World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire are subjects that have long attracted the attention of scholars, analysts, and assorted writers. Yet despite the widespread belief that the war and its immediate aftermath left an enduring stamp on the history and politics of the Middle East, the English-language literature, scholarly and popular alike, remains woefully uninformed by Ottoman and other indigenous sources. As a consequence of its dependence on European sources, that literature has tended to reflect the perspectives of the imperial actors, particularly but not exclusively Britain and France. And to the extent that it has included indigenous viewpoints, these have generally belonged to nationalists of the various successor states in the Balkans and Middle East. Scholarship on the Ottoman role in the war is especially thin. There exists not a single biography of any of the World War I era Ottoman “triumvirs”—Talat, Enver, and Cemal—in any language other than Turkish. And even in Turkish the number of monographs on the Ottoman leadership is sorely limited.
Of the senior Ottoman leaders, the most obscure is Ahmed Cemal. In 1906 Cemal, then a major in the army and critic of the regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II, joined the underground opposition. Soon thereafter he became a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Following the 1908 Constitutional Revolution engineered by the CUP, Cemal began a rapid ascent. Within six years he became naval minister, and upon the outbreak of WWI he assumed command of the Ottoman Fourth Army in Damascus and the post of military governor of Syria. He effectively ruled greater Syria until December 1917. It is Cemal's tenure in Syria that forms the subject of Talha Çiçek's new study.
The book makes extensive use of Ottoman sources, including Cemal's copious correspondence, as well as documentation from American, Austrian, British, French, and German archives. Such a rich source base alone would make it a worthy addition to the literature on the late Ottoman Empire and World War I. The book consists of eight meticulously footnoted chapters with an introduction and conclusion and is organized thematically rather than chronologically. Thus, rather than present a narrative that describes the course of Cemal's rule and the evolution of his administration over time, it examines in serial fashion Cemal's relations with and policies toward discrete entities and phenomena such as Arab activists, Christian churches and clergy, Armenian deportees, Zionists, Bedouin tribes, education, epidemic disease, and famine among others. This organization has the considerable virtue of making a wealth of detail accessible to readers focused on one or more of these aspects. But forsaking the proverbial forest for the trees does come at some cost in providing a broad and integrated overview of Cemal's rule and its impact.
This is not to say that the book lacks an overarching thesis. The thread that ties together the book's chapters is that Cemal was, above all, a state-builder whose overriding immediate objective was the establishment of uniform and centralized state administration throughout greater Syria. Cemal's ultimate goal, Çiçek argues throughout, was to raise within Syria a obedient, unified, and capable population that would actively and effectively support the Ottoman state in resisting the political, economic, and military advances of the Great Powers. Çiçek demonstrates that Cemal used a diverse array of tools, ranging from education to bodily coercion, in pursuit of his vision. He strove to accomplish two things in particular during the war. The first was to eliminate or at least subdue all social entities and groups that lay between the state and the individual subject. The second was to eliminate the influence of the Great Powers inside Syria.
Çiçek's thesis is straightforward but hardly banal. With it Çiçek overturns some of the most widespread misrepresentations of Cemal. For example, in Middle Eastern historiography Cemal is infamous for his suppression of Arab nationalism through public executions and exile of leading Arab figures who made claims on behalf of the Arabs as a people. Çiçek contends that Cemal's hostility toward these Arabists stemmed not from Turkist chauvinism but instead from a determination to expand the Ottoman state's control over society. The Arabists, with their aspirations to serve as intermediaries between the Ottoman state and its Arab population, loomed as obstacles blocking that vision, and therefore Cemal suppressed them, along with other groups such as the Christian clergy and Zionists.
In an aside that points to a striking obtuseness on the part of the ruling Unionists, Çiçek reveals that Cemal and his colleagues did not understand the Arabists to be representatives of an emerging political constituency with sociological roots. Rather, operating within a more traditional imperial conceptual framework, they dismissed the Arabists as mere “self-seekers” out only to advance their own careers by extracting concessions at the expense of the state.
More often than not, however, Cemal was shrewd. Facing potential British invasion from two fronts and possessing limited resources, Cemal dreaded rebellion among the Druze and Bedouin. Accordingly, toward these groups he followed the more conventional imperial policy of indirect rule and permitted them considerable autonomy. When it suited his goal of boosting the authority of the Ottoman state, Cemal sponsored projects that could reinforce Arab identity. Thus he ordered the restoration of monuments from the early Islamic as well as Ottoman periods. Similarly, he established an “Oriental” library in Damascus to house the main works of Arabic and Muslim literature in all their branches. Cemal's aspiration was to preserve local manuscripts from being taken to Europe and to make it possible for “Eastern” scholars to study and research without traveling to Europe. Countering European influence—though not rejecting it—was always on Cemal's agenda. Indeed, the determination to show Syria's inhabitants that Ottoman rule could transform Syria the way that British rule was changing Egypt helped spur Cemal's initiatives in areas as varied as urban planning and education.
Çiçek suggests that Cemal was not inhuman, his well-deserved reputation for severity notwithstanding. On the question of his policies towards Armenians, depictions of Cemal have varied radically, with some hailing him for saving Armenian lives and others fingering him as one of the masterminds in the wholesale destruction of Anatolia's Armenians. Çiçek maintains that Cemal, while absolutely opposed to the concentration of Armenians in any territory where they might constitute a majority and unwilling to break with Istanbul over its Armenian policies, nonetheless urged Istanbul to halt the deportation of Armenians from Anatolia to Syria, worked to block the spread of disease among the deportees, and encouraged the nominal conversion of Armenian children to Islam as a temporary expedient to ensure their survival, confessing, “I cannot bear to see them [the children] die in the streets . . . After the war they will go back to their people” (p. 126).
Çiçek's notes that a special concern of Cemal's was to change the role of women in Ottoman society. Acting from his belief that those societies that “keep their womankind in a state of slavery” (p. 11) are doomed to decay, Cemal used his authority to increase women's participation in public life. While acting as military governor of Istanbul in 1913, he took measures to curb catcalling at women in public, and then while in Syria he purposively invited Halide Edip to oversee educational activities and facilitated her opening of schools for girls in Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo. Such initiatives, Çiçek proposes persuasively, were of a piece with Cemal's overarching vision of modernization.
Another bit of lore that Çiçek debunks is the idea, found often in general histories of World War I, that Cemal was looking to break with Istanbul and cut a deal with the Entente to trade peace for recognition as the sovereign of his own state. Cemal's alleged eagerness to impress upon the Entente his suitability as an independent ruler is sometimes invoked to explain his relative mercy toward Armenians. Yet there is no evidence that Cemal ever entertained such an ambition. To the contrary, as Çiçek shows, Cemal consistently pursued policies in Syria that followed the same lines as those of Istanbul despite the extraordinary autonomy that he enjoyed. Çiçek's book combines lucid writing and clear argumentation with prodigious research to make an original and genuinely valuable contribution to the study of late Ottoman governance, empire and nationalism, and the history of World War I.
