hope to see it published soon. Footnote 20 In 1959 he wrote to Leo St. Clare Gondrona, who had published a book on buffer stocks the year before (St. Clare Gondrona Reference St. Clare Grondona1958), and declared his intention to devote the summer to working on his old project. Footnote 21 However, that same year Kahn diverted his efforts to individual commodity schemes, to which he applied the ideas he had developed. In 1959 he worked for the International Sugar Council and wrote them a report arguing that a buffer stock scheme was superior to export quotas and particularly appropriate for sugar, whose price broadly fluctuated over the year. Around the same time, he finished a “pretty lengthy” report on the International Tin Agreement (see section IV below).
Blau was kept informed of and appreciated Kahn’s new policy proposals. In the meanwhile, international relations between the two blocks showed signs of improvement, and in the climate of détente prevailing also within the FAO at the end of 1959, she felt free to invite Kahn to go back to their old project. She wrote in December: “Have you decided anything about publishing? … [W]e probably would be interested again in publishing. There is renewed interest and it seems that the ‘Camp David’ Footnote 22 spirit would make it possible for the Americans no longer to look upon an FAO publication on buffer stocks as part of the Cold War against them” (RFK 13/13/25-6).
This time Kahn’s reply to Blau, on 23 December 1959, left no hope: “I am afraid that the idea that I had of getting something on buffer stocks really ready for publication about now has had to be abandoned” (RFK 13/13/28). The manuscript was finally abandoned and Kahn’s research on buffer stocks remains today one of the lesser known parts of his activity. It is not even mentioned in the biographical essays by his younger colleague and friend Luigi Pasinetti (Pasinetti Reference Pasinetti, Eatwell, Milgate and Newman1987, 1994), which are still the main source of information on his life and works. Footnote 23
III. KAHN’S BUFFER STOCK: THE CULTURAL CONTEXT
A few words may be necessary at this point to explain the cultural and political context that, in the aftermath of WWII, drew the attention of economists to the creation of supranational institutions for commodity price stability, so that Kahn’s efforts do not seem the output of a utopian thinker who worked in isolation. Footnote 24 As said above, when Kahn began his book he was able to consult a list of at least a dozen scientific articles and several official documents on the subject. And he was not the only one whose services in this field were requested by an international organization. Between the 1940s and the 1950s, other prominent economists in addition to Kahn were called upon by international institutions to reflect on the problems of the production and distribution of raw materials: John Galbraith, Nicholas Kaldor, Albert Hart, Mordecai Ezekiel, Jan Tinbergen, James Angell, and Colin Clark. Among the most active institutions, a major role was played by the United Nations through the Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) and the Food and Agriculture Organization, which promoted some of the boldest plans in this field. One of the common features of these plans was their supranational character, which implied that control over commodities was to be delegated by governments of member states to a body of experts chosen on the basis of their competence and experience.
These ideas, so much in contrast with the nationalist sentiments of the interwar period, were the result of a widespread awareness that war had been also the result of bad policies and lack of international collaboration. In the field of agriculture and trade, the mistakes not to be repeated included neglect of the crucial role played by remunerative prices of primary commodities for world prosperity. Sagging prices in the 1930s were accompanied by scarcity of food for millions of people, while surpluses—unmarketable at declining prices—were being accumulated and destroyed. The war years had presented an alternative scenario: high wages and full employment in the US, coupled with careful planning of agricultural production together with upper limits for price fluctuations in the UK, had substantially improved the nutritional standards of the populations, while safeguarding the producers’ income. Large-scale commodity management had been found to work. It was tempting to replicate this experience in peacetime. The FAO was a product of this optimistic climate, which was nurtured by the untiring efforts of a group of people who were convinced of the need for far-reaching institutional solutions to large-scale social and economic problems. Among these people, a crucial role was played by Frank McDougall Footnote 25 and John Boyd Orr. Footnote 26 Their ideas won over President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who convened a conference on food and agriculture at Hot Springs in 1943, where the representatives of forty-four nations agreed on the establishment of an international machinery to cope with commodity problems. The event marked the foundation of the FAO. From the very beginning, two opposite visions of the role to be played by the FAO confronted each other in the international arena. One was the grand design of a supranational organization, inspired by the revolt against “poverty in the midst of plenty,” which could promote a fairer and more efficient production and distribution of foodstuffs. The other vision originated with the attempt, pursued by the UK delegation in particular, to adapt to the new environment the pre-war model on which Britain had built its fortune. This model, supported by all the British free-trade economists from David Ricardo onwards, advocated the importation of cheap food, low wages, better profits in industrial exports and shipping, and terms of trade favourable to manufactured goods. Britain was interested in stable prices and the possibility to achieve them through buffer stocks (Zaglits Reference Zaglits1946, p. 415), but was opposed to relinquishing power to a supranational institution.
It soon became evident that the latter approach was bound to prevail. However, the FAO, under the direction of Orr, did not desist and launched a bold plan for a World Food Board at its second conference in Copenhagen in 1946. The World Food Board, directed by businessmen representing all areas of the world under the general supervision of the United Nations, was to finance buffer stocks of each of the most important commodities, besides granting low-interest, long-term loans to populations unable to obtain sufficient food for their needs and purchase the surplus production of other countries. Admittedly, the project was fairly naive and unsophisticated. It was acknowledged that it would not be easy to determine the “right” world price. The amount of funds necessary for the sustainability of the whole project was not specified, and, above all, it was not clear who had to pay for it, although it was apparent to all that the only nation that could fund the project was the United States.
Yet, the strongest opposition to the World Food Board came from the UK, where the Labour government, the press, and the unions were simply not interested in supporting the plan. At the conference in Copenhagen, the British delegate recommended passing the whole matter to the planned International Trade Organization, which meant burying it forever. The US, on the contrary, supported the creation of a special commission to finalize the plan. The commission (Bruce Commission) presented its project in Washington in May 1947. The secretary of the commission was Mordecai Ezekiel, who, as author of the “cobweb theorem” (Ezekiel Reference Ezekiel1938), was well aware of the problems related to commodity price instability. Big food-exporting countries, like France and Denmark, supported the plan, together with the poorest nations. But this time the US joined the UK in dismissing the project because the US also, under the presidency of Harry Truman, by 1947 had changed its aid policy binding it to political alliances; the Marshall Plan ignored the FAO.
However, before the ambitious FAO plans were definitively dismissed, there was a second and last attempt at a comeback. In 1949 the FAO appointed a committee of experts to propose measures to correct the imbalances in world commodity trade. The “Report on World Commodity Problems” came out in 1949 and proposed the creation of an International Commodity Clearing House (ICCH). The report was co-authored by an impressive group of economists, which included John Condliffe, Colin Clark, John Galbraith, Dwarkanath Ghosh, and various others. In the long run, the ICCH was to be empowered, though not required, to buy storable commodities when their price fell substantially and sell them in periods of rising prices, with the aim of moderating price fluctuations. The ICCH shared with the World Food Board multilateralism and boldness. But although this plan was more limited in scope, it stood even fewer chances of being accepted, because of the changed political climate. The FAO 1949 conference firmly rejected it and the subject was buried for good. Establishment of the Committee on Commodity Problems within the FAO marked its transformation into a forum for reviewing commodity problems, gathering information, and coordinating national actions with little or no funds, and nil enforcing power. However, as was clear in its relation with Kahn, even in this role it was subject to strong political limitations.
IV. KAHN’S CASE FOR BUFFER STOCKS: THE ANALYSIS OF PRICE VOLATILITY
Kahn’s case for buffer stocks can be organized around three questions:
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1. Why do prices fluctuate so much?
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2. Why does speculation not succeed in stabilizing prices, and, in particular, what is the role of futures markets?
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3. What are the consequences for consumers and producers?
We will analyze them in turn.
Price Fluctuation
The starting point for Kahn, as for Keynes (Reference Keynes1938), is a failure of the market for primary products to reach a stable equilibrium so that there is a permanent mismatch between supply and demand. Kahn investigates the reasons for this market failure in terms of traditional partial equilibrium analysis, to which he adds a strong Keynesian flavor, since expectations under uncertainty play an important role. Partial equilibrium analysis focuses on the elasticities of demand and supply. There are significant differences between the markets for foodstuffs and industrial raw materials, which are acknowledged by Kahn, although not analyzed in detail. If the elasticities are low, chance changes in demand or supply have a strong impact on the price of the commodity, since large variations in price are necessary to eliminate even small gaps between demand and supply. Demand for primary commodities is inelastic, since they usually make up only a small fraction of the total cost of the final goods, in whose production they enter as inputs. Great changes in the price of the primary commodity have a small effect on the final price that consumers pay, and, therefore, on their demand. Likewise, producers are highly specialized and highly competitive. They cannot move their resources to other productions, and this makes the supply very inelastic in the short run. Therefore, they are obliged to take any price they can fetch. Changes in demand and price fail to stimulate or reduce output in a significant manner.
So far this is standard partial equilibrium analysis, which can explain short-term fluctuations of prices. When expectations are brought into the picture, it can be understood why these fluctuations do not iron themselves out over time and the equilibrium is unstable. Expectations of producers, who face the uncertainty of the future, are exceedingly affected by the current situation. When prices are high, there is a tendency to be too optimistic and to overinvest. When they are low, financial pressure and lack of incentives induce producers to neglect maintenance, so that when the demand recovers, the re-establishment of an adequate productive capacity is slow and costly: it is the “cobweb” effect that Keynes had already described in his 1938 article.
Speculation and Stabilizing Prices
Private speculation could help in stabilizing prices, since speculators perform the useful task of carrying the commodities from times of abundance, when they are bought at low prices, to times of scarcity, when they can be sold at higher prices. Kahn compares their function to that of transport facilities. However, as Keynes had already remarked, high storage costs, together with risk and borrowing costs, which increase as the stocks are being piled up, prevent profit-seeking speculators from providing their service—a public good—in the amount necessary to stabilize prices, above all when it is most needed in times of depression.
The stabilizing action of professional speculation is hampered by three obstacles, as Kahn, a speculator himself, knew all too well: finance, the need for diversification, and short-sightedness:
Finance is a serious limitation on any speculative market. Indeed the normal situation at a time when the price of a commodity has fallen heavily is how to avoid bankruptcy for some of those who are involved in the crash rather than how to take advantage of an excellent opportunity of making money. The professionals at those times are usually harassed rather than ebullient. (RFK2/12/2/29)
The funds of the professional speculators are borrowed and limited, which increases the natural reluctance to putting all the eggs into one basket. Kahn says, “As an expert speculator takes up a bigger and bigger position in a commodity because of its apparent cheapness, he becomes more and more cautious in placing reliance on his bullish expectations” (RFK2/12/2/30). While a public agency can take a long-term view and buy when the price begins to fall, professional speculators know that the price can decrease even further, under the pressure of large stocks that are being liquidated because they are “held in unsteady hands” (RFK 2/12/1/38). Before the speculators decide to step into action, the drop in prices can be dramatic. The existence of futures markets does not help in times of falling prices, since they enhance “bearish” sentiments.
Consequences for Consumers and Producers
Against the consequences of price instability—periodic disasters for producers, serious shortages for consumers—Kahn is convinced that the creation of buffer stocks is beneficiary. Unlike restriction schemes and quotas, which benefit producers at the expense of consumers, “the essence of the buffer-stock scheme is that it benefits producers and consumers alike, and increases efficiency all round” (RFK2/12/1/26). It benefits producers, because, in terms of utility, gains and losses of equal amount do not compensate each other, and producers are better off if they are saved from catastrophic losses even if they have to give up windfall profits when prices are rising. It benefits consumers, and efficiency in general, because average costs are lower when prices are stable and productive capacity is adequate to long-term demand, since high-cost producers, who can survive only if prices are exceptionally high, must leave the market.
Kahn’s arguments are clearly presented in a solid theoretical framework, but they are not entirely new. We find more or less the same arguments in some of the publications that Kahn read to prepare for his book (Porter Reference Porter1950, pp. 95–97; Staley Reference Staley1937, pp. 92–99). What is new and highly controversial is his idea of how the Buffer Stock administrators should manage it. In Kahn’s view, under the realistic assumption that they could not rely on unlimited resources, Buffer Stock administrators should be endowed with large discretionary powers and not have to follow any predetermined rule. All plans for buffer stocks of the time Footnote 27 required fixing floor and ceiling prices. On the contrary, discretion, which was to be used in exceptional cases in Keynes’s plan, becomes the rule for the behavior of the managers of the Buffer Stock in Kahn’s proposal.
V. THE TECHNIQUE OF BUFFER STOCK OPERATION IN PRINCIPLE
In fact, Kahn’s scheme differs from other buffer stock schemes in two major respects: (1) it must “aim at solvency in the ordinary commercial sense” (RFK2/12/1/66); and (2) it is run by an authority who fixes a buying and selling price, but who is free to intervene in the market at any price in the range between them and who is also free to modify the “ceiling” and “floor” prices without obeying any automatic rule.
Other schemes, in Kahn’s opinion, implicitly assume that the Buffer Stock authority, which Kahn refers to simply as “Buffer Stock,” can rely on unlimited resources, which is extremely unlikely. Yet, it is only in this case that the trade-off between the two objectives of the Buffer Stock—the aim of price stability and that of its own survival in the long run—can be easily reconciled. Kahn is well aware that the Buffer Stock operates in a market where there are not only individual agents who buy the commodity for their own use, but also other speculators who gain from temporary deviations of the price from its long-term trend. When the price gets close to the “floor,” speculators who are convinced that the Buffer Stock will defend the “floor” will be only too happy to accumulate stocks of the commodity, relying on the hope of future increases in price and on the expectations that the Buffer Stock will prevent them from incurring any loss. By doing so and buying the commodity, they will help to stop the fall of its price. In this case, the Buffer Stock performs its task of price stabilization very effectively, but it contributes to the profits of the speculators without any gain for itself to cover its own costs.
If traders are convinced instead that the “floor” will be lowered, they will unload all their stocks to the Buffer Stock, which can go on buying only if its funds are unlimited. If they are not and eventually the “floor” is lowered to avoid heavy losses, the Buffer Stock will have saved itself at the cost of price instability, since “there is little security in a floor which drops under your feet whenever you try to set foot on it” (RFK2/12/1/69). How then to reconcile limited resources and price stability?
Kahn suggests the introduction of dealing prices, which, if they must be fixed, are set wide apart, just to indicate to the market what are the possible extremes of price fluctuations. Their determination is not a political matter of bargaining between producers and consumers, and neither does it follow an automatic rule, but it depends on the judgment of the experts who are selected to manage the Buffer Stock.
When the price moves in a range between the dealing prices, the authority must not be passive, but must operate by trying to reconcile moderate opportunities for gain, which require risk taking and some price instability, with its main objective of reducing price fluctuations in the general interest. Kahn proposes the policy of “coming in late as a buyer and selling in good time” (RFK2/12/1/72). If the authority waits to buy, it may hope for a spontaneous readjustment of the market, and save its resources for when they are most necessary as the price threatens to fall dramatically. If it sells as soon as the price begins to rise, it can make a small profit besides slowing down the rise of the price. Footnote 28
There is no doubt on which side Kahn stands between discretion and automatic rules binding the Buffer Stock. In contrast with the positions held by Roy Harrod (Reference Harrod1948), who maintains that dealing prices must be subject to a variation limit of 3%, or Robert Porter (1950, p. 103), who maintains that dealing prices should be a given percentage below or above the average of market prices of the previous period, or St. Clare Grondona (Reference St. Clare Grondona1958), who advocates automatic rules for price adjustments, Kahn wants to give to the Buffer Stock the discretion to deal as it thinks best. This is the only way to avoid situations where the market is unanimously convinced of the direction and amount of the price changes: “It is bad enough if the market can guess which way the cat is going to jump if it jumps at all, it is fatal if they not only know this for certain but also how far it is going to jump and when” (RFK2/12/1/87). If the Buffer Stock wants to survive in a speculative market, and does not have unlimited resources, it must keep the market guessing. Changes in the dealing prices must be infrequent, unexpected, and as unpredictable as possible.
It may seem paradoxical that stability is promoted by an arbitrary behavior. But the objective of the authority is to ensure that those who believe there will be a change in dealing prices will hold this belief with great uncertainty, and this uncertainty will be increased by the interventions of the Buffer Stock. The behavior of the agents can be affected not just by influencing the content of expectations, but also by the confidence with which the expectations are held. Footnote 29
There are many similarities between Kahn’s views on the working of the commodities market expressed in his unfinished book on buffer stocks and the description of financial markets in his article on liquidity preference, written and published in the same years (Kahn Reference Kahn1954). In both cases we have two kinds of economic agents who operate in the market. In the financial markets there are speculators who hope for capital gains and who make their predictions about the future behavior of bond prices on the basis of accurate calculations. But there are also “orphans and widows” who “do not have a clue” as to what may happen, and, for lack of a better alternative, prefer to think that the present situation will persist and do not hold the belief that the situation will change with enough certainty to induce them to change the composition of their portfolio, even if it may not be “optimal.”
Similarly, in the commodities markets, there are professional speculators who are experienced traders and gather all the available information on the state of stocks, supply and demand. On this basis they form their predictions. Yet, there is also “the manufacturer, the consumer, the grower … who ... lives from hand to mouth” (RFK2/12/2/29). They make “an important contribution to the average, and it is on the whole a contribution which is highly colored by the expectation that prices will go on moving as they have been” (ibid.).
In both markets, if a “best guess” could be held with absolute certainty, it would lead to a yes/no behavior. In the financial markets, if speculators think the rate of interest will fall, they invest all their funds in securities; if they think it will rise, they sell all their securities for money. Similarly, in the commodities market, if speculators could be certain that the Buffer Stock will defend the floor, they would buy all the stocks of the commodity in question (and this would certainly happen if the Buffer Stock were endowed with unlimited resources); if they could be certain that the floor would be lowered, they would sell all their stocks. In the former case speculators would be allied with the Buffer Stock; in the latter they would compel the Buffer Stock to abandon its defense of the price, even if it did not intend to. How can the Buffer Stock use speculation to its own advantage, when its resources are limited? It must influence expectations, and in this task it is helped by the fact that “the future is uncertain and that speculators are hesitant” (RFK2/12/2/34). As Kahn notes in his article on liquidity preference, the division is not just between agents; Footnote 30 it is also inside their minds, and no “best guess” can be held with absolute certainty: “Innate skill may be great but it still has the laws of chance to contend against” (RFK2/12/2/30). The Buffer Stock can be successful in curbing price fluctuations only if it convinces the market that it can be successful. The skill Buffer Stock managers require is not just the knowledge of the market, like any other speculator, but the ability to influence opinions and expectations. And it is from this perspective that Kahn assessed the only actual experience of international buffer stocks in the 1950s: the International Tin Agreement.
VI. DEALING WITH REAL BUFFER STOCKS: THE INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT
After failing to have his book accepted, Kahn began to prefer the lower-key approach of making “special studies of particular aspects from time to time,” Footnote 31 perhaps in the belief that his arguments in favor of international intervention on the commodity markets would appear more convincing if supported by practical illustrations rather than theoretical arguments. Even these attempts were not particularly successful, and Kahn’s recommendations were not adopted. (These recommendations were to introduce a buffer stock scheme, in the case of sugar, or increase the discretionary powers of the managers of the one already in existence, in the case of tin.) However, his faith in the potential of buffer stocks as a means to dampen fluctuations of primary products did not waver, as testified by the two memoranda he prepared in 1959. Both memoranda remained unpublished. One was written for a meeting of the International Sugar Council in September 1959, and the other was a report on the working of the International Tin Agreement. The former is interesting because it testifies that Kahn was still convinced in 1959 of the feasibility of a Buffer Stock scheme. The latter is much longer and more articulated; it is the application to an actual case of the principles explained in the book, which never appeared.
The International Sugar Agreement was based on “restricted quotas.” The aim of the agreement was to constrain the price within a range between a “floor” and “ceiling” price per pound of sugar of a given quality. The countries that had signed the agreement were obliged to restrict their production up to a maximum of 20% whenever the price overtook the floor. In September 1959 the International Sugar Council, which managed the agreement, proposed to supplement the quota restriction with a multilateral options scheme: i.e., obligation to buy (or sell) sugar for a given amount whenever the price reached the boundaries of the fixed range. Kahn was invited to participate in a meeting where the proposal was discussed, and he criticized it. In his written comment he argued that fluctuations in the price of sugar were mainly seasonal and reflected fluctuations in the existing stocks, which were subject to abrupt variations, depending on the expectations and fears of the speculators, who often take a “wrongful and disharmonious view” (RFK 2/19/850). Under these circumstances, Kahn deemed that the options scheme was neither useful nor appealing enough to the countries involved to be accepted. He suggested an alternative approach, but also concluded his report with an appendix “designed to draw attention to the superior, but not necessarily conflicting, merits of a buffer-stock scheme” (RFK2/19/839). In the appendix, which is less than one page long, Kahn reiterated his belief in the effectiveness of a Buffer Stock, funded with the proceeds of the sales of sugar at the highest price, to keep the price in a range even narrower than the one envisaged by the agreement.
Kahn’s ideas, along the same lines, are more clearly expressed in what he called his “Tin report.” Footnote 32 The International Tin Agreement (ITA) had come into force in July 1956, after nine years of study and negotiations. It was ratified by countries that represented 90% of the world production of tin and 45% of its consumption. The United States, although a big importer, for “emotional reasons,” says Kahn, preferred a behavior of “benevolent neutrality” (par. 5).
Agreement implied the establishment of a Buffer Stock, which was the focus of Kahn’s attention, and probably also of the FAO’s, which commissioned the report, whose interest for us lies in the careful reconstruction of the operations of the tin Buffer Stock and the reasons that Kahn provides for its successes and failures. The concluding assessment was that the Buffer Stock had “not been unsuccessful in weathering a difficult period” (par. 41), but that many problems could have been avoided if the ITA had been conceived and managed in a less cautious way. Indeed, the whole report is a comparison between the buffer stock as it actually existed and the “ideal” Buffer Stock that Kahn advocated and hoped to see established for several other commodities. The differences between the two were of three kinds, as described below.
1. The objective of the Buffer Stock. The actual buffer stock was conceived by the ITA as “ancillary to a restriction scheme,” since the ITA worked primarily through export control. When the buffer stock held more than 10,000 tons of tin (approximately 7% of the yearly consumption), the council of the participating governments interpreted this as a signal of a persistent discrepancy between supply and demand, and fixed a “total maximum permissible amount” for exports. Quotas of the restricted production were allocated among the producers. Given that the determination of this permissible amount was subject to time lags and errors, the aim of the buffer stock was to level out the ensuing fluctuations of prices, Footnote 33 and not to keep the output reasonably stable. On the contrary, the Buffer Stock advocated by Kahn had the aim of completely obviating the need for restrictions, “by carrying the whole onus of the difference between unrestricted production and consumption and of fluctuations in privately held stocks” (par. 52). It was debatable which commodities were best suited for a Buffer Stock of this kind. Footnote 34 Since a growth in demand for tin was easily foreseeable in the near future, it was worthwhile preserving the productive capacity, which would be destroyed if the price of tin were allowed to fall to a very low level. However, in the case of tin, the discrepancy between supply and demand was estimated by Kahn as probably too large to be absorbed by a Buffer Stock, and he considered some restriction scheme unavoidable. Therefore, while the “ideal” Buffer Stock aimed to stabilize output or its rate of growth, the real buffer stock had the less ambitious aim of restricting the range of price variations, while production was adjusting to demand.
2. The size of the Buffer Stock and the funds at its disposal. The maximum size for the holdings of the ITA buffer stock was approximately 15% of the yearly production. Kahn thought that it should have been at least three times as large. The funds, collected by the producers before the ITA entered into force, with no contribution from the consumers, were also too small. A larger buffer stock would have mitigated the need for restrictions as large as those enforced (they reached 43% of the yearly production), besides proving itself a profitable business when the price rose again. From the point of view of the producers, the larger the buffer stock, the more stable the level of production, although at the cost of slackening the subsequent rise of the price. But Kahn thought that this was a cost worth paying.
3. The discretionary powers of the manager of the Buffer Stock. This is the most original and innovative part of the whole report. Under the ITA, the discretionary powers of the manager were limited. There was a floor and a ceiling price, and the manager was obliged to buy tin at the floor price as long as he had funds available, and to sell tin at the ceiling price as long as his supplies lasted. The interval between the floor and the ceiling prices was divided into three parts: in the upper third the manager could sell tin, in order to prevent steep variations in price; in the lower third he could buy tin, for the same reason; in the middle third he could do nothing unless explicitly authorized by the council.
Kahn noted that these provisions, conceived to keep the price within a narrow range, had the opposite result of increasing the size of its fluctuations. The aim of the ITA was “to achieve a reasonable degree of stability of prices” (par. 49), but, in Kahn’s view, not enough emphasis had been put on the term “reasonable.” The buffer stock manager interpreted his mandate as the obligation, not the possibility, to buy and sell as soon as he was allowed to do so; these were also the expectations of the market. These expectations, held with strong conviction, were damaging for the operation of the Buffer Stock, since they enhanced the destabilizing effects of speculation.
On the contrary, Kahn thought that the manager should have “complete discretion to operate, if and when he wished to do so, in either direction anywhere between the floor and the ceiling prices,” and that “speculators, traders and users should be in a state of doubt as to the Manager’s policy and actions” (par. 71). The manager should try to use the forces of speculation to help him stabilize the market. When the price hits the floor, speculators should be reasonably expected to begin to buy the commodity, in view of a subsequent price increase—especially if they know that supply has been restricted and a demand surplus can be reasonably foreseen. If they do not begin to buy and their bearish sentiment persists, it is for two reasons. One reason is that they think that the prospective gain will not be high enough, if the manager begins to sell tin as soon as the price enters into the higher third of the interval, in order to please the consumers. Therefore, the manager should wait to sell, the floor and ceiling prices should be set wide apart, and speculators must be left with the hope of high price increases, at least for a short period. The damage to consumers who have to pay a high price for a few days is more than offset by the shorter duration of the restrictions, since the extra production is absorbed by the piling up of the stocks. Footnote 35 The other reason for the persistence of a bearish attitude is that speculators may expect that the floor could be lowered, because the Buffer Stock runs out of funds. In this case they wait in the hope of purchases at a lower price. Kahn suggests that the manager should not be obliged to buy tin at the floor price until his funds are exhausted, but he should be free to suspend the support to the floor price and to buy at a lower price, with the positive results of making a good profit when the price increases and of confounding the speculators, while preserving the floor price. Kahn is well aware that
[c]omplete abolition of this obligation, much though there is to be said for it, would involve so radical a departure from the conventional concept of a buffer-stock scheme as not to be worth consideration here—not at any rate in connection with a buffer-stock scheme which is merely ancillary to the scheme for control of exports, itself designed taken by itself to keep the price between specified floor and ceiling prices. (par. 79)
Kahn’s “ideal” Buffer Stock, as it emerges in the “Tin report,” is endowed with very substantial resources that can be increased by successful market operations. Its manager should be completely free to operate on the market, in an unpredictable manner; information about the holdings of the Buffer Stock should be kept secret; speculators must know only that the Buffer Stock exists and that it is powerful, so that their bullish or bearish sentiments can be exploited in favor of the aims of the Buffer Stock, not against them.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
There is no doubt indeed that in this proposal Kahn draws his inspiration from Keynes in many respects. The knowledge he had acquired through Keynes and with Keynes on the actual working of commodity markets is at the basis of his plan. Like Keynes, Kahn never assumes an economic agent with perfect foresight. On the contrary, his traders and speculators in commodities take decisions under uncertainty. As in the case of monetary policy, public intervention can have an impact on the economy by influencing the expectations under which they act.
But there is another aspect in which Kahn appears as “Keynes’s best pupil,” and which he shares with the other Keynesians of postwar Cambridge. This is the belief that when the market fails, it must be corrected, not destroyed. The consequences of the failure, social and economic, cannot be passively accepted. The correction must not entail self-inflicted scarcity and poverty, as export restriction and quotas would do. The market for primary products is inefficient, since there is not enough hoarding in the economy, given that the speculators cannot afford the costs of financing and storage, which increase with time and size of their positions. The necessary hoarding must then be provided at a lower cost by a public authority, which can survive only if it becomes a speculator among other speculators, not for its own profit, but in the general interest.
APPENDIX: THE THREE DRAFTS OF THE BOOK
There are three drafts of Kahn’s book on buffer stocks preserved among Kahn’s papers, in the following chronological order: the 1953 draft, the “long draft,” and the “short draft.” Contrary to the description in Palma (1994, p. 117), then, there are not only two versions, and the “short” version was written after the “long” one.
The 1953 draft appears in the catalog as “contents page and chapters III–VI” (RFK 2/12/3). In fact, it consists of four chapters, entitled: ch. 3: “Ancillary Objectives”; ch. 4: “The Technique of Buffer Stocks”; ch. 5: “Buffer Stocks and the Balance of Payments”; and ch. 6: “The Problem of Separate Markets.” According to the table of contents, seven other chapters were supposed to follow. Gerda Blau and Henryk Tyszynski comment on this version in October 1953, as can be deduced from their references to the numbers of the pages and sections.
The “long” version (RFK2/12/2) consists of five chapters and is incomplete, although there is no table of contents or indication of how many chapters were to follow. The finished chapters are: ch. 1: “An Outline of the Case”; ch. 2: “Buffer Stocks and Restrictive Agreements”; ch. 4: “Ancillary Objectives”; ch. 5: “The Technique of Buffer Stocks”; and ch. 6: “Buffer Stocks and the Balance of Payments” (with an Appendix; the numbers of the chapters were those chosen by Kahn). Chapters 4 and 5 are identical to those of the 1953 version with the same titles. The others are new. Tyszynski commented on chapter 1 and chapter 6 in October 1954.
The “short” version is available in manuscript and typescript form. The manuscript (RFK2/10) is made of cuttings from the previous two versions connected by parts in Joan Robinson’s handwriting. The typescript version (RFK2/12/1) is in five chapters: ch. 1: “Introduction”; ch. 2: “The Case for Buffer Stocks”; ch. 3: “Some Objections”; ch. 4: “Ancillary Objectives”; and ch. 5: “The Technique of Buffer Stocks.” The first page includes a reference to a work by Gerda Blau published in 1956, and must therefore have been written after that date. Comments on this version, if any, are not extant.
