The main question that Dinissa Duvanova's book addresses is why business associations form in postcommunist states, in particular given the low level of civic associational activity in general and given the challenges of overcoming collective-action problems. The analysis uses multiple methods and numerous sources of data in order to account for the formation of business associations, more commonly referred to as industry associations. Duvanova draws upon firm-level survey data, cross-national quantitative data from 27 countries, and qualitative data from Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, and Kazakhstan.

This analysis shows that very strong regulatory environments discourage the formation of business associations. However, when the enforcement of regulations is weak, arbitrary, and linked to low-level corruption, then business associations are more likely to form and flourish. When business associations can help reduce the costs associated with adhering to regulations, either through protection from corrupt bureaucrats or through the provision of information on regulatory statutes, they emerge and endure. In addition, the analysis finds that business associations form in environments where they can provide selective benefits to members, rather than provide collective goods to all. Moreover, when local bureaucrats have little discretionary room to interpret rules, business associations are less able to help their members lower the costs of regulatory compliance, and therefore are much less likely to form. The variation in the post-communist world helps to tease out further refinements of Duvanova's theory of association formation. For example, business associations are more likely to form when there is a smaller number of firms per sector, the ownership structure includes foreign and private ownership, and larger enterprises are present.

The book's comparative analysis shows that business associations in the post-communist world have a low level of membership compared to other regions. Duvanova argues that the particularly intrusive nature of regulation in many postcommunist countries (as measured, for example, by the number of days required to form a business) helps to explain the relatively low level of business association membership. She also highlights that postcommunist business associations do not form strong lobbies, as compared to associations in other regions. That said, she argues that their limited lobbying activity does not mean that they are unimportant. In fact, they are perceived to be more influential than labor unions, foreign organizations, and even organized crime, according to survey data (p. 46). An important and interesting prediction that comes out of Duvanova's model is that as associational membership grows over time, bureaucratic corruption should diminish (p. 128).

The author's emphasis on business associations' defensive behavior contrasts with common assumptions about industry associations, which emphasize lobbying and rent-seeking in the postcommunist context, lobbying is seldom part of what associations can do on behalf of their members. Rather, according to Duvanova's theory, associations form to protect members from arbitrary application of the law at the local level, and have little contact with lawmakers who design regulations. In addition, Duvanova acknowledges that rent-seeking and collusion can occur, but that they are (fortuitous) side benefits of business associations' activity, rather than their primary purpose or their set of formal activities. Only on occasion do the book's specific examples depart from this general observation, such as the example of the Croatian travel industry that forms an association to combat “unfair” competition in the industry.

The author situates her theory of defensive organization in multiple theoretical traditions, including modernization theory, social choice theory, and industrial organization theory, and the concluding chapter speaks directly to theories of economic growth, good governance, civil society, and democratization. In terms of its empirical contribution, the book is rich in valuable primary and secondary data. It draws upon surveys of business associations, enterprises, and self-conducted structured interviews, as well as documents published by industry associations and data collected by international financial institutions on business associations in the region and internationally.

The theory of defensive organization rests squarely on the types of activity that these associations perform for their members. Hence, the 13 individual case studies describing association activity across different sectors and countries (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Croatia) are particularly valuable to the overall argument. For example, discussion of the formation of associations like the Federation of Restaurants and Hotels in Russia, Ukraine's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, or the Russian Association of Ice Cream Producers emphasize and highlight the importance of member-specific benefits that associations provide, and also support the most important dimension of the theory—that the activity of these associations is intended to help lower the costs of compliance for firms (and has little influence in shaping the regulations themselves). One of the most interesting examples was from the Almaty Association of Entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan. This association provided emergency response services for its members facing on-site inspections. The association would send out a mobile emergency legal team to be present during an inspection by local bureaucrats, which helped prevent abuse and the imposition of illegal fines (pp. 153–54).

Duvanova challenges the existing research in political science that emphasizes the rent-seeking and lobbying activity of industry associations, instead of their more important role of helping firms cope with burdensome regulation. The book's argument and conclusions fall clearly on the side of business interests—in that the organizational activity of firms is found to be concentrated primarily on protecting firms from malevolent and corrupt bureaucrats, and secondarily on gaining information about how best to comply with regulations. Even the cover of the book—in which a businessman walking a tightrope is bearing the wings of an angel—portrays the postcommunist businessman in celestial terms.

The author's attempt to break so starkly with the existing literature may explain why the analysis is so exhaustive. Duvanova leaves no stone unturned. Indeed, her message is told and retold in many different ways—with the main thesis of defensive organizational behavior supported or substantiated from every imaginable angle. Even the most skeptical reader, namely, the one who is least likely to trust industry associations as mainly benign organizations formed to defend the interests of the hard-working, profit-oriented business owners, will be hard-pressed to deny the strong empirical and theoretical bases of Duvanova's analysis.

In sum, the author does an impressive job of building and supporting a theory of defensive organization of business associations. While the broader set of challenges of building business in the postcommunist world, as suggested by her title Building Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia, is not fully realized (with relevant actors and forces, like organized crime, absent from her story), Duvanova's more narrow focus does allow her to make a convincing and eloquent case as to the reasons behind business association formation in the postcommunist world.