Grand strategy is in vogue, notes Hal Brands. But what is it? He defines grand strategy as “a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so” (3). He puts flesh on these bones in making his case that crafting and executing a grand strategy, while fraught with difficulty, is necessary in a complex world.
Brands traces the grand strategies of four Presidents – Harry Truman, Richard Nixon (and Henry Kissinger), Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. This is not a chronological narrative, but an “applied history” meant to identify lessons for contemporary strategists (viii). Each case study is superb. Brands distills the enormous scholarship on each President and presents a succinct account of their grand strategy. The writing is lively and Brands has a keen eye for quotations from primary sources that punctuate his argument.
The Truman years, long held up as the “golden age” of grand strategy, were nonetheless “messy and vexatious” (18). The story of Americans busily building the international architecture of world order is well known, but Brands's account is useful for treating policy towards both the Atlantic and Pacific as a whole. He reveals the frustrating process whereby the Americans sought to concentrate their strength but found it dispersed. Truman's “responsibilities had a tendency to snowball” (41). Ultimately, Truman's snowball rolled into Korea, where the United States ended up with precisely what it did not want: war. Overall, Truman's grand strategy was marked by “real purpose and innovation” (60). But it was also enormously expensive. As early as 1945 the ends of postwar American grand strategy have been at odds with the means available.
Nixon and Kissinger are the black sheep in the history of American grand strategy; this chapter is an important contrast to the other three. Their fundamental notion – that the United States could not and should not carry the whole load of the liberal world order – differs radically from those of Truman, Reagan and Bush. But whatever Nixon and Kissinger's theory, their practice was imperfect. An opportunistic policy during the Yom Kippur War backfired; linkage with Moscow had unintended consequences, and senior officials seemed oblivious to critical elements on the international environment, like petro-politics and concern for human rights. Ultimately, Nixon and his administration's pathologies discredited their less moralistic, less exceptional, approach to grand strategy.
Ronald Reagan, Brands argues, came to office eager to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and prove to Moscow it could not possibly win the Cold War. By a show of American strength, Reagan expected his adversaries to accept a modus vivendi. At first, he overplayed his hand, frightening the Soviets. But he recalibrated – if not reversed – his policy to make it less inflammatory. This was possible once Reagan recognized that Moscow's military strength hid severe political and economic weaknesses. While certainly Reagan cannot take credit for these weaknesses, Brands argues that his grand strategy shaped the range of Mikhail Gorbachev's options. Reagan's grand strategy had its costs. Unsavory partnerships around the world, for one. But also it was so expensive that the United States became a debtor nation for the first time since the First World War. How might a different President have approached this era?
Brands's account of the George W. Bush administration explains how Iraq came to be the “linchpin” of an ambitious and broad American grand strategy after 11 September 2001 (164). The President and his advisers overestimated what America could accomplish, and at what price. Ultimately, Bush's was “a grand strategy that was simply too grand” (145). This inherent flaw was exacerbated by mistakes and poor execution, and an explosion of federal debt. Somehow, American grand strategies – good and bad – are often very expensive.
In his conclusion, Brands offers a list of ten suggestions for public-policy officials engaged in grand strategy. Three are especially important: grand strategy is not a blueprint for action, but a process. Leaders should understand that power can be more powerful when conserved than when exercised. And, above all, expectations loaded onto a grand strategy must be kept realistic.
Readers will notice the curious Eisenhower–Kennedy–Johnson-sized hole in the book. Brands's exclusion of Eisenhower is puzzling, since the Eisenhower administration, more than any other since 1945, sought to implement a planning process similar to what Brands advocates in his conclusion. Overall, Brands's study raises more questions than it answers, and this is a good thing. How grand can a grand strategy be and still succeed? How does one measure the costs of a grand strategy? How much control do Presidents have in setting American grand strategy, and how much is foreordained by larger forces? This book will help guide the search for answers.
