In this monograph H. explores the complicated relationship between the Achaemenid Persian Empire and the Greek states after the onset of the Peloponnesian War. Utilising newer scholarship, H. attempts, and in my opinion succeeds, in establishing the goals and motivations, both ideological and material, for the Persian emperors’ and satraps’ actions regarding the Greeks.
In Chapter 1 H. establishes the foundations of his study. From a historiographic perspective H. calls into question the established belief that the Persians played the Athenians and Spartans off of one another with the end goal of weakening both states. He grounds his thesis in Persian imperial ideology. The Persians were driven to be the supreme power within the world, but were grounded by practical limitations. This allowed them a level of flexibility in their search for imperial supremacy – direct rule was not a necessary requirement, and restraint, rather than military action, was possible albeit difficult. H. is also interested in exploring the gaps between ideology and action, especially with regards to the satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, who were both involved in Greek affairs.
In Chapter 2 H. examines the likely reasons why Artaxerxes I did not re-engage the Greeks in military actions and why he instead settled for the Peace of Callias. In this chapter we see how H.'s historical reconstruction depends upon the interplay between ideology and fiscal/tactical realities. The loss of revenue from Ionian tribute was to no small degree presumably offset by increased Athenian trade with Persian sites. Furthermore, the cost of naval warfare was prohibitive. The Persian navy, as understood by H., consisted of decades-old boats that would have been liabilities at sea. Creating a new navy and manning it at this point in time would have been a tremendous drain on the empire. Peace had distinct advantages in this situation.
H. looks at the changing relationship between Persia, particularly under Darius II, and the Greeks in Chapters 3–4. On the interpersonal level, H. explores Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus as competing satraps looking to win the favour of their king. This is especially noticeable in their separate negotiations with the Spartans. H. covers the initial stage of Persian aid to the Spartan war effort and the tensions that quickly develop due to Spartan delays. The focus is on Tissaphernes as the satrap is faced with the increasingly expensive responsibility of funding the Spartan navy as well as the re-emergence of Athens. This is an incredibly important factor when analysing the motivations behind Tissaphernes’ actions – self-funding the Spartan naval forces could provide him with considerable status, but Spartan delays (intentional or otherwise) severely strained his personal treasury. H. concludes Chapter 4 with a convincing explanation of Persian goals in the Treaty of 411 BC. The treaty is to be seen as consistent with Persian policy.
In Chapter 5 H. addresses the continued problems that the Persians faced in Ionia as the war continued to drag on. The series of expulsions of Persian garrisons by Ionian states, beginning with Miletus, and Tissaphernes’ responses are discussed. H. then examines issues with Thucydides’ interpretation of the withdrawal of Darius II's fleet. Rather than understanding this action as a Persian attempt to balance Greek powers, H. attributes Darius’ actions to pragmatic logistic and economic motives. The chapter concludes with a new focus on Pharnabazus’ increased role in western Anatolia.
Chapter 6 covers the end of the Peloponnesian War, with a focus on the renewed relations between Persia and Sparta when Cyrus the Younger was given charge of Sardis. H. concludes that Spartan victory was heavily dependent upon Cyrus’ actions, both his funding and his enthusiasm. H. also believes that the victory fits with Persian ideology, ‘displaying the empire's strength and commitment to its clients’ success’ (p. 120).
Chapter 7 begins with Cyrus’ attempt to usurp the throne from his brother Artaxerxes II and the drastic effect it had on Persian influence over Ionia. According to H., Artaxerxes’ victory over his brother ‘severed connections between the empire, the Ionians, and Sparta’, which could only be re-established by war (p. 127). This is followed by Agesilaus’ campaigns through Ionia and the eventual removal of Tissaphernes. The chapter concludes with Persian naval victory, under the command of the Athenian Conon, at the Battle of Cnidus.
In Chapter 8 H. reaches the final stage of his narrative. He begins with Pharnabazus’ aggressive movements in Greece, including funnelling financial aid to the faltering anti-Spartan forces at Corinth and helping Athens in the rebuilding of its long walls. H. does a terrific job in this chapter as he explores the reasons behind the collapsed peace talks with Sparta. According to H., much of the blame is to be placed on Tiribazus, whose operation seems to indicate independent action on the part of this Persian agent rather than the direct will of Artaxerxes II. This set up a series of events that created further problems for Persian control over Ionia. Even the military successes of Strouthas against Sparta were not enough to repair Persian relations with Athens. The King's Peace of 388 fitted with Persian ideology of benign imperialism, allowing Greek autonomy outside of the borders of the empire, but, as H. states, it was an imperfect triumph over the Greeks.
H.'s entire thesis is founded upon the belief that Thucydides’ interpretation of Persian motives during and after the Peloponnesian War is incorrect. What makes this so challenging is that works like History of the Peloponnesian War and Xenophon's Hellenica are the only material we have concerning Persia's role in Greek affairs during this period and that they are often viewed as definitive (or at least nearly so) by scholars. Thucydides and Xenophon lived during the events, and, furthermore, they are strong, authoritative authors who present powerful historical narratives. An example of this is the narrative whereby the Persians were playing the Athenian and Spartans against each other by funnelling funds to both sides. This has its roots in Thucydides’ history. He believed that Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap of Sardis, had tried to negotiate with both Athens and Sparta in order to prolong the conflict between these two states. Athens and Sparta would destroy each other with Persian monetary support, and the Persians would then sweep in to claim Greece as their own. Another example worth noting is H.'s analysis of Diodorus’ interpretation of Artaxerxes I's peace. While Diodorus understood this as a sign of Persian weakness, H. sees it as fitting ‘the symbolic language of Achaemenid royal strength’ (p. 32). By shining a light on traditional Greek misunderstandings of Persian motives, H. is able to situate Persian actions within a specifically Persian context.
Throughout the work H. employs the use of quantitative data in tables to bolster his argument. Whenever possible numerical figures are directly derived from ancient (Greek) sources. H. is well aware of the potential dangers in relying on such numbers, but he is forced to make judgement calls as to what seems reasonable versus (gross) exaggeration. The data can be quite convincing. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (p. 21) examine tribute that the Athenians pulled in from Anatolia. H. productively uses this data to examine the true economic cost of the Persian's loss of Ionia. In most other situations, however, H. is forced to derive numbers not explicitly given in the text. For example, in table 5.2 (p. 93), there is a list of ten instances where Pharnabazus provided subsidies to the Peloponnesian fleet. The only actual sum in talents known is for January 411 (Thuc. 8.8, 39.1). H. estimates the sums for the remaining nine instances. The numbers he provides seem reasonable, and there is little doubt that H. put a considerable amount of work in developing them, but ultimately they are only postulates. H. relies, sometimes heavily, on these reconstructed numbers, and while they may seem highly plausible, they are still constructed by the historian. There is always the possibility that these derived numbers may potentially masquerade incorrect data as solid evidence.
H. is to be commended for this work. It is well written, and the argument is highly engaging. H. is not the first to explore Persian motivations during and after the Peloponnesian War, but to my mind his is the most mature and fully realised work to do so. This work will be of value to historians and graduate students studying this period.
