A renowned authority on eighteenth-century French political thought, Céline Spector has focused on the philosophy of the Enlightenment, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the field of political economy. To those familiar with her prior work, it will come as no surprise that this current book is an excellent introduction to the political, social, and moral thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A professor at the Sorbonne since 2016, Spector has held positions at Stanford University and the University of Chicago, which helps to explain why she writes with such ease and clarity in English.
Published in the Polity Press series Classic Thinkers, Spector's book reads like a work of reference, but it is clearly not just a summary of current scholarship. Such a work of synthesis would, in any case, be quite impossible given the quantity of existing scholarship on Rousseau and its often contradictory nature. Instead, Spector makes selective use of this scholarship, some of it old, some of it new, to make a nuanced argument of her own. In this she is helped by her vast knowledge of both the relevant primary and secondary literatures. Much of this book is, in fact, a useful distillation of work she has published elsewhere in French.
One of the most frequently heard refrains about Rousseau is that he was a “man of paradoxes.” His writings have been described as disjointed and contradictory, making it near impossible to see any consistent argument across his life's work or any express purpose to his writing. Much attention has been focused on the perplexing relationship between the Second Discourse, a strongly individualistic text, and the Social Contract, which is an emphatically collectivist one. Moreover, in the Second Discourse, Rousseau seems to idealize the state of nature and uses nature as a moral standard. He describes the evil effects of socialization on the freedom of the individual and seems to suggest that there can be no remedy to modern man's corruption. In the Social Contract, however, he describes standards of justice as the result of human conventions and proposes the foundations of what could be a just society. More confoundingly still, in this text he advocates measures that would “force men to be free.” How should we reconcile these apparent contradictions? Some have wondered if Rousseau was perhaps confused or emotionally disturbed. Or was he simply an intellectual provocateur, an irresponsible stirrer?
The overarching argument of Spector's book is that there is, in fact, an underlying coherence to Rousseau's thought. She prefers to speak of “tensions” in his texts rather than contradictions. She thus claims to take Rousseau at his word. Although he once confessed that he would “prefer to be a man of paradoxes rather than a man of . . . prejudices,” he also declared, in a letter to the archbishop Christophe de Beaumont, that “I have written on various subjects, but always with the same principles: always the same morality, the same belief, the same maxims and, if you will, the same opinions.” Spector cites this letter twice.
Rousseau's coherence becomes clear, Spector contends, when we see him as a “modern critic of modernity” and when we understand his underlying “philosophical system.” She breaks this system into three key ideas: the first is that man is naturally good; the second, that the contradictions of the social system, and especially the evil effects of private property, corrupt man; and the third, that pedagogical and political remedies can be found. Spector argues that all of his political writings unfold from these ideas.
Armed with this system, Spector thus finds ways to bridge the Second Discourse and the Social Contract. She writes that there is no glaring contradiction between them. Never a straightforward primitivist who dreamed of an exit from civilization and a return to the state of nature, Rousseau's purpose was instead to make us weigh civilization's supposed benefits against its costs. Nor did Rousseau ever provide a blueprint for an ideal constitution. Instead, he posited the standards against which modern governments should be judged.
Much of this is not new; we have heard it before. The originality of the book lies instead in the clarity and precision of Spector's argument as well as the sources used. For example, chapter 3, “Political Legitimacy and Applied Politics,” includes an illuminating section on the Letters Written from the Mountain, a text written in 1764 and rarely mentioned in Rousseau scholarship. The Letters were written in response to a constitutional crisis in Geneva, Rousseau's city of birth, a crisis that was in part caused by the city's ban of his Social Contract. Examining the Letters allows Spector to correct some common misapprehensions about Rousseau's supposed disregard for individual liberty and his alleged scorn for the English constitution. Spector shows that in this text Rousseau suggests that he has changed his mind about the superiority of republics over monarchies and uses the English constitution as a standard against which to measure the loss of political and civil freedom in Geneva. Here he clearly defines freedom as protection of the individual against arbitrary power.
In an insightful chapter on “morality and education,” Spector includes a few pages on the role of women in Rousseau's thought. She argues here that Rousseau never contended that men are intrinsically superior to women, as is so often said, nor that women lack rationality, but rather that a proper moral philosophy can only be achieved through a gendered yet complementary division of scientific labor. This section, in which Spector places Rousseau in dialogue with Nicolas Malebranche, is a particularly welcome addition to scholarship. And so is chapter 6, on Rousseau's economic philosophy.
It is often said that Rousseau was not very interested in economics, nor very original when he wrote about it. However, by bringing to light ideas he expressed in his Plan for a Constitution for Corsica and Considerations on the Government of Poland, two texts also relatively neglected by scholars, Spector shows that his economic ideas are also consistent with his “philosophical system.” In chapter 7 she discusses his views on international relations, another topic often left out of treatments of Rousseau's thought.
Spector's book ends with a short and insightful chapter on Rousseau's legacy in contemporary political philosophy. Here she begins with Cold War readings of Rousseau, in which his “protototalitarianism” was stressed, and proceeds to the shift produced by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, in which Rousseau is interpreted as a forerunner of political liberalism. Spector further considers Rousseau's contribution to modern theories of republicanism and deliberative democracy and the treatment of his thought in critical theory.
Rousseau's work is too vast and varied to be fully covered in one book, and Spector admits to leaving out his work as a playwright and musician and not analyzing fully his novel Julie or his autobiographical works (Confessions, Dialogues, Reveries). It is curious that she does not discuss Rousseau's description of women in the Second Discourse, which it seems would have supported her overall argument. She might also have spent more time on the Discourse on Political Economy and the Letter to d'Alembert, which she curiously calls “transitional texts.” But one can only admire this book as a masterful exposition, which argues for the overall unity of Rousseau's thought, while also allowing for its complexity.
