The American constitutional order is suffering from “constitutional rot” (pp. 178–88). So argues John E. Finn in his provocative new book, Peopling the Constitution. The root of the problem is that “We the People” no longer play much of a role in the process of interpreting, applying, and perpetuating constitutional principles. We have abandoned these responsibilities to the courts, and the result has been a gradual hollowing out of our constitutional system. In short, the external forms and symbols of constitutional government remain in place, but Americans are no longer able to recognize when these forms and symbols are employed in the “service of ends or pursued through means that cannot be squared with the normative presuppositions of constitutionalism” (p. 188).
As this brief summary suggests, Peopling the Constitution belongs to a growing body of literature that seeks to revitalize the civic or popular strand of American constitutionalism. (Readers of Larry Kramer’s The People Themselves [2004], for example, will be familiar with at least some of Finn’s arguments.) Finn’s study stands out, however, for the claim that the American constitutional project has from the outset been susceptible to two distinct and ultimately “disharmonic” interpretations. Under the first (which Finn labels the Juridic Constitution) the constitutional text is viewed as a legal code, authority for interpreting the text is vested exclusively in the judiciary, and constitutional meaning remains largely inaccessible to those not “schooled in the mysteries of law and legal logic” (p. 3). Under the second (which Finn labels the Civic Constitution) questions “concerning the meaning and application of constitutional principles to public life are a shared public responsibility,” and citizens are “expected to shoulder a significant part of the responsibility for achieving and maintaining a constitutional way of life” (p. 1). Although Finn clearly prefers the Civic Constitution to the Juridic, he insists that both strands have their proper place in a healthy constitutional order. His aim is to “revitalize our understanding of the Civic Constitution…not at the expense of the Juridic, but alongside it” (p. 32).
The book’s three chapters roughly correspond to three stages in the life cycle of a constitutional order. The first chapter, entitled “Constituting,” examines how the balance struck between civic and juridic elements at the time of the founding can shape opportunities for civic engagement far into the future. Assuming we want future generations to play an active role in interpreting and cultivating constitutional principles, Finn asks, what sort of constitutional order should we construct? Any constitution deserving of the name, he argues, must endorse a set of core principles—such as self-governance, equality and human dignity—that “comprise the definition of constitutionalism proper” (pp. 33–4). In addition, the language of the text must be free of “legalisms and other terms of art that require professional expertise…to comprehend” (pp. 38–9). More controversially, Finn insists that a properly civic conception of constitutionalism must include within its definition of “the Constitution” important non-legal texts that serve to constitute the “civic identity” of a people (pp. 47–8). (In the American case, such texts would include, among others, the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, and Martin Luther King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”) Finally, a properly constructed constitutional system will promote popular engagement by “increas[ing] the number of arenas in which [constitutional] discussion occurs” (p. 57). In practice, this means that the framers should not concentrate interpretive authority in the judicial branch, but should instead “favor designs for the separation of powers that entrust all institutions with some measure of responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the Constitution” (p. 58). A “robust civic federalism” is also desirable, as power sharing across levels of government allows “more and different voices an opportunity to participate in constitutional conversation” (p. 61).
The book’s second chapter—on “constitutional maintenance”—argues that only an active and engaged citizenry can prevent the erosion of constitutional commitments over time (p. 91). The type of popular engagement Finn has in mind, however, looks nothing like the occasional and extraordinary “moments” of popular mobilization examined in Bruce Ackerman’s We The People trilogy (1993; 1998; 2014). Dismissing “episodic” popular engagement as insufficient to the task of constitutional maintenance, Finn demands from citizens a daily commitment to “civic work”—a commitment that entails both a particular way of deliberating and a particular way of living (pp. 97–8). In their interactions with others, good constitutional citizens must display “civility,” or a willingness to deliberate in a spirit of civic-mindedness and to reason in terms of broadly shared norms. Beyond this, they must also commit to an ethic of “tending,” or an “active, ongoing commitment” to the often mundane forms of civic engagement that help to ensure the preservation of a vibrant constitutional culture (pp. 26, 104–5). The critical question, of course, is how these traits are to be cultivated. In contrast to most liberal theorists, Finn insists that the state must play an active role in shaping citizen character (pp. 105–6). In practice, this means that public schools should adopt a more rigorous civic curriculum; that opportunities and incentives for direct political involvement at the state and local levels should be expanded; and that First Amendment freedoms should be interpreted broadly to encourage the “flourishing of a great variety” of private associations where civic skills may be learned (p. 119).
The book’s final substantive chapter covers the subject of “constitutional failure.” Finn’s most important observation is that constitutional failure need not take the form of open violence or disorder; it can also occur through a process that is “quiet, insidious, and subtle” (p. 189). In the American case, he points to the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as the moment when “constitutional rot” took hold. Our defense and intelligence agencies, he observes, are increasingly pursuing policies (indefinite detention, secret surveillance, targeted killings) that are incompatible with basic constitutional values. At the same time, our two most recent Presidents have claimed for themselves prerogative powers that violate our purported commitments to democratic accountability and the separation of powers—and not as temporary emergency measures but as “permanent features of the legal order” (p. 194). And, what is most troubling, Americans do not appear particularly bothered “by the security policies we have adopted or much interested in whether they comport with constitutional ideals” (p. 216). If Americans cannot be made to confront and take responsibility for correcting the “odious” policies our leaders have pursued, Finn warns, the Constitution will soon exist “only as text and as symbol; it [will no longer] govern in any meaningful sense” (p. 218).
If there is a weak spot in Finn’s analysis, it stems from his tendency to frame our current woes in highly abstract terms—a tendency that occasionally leads him to downplay the hard realities of institutional design and constitutional politics. One wonders, for example, whether at least some of the problems he identifies are not attributable to the deep structure of our institutions, as opposed to the ethical failings of the citizenry. As scholars including Robert Dahl (How Democratic is the American Constitution, 2001) and Sanford Levinson (Our Undemocratic Constitution, 2006) have pointed out, the Constitution is shot through with features—from the Electoral College, to the Senate, to the impossibly rigorous amendment process—that might lead even the most public-spirited of citizens to view civic engagement as an exercise in futility. What is more, Finn largely fails to acknowledge that incentives for civic participation and reasoned deliberation may be shaped by social and political developments that are more or less beyond our power to control, at the least in the short run. Surely the rise of ideological political parties and the resulting paralysis of the legislative branch bear at least as much responsibility for the recent expansion of executive authority as the “culture of fear” that, according to Finn, characterizes our post-9/11 public discourse (p. 206).
In the final analysis, however, Peopling the Constitution offers a compelling account of the patterns of thought and action that are necessary to sustain a vibrant constitutional culture. It is well argued, engagingly written, and never less than fair to competing theoretical perspectives. Even scholars who favor a robust judiciary, or who doubt the ability of average citizens to fulfill the demanding role Finn assigns them, will be forced to reckon with this book’s deeply troubling conclusions.
