Lori Allen's study of Palestinians’ engagement with human rights is ethnographically rich and theoretically sophisticated. It should certainly be read by anyone interested in a comprehensive treatment of human rights activism in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip that is informed by the post-1967 history of Palestinian nationalism and the politics of state-building and statelessness. But her book deserves a much wider, interdisciplinary audience as well because of the compelling ways in which she tackles several of the thorniest issues in the contemporary politics and practices of human rights. Foremost among these is the question that resounds across the contemporary Middle East and in other parts of the world: what good are human rights (or what good can human rights do) when violations remain so common, enforcement so inadequate, and accountability so elusive?
Allen deploys cynicism as an analytical concept to help explain why human rights continue to matter to so many Palestinians despite the fact that the conditions of their collective existence remain so incommensurate with norms and standards enshrined in international law. Cynicism, in her hands, neither means “disdain” nor indicates “repudiation”; while it relates to “disillusionment,” it is not an interchangeable term. Rather, she explains, “[c]ynicism is a critical stance by which those who are displeased with choices available in the present hold on to the belief that such limited options are not all that there should be” (p. 189). The key term here is “belief” as multidimensional and culturally mediated phenomena, and she rightly notes that the best way to get at this is through ethnography.
Although Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip “enjoy” neither the rights they “have” as humans nor those particular to a population living under foreign occupation, many find uses for human rights. For some, those uses are utilitarian or instrumental. For example, some of Allen's informants who were activists in nationalist parties and organizations through the first intifada shifted, for pragmatic reasons, to work for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at the start of the Oslo period. The political changes instituted through the Oslo process included a redoubling of the “NGO-ization” of Palestine, which is fueled by foreign funding and has produced neoliberal dependencies. Human rights organizations (HROs) constitute a significant portion of the NGOs in the occupied territories.
Allen compares how people employed by human rights organizations experience their frustration at the inefficacy of human rights but nevertheless continue to work in that sector because it is a source of income and/or a means for remaining involved in what, these days, is a dominant form of social engagement in the territories. A more baldly instrumental use of human rights is that of Palestinian Authority (PA) officials and security agents. They aspire to talk the human rights talk (e.g., by putting themselves through training sessions) as a means of performing legitimacy to appeal to foreign donors and international constituencies on whom their political power depends. These two examples of instrumentalized attachments to human rights illustrate why and how the concept of cynicism is so useful in analyzing Palestinian politics.
The alternative to cynicism is sincerity. As Allen explains, Palestinians who remain sincerely attached to human rights are not naive. Rather, their sincerity manifests as hopefulness in particularly cosmopolitan (i.e., internationally minded) kinds of ways. For them, human rights matter as a way of framing aspirations for the people's future, grounding critiques of occupation and authoritarianism—and the resultant violations—in the present, and providing terms (symbolic and rhetorical) for a Palestinian political narrative of national deserving that appeals to transcendent and universal norms. Allen's insights about sincerity—as a rebuttal to charges of naïveté—will be encouraging to human rights activists (in Palestine and beyond) and enlightening to scholars working in/on other parts of the world.
In addition to the various activist types one would expect to remain sincerely committed to human rights, the big surprise in the book is that Allen locates Hamas in this camp as well. Her point of departure is that Hamas self-consciously presents itself—because it is—as a sincere and effective alternative to Fatah, and that its alternative take on human rights is part of its appeal among Palestinians. This alternative take includes an “insistence on Palestinians’ right to be nationalist [and] on their right to demand rights that will be guaranteed by a political rather than technocratic solution” (p. 157). Allen's research for this chapter is, necessarily, somewhat different because of the impossibility of spending time in the Gaza Strip due to the Israeli closure and siege, and the sensitivities of talking about Hamas in the West Bank because of the fierce Hamas-Fatah rivalry that has been ongoing since 2007; consequently, her Hamas-focused interviews and participant observations are fewer and her reliance on texts is greater.
What her research contributes to knowledge about Hamas is a close reading of its leaders’ and thinkers’ engagements in debates about the relationship between Islam and human rights (commitment to social justice being the key), and the party's action-oriented approach to human rights, which includes earnest criticisms of the system for failing to live up to its own ideals, using international law standards to criticize Israeli and PA violations, and being responsive and responsible to United Nations human rights bodies. I found the rosy picture more plausible than I would have expected. However, her narrative tends to minimize and in one significant way ignore the role of violence in Hamas politics. She writes: “by the end of the first intifada in 1993, the movement shifted away from political violence and moved toward social sector charity and educational initiatives during the Oslo period” (p. 161). The next sentence jumps to 2006 when Hamas won the national election. There is no mention of Hamas suicide bombings, which first occurred in 1993 and continued throughout the 1990s as well as during the second intifada. Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) bombings and Israeli targeted killing operations occurred in cycles, with each typically claiming their action was in retaliation for the other's violence. The tactic of suicide bombing became a major point of political disagreement among Palestinians, with critics decrying the consequences both to their own people and to the reputation of the nation in the international community. Allen does discuss rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, which she non-judgmentally portrays as a manifestation of Hamas' political position on the right to fight—and indeed international law (i.e., Additional Protocol I) does provide a right to fight against foreign occupation and for national liberation. What is provocative and novel in her argument is that she relates this fighting creed to Hamas’ approach to human rights, part of what distinguishes it from PA and Fatah cynicism and ineffectiveness.
Allen is influenced by Lisa Wedeen's concept of “as if” to explain how people individually and collectively act as if something is true while harboring no illusions that it is not. In the Palestinian context, which differs from Syria and Yemen where Wedeen did her political ethnographies, statelessness and the fraught, frustrated, or arguably failed process of state-building serve to cast “as if” in a different light. Poignantly, many Palestinians continue to believe in human rights as if their (varied) actions could make the difference.
