For the majority of Iranians who went through the Islamic Revolution of 1979 with high hopes, the “Spring of Freedom” (Bahar-i Azadi) never really bloomed except perhaps on the specially minted gold coins issued in March 1979 by the Provisional Government of Mahdi Bazargan. Revolutionary optimism quickly died out and gave way to a long winter of discontent. For the peoples of the Arab world who are presently witnessing an “Arab Spring,” the turn of events may be different. Though the current movement has yet to fully unfold, potentially taking months or even years, and though it is unrealistic to generalize about all Arab countries as if they were one monolithic unit, there are features that set today's movements apart from the 1979 Iranian Revolution as much as there are striking parallels.
To begin with, the prospect that a charismatic figure like Ayatollah Khomeini will emerge is very remote, even in Bahrain with its large Shiʿi population. Irrespective of the outcome of the Arab uprisings down the road, so far none have produced an oppositional group with a monopolizing agenda similar to the radical Iranian clergy—not even Egypt's al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. Nor is there a guardian jurist in the offing to assume absolute authority only six months after the fall of the shah (whose own absolute rule was the root cause of the revolution). Furthermore, despite the great courage and resolve displayed in today's demonstrations, there is no messianic martyr cult in the Arab protest movements to generate a euphoric momentum or to allow any Islamic group to reap the benefits.
To the extent evident to an outsider, despite its distinct antidictatorial aspirations, the Arab Spring cannot be defined as ideological in the old sense of the word. If anything, it is a postideological phenomenon in marked contrast to the movements of the 1960s and 1970s of which the Islamic Revolution was the (un)natural product. In today's Arab countries there are virtually no hardcore Marxist–Leninist groups like Iran's Tudeh Party after 1979, no assortment of urban guerilla organizations like the Fadaʾiyan-i Khalq, no indoctrinated Islamic Marxists like Mojahidin-i Khalq, and apparently not many armchair Trotskyites. All of these were highly influential forces in bringing the Iranian Revolution to the edge of a radical abyss, not only by indoctrinating youth and advocating violence but also by facilitating the rise of Khomeini and his loyalists. In today's Arab Spring it is not just the left that seems to have lost its power of persuasion; the postcolonial models like the revolutions in Egypt in 1952 and Iraq in 1958 seem to have also lost their allure.
In these first truly popular revolutions of the Arab world the liberal side of the political spectrum, in Egypt at least, shows promising signs of a democratic commitment largely missing in 1979 Iran: a youth movement committed to a civil society, sober nationalists (even Nasirites, though without an al-Nasir), the middle classes promoting religious tolerance, and even amorphous crowds like Egypt's football fans turning into political activists. No one—not even the radical Islamists—seems to have a readymade blueprint for creating a utopia in the same fashion that Khomeini and his followers quickly adopted violence and anti-Westernism in their rush to reconstruct the pristine Islam. A hostage crisis, cries of “Death to America,” vengeful revolutionary courts, unruly revolutionary committees and summary executions, confiscations, and intimidations are not likely to be the hallmarks of the current protest movements. Nor are prolonged international isolation, imposed Islamic morality symbolized by the mandatory use of the hijab, widespread purges at universities, and intolerance toward ethnic and religious minorities likely to poison the environment, at least not yet. Moreover, the violent ingredients of the revolutions of the recent past in countries as diverse as Russia, China, and Iran appear to be less pronounced in today's protest movements despite the intransigence of the likes of Assad and Saleh. If anything, the antidictatorial trends of today's Arab world have far more in common with Iran's Green Movement of June 2009 (against the fraudulent election that reinstated Ahmadinejad in office) than they do with the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Like Iran's Green Movement, the Arab Spring demands political freedom, an end to the monopoly of power, and an end to corruption and plutocracy. Yet today's revolutionaries also aspire to social justice, an end to their isolation from the global community, and cultural liberation from the ideological shackles superimposed for decades on the societies of the Middle East. These are the demands of a new urban middle class now living in megacities across the region. They are demographically young, socially frustrated, mostly unemployed or underemployed, and they generally share a sense of economic deprivation. Though in social composition they are comparable to the Iranian crowds of the 1970s, they seem less likely to be enthused by the extremist messages that easily beguiled a generation of Iranians.
Even with a healthy dose of skepticism, the outcome of these movements may be dramatically different for another crucial reason. In today's Arab world the fate of the military does not seem to be entirely wedded to the fortunes of the deposed dictators such as Bin ʿAli, Mubarak, and even al-Qadhafi (although in Yemen and Syria the fate of the army is yet to be determined at the time of this writing). This is clearly different from the position in which the Iranian military elite found itself, being totally dependent on the shah and closely associated with the Pahlavi regime. Whereas the Iranian armed forces in less than a year after the start of the protests were dismantled in the face of demonstrations and strikes, the Arab armies by and large are holding up against revolutionary pressures. In Egypt, at least, for a period of time the army even appeared to be the protector of the nation against the brutality of the riot police and attacks by the pro-Mubarak thugs.
The survival of the army as an instrument of stability and control, however, may prove to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it could emerge as the facilitator of a relatively orderly and staged progress toward an open society. On the other hand, it could bring the democratic process to a halt by trying to safeguard its own vested interests and eventually to foster a new autocratic regime subservient to its whims and wishes. The answer to this key question may well hinge not only on regional and international factors but also on the senior officers’ recognition that the era of military dictatorship with a nationalist (or fundamentalist) facade is coming to an end. What is certain is that the Iranian military of 1979, abruptly finding itself at such a critical juncture, was neither capable of nor probably in a position to choose either of these options.
Yet in the Arab Middle East of 2011, if the ideologies of the left are largely absent, the Islamic alternative is very much present. There is an undeniable fascination with political Islam as an alternative to the corrupt and oppressive ways of past leadership. Like Iran of 1979, such a tendency cuts across class barriers, enticing not only the urban poor and the lower middle classes but also the more educated middle classes (perhaps with the exception of the Syrian—more specifically Damascene—affluent strata) to rally behind the alluring notion of one for all and all for one Islam. Within this only remaining facet of ideology still appealing to the people, there are diverse trends ranging from Egypt's conservative al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, to extremist Salafis, to simple mosque-goers with sincere aspirations for installing a morally viable regime in office. And despite a sea of enmity between Shiʿi Iran and Salafi Sunnism, the Islamists in the Arab world, much like their Iranian counterparts, are going to thrive in an environment of conflict and turmoil and in the face of repeated clampdowns on protesting crowds. As the most organized and the most committed, they appeal to the ordinary folks, just like the Iranian masses opted for the Islamic alternative in the absence of any other viable political choice.
To this end we may also include a visible resentment toward Israel and its hegemony over the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Such sentiments are bound to be heightened in a revolutionary environment. In contrast to the inaction of the Arab regimes, the outpouring of sympathy toward the Palestinians, and toward the Iraqis after the disastrous U.S. invasion, undoubtedly will generate more widespread solidarity across the Muslim world from Morocco to Pakistan. This turn of events may give the political discourse of Islamism a new boost and hence allow greater anti-Western sentiments, in parallel with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Even if the Arab Spring opts for a different Islamic interpretation not unlike the Turkish model—devoid of political extremism but loyal to its indigenous identity—the question of Palestine is bound to generate greater hostility toward Israel and the United States in tune with Iran's Islamic Republic.
Irrespective of what political order may immediately prevail, however, over a wider historical span the Arab Spring, like the Iranian Revolution three decades earlier, is likely to unleash new dynamics and bring to the surface powerful social forces—especially among the younger generation—that will change the face of the Middle East forever.
