Theories explaining the differential development of Latin American economies abound. More particularly, many authors have attempted to explain differential policy success by teasing out why some leaders pursue policies aimed at longer-term, widespread, and societally shared development, while others engage in clientelistic and personalistic policies that damage the prospects for long-term development. Two major sets of theories address this puzzle. Sociological poverty-based theories focus on voters' short time horizons and the pressing material needs that lead them to prefer clientelistic policies. Institutionally based explanations focus on the electoral system or regime structure and the incentives they create for politicians to institute reforms that result in effective long-term public policies rather than falling victim to pernicious clientelism.
Mona Lyne's excellent book, The Voter's Dilemma and Democratic Accountability, directly challenges these approaches and provides an innovative new one. Lyne dramatically changes the locus of explanation, bringing it from macroinstitutions and the problems generated by poverty down to the most basic transaction in a democracy: the vote.
Accountability is a core feature of democracy. In theory, politicians should pursue good public policies that maximize citizen welfare for the long term. If they do not, voters can hold them accountable and remove them from office. Nonetheless, in certain situations, incentive structures may align in a way that removes voters' rationale and motivations to do so. Lyne focuses her arguments on mechanisms of accountability to explain this behavior, and, in turn, the broad divergence we see with respect to economic policymaking in Latin America and economic success.
For Lyne, the problem boils down to a prisoner's dilemma. No single voter has the capacity to hold a politician accountable, and the benefits of good policy are nonexcludible, equally benefiting all voters. On the other hand, clientelistic benefits (as defined by Lyne) are tied quid pro quo directly to the way voters cast their ballots. This is the crux of Lyne's creative conceptualization of the “voter's dilemma.” While all voters will benefit from good national policy—irrespective of the way they vote—only those voters who cast a ballot for a clientelistic politician will receive individualistic benefits. This consistently provides voters an incentive to defect, opting for clientelistically oriented politicians and, in turn, policies that stymie national development.
Similar incentive structures exist for politicians within the context of Lyne's model. Certain contextual situations compel politicians to play the clientelistic game, and they are more likely to perpetuate its rules and receive benefits from voters and party leaders by doing so. On the other hand, politicians with more nationally oriented development goals are deprived the currency that their more clientelistically oriented colleagues use to advance their political careers. The interaction of incentives at the level of the voter and those of politicians align to create what Lyne calls a “clientelistic equilibrium.” This is in stark contrast to a “policy-based equilibrium” where structural conditions prompt enough voters to forego clientelistic goods in favor of opting for politicians that offer more collective goods.
To make this argument and to analyze the development of the structural conditions necessary for the development of one or the other equilibria, Lyne relies on case studies of Brazil and Venezuela during two critical periods in each of the countries' histories. Lyne contends that in postwar Brazil and in pre-Chávez Venezuela, the costs of clientelism eroded any possibilities for widespread and widely shared development programs. In contrast, contemporary (post-1980) Brazil diverges markedly from this pattern (as does post-Chávez Venezuela—the fourth case analyzed) for its ability to break out of the clientelistic equilibrium and to undertake successful, nationally oriented economic policies that have resulted in more even and widely shared development.
Still, we are left with a few puzzles. Why do these clientelistic equilibria develop, and how can they ultimately be transformed, as was the case for contemporary Brazil? Lyne contends that the structural characteristics necessary for a clientelistic equilibrium to develop include a sufficient supply of particularistic goods to meet voter demands. However, when these structural conditions change, the clientelistic equilibrium is also likely to change. Lyne explains this phenomenon as it applies to the different paths taken by contemporary Brazil and post-Chávez Venezuela. In particular, the 1980s debt crisis, Brazil's deteriorating creditworthiness, and high inflation all reduced the supply of particularistic goods available to politicians. At the same time, “the reservation price of an election” (p. 69), as Lyne terms it, increased in response to the ballooning size of the electorate and an increase in the percent of the economy in private hands and outside the purview and control of the state. Venezuela, on the other hand, faced different structural conditions, with massive oil revenues financing the continued supply of particularistic goods in the hands of the state.
Lyne employs a wide array of tests of her theory, though most are indirect given the paucity of relevant data and the difficulty of concretely measuring the equilibria that she posits. Still, Lyne marshals impressive data related to congressional voting patterns, party switching, legislative organization, and internal party politics to convincingly make her point. In an era when too much political science literature simply adopts easy and questionable measures to allow regression analysis to make the point, Lyne employs a painstaking and thorough methodology that is much more convincing than simple attempts to quantify phenomena that are questionably quantifiable.
Despite the elegance and thoroughness of Lyne's arguments, some questions will undoubtedly remain in readers' minds. Lyne's conclusions are based on the assertion that quid pro quo voting can exist in times of secret ballots and open elections. Though her attempts to provide evidence are impressive, her argument falls a bit short in documenting the kind of party organization and sanctioning mechanisms necessary for such a voting system to function in as pervasive a way as she posits. Also, Lyne could have done more to explore and argue for “the voter's dilemma” as a cross-nationally applicable concept. While, again, she makes a case for the applicability of the model across regions, and to both developed and underdeveloped countries, her focus on structural conditions makes the reader wonder whether broad differences in contextual conditions will also produce different outcomes.
Despite these relatively minor shortcomings, this is a powerful book. In empirical terms, when published in 2008, some might have doubted Lyne's sanguine assertions concerning Brazilian economic performance and management. Nonetheless, with the passage of time, it has become clear that Brazil may have indeed reached a new policymaking equilibrium. Brazil's contemporary policymaking process and its outcomes with respect to growth, social welfare, poverty elimination, and success in battling Brazil's notorious inequality only make Lyne's argument more convincing with the passage of time.
Further, in this book, Lyne does exactly what political scientists are supposed to do. She takes an interesting puzzle and devises a new and elegant model to creatively explain it, drawing on the insights of many literatures and approaches. The book also makes a very valuable theoretical distinction between clientelistic goods (exchanged for votes) and targeted collective goods that benefit certain sectors or regions not subject to a vote exchange. Lyne employs an effective and nondogmatic theoretical approach, critiquing institutionalist literature while skillfully using some of its tools and concepts in her analysis.
In sum, The Voter's Dilemma and Democratic Accountability is an impressive and well-executed piece of scholarship. It engages and connects in creative ways the literature on clientelism, accountability, legislative behavior, and development. The book will be an essential reference point for scholars interested in these connections for a long time to come.
