In this book Fred Lawson undertakes the important project of bridging the gap between material and ideational approaches to understanding the dialectic between identity and the territorial state, which is arguably the distinctive feature of Middle East international politics. Many of the explanations in the literature for the emergence of nation-states are, Lawson thinks, too focused on “ideas and beliefs rather than the material conditions that make it possible for certain norms to arise” (p. 16), which is Lawson's interest. His concern parallels the debate between constructivists who insist on the importance of identity-derived norms and materialists who focus on interests. Arguably the task is to identify the relations between the two.
Chapter 1 provides a survey of theoretical issues derived from the European experience, where a drive for congruence between nation (identity) and state (territory) produced a stable and effective political form that has been exported, with varying degrees of success, worldwide. In the Middle East, however, rival qawmī (Pan-Arab) forms of identity coexist with state (waṭanī) identities and delay this convergence. Hence, states' independence, Lawson observes, marked no uniform transition to a Westphalian system. In Chapter 2 he explores variations in this transition to Westphalianism in different states: some states were far ahead of others in embracing sovereignty over wider identities—for example, Egypt and Tunisia did so fairly early compared with Jordan and Iraq, and Syria is said to be a middle case.
In the remainder of the book Lawson tests three theories in trying to explain these variations. What the three theories have in common is the hypothesis that state building, that is, the development of material infrastructural power allowing state penetration of domestic society, is associated with the normative embrace of sovereignty. However, Lawson rejects the claim that relative state penetration by itself explains much. To be specific, he argues that the Jordanian state penetrated and controlled society more than the Egyptian one, but sovereignty was accepted earlier in the latter than the former. The argument that Egypt's state was weaker than Jordan's is, however, strange because Lawson acknowledges that Egypt's central administration penetrated local areas, conscripted, built infrastructures, and managed agriculture and irrigation. However, because Egypt under British occupation did not control its own army, foreign policy, or the foreign capital and banks on its territory, it is thought to lack stateness. Yet this was no less so in Jordan, where it was the British, particularly the Royal Air Force, who empowered the monarchy against the tribes and Pan-Arabists, and the state performed none of the complicated tasks it did in Egypt. In Syria, state penetration is correctly shown to be weak, but the debatable assertion is made that state sovereignty was fairly early embraced—in this the home of the Pan-Arab Baʿth party!
A variant theory (inspired by Hendrik Spruyt) that Lawson tests is that state building, hence the embrace of sovereignty, is a function of backing for it by merchants who, as exporters of low cost/profit, high-volume commodities (as opposed to those who deal in luxury goods), need the protection of a strong state. Lawson discounts this explanation too, because differential embrace of sovereignty across states is not explained by differences in kinds of exports. In my view, this theory may fail because it is not very relevant to the Middle East; although Lawson tries to distinguish between kinds of exporters, in fact all the states were at this time primary-product exporters. The real difference between kinds of merchants that may explain different attitudes toward state sovereignty is likely to be their markets: merchants whose businesses were Western-oriented import–export trade were likely to support sovereignty (because the Pan-Arab alternative was associated with antiimperialism) but not protectionism and regulation (stateness), which would interfere with their foreign-trade operations. Regional-oriented merchants and manufacturers who saw their markets in the Arab world might well be Pan-Arabist but could be either for or against state protectionism among the Arab states depending on how competitive they thought their firms were.
Lawson concludes that the embrace of sovereignty as a norm was driven by the state building that bigger capitalists accepted for fear of radicalization and revolution. Managing the class cleavage between the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie (who, especially in time of economic contraction, attempted to mobilize the masses on their side) gave rise to new government agencies to confront the economic crisis, thereby thickening stateness, hence sovereignty. This is sensible, but Lawson conflates two different dimensions, namely, the support for a strong interventionist state with support for sovereignty over wider identities; in fact, in the Middle East they do not go together. Petit bourgeois Pan-Arabists advocated a strong state, and their usually sovereignty-supporting (comprador) bourgeois rivals wanted a laisser-faire state.
Lawson is asking the right questions, and his research agenda is promising, but he has not quite delivered convincing answers. The problem is partly his rather mechanical application of theories developed to understand the West to the Arab world; more promising would be an attempt to tailor these theories to the region in light of the accumulated research we already have on regional state building. Another problem is that no attempt is made to systematically measure variations in stateness and variations in the embrace of sovereignty; also, the time frames treated in each country are not uniform, hence the conditions vary. As a result, correlations asserted between stateness and embrace of sovereignty often seem to be arbitrary judgments. As mentioned, it does not help that support for state building and the embrace of sovereignty over Arabism tend to get confused, when in fact they are independent dimensions, and if there is a relation, it is one that Lawson should be testing, not prejudging.
Also dubious is Lawson's practice of forcing bits and pieces of information that are often trivial, of marginal relevance, or open to multiple interpretations into the procrustean bed of his theory; one rather perverse example of interpreting the facts to fit the theory is that because the Muslim Brothers represented social forces that should, in his theory, have valued state protection and hence sovereignty, Lawson has to dismiss the group's suprastate Pan-Islamic ideology as inoperative. Too often the linkage between theory and fact is asserted rather than actually shown. Finally, although the book has extensive footnotes, there is no bibliography.
Despite these flaws, this book is a useful contribution to the literature on international relations of the Middle East and points the way to future research on state formation in the region.
