A crucifix may ward away vampires, but should we believe that the Bill of Rights has the same effect on despotism? Americans are indeed a superstitious people in this respect, certain that what James Madison called “parchment barriers” can actually limit something so boundless as political power. Yet political power is surprisingly responsive to the Bill of Rights, at least when it is interpreted by the US Supreme Court. One ruling, and Congress, presidents, state governments, and almighty democracy itself come to a halt. But while this seems to work in practice, is it a realistic way to protect freedom?
Patrick M. Garry, Professor of Law at the University of South Dakota, has written a book that compels us to reconsider this “rights-alone” approach to liberty. He reminds us that the Constitution's protection of liberty does not rest on the Bill of Rights but on the mechanisms designed to make government limit itself. The modern emphasis on the Bill of Rights is in fact a radical departure from the Founders' intent, a danger to American democracy, and an unworkable system fraught with trouble for the courts.
The Founders took rights seriously, to be sure. But when it came to framing a government, they found these rights “so vague and general” that they could not be incorporated in the original Constitution (12). Everyone knew that the meaning of rights could change over time, and it was impossible to list them all. The goal was not to boldly state the rights of citizens, but to establish a strong central government consisting of institutions with the legal and political authority to limit each other, “thereby indirectly protecting individual freedom” (2). The Founders knew that if government power was the greatest threat to personal freedom, the only way to check it was by establishing opposing powers, so no single branch could come to dominate the whole system. Hence, the superior value of Articles I–VI, which were all about “striving to limit the power and reach of government, which in turn would serve the cause of liberty”—a much better protection than anything a judicial reading of the Bill of Rights could offer (4).
So why have a Bill of Rights? Garry argues that it was there to do what the rest of the Constitution did: limit government by vesting a checking power in the people themselves. That was the central question in the Ratification Debate—not “Should we list our rights?” or “How can we empower the Court to protect them?” but “What checks are left if institutions fail?”
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, for instance, was not an abstract “substantive right,” but support for a vibrant spiritual life that could prepare people for citizenship. It encouraged free associations in churches, and established “an important means by which society could judge and control government” by recognizing its subordination to God (98). Similarly, the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech “directly relates to the conduct of democratic self-government, and it is within the process of self-government that democratic society can control and limit the power of its government” (83). Hence, there was no such thing as a “substantive” right; they were all procedural limitations on power.
So why the tremendous emphasis on the Bill of Rights today? Like most scholars, Garry places the blame on the New Deal. As the regulatory state became a radical new presence in American life, the meaning of personal freedom changed from the exercise of self-government to individual rights per se. With a growing, ever-present, and all-invasive regulatory state, this was the last bit of liberty we could enjoy—a tiny alcove of personal privacy, which government, thanks to the judiciary, mercifully respects.
In our time, that freedom is no longer political, Garry claims, but part of a “therapeutic culture, in which the central moral question is individual fulfillment.” Here, personal autonomy is the principle behind all rights, “and the development of the self is among the highest goals of society” (15). The fundamental freedom is, of course, sexual privacy and reproductive rights, along with “freedom of belief” in religion, and free speech reduced to nothing more than “self-expression.” All freedoms, though, are rooted in the absolute freedom of choices that create “the self.”
It is easy to view such protections as cost free. But they instead have the effect of radically aggrandizing the role of the judiciary, which is now entrusted with policing democracy, examining the content of religious belief and free speech, inventing new tests and applying new judge-made rules. The Court burdens itself with “a kind of political-moral reasoning process to determine whether a particular interest deserves protection as a constitutional right” (52). Conservatives look to rights that are “deeply rooted in history and tradition,” while liberals appeal to “evolving standards of decency.”
But none of this would be necessary if the Court simply focused on checks and balances, Garry argues. “When the Court ceases to protect the kind of government structures designed to guard individual liberty, then only the judiciary is left to act as the guardian of liberty—and it does so by defining and strictly enforcing individual substantive rights” (29). Garry proposes that the Court relieve itself of this burden by simply devoting attention to institutions rather than philosophic hair-splitting and theories of justice; meanwhile, the public could be reassured that all rights, even the most exotic and sacred kinds would indeed be protected because government would be too limited to infringe on them in the first place.
Insightful as it is, Garry's book gives scant attention to the architect of checks and balances, James Madison. Garry claims that the powers of government were designed to “oversee and enforce the limitations on each other's powers” (21), giving them the ability to “keep each other in check” (23). But Madison did not believe the Constitution created “limited government” so much as energetic government, featuring institutions with enough “constitutional means and personal motives” to “repel encroachments” of the others, thus using their respective legislative, executive, and judicial functions to guard themselves against each other (Federalist No. 51).
Moreover, Garry fails to acknowledge the rights appearing in the original Constitution under Article I, Section 9, that is, no bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or suspension of habeas corpus (though, oddly, he does mention the first two prohibitions against states in Section 10); nor does he discuss the prohibition against religious tests for public office in Article VI (21). These were perhaps the rights Alexander Hamilton had in mind when he describes the Court's role in guarding “the rights of individuals,” which called for “an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution.” Should checks and balances, federalism, and the people themselves fail to protect rights plainly written in the Constitution, what institution is left to fulfill such a responsibility but the Supreme Court?
In any case, Garry's Limited Government and the Bill of Rights is an exceptional challenge to modern judicial supremacy, a fine reminder of a path not taken, and perhaps an opportunity to recover a better way for American constitutionalism.
