The speech of the Armenian embassy to Khusrow in the opening of Book 2 of Procopius' Wars has received little scholarly attention. Historians propose that this embassy, along with those sent by the Goths and Lazi, provided Khusrow with a pretext for violating the Eternal Peace in 540.Footnote 2 As for the speeches themselves, they have been considered formulaic set pieces, requirements of the genre in which Procopius was writing.Footnote 3 However, Anthony Kaldellis has argued that Procopius uses the Armenians as a mouthpiece for his own criticisms of Justinian, namely that the emperor is to blame for ending the Eternal Peace and that he behaved like an oriental despot.Footnote 4 While these literary and historical readings are not incompatible, none fully explicates the mechanics and function of the Armenians' speech.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how the speech of the Armenians functions both as a critique of Roman foreign policy and as a commentary on the end of the Eternal Peace, and to consider the implications for the composition of the Wars. It will provide an alternative model for the narrative role of such speeches in Procopius: this speech corresponds neither to what the Armenians ‘actually said’ on the occasion (it tallies too closely with the events recounted in Procopius' own narrative), nor is it a mouthpiece for Procopius' own critique of Justinian (as he would not subscribe to their view of Justinian's grand vision). The speech plays upon specific themes that link Books 1 and 2 of the Wars and bridge the gap between 532 and 540. The present paper will identify those themes and how they inform the non-military episodes that seemingly intrude at the end of Book 1. It will conclude by reconsidering who was responsible for ending the Eternal Peace.
JUSTINIAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SPEECH OF THE ARMENIANS
The speech of the Armenian embassy is a hostile summary of Roman foreign policy across the eastern frontier that exaggerates Roman successes, including the oppression of Armenia, the subjugation of the Lazi and Tzani, the defection of the Bosporitae from the Huns, and the extension of Roman holdings in Arabia through annexation and alliances. When compared to Procopius' own accounts of the events in question (each is discussed earlier in his narrative), the interpretation offered by the Armenians is shown to be exaggerated, misrepresented or simply false. The contrast between representation and reality (or the narrative's ‘reality’) highlights both the disparity between Roman goals and achievements, and the vulnerability of Rome prior to Khusrow's invasion in 540.
Procopius places his account of the embassy early in Book 2 at the end of a description of Roman policy in Armenia following the settlement of the Eternal Peace. His account opens with a series of local governors beginning with Symeon,Footnote 5 and continuing with AmazaspesFootnote 6 and Acacius.Footnote 7 Acacius gained his position by denouncing his predecessor and was killed in a revolt after attempting to impose a new tax (Procop. Wars 2.3.1–7).
After Acacius' death, Justinian dispatched Sittas (then magister militum per Armeniam) to quell the uprising. Sittas sought reconciliation, but was ordered to be more aggressive. He initiated a policy of divide-and-conquer, attempting to win over the tribe of the Aspetiani. This plan was derailed when the messengers charged with delivering guarantees of immunity failed to rendezvous with the Aspetiani. The situation deteriorated further when Sittas killed a group of Aspetiani women and children (Wars 2.3.8–18). Facing a now united force, Sittas engaged the Armenians in a battle at Oenochalacon. During the skirmishing, the general and his retinue crossed a ravine to pursue a group of enemy horsemen. Shortly thereafter a member of Sittas' party accidentally broke the general's spear, the general was recognized and the Armenians pursued the Romans back across the ravine. In the process, Sittas was struck on the head and stabbed from behind, either by Artabanes,Footnote 8 a member of the Arsacidae, or by Solomon, a man of no note (Wars 2.3.19–27).
Sittas' death is a comedy of strategic errors and poor management. Just as important as the circumstances of his death is the brief encomium offered by Procopius:
In this way Sittas disappeared from among men for no reason, in a manner unworthy of his virtue and of the things he had always accomplished in the wars. He was a man by nature handsome in his body and noble in war, and he was an excellent general, inferior to none of his peers. However, some say that Sittas did not die at the hands of Artabanes, but that Solomon, an exceedingly obscure man among the Armenians, killed him.Footnote 9
This notice is interesting less for what it praises than for how it reflects on the Roman military. Procopius places his praise between his account of Sittas' death and the mention of the alternate account involving Solomon. The latter story emphasizes the absurdity of Procopius' final claim, that Sittas was inferior to none of his peers, presumably other senior Roman generals. Taken by itself, the manner of Sittas' death – he was stabbed in the back while fleeing (Wars 2.3.25), an ancient Roman taboo – might be read as an unfortunate accident. However, Sittas' death is the culmination of a series of strategic and tactical blunders that range from his failure to wear a helmet to his inability to coordinate with would-be allies. If he was the best the Roman military could offer, his performance calls the competence of the Roman high command into question, and there is no reason to doubt Procopius' assessment, which is shared by the Armenians (Wars 2.3.52), in this regard. Sittas replaced Belisarius after the defeat at Callinicum in 531 and was subsequently assigned to head the reorganized Armenian command.Footnote 10 Sittas was also Justinian's brother-in-law through his marriage to Comito, Theodora's sister, an indication of his standing at court.
The speech of the Armenians follows an account of the shameful and unnecessary death of a senior general. Between the death of Sittas and the embassy, Procopius briefly recounts an unsuccessful attempt to kill the leading members of the Armenian insurrection.Footnote 11 It is one of them, Bassaces, who speaks for the embassy:
Many of us, lord [Khusrow], are Arsacidae, descendants of Arsacus, who was never hostile to the kingship of the Parthians when the Persian state was subject to them, and he was a famous king, inferior to none of his peers.Footnote 12
Bassaces' statement that Arsacus was ‘inferior to none of his peers’ recalls Procopius' comment about Sittas and his failed campaign in Armenia and reinforces the implicit criticism when, shortly thereafter, Bassaces admits that Arsaces was inferior to at least one of his peers, Theodosius II, to whom he surrendered his kingdom (Wars 2.3.35). The Armenians proceed to claim that Justinian has made them ‘slaves and fugitives’ (Wars 2.3.33), an obvious exaggeration given their success in overthrowing their appointed governor, resisting a Roman invasion and killing a senior general, an achievement they themselves highlight later in the speech (Wars 2.3.52).
This early exaggeration primes the reader to be suspicious of the Armenians' claims. Such suspicion is warranted by their depiction of Roman foreign policy. The Armenians present Khusrow with the image of a masterful and coherent Roman foreign policy designed to encircle Persia from the Caucasus to the Red Sea:
Has [Justinian] not assigned to us the payment of a tax that did not exist before? Has he not enslaved our neighbours the Tzani who were autonomous? Has he not imposed a Roman general on the king of the miserable Lazi? All of which are not in accordance with nature nor are they easy to describe. Did he not send generals to the Bosporitae, the subjects of the Huns, and attach to himself a city that in no way belonged to him? Did he not make an alliance with the kingdoms of the Ethiopians [Axumites], who were completely unknown to the Romans? But he has even brought under his control the Homeritae [Himyarites] and the Red Sea, and he has attached the Palm Groves to the domain of the Romans. We pass over an account of the sufferings of the Libyans and Italians.Footnote 13
Were these claims true, we would have a high opinion of Justinian's foreign policy. However, Procopius' own account shows that each of these claims is exaggerated or misrepresented.
The Armenians open with their own plight, charging that Justinian has made them slaves and fugitives, and established a new tax. The first claim is hardly credible given their success in resisting Roman authority. The tax to which they refer, the four centenaria, is attributed to Acacius, the governor of Armenia appointed sometime before the spring of 536.Footnote 14 Justinian's programme in Armenia was one of military reorganization and legal codification, geared toward transforming the Roman-affiliated territories in Interior Armenia into regularly administered provinces,Footnote 15 and there is no indication that Justinian imposed the new tax. In the Wars, Procopius lays the blame on Acacius and does not return to correct himself in the Secret History. Given that a section of the Secret History is devoted to administrative and financial policy, we can reasonably expect that the omission confirms Acacius' responsibility.Footnote 16
It is curious that Procopius does not take this opportunity to have the Armenians mention Justinian's military reforms, as these would be excellent evidence for the Roman encroachment the ambassadors are describing to Khusrow. The difference between the unmentioned military reforms and the policies the Armenians complain about is the success of the former. In the Secret History, Procopius claims that during the invasion of Lazica in 541 Khusrow dispatched Huns to harass Roman Armenia, only to have the new magister militum decisively defeat this force.Footnote 17 The claims attributed to the Armenians by Procopius are directly contradicted by the narrative of the Wars, and the contrast between these two accounts highlights the military weakness of the Roman state.
The Armenians next claim that Justinian enslaved the Tzani. The Tzani were a group of pastoralists in the mountains outside of Trapezus (modern Trabzon) who raided the neighbouring lands. Prior to Justinian's reign, Trapezus was in the province of Pontus Polemoniacus, but was detached by Novel 31 and made a part of Armenia I, under the administrative authority of Acacius and the military command of Sittas. Procopius reports that the Tzani were unconquerable due to the remoteness of their homeland, but were easily defeated in battle. Sittas was able to win them over after such a defeat and enroll some of them in the Roman army (Wars 1.15.24–5). Despite Justinian's claim, in 535, to have acquired the territory, Roman control was fragile and required repeated campaigns to pacify the region.Footnote 18 At the time of the embassy, the Tzani were pacified but not subdued. The Armenian charge of enslavement is a gross overstatement and directs attention to Procopius' assertion that Roman arms could not conquer the Tzani.
The Armenians proceed from the Tzani to their neighbours the Lazi, who occupied the western portion of modern Georgia. The embassy claims that Justinian imposed a general on the king of Lazica, and this agrees with Procopius' account, which reports that Justinian sent Irenaeus with an army to secure Lazica between 526 and 528,Footnote 19 but the Armenians are not telling the whole story. Justinian sent Irenaeus to secure Lazica against Persian invasion following a failed attempt to remove Iberia (the eastern half of modern Georgia) from the Persian sphere. According to Procopius, the Persian emperor Kavad attempted to impose Zoroastrianism on Christian Iberia, which inspired king GurgenesFootnote 20 to defect. Justin sent ProbusFootnote 21 to hire Hunnish mercenaries from the area around Bosporus to reinforce Gurgenes' rebellion. He failed and Gurgenes and his supporters fled a Persian invasion in 526/7.Footnote 22 The presence of a Persian army across from Lazica, which had come into the Roman sphere in 522 after long affiliation with the Persians,Footnote 23 disturbed the Romans, for whom control of Lazica offered many advantages.Footnote 24 For this reason, Procopius reports, Roman soldiers replaced native Lazi at two forts guarding the passes to Iberia.Footnote 25 However, they were unable to maintain their position because of the difficulty of supplying such remote locations and abandoned the forts to the Persians, only to regain them under the terms of the Eternal Peace.Footnote 26
The Armenians' claims about the Lazi lead directly into those about the inhabitants of Bosporus, where the Romans attempted to recruit Huns to reinforce Gurgenes. According to the Armenians, Justinian seized (προσεποιήσατο) control of the city, which was subject to the Huns, but Procopius says only that the city affiliated (προσχωρεῖν) itself not with Justinian but Justin, and makes no mention of Hunnish rule (Wars 1.12.7–8).Footnote 27 In both Procopius' and the Armenians' presentation of these events, the line between Justin and Justinian is blurred.Footnote 28 This does not affect our reading because the actions of both emperors contributed to the state of the Caucasus at the time of the embassy. The goal of the embassy is to convince Khusrow to make war on Justinian, so the Armenians' case is strengthened by additional charges, even false ones.Footnote 29
Comparing the accounts of Procopius and the Armenians, we again find that the claims of the Armenians pointedly contrast with the documented failures of Roman foreign policy. The Romans did not subjugate the Bosporitae, and Probus failed to recruit forces to relieve Gurgenes. The immediate effect of his failure was the arrival of a Persian army in Iberia, where it menaced Roman holdings in Armenia and Lazica. This prompted the stationing of Roman troops in Lazica, a move taken against the objections of the Lazi that did lasting damage to their alliance with the Romans.Footnote 30 Again, the claims of the Armenians draw attention to the limits of Roman power and the dangers that accompanied failure.
The final claims made by the Armenians deal with the other end of the frontier: Arabia and the Red Sea. The Armenians make two accusations, that Justinian allied himself with the Axumites, complete strangers,Footnote 31 and that he took control of Himyar (modern Yemen) and the Red Sea as far as the Palm Groves. The language of the first claim is telling: the plural places the event after the Axumite invasion of Himyar and establishment of an Axumite regent in 525.Footnote 32 The Armenians presumably construe two initiatives as evidence for an alliance: Justinian's attempts to open a new route for silk import and to re-establish the phylarch Caisus over the tribe of the Maddeni (Ma'add) in order to attack Persian holdings on the Persian Gulf.Footnote 33 In Procopius' telling, both enterprises failed; the Axumites were unable to circumvent Persian monopolies on silk, while the Axumites in Himyar baulked at the difficulty of crossing the Arabian Peninsula. The chronology of Procopius' Red Sea digression is telescoped. It ends with the abortive expedition against the Persians by Abraha, an Axumite rebel in power in Himyar by 531.Footnote 34 This expedition postdates the embassy of the Armenians, but in Procopius' narrative it is placed after the initiatives to which the Armenians refer, extending the pattern of Roman failure into the future and showing that Roman diplomacy in Arabia was not and would not be a threat to Persia.Footnote 35
The final Armenian claim, that Justinian added the Palm Groves to his empire, is contradicted by Procopius' account. The Palm Groves were given to Justinian by the phylarch AbocharabusFootnote 36 (Abu Qarib), but were a gift in name only because they were too distant to be of use to the emperor (Wars 1.19.12). Again, Procopius is calling attention to the limits, not the extent, of Roman power.
The first section of the Armenian address deals with events in Wars Book 1, but it goes on to describe events narrated in Wars Book 2:Footnote 37
Has he not undertaken to suborn your slave Alamundarus [al-Mundhir] in a time of peace and incite him to rebel against your kingdom? Was he not able just recently to ally himself with the Huns, who were in no way familiar to him, against your affairs?Footnote 38
The attempt to win over al-Mundhir,Footnote 39 the Lakhmid king and Persian ally, and the Huns is a charge levelled by Khusrow, the truth of which Procopius declines to confirm or deny.Footnote 40 Both attempts are failures (if they even occurred); this aligns them with the other charges brought by the Armenians. The effect is to demonstrate Roman weakness in the face of an aggressive Khusrow. Given the proximity of this claim to Procopius' own statement of doubt, the charge serves as a reminder of the Armenians' persistent misrepresentations.
The Armenians' speech presents Roman foreign policy as a masterwork of imperial strategy; with minimal expense Justinian weakened Persia and positioned himself for a new war following his victory in the west. When read against Procopius' narrative, the speech highlights the weakness of the Roman cause all along the frontier. Therefore, when the Armenians call attention to the fact that the bulk of Justinian's forces are currently on the far side of the Mediterranean, it must be understood not as a fleeting opportunity to strike, but the culmination of a disastrous foreign policy:
For it happens that the majority of the soldiers the Romans possess are at the farthest reaches of the inhabited world, and as for the two generals, who were their finest, we come already having killed the one, Sittas, and Justinian will never see Belisarius again.Footnote 41
This comment serves two functions: it brings the speech back to where it began, the rebellion in Armenia and death of Sittas, and recalls Roman policy in the west, already alluded to as the sufferings of the Libyans and Italians, reminding the reader of events beyond the Persian front that the first two books of the Wars have left out.
After considering the rhetorical and thematic function of the Armenian speech, it is possible to understand how the episodes of intrigue at the close of Wars Book 1 promote the theme of Roman vulnerability and effect a smooth transition from the settlement of the peace in 531 to Khusrow's invasion in 540.
DOMESTIC INTRIGUE AT THE CLOSE OF BOOK 1
The speech of the Armenians ties together the foreign policies described in Wars Book 1, while reintroducing the sense of defeat and defensiveness that followed the defeat at Callinicum in 531.Footnote 42 Yet the close of Wars Book 1 anticipates other ideas presented at the opening of Book 2. Understanding the thematic and narrative links between the books is crucial for appreciating the structure of the Wars, its depiction of Justinian and his regime, and the ways in which Procopius spans the years of the Eternal Peace (532–40) without sacrificing an appreciation for those years in his subsequent narrative.
The final three chapters of Wars Book 1 have troubled scholars because of the late date at which their contents could have been inserted and their chronological discontinuities. The events in question are the plots against Khusrow and Justinian, the entrapment of John the Cappadocian (with references dated as late as 544),Footnote 43 and the rebellion of John Cottistis.Footnote 44 Cameron argued that Procopius distorted his chronology in order to end Book 1 on a high note for Belisarius (the Nika Revolt) and lay the groundwork for a critique of the general in Book 2.Footnote 45 Greatrex argued that the confused chronology resulted from a last-minute transfer of material from the Secret History following the dismissal of John the Cappadocian in 544.Footnote 46 According to him, John's fall was inserted in 546, while Theodora's role was added between 547 and 550 (the empress died on 28 June 548).Footnote 47 But Greatrex's model does not account for the chronology of the other episodes; moreover, if Procopius intended to introduce material from the Secret History into the Wars, we would expect him to have planned a place for them in his narrative and the years between the first insertion and publication in 551 would have given him ample opportunity for revision.Footnote 48 Each of these episodes has a role to play in the Wars and cannot be dismissed as awkward last-minute transfers.Footnote 49 Kaldellis has offered a literary explanation for the closing events of Wars Book 1, arguing that they associate Justinian and his court with the Herodotean model of oriental despotism, paralleling the domestic disorders in Persia after Plataea with those of Justinian after Callinicum.Footnote 50 His reading does not account for all of the episodes at the end of Book 1, in particular the rebellion at Dara.
Discomfort with the chronology at the end of Wars Book 1 is predicated on the assumption that the episodes should continue the lockstep chronology of the military narrative. Yet neither Greatrex nor Cameron is troubled by the telescoped chronologies in digressions, such as those on Lazica and the Red Sea cited above. As a rule, Procopius' military narrative follows a strict chronology, but events outside that narrative have an independent chronology. The military narrative ends with the Eternal Peace, so there is no reason to expect a strict chronology in the remainder of the book, or to attribute its absence to hurried composition.
Procopius deliberately placed the accounts at the end of Wars Book 1 outside the chronology of the military narrative, and they develop the same themes as the opening of Wars Book 2. The Eternal Peace is finalized at 1.22, and 1.23 immediately introduces accounts of conspiracies and insurrections directed at the two rulers (Wars 1.23.1). This line directs attention away from the details of the conspiracies – the singular ‘plot’ (ἐπιβουλήν) is curious, as four events are reported – and toward the parallels between Khusrow and Justinian.Footnote 51 However we interpret the following narrative, Procopius is inviting us to compare the two rulers. The results lay the groundwork for the deflating effect of the Armenians' speech.
The first conspiracy Procopius recounts is directed at Khusrow. Zames,Footnote 52 Khusrow's brother, was popular among the nobility but ineligible for the throne. His supporters plotted to kill Khusrow and place Zames' son on the throne with his father acting as regent and de facto ruler. The plot was discovered, and Khusrow executed Zames and his supporters. Procopius then advances the narrative to 541 when, during his invasion of Lazica,Footnote 53 Khusrow discovers that Zames' son was saved by Adergoundounbades. While on the march, Khusrow summons AdergoundounbadesFootnote 54 and executes him. The fate of Zames' son is unknown, though a man claiming to be him arrived in Constantinople around this time.Footnote 55
This event is Khusrow's first significant appearance in the Wars after entering the narrative following his father's death. Our first impression of him is of a strong, brutal and autocratic leader. Khusrow crushes his brother's rebellion, executing everyone involved. Years later, Khusrow, at the head of an army, brutally dispatches an insubordinate courtier. The image conveyed is of a ruthless young emperor at the head of a powerful military. His strength is made more ominous by the mention of his invasion of Lazica after the end of the peace. We are already being told that the peace will not last and that Khusrow and his armies will be on the offensive.
This last point is worth emphasizing. Procopius places an unambiguous reference to campaigns after the end of the Eternal Peace in 540 immediately following the military narrative and settlement of that peace. By telescoping the chronology, Procopius directs focus away from events during the Eternal Peace toward what happened after it was broken. Procopius thereby encourages the reader to look ahead, even referencing his own account of these events: ‘Later, Khusrow invaded the land of Colchis [Lazica] with a great army, as will be recounted by me in subsequent books.’Footnote 56 This context must be remembered when evaluating the final three chapters of Wars Book 1; Procopius juxtaposes his accounts of the Nika Revolt, the fall of John the Cappadocian and the rebellion of John Cottistis with the renewal of hostilities in and after 540.
Procopius follows Zames' conspiracy with the Nika Revolt.Footnote 57 Whereas the conspiracy against Khusrow originated in the royal family, the Nika Revolt began in an impromptu alliance between members of the Green and Blue factions who, after freeing some of their members from jail, began to sack Constantinople as though they were enemies (πολεμίοις) rather than citizens (Wars 1.24.8). Given the content of the first book of the Wars and the earlier reference to Khusrow's invasion of Lazica, such ‘enemies’ can only be Persians. This reference invites a comparison between Justinian's handling of the Persians and the rioters. It poses a ‘what if’ scenario that encourages the reader to imagine Justinian's reaction to an actual Persian attack and foreshadows the sack of Antioch in 540. Such a scenario is later played out in the prelude to that sack, when Justinian prepares for invasion by writing a strongly worded letter (Wars 2.4.14–26).Footnote 58 Through this simile, Procopius draws connections between Justinian's weakness at home and abroad, and hangs the spectre of Persian aggression over the remainder of his account.
Justinian reacts to the riot by hiding in his palace and acquiescing to the mob's demands, dismissing John the Cappadocian and Tribonian. When these steps fail and the rioters rally around the family of Anastasius, Justinian considers flight, only to be goaded into action by Theodora. He then sends Belisarius to disperse the rioters. The first attempt fails but Justinian orders the general to take a more dangerous route: together with Mundus, he enters the Hippodrome and slaughters 30,000 rioters (Wars 1.24).
The focus throughout the account is on Justinian and not, as Cameron has claimed, Belisarius.Footnote 59 Though the general is given a moment of ‘glory’, plunging into the crowd, sword drawn, his subordination to Justinian is evident from his lack of agency: he never speaks and only acts on Justinian's orders. The account is structured around Justinian's response to the riots and contrasted with Khusrow's handling of Zames. Whereas Khusrow dealt swiftly and brutally with Zames' conspiracy, Justinian hides, bargains, then fights only after being goaded by his wife. When the revolt is put down, it is Belisarius who attacks the rioters while the emperor remains in the palace, a very different image from Khusrow's handling of the execution of Adergoundounbades while personally invading Lazica.
Looking ahead to the opening of Wars Book 2, the Justinian of the Nika Revolt is an inversion of the Justinian the Armenians construct in their speech. The image of Justinian the master strategist, whose successful foreign policies threaten all of Persia, reflects the failed domestic policies that lead to, and fail to resolve, the Nika Revolt. When the Armenian speech is read against Procopius's narrative, their superlative claims highlight Justinian's strategic failures abroad and his military ‘success’ against his ‘enemies’ at home. We find here traces of the Justinian from the Secret History, who is a greater threat to the Romans than their enemies.Footnote 60
Procopius places the fall of John the Cappadocian, Justinian's hated praetorian prefect, after the Nika Revolt. There was a contest between Theodora and John for control of the emperor, in which neither could gain the upper hand. Theodora was preserved by the emperor's affection and her marriage, while John was simply too useful for Justinian to dismiss. After a brief introduction to this conflict, Procopius opens his account: ‘Belisarius, when he had subjugated Italy, came to Byzantium together with his wife Antonina, having been summoned by the emperor in order to wage war on the Persians.’Footnote 61 This comment places the episode in the winter of 540/1, after the collapse of the peace, and builds upon the post-peace narrative already introduced by Khusrow's invasion of Lazica. What is not mentioned, but colours the episode, is the campaign that prompted Belisarius' return: the Persian invasion culminating in the sack of Antioch. The mention of Italy is also noteworthy as it reminds the reader of events prior to 540 that Procopius will not address in Wars Book 2. The reference also links this episode with the opening line of Book 2, which specifically mentions the subjugation of Italy. Finally, the claim that Belisarius had subdued Italy would have been inaccurate in 551, when the first edition of the Wars was published, given that Totila had effectively reclaimed Italy. Procopius therefore places John's fall against a context of Roman vulnerability, military disaster, failed foreign policy and the collapse of the Eternal Peace, all of which reappear at the beginning of Book 2.
John's fall may be summarized. Antonina, in collusion with Theodora, convinced John to help in overthrowing Justinian. The pledge was witnessed by two of Justinian's officials and John, fearing for his life, fled to a church and took holy orders before being banished to Cyzicus, then Egypt (Wars 1.25.11–44). It is Procopius' account of John's misdeeds in Cyzicus and exile to Egypt that underlie Greatrex's assertion that this account was a late addition to the work, inserted after 546.Footnote 62 While Greatrex's dating is plausible, there are reasons not to view this episode as out of place. Even if Procopius was only able to add episodes to the Wars for contingent reasons, we must assume he had a plan for inserting them once it was safe to do so.
This episode extends the comparison between Khusrow and Justinian, and again the result is unfavourable for the Romans. While the metropolis of Syria has been sacked by the Persians and Roman arms are spread thin across the Mediterranean, Justinian is distracted by a rivalry between his wife and a senior official. It is no coincidence that the affair with Adergoundounbades occurs at roughly the same time, the winter and spring of 541, when Justinian is distracted by these troubles.
The rivalry between John and Theodora closely parallels another event that Procopius places in his account of Zames' rebellion: the rivalry between MebodesFootnote 63 and Zaberganes.Footnote 64 Procopius' account says only that Zaberganes falsely slandered Mebodes to Khusrow, who then had Mebodes executed (Wars 1.23.25–9). While Khusrow's court is kept orderly, albeit through brutality and injustice, Justinian's is in disarray just when the Romans can least afford distractions. The contrast is emphasized by Procopius' comment that the emperor would have forgiven John, had the prefect gone straight to see him (Wars 1.25.30). For all his brutality, Khusrow is at least decisive.
THE REBELLION AT DARA AND THE END OF BOOK 1
The final episode of Wars Book 1 recounts the rebellion of John Cottistis at the border fortress of Dara. Dara was founded and fortified by Anastasius in 505 to counterbalance the fortress of Nisibis and act as a command centre for the dux Mesopotamiae.Footnote 65 Dara plays an important role in Procopius' narrative, beginning with the risks Anastasius took to found the city in violation of a treaty with Persia (Wars 1.10.13–17).Footnote 66 Dara is subsequently a fixture in the conflict in Mesopotamia, and the removal of the command post (στρατιωτῶν τις ἀρχή) from the city was one of the terms of the Eternal Peace (Wars 1.22.16).
As with the fall of John the Cappadocian, Procopius places John's rebellion in a specific context, this time framing it with Khusrow's demand for a share of the spoils from the conquest of Africa (Wars 1.26.1–4). We can place this request between the defeat of the Vandals in 533, most likely after Belisarius' triumph in 534, and the invasion of Sicily in 535, though we know from other sources that John's rebellion occurred in 537.Footnote 67 In any case, the episode occurred prior to the dismissal of John the Cappadocian.
Procopius provides only a brief description of John: ‘there was a certain John stationed there [at Dara] in the roster of the infantry’.Footnote 68 Procopius usually distinguishes between the Johns of his period with epithets commenting on their characteristics, family or high offices. Not only does John Cottistis not receive an epithet (the surname Cottistis comes from another sourceFootnote 69), but his identity is also obscured by the one detail Procopius does provide: that he was a simple infantryman. We cannot know how many Johns were serving in the infantry at Dara in 537, but the number was certainly not small.
John's anonymity and low station are in stark contrast with the status and importance of Dara, making the success of his rebellion all the more striking. The context Procopius provides, of a restive Khusrow begrudging Justinian his successes in the west, brings the prospect of Persian aggression into his account (and it is this resentment the Armenian embassy plays upon). The reference to the Persians also raises the issue of the Eternal Peace, which enabled John's uprising by removing the local dux and his staff from the city. The rebellion of John, then, is an inversion of the claims made by the Armenians in Book 2. Here, Khusrow's diplomacy has injured the Roman position by so weakening the garrison of a critical fortress as to allow a member of the rank and file to remove it from imperial control, if only temporarily.
John's tyranny was short-lived. Procopius offers two accounts of his capture. In the first, a priest and local notable organize an attack on the palace, seize John, throw him in jail and execute him. The second account differs in the manner of his capture:
Yet some people say that it was not the soldiers who first performed this deed [attacking John], but while they were delaying in the courtyard afraid of the danger, some sausage vendor who was with them burst in with his cleaver and, encountering John, struck him unexpectedly.Footnote 70
Procopius does not vouch for the truthfulness of this account, opting to present it as a rumour. There is good reason for this: a sausage seller defeating a would-be tyrant in order to save a city and, by extension, an empire is the plot to Aristophanes' Knights.Footnote 71
By making a sausage seller the saviour of Dara, Procopius draws a parallel between the city and empire of the Athenians and that of the Romans. In the Knights, the city of Athens is represented by the character Demos, who is saved by a sausage vendor from the clutches of the hawkish Cleon (represented by the Paphlagonian), restored to good sense and presented with a pair of slave girls representing peace treaties.Footnote 72 The irony of the Knights is that the Athenians did eventually settle a peace with the Spartans, only to use the opportunity to launch an expedition against Sicily that was, in Thucydides' narrative (Thuc. 8.2), the beginning of the end of their empire.Footnote 73 Procopius likewise places his account of John's rebellion (incorrectly) at the precise moment the Roman Empire is preparing to invade Sicily in a time of peace with a major enemy closer to home.
Charles Pazdernik has shown, in his discussion of the parallels between Brasidas' Thracian and Belisarius' Gothic campaigns, that ancient readers did (and modern readers should) view parallels of circumstance as evidence of intertextuality.Footnote 74 Procopius' mention of the sausage vendor evokes the image of an empire ignoring a mortal and immediate, though temporarily pacified, enemy for the sake of an unnecessary and risky foreign venture, only to be critically weakened when the original conflict is renewed. This intertext foreshadows the renewal of war with Persia as well as the difficulties of Justinian's Gothic campaigns. Such a reading accounts for the curious intrusion of Aristophanes into the Wars, and explains Procopius' misrepresentation of the timing of John's rebellion. By placing the event before the invasion of Sicily, Procopius allows the Aristophanic and Thucydidean intertexts to operate more clearly. Moreover, this placement sets the stage for the opening lines of Book 2, in which Belisarius' success in Italy is identified as the impetus for Khusrow's invasion:Footnote 75
And a little later, when Khusrow had learned that Belisarius had begun to win over even Italy for the emperor Justinian, he was no longer able to restrain his mind, and wished to contrive pretexts in order that he might dissolve the peace by means of some plausible argument.Footnote 76
Procopius uses his framing of John's rebellion to reintroduce a strict chronology at the beginning of Book 2. The rebellion, along with its foreshadowing, is placed prior to the invasion of Sicily and Italy, and it is those invasions that set the stage for Khusrow's search for pretexts.
According to my reading, the episodes that close Wars Book 1 are not at all out of place. In them, Procopius repeatedly refers to the end of the peace while underscoring the weakness of Roman arms, the distracted and fractious character of the court, and the emperor's lack of resolve. The episode at Dara picks up these themes, provides a cognitive model for the missing account of events in Italy and the seemingly ‘empty’ eight years of peace, and returns the narrative to a strict chronology. The opening lines of Book 2 are not meant to invoke surprise in the reader, but dread. Because of Justinian's incompetence and greed, Rome is not prepared for the inevitable breakdown of the Eternal Peace.
WHO BROKE THE ETERNAL PEACE?
Wars Book 2 begins with the build-up to Khusrow's invasion which includes the speech of the Armenian embassy. Kaldellis has shown that these sections deserve close scrutiny as Procopius subtly introduces criticism of Justinian into his account, in this case implying that he was guilty of suborning al-Mundhir.Footnote 77 This affair is not the only charge Procopius levels against Justinian in this way; he also accuses the emperor of plotting to break the peace following the conclusion of the campaigns in the west. Procopius allows for this charge, and Justinian's role in breaking the peace, even when he explicitly condemns Khusrow as being ‘most responsible’ for the end of the peace (Wars 2.9.10–11). The comparison implied by the superlative requires that Khusrow not be solely responsible.
The Armenian speech is preceded by an embassy from the Goths, who lay out Justinian's strategy. According to the Goths, Justinian made peace with Persia only to secure his flank while settling matters in the west. Once those conquests are complete, he will turn his armies against Persia.Footnote 78 Procopius's brief defence of Justinian, which follows the speech, only reinforces the Gothic argument.Footnote 79 The Armenians advance a similar claim but take it a step further, arguing that Justinian will never be satisfied, even if he conquers the entire world (Wars 2.3.42–3). The consistency of the argument is noteworthy and emphasized by the parallel between the Armenian depiction of Justinian and traditional depictions of Alexander, whom Procopius invokes as a model following the Gothic address.Footnote 80 Procopius also offers an apparent defence in the Armenians' speech, saying that ‘the Romans suspected nothing, and did not think that the Persians would ever break the peace that was called Eternal’.Footnote 81 What is important is what Procopius does not say. He does not tell us that the Romans had no plans to attack Persia or that Persian concern was unwarranted, only that the Romans did not expect the Persians to be the ones to break the peace, even though the Persians were known to be levelling these accusations (Wars 2.3.57). Procopius allows room for the claim that Justinian intends to attack Persia and this serves as tacit confirmation.
Given the implications of Procopius' silence, the rationale for action that the Armenians offer to Khusrow becomes more interesting:
For they break a peace, not whoever are the first to arms, but those who conspire against their neighbours in a time of peace. The charge is levelled at the man who has undertaken the matter, even when success is lacking.Footnote 82
The Armenians are referring to the affair with al-Mundhir, but the argument naturally extends to Justinian's long-term plans for Persia, which are at the heart of their address. Although the policies the Armenians cite are failures, they demonstrate a pattern of anti-Persian manoeuvrings. Justinian is clearly guilty of plotting against the Persians, but this model of blame is also problematic for Khusrow because we are told that Khusrow set out to find a pretext for dissolving the peace. By the Armenians' standards, both parties are in violation of the peace for acting in bad faith. However, we have no indication that Khusrow planned to attack Rome before Justinian began his campaigns in the west, while both the Armenian and Gothic ambassadors indicate that Justinian's plan in settling the peace was to attack Persia once the west was reconquered. On this criterion, Justinian is guiltier than Khusrow.
Intention is not the only basis for assessing guilt, however, as Procopius makes clear when he places the following sentiment in a letter written by Justinian: ‘actions, not intentions, reveal the charges against those who are unjust to their neighbours’.Footnote 83 It is not coincidence that Justinian here directly contradicts the Armenian model; Procopius has already informed the reader that the Romans were familiar with the arguments being made at the Persian court. What is important is what is again not denied, that Justinian always intended to attack Persia when the time was right.
Procopius himself prevents us from taking this argument too far by making it clear that he considers Khusrow most responsible for the end of the peace. This is fair. Khusrow was the first to take an army across the border. However, Justinian is not innocent, especially because it was his scheming in the west that first roused Khusrow to action. It was the same western focus that left the eastern frontier susceptible to Persian aggression, a fact that Procopius emphasizes in two ways. First, he reports that the ambassador Justinian chose to deliver the letter was that Anastasius ‘who had put down the tyranny that had just then occurred at Dara’.Footnote 84 Procopius is reminding the reader of the weakness of the Roman position on the frontier and recalling the general incompetence and weakness that characterize Justinian's actions at the end of Book 1. Second, Procopius makes no mention of any Roman preparations save the letter itself. Threatened with invasion, Justinian can mount no better defence than rhetoric.
The Armenian embassy occupies a crucial place in Procopius' narrative. It lays out for the reader the mirage of a fully realized Justinianic foreign policy, but one which cannot withstand comparison with Procopius' own narrative. The Armenians' misrepresentations create a critical summary of Roman foreign policy, a reminder of Roman vulnerability following the Eternal Peace, and offer evidence of Justinian's bad faith in dealings with the Persians. It contributes to Procopius' critiques of Justinian's character as well as his foreign and domestic policies, which culminate in the accusation that, while Khusrow may have broken the peace, Justinian's schemes both caused and failed to protect against the renewal of hostilities in 540.Footnote 85
