About the time I received the review copy of Feminist Interpretations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a former student, now in graduate school, emailed me asking for readings from a feminist perspective she could use as secondary sources for a course she was taking on Merleau-Ponty. A year ago, I would not have had a ready answer for her. As it was, however, I immediately recommended this volume, providing instant proof of how necessary a book this is. Happily, it is also a very good book.
Merleau-Ponty has made important contributions to feminist thought through his extensive work on the phenomenology of the lived body and his unfinished book, The Visible and the Invisible (edited by C. Lefort, translated by A. Lingis [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968]). He has also been the subject of important feminist critiques by Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, and Judith Butler, among others. Both sides of this debate among feminists about his work are amply explained, commented upon, and further developed in this book. However, two other areas of possible feminist interest in Merleau-Ponty—his engagement with existentialism and his political philosophy—are less well represented. Many of the contributions also show their origins as conference presentations and could have benefited from a fuller and more complex development of the ideas than is possible in the standard twenty-minute allotment. Others, especially those on literary topics, although fascinating, could have been more explicitly traced back to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas. Thus, while invaluable as an introduction to this rich literature, and quite useful on some topics, the volume does not succeed in being the perfect all-purpose reference work it might have been.
Dorothea Olkowski’s Introduction provides both some necessary background on Merleau-Ponty’s work and an intelligent guide to the contents of the volume. There follow two articles on the problem of gender difference in Merleau-Ponty by Sonia Kruks and Olkowski. In “Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of Difference in Feminism,” Kruks draws on the account of the lived body in Phenomenology of Perception (translated by C. Smith [New York: Routledge, 1962]) and Merleau-Ponty’s political philosophy to develop the possibility of an account of “the specificities of feminine embodiment” (p. 43) as a ground for feminist solidarity, while wisely noting that this move is not without risks. Olkowski turns to Merleau-Ponty’s work on child development (another topic otherwise missing from the volume) in “Only Nature is Mother to the Child.” She argues that Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the post-natal child/father dyad in these texts reflects a profound, and distorting, male bias in his work.
Beata Stawarska’s essay, “From the Body Proper to Flesh: Merleau-Ponty on Intersubjectivity,” is similarly in a critical vein. She follows Beauvoir in criticizing Merleau-Ponty’s “tendency to reduce the other to the same” (p. 92) and argues that this move persists even in The Visible and the Invisible, a text often cited elsewhere in the volume as vital to feminist readings of Merleau-Ponty’s thought. On the other hand, in “Female Freedom: Can the Lived Body be Emancipated?,” perhaps the strongest article in the volume, Johanna Oksala argues that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body marks it not as an irreducible given, but rather as historically constituted. While she recognizes that Merleau-Ponty does not problematize bodily “normality,” she looks back to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl to find the basis in Merleau-Ponty of an account that creates the possibility of understanding the female body as a site of both generativity and resistance.
Gail Weiss’s “Urban Flesh” is a more indirect application of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas. She takes Irigaray’s critique as a starting point, but quickly moves to consider two dimensions of the “flesh” of urban life—the fall of the Twin Towers and homelessness—that mark both the responsibilities of dwelling and how the city itself can become the tragic space of home. Three other chapters similarly extend Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the realm of politics and the arts. Helen Fielding’s “White Logic and the Constancy of Color” draws on works in a variety of media to contemplate the literality of colour, and Merleau-Ponty’s account of colour perception in light of the significance of skin colour in our society. In “Bodies Inside/Out: Violation and Resistance from the Prison Cell to The Bluest Eye,” Laura Doyle reinterprets the violation of the body in prison narratives and in Toni Morrison’s novel in terms of the transposition of interior and exterior space, and the manipulation of the horizon of perception to undermine the sense of self for which Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology offers a theoretical account.
Jorella Andrews’s “Vision, Violence, and the Other: A Merleau-Pontean Ethics” is a more direct discussion of the interrelation between the arts and ethics in Merleau-Ponty. She looks at his discourse on violence, especially the violence of visual perception, and articulates it with Beauvoir’s L’Invitée to explore the possibility of an ethics based on the inherent limitations of our embodied intersubjectivity. David Brubaker’s “Care for the Flesh: Gilligan, Merleau-Ponty, and Corporeal Styles” puts Merleau-Ponty in dialogue with Carol Gilligan’s work on the “care” orientation in ethics. He recasts her view in terms of moral-perceptual Gestalts, as discussed in The Visible and the Invisible, but concludes that the question of whether Merleau-Ponty’s late work can ground an ethic of sexual difference remains an open one.
Finally, three of the chapters specifically address Irigaray’s critique of Merleau-Ponty in An Ethics of Sexual Difference (translated by C. Burke and G. C. Gill [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993]). In “Sexual Difference as a Question of Ethics: Alterities of the Flesh in Irigaray and Merleau-Ponty,” Judith Butler notes the extent to which Irigaray’s text, while highly critical of Merleau-Ponty, remains dependent on his, and also questions the priority Irigaray assigns to sexual difference over other forms of difference. Vicki Kirby’s “Culpability and the Double Cross: Irigaray with Merleau-Ponty” makes a similar, if stronger, defence of Merleau-Ponty by emphasizing the differences between how he and Irigaray understand language, and, hence, discourse, across sexual difference. Ann V. Murphy’s brief chapter, “Language and the Flesh: The Politics of Discourse in Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Irigaray” puts Merleau-Ponty in dialogue with both these other thinkers to engage again with the question of whether his phenomenology ultimately reduces the Other to the Same. While she suggests that the arguments of the two interlocutors understate the importance of embodiment in making this claim, the ultimate validity of their arguments remains undecided.
As can be seen from these brief summaries, this volume offers more defences of the value of Merleau-Ponty’s work for feminist thought than arguments to the contrary. Even the more critical articles tend to be sympathetic (including Butler’s, despite her earlier stronger critique), and often ultimately leave the question as an open one. This is probably inevitable—those strongly critical of a thinker are unlikely to take the time to contribute to a volume such as this. Nor is this subtle bias necessarily a flaw. I merely comment on it as a warning to those more interested in the negative side of the implicit argument made here.
As I said at the outset, this is a both a necessary book and a very good one. Certainly good enough that it could have been a required, or at least recommended, text for the course my former student was taking, or for any course on Merleau-Ponty. That this volume is not the perfect feminist resource on Merleau-Ponty is not a negative judgement, given that it is currently the best to be found.
