As the editors put it in their introduction to The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science, the aim of its thirteen essays is to trace ‘the line of thought leading from Kant, through romanticism and Naturphilosophie, through Fries, to Helmholtz and academic neo-Kantianism, and finally to Poincaré’ (p. 4). The essays have largely succeeded in that aim, though that ostensibly continuous line becomes fainter towards the end of the century. Direct Kantian influence on scientists seems to have played itself out around the time of Helmholtz, while those who later drew problems from that source were overwhelmingly philosophers: Hermann Cohen, Alois Riehl, Moritz Schlick and Charles Sanders Peirce are the figures given notable attention here. To be sure, Poincaré's concern with the epistemological grounding of mathematics on intuition placed him within a broad ‘Kantian legacy’, though even here, as Janet Folina observes, Kant's concept of intuition, unlike Poincaré's, was ‘explicitly tied to sensibility’ (p. 277). What centrally characterized the century-long Kantian legacy was a preoccupation with epistemological questions – whether approached through philosophy, psychology or the experimental investigation of sense perception – and a conviction that addressing epistemological questions was proper to the scientific enterprise, just as the findings of science could be exploited for philosophical purposes.
Historians of science will probably draw most profit from the first five essays, dealing with Kant, Fries and several of the major exponents of Naturphilosophie and Romantic science. Of the rest, I found the two essays on Helmholtz hard to follow; an adequate estimation of, for instance, Timothy Lenoir's success in expounding Helmholtz's instrumental–experimental operationalization of Kantian epistemological problems will require substantial familiarity with a range of abstruse issues. The remaining six essays address predominantly philosophical issues, even as the examples of Hertz and Poincaré illustrate the inadvisability of trying to draw too firm a line between their science and what one might be tempted to call more properly philosophical issues. Whatever interests and backgrounds they bring to the volume, all readers will appreciate its well-made index and useful collective bibliography.
Alongside their sure command of difficult material, the principal strength of the essays by Frederick Beiser, Robert J. Richards and Michael Friedman is their success in laying out the coherence and seriousness of the attempts by post-Kantian German philosophers of nature to solve outstanding problems inherited from Kant: the status, regulative or constitutive, of the purposiveness of organisms (and indeed of a priori principles in general); how one might gain knowledge of the real world via some kind of other-than-Kantian intuitive connection; and how one might do justice to the phenomena made manifest by a rapidly expanding empirical science in terms of a usefully deployable set of philosophically grounded concepts. Lucidly rendered are the protagonists' ideas – no mean feat by itself – and their specific historical problem contexts with regard to both the Kantian legacy and subsequent scientific findings. Naturphilosophie emerges as an integral part of the European scientific and philosophical tradition, not as some monstrous misbirth, with the Naturphilosophen coming across here as well-informed, even brilliant, people struggling to make sense of, and to make knowable, a world that contains – and presumably produced – rational beings capable of knowing that world. (I use the German terms sensu lato here to include the contemporaneous and cognate Romantics and their natural philosophy.) Particularly insightful is Friedman's exposition of all three of his essay's announced subjects: ‘Kant–Naturphilosophie–[Oersted's] Electromagnetism’. But whereas Friedman's Oersted exploited Kant and (more particularly) Schelling in order to make sense of physical phenomena, the Fries of Frederick Gregory's and Helmut Pulte's essays appealed to the findings of natural science in order to solve philosophical problems, even as he aimed (in Pulte's words) ‘at establishing an autonomous philosophical metascience that develops in close contact with science’ (p. 118).
Among the important interpretative lessons that these essays exhibit, especially by focusing on their protagonists' search for specific solutions to specific problems, are the realizations that scientific concepts and theories are themselves always answers to outstanding problems, that differential commitment to the solution of different problems determines the relative acceptability of those concepts and theories, that scientists' increasing attention to the circumscribed solution of tractable problems effectively left unaddressed and unsolved profound cognitive problems, and that respect for alien-sounding ideas is a prerequisite for any deeper understanding of them. The richness and effectiveness with which these take-home lessons are exemplified may well be the book's chief value for specialists and non-specialists alike.
