The book under review is the latest volume in The Enneads of Plotinus series, edited by J. Dillon and A. Smith. Similar to the series published by Les Éditions du Cerf, this series provides detailed discussions of individual treatises. The present volume consists of an introduction to the series by the editors and an introduction, translation and commentary of IV.7 On the Immortality of the Soul by F. This is the second of F.’s contribution to this series (Plotinus: Ennead IV.8, On the Descent of the Soul Into Bodies [2012]).
The Enneads is the edition of Plotinus' writings that his pupil and biographer, Porphyry of Tyre, edited and arranged. We know from Porphyry's biography of Plotinus that, when he arrived in Rome and began attending Plotinus' seminars in 263 c.e., he found that Plotinus had written 21 treatises (Life, Chapter 4). Included among this early group of treatises is IV.7, which Porphyry listed as occurring second in the chronological order (Life, Chapter 1). Thus, IV.7 is a very early treatise that summarises the findings of a seminar that Plotinus led shortly after his arrival in Rome in 244 c.e. It may even have been the first treatise Plotinus wrote. We also know from Porphyry's biography that the content and style of the treatises were shaped by Plotinus' discussion with his students, that his seminar discussions were conducted in a dialectical and aporetic manner, and that he discussed not only the texts of Plato but also those of other schools (Life, Chapters 4–5 and 13–14). Thus, the treatises have a dialectical and aporetic style that reflects the particular issues that arose during seminar discussion. Treatise IV.7 is the perfect example of this since it contains a criticism of materialist theories of soul belonging to rival schools as well as answers to objections to the Platonic view.
The chronology and style of IV.7 play an important role in F.’s introduction and commentary. F. sets out to recreate the context of the original seminar by highlighting the thinkers Plotinus is arguing against and the texts he has at hand. He writes, ‘[i]n keeping with the historical context of the original seminar there is little sign of the later systematization of Plotinus' Platonism. Hence, I have put my main emphasis on interpreting Plotinus' text in light of what I consider to have been the discussions in the seminar, leaving it to others to put them in the broader context of Plotinus' achievement’ (p. 26). This approach makes for a very engaging commentary that highlights Plotinus' unique manner of thinking. It is particularly useful in Chapters 3–85, where Plotinus criticises Epicurean, Stoic, Pythagorean and Aristotelian theories of soul. Take for example chapter 82, which contains Plotinus' criticism of the Stoic theory of total blending (krasis di’ holōn). F. prefaces his commentary with a lengthy discussion of the texts Plotinus likely had at hand, concluding that ‘[t]he terminology and the arguments he deploys suggest that Alexander's works, especially On Mixture, On the Soul, and Supplement were to hand at Plotinus' seminar(s) where the topic was discussed’ (p. 182). This is fascinating (at least to me) because it exposes the reader to what sources Plotinus had available and how he interpreted them. It also reinforces Porphyry's characterisation of Plotinus as a teacher who had commentaries read aloud during his seminars and brought a distinctive line of interpretation to them (Life, Chapter 14).
Although this approach is extremely illuminating and very engaging in the chapters concerned with rival theories of soul (3–85), I do find it somewhat limiting in the chapters concerned with Plotinus' own theory of soul (Chapters 1–2 and 9–15), especially Chapters 9–11. F.’s commentary on these chapters places emphasis on the Platonic sources of Plotinus' reasoning and presents Plotinus as merely expounding Platonic doctrine while relying on the authority of Plato. This reflects his view that Plotinus is not concerned with proving the immortality of soul in IV.7, but rather with demonstrating the weaknesses of materialist theories of soul and with reiterating Plato's belief that soul is an immaterial essence that has being through itself (pp. 15–16). F. is surely right that Plotinus is following closely Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul, especially in the Phaedo. However, I believe a case can be made that Plotinus is improving upon Plato's arguments, and is thus innovating.
Plotinus follows Plato in arguing that the soul is immortal on the grounds that it has being through itself; however, he establishes the truth of this claim on the basis of his own first personal experience. In other words, he reflects on himself in the intelligible world and experiences the truths contained in Intellect, then draws on this experience to establish the kinship of soul with intelligible being. Chapter 9 contains an argument that the intelligible world has being through itself and is therefore immortal. Chapter 11 contains an argument that, since the soul has a kinship with intelligible being, it also has being through itself and is therefore immortal. Chapter 10 contains the experiential link that connects these two arguments together. This is the whole point behind the famous statement at IV.7.10.30–7:
Consider it by stripping, or rather let the one who is stripping look at himself and he will have confidence that he is immortal, when he looks at himself as one who has come to be in the intelligible and the pure. For he will see an intellect (nous) seeing no sensible thing nor any mortal thing, but the eternal grasping it by its eternal [nature], and all the things in the intelligible world, having become itself an intelligible universe (kosmon noēton) full of light, illuminated by the truth from the Good (Armstrong modified).
Plotinus' point is that, when we strip away the accretions that have resulted from embodiment and come to be in the intelligible world, we will recognise ourselves as pure intellects which think, exist and have awareness on a higher level. This is something Plotinus himself claims to have experienced (e.g. IV.8.1.1–11), and it is something he exhorts his interlocutor to experience for himself in IV.7.10. There is nothing in Plato that comes close to this. F. gestures towards this in his note on 10.8, but I would expect additional commentary on such an important and novel feature of Plotinus' thinking.
The synopsis and translation capture well the dialectical and aporetic quality of the treatise by drawing attention to how often Plotinus develops his view by criticising rival theories, or by addressing questions, or by entertaining objections, or sorting through the difficulties of maintaining a certain position. This is something lacking in Armstrong's translation. It brings Plotinus to life in a way that I find is absent in the Loeb edition of the Enneads. F. is an excellent translator, and he does a remarkable job making Plotinus engaging and accessible without sacrificing accuracy.
On a closing note, I am happy to see that Parmenides Publishing is beginning to reinforce the binding of their books. The durability of the volumes will now match their beauty.
