The names of Ian Brownlie and James Crawford will surely be known to everyone interested in public international law, be they a student, an academic, or a practitioner. But Brownlie and Crawford are not necessarily known for holding the same legal views, and may very well be invoked to support significantly different arguments. Their writings on the law of State responsibility and recognition, as well as their General Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law illustrate this. The differing views of the original author and the author of the book under review on a number of significant issues presents a particular challenge when considering how Crawford's Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law [Crawford's Brownlie] combines Crawford's ‘need for an overhaul’ with a ‘preserv[ation of] … the general spirit and tone of [Brownlie's] work’ (xvii).

The structure of Crawford's Brownlie will be broadly familiar to the users of previous editions. It has 11 parts—Preliminary Topics, Personality and Recognition, Territorial Sovereignty, Law of the Sea, The Environment and Natural Resources, International Transactions, State Jurisdiction, Nationality and Related Concepts, The Law of Responsibility, The Protection of Individuals and Groups, and Disputes—and 33 chapters. Titles of parts and chapters are similar to the previous editions but have been mostly rephrased, and chapters have been rearranged in fewer parts and in a manner that seems logical and aesthetically pleasing (the seventh edition of Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law [7 Brownlie's Principles] had 33 chapters in 13 parts, of which one part had only one chapter). With one exception (the introductory chapter dealing with the theory and history of international law, on which more below), the scope of the book remains unchanged. At the same time, a major updating of the content, on some issues, which was very necessary in light of developments in both practice and judicial decisions, has taken place.

The most obvious change lies, in the language by which even substantively unaltered arguments are expressed. Titles of many chapters have been changed (‘Sources of the Law’ in the 7th edition to ‘The Sources of International Law’, ‘Incidence and Continuity of Statehood’ to ‘Creation and Incidence of Statehood’ and so on), and a similar degree of stylistic change also appears in many parts of the text. This may make the argument easier to appreciate for a first-time Brownlie-reader. But it may also raise certain challenges, one of which is very practical in nature. While practitioners waiting for the 10th edition of Oppenheim to provide the most authoritative statement of lex lata, they might choose to look through Crawford's Brownlie to see what was the law in 2012 was on, for example, the delimitation of continental shelf, and whether it had changed since 2008. (Crawford's Brownlie is a textbook and not a practitioners' guide, but it is not uncomfortable with being used by practitioners: three out of five endorsements on the back-cover note its relevance for them.) The relevant sections on the delimitation of continental shelf (288–9) are very similar to the 7th edition and have identical footnotes (7 Brownlie's Principles, 206–8), but there are some visible changes that may or may not be important: among other things, the presumption that equal division of the areas of overlap is equitable is now qualified by ‘mild’, and some of the relevant circumstances are now introduced as ‘not as well accepted’. Is the new language meant to express the same point more clearly, has there been a change in the law, or did the previous edition get the law wrong? The answer is not necessarily obvious, suggesting that gains in elegance and clarity of exposition might sometimes have paradoxical costs in terms of certainty.

The same point may be expressed in more abstract terms. To take again the example of Oppenheim, there is something very comforting about finding Lassa Oppenheim's original language of 1905 sometimes still unchanged in the most recent edition of 1992, demonstrating the continuity of the basic elements of the international legal order. For precisely the same reason, others might be infuriated by the inability of international law to move beyond its traditional premises. Still, whatever the normative position on textbooks and time, the continuity of language, changing only along with the law, allows the reader to trace the (perception of) development in the international legal order. One could easily do that with the 1966–2008 Brownlie, but less easy with the 2008–2012 Brownlie. Or, of course, the linguistic break in Crawford's Brownlie may be related to precisely this point, implying that method and the nature of international law in 2012 are such that Crawford can articulate his own argument within the structure of 1966 only by using a new language.

Brownlie's influence on the perception of international law was so considerable that it may be difficult to distinguish between his authoritative exposition of points of general consensus and his own particular positions. The next paragraphs will therefore focus on a number of issues that seem fundamentally Brownlie-esque to the reviewer, and consider how they have fared in Crawford's Brownlie. The first innovation is the introductory chapter. The significance of its discussion of history and theory of international law lies in its mere presence. Brownlie was well known for his avowed scepticism both about legal theory in general and the added value of including it in international law textbooks in particular, and it was traditional for Principles to start with a discussion of technical aspects of sources. Chapter 1 may at first glance seem a significant departure from the canon, either as a nod to a post-post-ontological state of the discipline or as a recognition that even the most positivist inquiry cannot be carried out without a historical and theoretical framework. Still, it may be less of a conceptual innovation when read against the background of Brownlie's other writings, where he is quite comfortable in discussing history,Footnote ¹ theoryFootnote ² and his own theoretical approach.Footnote ³

The Introduction, however, may be read, paradoxically, to support Brownlie's scepticism: what does it say about the relevance of (critical strands) of theoretical scholarship, if a chapter on theory, concluding with a long citation from Koskenniemi (18), can be inserted in front of the legal argument without obviously affecting anything in its structure or content?Footnote ⁴ Should not one conclude that theory (of this kind) is the ultimate apologist for Brownlie's objective positivism? In fact, one might go further and say that the explicit recognition of critical scholarship in the Introduction coincides with its expulsion from the book itself. ‘Brownlie as a critical legal scholar’ is an incongruous statement on many levels, but his analysis in the last editions of recent developments in the law on use of force and particularly international criminal law through the lenses of political abuse did not easily fit with the positivist tenor of the book. The entirely rewritten chapter on international criminal justice (Chapter 30) and the chapter on use of force (Chapter 33) bring the argument back into the four corners of positive law.

It is unsurprising that later editions of international law (text)books take a different view of the content of the law than earlier ones as a result of new practice and judicial decisions. They may also extend the scope of analysis by considering new case studies, as the book under review does regarding different domestic approaches to international law. The earlier editions only looked at the approaches of English and Commonwealth law and selected ‘other States’ (the US and Italy) (7 Brownlie's Principles, 41–9); the book under review not only provides greater detail on these legal systems but additionally addresses France, Germany, Russia, the Netherlands and Sweden (62–100). Such eclecticism is to be welcomed in light of the ever-increasing role that international law plays in domestic legal systems and courts. It also fits the broader normative picture, reflecting the extent to which domestic approaches and traditions flow into the basic elements of the international legal order, both substantive (custom and general principles) and procedural (representation of principal legal systems in the membership of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court). Indeed, a discipline with a claim to universality might conceivably cast the net for representative legal systems even wider, moving beyond the US and Europe (perhaps considering BRICS, G-20, or OECD States, or choosing another benchmark that captures the elusive criteria of influence and diversity in a more accurate manner).

On a number of points, Crawford's Brownlie goes further than elaboration and extension, and departs from positions that Brownlie was known to strongly support. Chapter 30 (International Criminal Justice) mentioned above provides one example, addressing the topic as raising important issues of law and policy, but certainly not as a mere political ploy of 1990s. Chapter 22 (Privileges and Immunities of Foreign States) is another example. In previous editions, Brownlie criticized (what probably was) the mainstream view on the issue, influentially articulated by Lady Hazel Fox in The Law of State Immunity, which drew a distinction between different types of conduct and their subjection to immunity. Instead, he suggested that there were a number of countervailing considerations that should be balanced in each particular instance (7 Brownlie's Principles, 332–6; see in particular 334 fn 61). Chapter 22 abandons this position, adopting instead, along with Lady Fox, the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities and the distinction between different types of conduct for purposes of structuring the analysis of the law (489–91, 502–4).

Even legal positions that Brownlie defended personally have not been immune from criticism. What many consider to be his greatest success, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua at the International Court of Justice, is now described as a judgment based on confusion between jurisdiction and applicable law, with the dissenting judges rather than the Court getting it right (33). Another example is provided by historical consolidation of territorial title: Brownlie defended this argument on behalf of Nigeria in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria and, despite its rejection in the Peace Palace ([2002] ICJ Rep 303 [62]–[70]), thought that there was more to it than had met the eye of the Court (7 Brownlie's Principles, 156–8). The book under review reverses the position and brings it in line with the Court's judgment with a wonderfully light touch, switching a few sentences and adding ‘epitaph’ to the heading (235–6). Clearly, when Crawford felt that the law in the previous editions was not quite right, even on a significant issue, he has not hesitated to correct it.

Inevitably in a book of such breadth, there will be propositions with which reasonable people may disagree or will at least hesitate to subscribe to in unqualified terms. Two small points that caught the eye of this reviewer relate to estoppel in investor–State relationships and the general rule of State immunity. To take the latter point first, a judgment of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal is relied on to suggest that the positions of China and Hong Kong on absolute immunity ‘create an obstacle to the consolidation of the customary law of restrictive immunity’ (504–5); DRC v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC, Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, Judgment of 8 June 2011 (provisional judgment finalized 8 September 2011). It is a defensible position. But to determine the precise impact of FG Hemisphere on custom, one has to consider its rationale on issues of international law. Four out of five judges took no position on international law at all (Justices Chan, Ribeiro and Mason, [410]–[411], Justice Mortimer, [502]–[514]), and Justice Bokhary suggested in passing that China was a persistent objector to the general rule of restrictive immunity, [121]). Viewed in this light, FG Hemisphere either says nothing about international law or even provides gentle support to the rule of restrictive immunity, with China viewed as objecting to its application but not existence; see consistently with this reading (28 fn 45) (whether China can combine the required degree of persistence with its obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the 2004 UN Convention is a different question altogether). The second example relates to the suggestion that estoppel may operate between a State and an investor (420 fn 26, 611 fn 27). Again, this is a defensible position. But one can also view estoppel as presupposing structural equality between actors that make representations in their normal interaction of rule-making and application in a manner that can change their rights and obligations. Since investors do not participate in the creation of international legal rules in this manner, estoppel may be structurally inappropriate for addressing induced reliance. Instead, this issue should be dealt with through the lenses of abuse of rights and process (regarding investors) and either content of particular primary obligations of international law or authoritative public perceptions affecting the content of domestic law as a point of fact (regarding States).

The possibility of reasonable disagreement with some aspects of the fine print in no way affects the overall verdict that this is a very impressive work, wide-ranging in scope and nuanced in content, just as one would expect from its eminent author. The index, albeit one fifth shorter than that of the previous edition (28 to 35 pages), seems very detailed, and the book's references are exhaustive regarding the important authorities yet not overbearing with the minutiae (the traditional nod to a stray footnote goes to 45 fn 158: an unusual case because the footnote is right but the text has moved on; cf 7 Brownlie's Principles, 26 fn 167). For this reviewer, the combination in Crawford's Brownlie of the traditional structure with modern developments in theory and practice is a success, delivering what seems to be at the moment the best single-author English-language international law textbook. It is highly recommended, both as a student text and as a persuasive authority for the practice of international law.