In their edited volume, Negar Mansouri and Daniel Quiroga-Villamarín provide a diagnosis and prescription for the subfield of international organizations law. The main problem, as Mansouri and Quiroga-Villamarín see it, is that mainstream scholarship has been asking small (boring, technical, legal) questions and therefore getting only small (boring, technical, legal) answers. In short: “a pragmatic and practice-oriented lens, underpinned by a particular understanding of the legal scholar’s craft, has come to dominate the international legal inquiry into institutions” (p. 4).
The solution they prescribe to reinvigorate this corner of the law is to turn to critical approaches, other disciplines, and a broader range of sources. The goal is to ask different (bigger, better) questions and look for insights from different perspectives, investigating both the micro (the details of the day-to-day practices of international civil servants) and the macro (the broader global trends that shape what international organizations do—and that international organizations, in turn, can reinforce and legitimize). Across sixteen chapters, the contributors to this volume powerfully demonstrate the value that non-doctrinal critical and interdisciplinary approaches can bring to the study of international organizations. In doing so, the volume lays an important foundation for further work to reimagine the law of international organizations.
The Diagnosis: The Dominance of Problem-Solving, Positivism, and Functionalism in Mainstream Scholarship
In explaining what ails mainstream legal scholarship on international organizations, the first three chapters of the volume identify several inter-related features that contribute to the field’s limited focus and overly optimistic conception of international organizations. Mansouri and Quiroga-Villamarín characterize mainstream scholarship as taking a “problem-solving” approach—and therefore being plagued by the deficiencies associated with this approach. Here they draw on work by political scientist Robert Cox. Cox explains that the problem-solving approach “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action.”Footnote 1 This narrow frame has an important advantage: it “reduce[s] the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination.”Footnote 2 But it has drawbacks that may not be immediately apparent: although the problem-solving approach might appear to be value free, Cox argues that it has an ideological bias: it “implicitly accepts the prevailing order” and thus (perhaps unwittingly) serves the interests of those who find the status quo comfortable.Footnote 3 The problem-solving approach does not inquire about the origins of the prevailing order or consider “how and whether they [i.e., the institutions and social and power relations that characterize that order] might be in the process of changing.”Footnote 4 Mansouri and Quiroga-Villamarín thus argue that mainstream legal scholarship on international organizations misses—and obscures—the real action.
In his contribution, B.S. Chimni characterizes mainstream scholarship as “rooted in the positivist tradition of international law” and as credulously presenting international organizations as “neutral institutions that promote international cooperation and the global common good” while neglecting the role that these institutions play “in the expansion and stabilization of a hegemonic global order” (p. 16). Chimni’s own work, of course, along with that of other critical scholars including Antony Anghie and Guy Fiti Sinclair, made important headway on the latter point.Footnote 5 Jean d’Aspremont recently ribbed his colleagues in the field for their undeclared love of international organizations.Footnote 6
For Jan Klabbers, the problem is the long-term dominance of “functionalism.” In prior work, he reconstructed “functionalism” as the theory that took shape before the turn of the twentieth century and continues to dominate the law of international organizations.Footnote 7 In short: functionalism zeroes in on the relationship between member states and the organizations they establish to perform specified tasks. Those tasks are typically technical and purportedly apolitical—and carrying them out is assumed to conduce to the greater good (p. 40). Functionalism thus supplies the basis for the normative claim that the law should facilitate the work of international organizations. Like positivism, functionalism centers states and ignores private actors (p. 44). Perhaps most importantly, functionalism “does not (and cannot) address relations between the organization and the outside world,” including, importantly, private individuals who are harmed by international organizations’ acts or omissions.Footnote 8
To the extent that “mainstream” is meant to describe something like the bulk or mine run of scholarship on the law of international organizations, the description that emerges from these three chapters (overly sunny and dominated by problem-solving, positivism, and functionalism) does not quite ring true. The central preoccupation of the subfield for at least the last few decades has been accountability, or rather lack thereof—that international organizations are unaccountable because (1) they have immunity from legal process in national courts, (2) they need not answer to individuals affected by their acts or omissions, (3) they are or might be largely unbound by international law, and (4) even if they are bound, almost no institutions exist to adjudicate violations or discipline illegal actions. The International Organizations Law Review has published 479 separate essays and articles across its twenty-two volumes to date; the word “accountability” appears in 279—well over half.Footnote 9
Klabbers is right that functionalism does not give scholars traction on these questions of accountability. Positivism does not help much either. Indeed, even though their international legal personality is widely accepted, international organizations continue to sit somewhat uneasily in the positivist theoretical universe. From a positivist perspective, how might the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations come to bind international organizations? If the answer is customary international law, would one look for evidence of practice and opinio juris on the part of international organizations themselves on the view that their consent is essential? Or would one look only to the practice and opinio juris of states because states remain the primary actors at the core of the international legal system while international organizations are secondary and derivative?
Precisely because of these limitations, the focus on the accountability of international organizations almost inevitably pulls scholars away from both functionalism and positivism. To answer questions like why the UN Security Council has human rights obligations, or more broadly why customary international law binds international organizations, scholars pivot to arguments that turn on features of the international legal system or the international community. Global administrative law and constitutionalism, for example, are both motivated by addressing problems of accountability—and neither is grounded in functionalism or positivism.
Put another way, to answer seemingly simple doctrinal legal questions about international organizations that relate to accountability, scholars do not have the option to take a narrow problem-solving approach grounded in positivism and/or functionalism; they must grapple with broader systemic questions and develop alternative theoretical perspectives. It is also worth noting that troubling distributional consequences often motivate scholarship about accountability of international organizations. When Haitian victims of cholera and their survivors cannot sue the United Nations in national court and lack access to an alternative venue where they can challenge its conduct, those individuals bear the losses. For these reasons, the binary distinction the opening chapters draw between mainstream and critical approaches is overstated and potentially misleading.
Still, the contributors to the volume are right that, at a minimum, there is dissatisfaction and unresolved tension within the subfield; scholars of international organizations law have been wrestling with these accountability questions for quite some time without settling upon definitive and broadly accepted (and implemented) answers. And the contributors are also clearly right that there are other questions that need attention and other methods and materials that can yield important insights.
The Prescription: Critical and Interdisciplinary Approaches
Mansouri and Quiroga-Villamarín’s volume demonstrates the value added from critical and interdisciplinary approaches and sets out an agenda for future work in this area. Given limited space, instead of recounting the contributions sequentially, this review highlights some of the key themes and takeaways from different groups of chapters. (The contributors are legal scholars except as otherwise noted.) The contributions in the first two clusters discussed below focus on expertise and moments of innovation; in Guy Fiti Sinclair’s words, each of these contributions “trace[s] how [international organizations] are constituted through heterogeneous practices and materials” (p. 314). A third cluster of chapters, addressing winners and losers, focuses on distributional consequences of these decisions and dynamics. The fourth cluster identifies new materials and sources for understanding what international organizations do and why they do it. Critical approaches often highlight the indeterminacy of international legal rules, and international organizations provide ample opportunities to illustrate the claim. The texts that establish international organizations and set their work in motion are, inevitably, rife with gaps, ambiguities, and unanswered questions. These organizations often evolve in directions that could not have been predicted when they were founded. The individuals who play a part in their functioning over time exercise considerable discretion and agency in how they go about their work. The contributions to this volume showcase the extent of that discretion and agency—and illuminate its consequences.
Expertise and Exercises of Discretion
When individuals exercising discretion are experts in some domain, their expertise is both a source of authority (because it makes it harder for non-experts to question those claims or actions) and a constraint (because it takes certain kinds of claims or actions off the table as unjustified within the relevant epistemic community). For example, Tommaso Soave and Dimitri Van Den Meersche point out that lawyers—even those in positions of authority like international arbitrators, judges, and IO general counsels—must be able convince the other lawyers in their professional communities that they are acting competently (pp. 133–35, 241–42).
Still, the need to establish competence is only a modest constraint and it leaves a lot of space to exercise discretion. Several chapters showcase the breadth of that discretion—and interrogate how various experts choose to exercise it. As political scientist Annabelle Littoz-Monnet underscores, “the making of expertise involves political processes of inclusion, exclusion, and assembling,” and that “has implications for how we conceive global objects of governance, those ‘matters of concern,’ or ‘problems,’ that IOs govern” (p. 60).
Richard Clements illustrates this point by taking a close look at a particular endeavor to reform the International Criminal Court (ICC): the enlistment of a panel of nine independent experts, all international lawyers, to produce a report containing “concrete, achievable and actionable recommendations aimed at enhancing the performance, efficiency and effectiveness of the Court” (p. 85). The lawyers’ expertise helped shape the panel’s approach to their task. The panel “did not seek to offer a sociological, economic, or anthropological analysis” (p. 95). But, importantly, the panel still had and made choices about how to frame and pursue its assigned task. The panelists could have focused on “the African Union’s hostility towards the court or the tangibility of justice for victim communities” (p. 97); these issues are surely relevant to the ICC’s performance and effectiveness. Instead, the lawyers prioritized efficiency; they developed a novel “three-layer governance model” that specified the appropriate levels of oversight for different aspects of the ICC’s work. Overall the model validated more intensive supervision by member states—and, Clements argues, gave more weight to the financial concerns of member states that were bigger funders of the ICC.
Juanita Uribe, a political scientist, shows how the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organizations, and UNICEF came to view “hidden hunger” as a problem that belonged on their agendas. “Hidden hunger” refers to deficiencies in vitamins and minerals rather than calories. It was not obvious or inevitable that hidden hunger warranted these organizations’ attention. In fact, it required considerable effort to make hidden hunger an “object of governance.” The first step was to collect consistent and comparable data about nutrient intake across the globe, since the needed statistics were not readily available. Framing “hidden hunger” as a problem also had significant consequences. It made certain kinds of nutritional expertise indispensable while diminishing other kinds of knowledge related to food—including that of women responsible for feeding their families (p. 114). Moreover, defining the problem in terms of nutritional deficiencies cleared the path for one particular solution—namely nutritional supplements, which can be provided through targeted vertical interventions—while sidelining other solutions, especially those that addressed the root causes of hunger (p. 116). Presenting statistics about hidden hunger as a set of objective “facts” obscures each of these features. Uribe does not unpack which actors inside or outside these organizations led the charge on “hidden hunger,” but wealthy donors often prefer vertical interventions like nutritional supplements or immunizations with results that are visible, concrete, and easily quantifiable in the short term.Footnote 10
Both Clements and Uribe thus highlight contingencies—instances where expertise could have been deployed differently and steered these organizations in different directions. And both Clements and Uribe describe experts as paving the way for policies that favor the preferences of wealthy states—while not necessarily serving the needs or respecting the preferences of individuals affected by the relevant organizations—victim communities and recipients of nutritional assistance. This tension between catering to the preferences of (certain) member states versus affected individuals features prominently in the IO accountability literature described above.
Discretion, Innovation, and Levers of Change
Contributions from Miia Halme-Tuomisaari and Dimitri Van Den Meersche highlight discrete instances of innovation: how actors responded to novel challenges. Both take a close look at day-to-day operations to document how those innovations unfolded. These contributions respond to Chimni’s call for “thick histories of organizations that allow an assessment of … the informal and formal processes through which respective mandates are adapted to address new challenges” (p. 26).
Halme-Tuomisaari, a legal anthropologist, addresses an unusual day at the Human Rights Committee. On March 15, 2013, the written report submitted by Belize was scheduled to be the subject of a Constructive Dialogue at the Palais Wilson in Geneva. “For the first time, the seats state representatives customarily occupied at the front of the spacious conference room were empty” (p. 219). The relevant treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), does not supply a script for handling this kind of situation.Footnote 11 The Committee opted to proceed without Belize. Halme-Tuomisaari reports that the committee members expressed their frustration but “did not slack off: despite the absence of a respondent, they followed the usual session choreography by posing pointed questions … regarding the ICCPR” (p. 220). Halme-Tuomisaari suggests that the Committee’s “elaborate, ritual sessions” are significant because they are the arena in which states demonstrate that they qualify as “civilized”—that is, that they should be recognized as upstanding members of the international community (pp. 221, 223). One might add that, by refusing to have its work derailed by the absence of state representatives, the Committee preserved its own legitimacy and authority.
Dimitri Van Den Meerssche shows how Roberto Dañino, as general counsel, broke from his predecessor, Ibrahim Shihata, and set a new course for the Word Bank’s legal office. Shihata understood his role as ascertaining legal constraints and then insisting on compliance with them, even when he encountered resistance from other Bank officials. As a result, the office was frequently sidelined and its staff demoralized. To fix this problem, Dañino reinvented the legal counsel’s role. Instead of instructing colleagues about what they could and could not do, Dañino wanted to help them figure out how to achieve their goals without undue legal risk. Instead of memos with binary yes-or-no answers to questions about whether a particular course of action was legally permitted, Dañino’s office produced color-coded risk evaluations (“green lights, yellow lights and red lights”) (p. 235)—and offered advice about how those risks could be mitigated, for example, by establishing safeguards or monitoring devices. The goal was to advance the Bank’s mission—and, just as importantly, to ensure that the legal office would be perceived by the rest of the Bank as a source of added value. And Dañino’s new approach changed how the Bank operated: for example, the Bank began funding criminal justice reform—something Shihata had judged off-limits to the Bank.
In combination, the chapters in these first two clusters demonstrate the wide range of actors who can influence international organizations, including international civil servants, representatives of member states, and outside experts brought in for specific assignments.
Winners and Losers
Some contributors focus on the distributional consequences of exercises of apparently neutral exercises of discretion: “who gets what?” and “whose interests and purposes are served?” (p. 274). Two chapters use a “wide-angle lens,” investigating developments across multiple organizations, while the third zooms in on the experience of a single state, Ethiopia.
Political scientist A. Clair Cutler chronicles the seemingly neutral concept of “resilience” as a buzzword and policy goal pursued across several different international organizations, including the World Bank, World Health Organization, and United Nations. The concept of resilience has roots in multiple disciplines that deal with risk management, including ecology, engineering, and psychology (p. 280). The key question is “how a system, community or individual can deal with disturbance, surprise and change” (id.). The most vivid illustration of the political economy of what Cutler calls “resilience talk” is in discourse about individuals who must relocate to cope with the consequences of climate change (p. 284). Cutler argues that resilience talk transforms the climate refugee into the climate migrant and changes our conception of both the problem and the solution. A climate refugee is someone who has been wronged by the wealthy states that contributed the lion’s share of historical greenhouse gas emissions and are not doing nearly enough to mitigate climate change—and who has “rights to security and (reparative) justice” (p. 285). By contrast, a climate migrant is an individual with responsibilities, including “a duty … to manage and adapt to the crisis by integration as a migrant into the work force of the receiving state and contribute to the development of the home state by sending regular remittances home” (id.). Thus, the effect of “resilience talk” is placing the burden of adaptation on the individual victim of climate change while letting wealthy states off the hook.
Mansouri, taking a historical materialist approach, documents contestation among member states across two organizations, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the International Tropical Timber Organization, and the international regime governing global shipping. While “international lawyers have historically viewed the capitalist state as a homogenous category,” Mansouri divides capitalist states into two groups (p. 249). On one side are the capitalist states with laissez-faire or Lockean systems, which are characterized by a “small government, a self-regulating market, and an entrepreneurial individual” (p. 251). On the other side are those with state capitalist or Hobbesian systems, which are characterized by a strong state that “commands the organization of production relations in line with ethno-nationalist objectives” (id.). The United States, the United Kingdom, and continental European states after 1945 are examples of the former, while continental European states before 1945 and contemporary states in Asia, Africa, and South America are examples of the latter. Mansouri shows that, in each of the three institutional settings she investigates, laissez-faire capitalism ultimately triumphs while states with Hobbesian systems lose control over tools of national governance (p. 270). For example, the ITU was established in the mid-nineteenth century by then-Hobbesian continental European states to reinforce their governance capacities: by insulating member states’ national telegraph agencies from competition, the ITU protected sovereign choice with respect to the organization of communication networks. And yet, by the 1990s, the ITU switched sides: it became an organization that actively promoted laissez-faire policies, including deregulation and enhanced competition with respect to telecommunications. To help the medicine go down, the ITU began disseminating narratives about how competition and entrepreneurship propel development (p. 258). Explaining this about-face, Mansouri portrays the ITU as a reactive institution that was under significant pressure to avoid obsolescence in the face of external developments following World War II, including technological innovations in the telecommunication field, the subsequent establishment of a competing international organization (INTELSAT), and the negotiation of new and increasingly robust agreements on international trade in services.
Quiroga-Villamarín recounts Ethiopia’s experience as a member of the League of Nations and the United Nations; in doing so, he responds to what Chimni described as the “justified lament of postcolonial theory” that neither mainstream nor critical approaches “study the record of participation of Global South nations, occluding the possibility of soundly assessing their place and role in IOs” (p. 23). Quiroga-Villamarín concludes the track record is mixed; Ethiopia experienced many disappointments but also notched some important victories. The League offered Ethiopian leaders some opportunities to challenge racial hierarchy in the international order (p. 302). And yet, when the stakes were highest, the League failed Ethiopia by not preventing Italy’s invasion in 1935. But even then the League provided Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassi with a venue where Italy’s “treacherous ways could be called to account” (id.). Later, Ethiopia was one of three independent African states to participate in the 1945 San Francisco conference. The United Nations both “provided cover for racialised hierarchies” through its protection of sovereignty and created a new set of opportunities “for those who wanted to challenge the global colour line,” especially as the number of newly decolonized states in the General Assembly swelled (p. 305).
The takeaway from Quiroga-Villamarín’s chapter—that when you zoom in and look closely, the story about winners and losers becomes more complicated—generalizes to other organizations. For example, contestation over open shipping registries involved diverging preferences among states of the Global South; there were winners and losers among those states—and within them too. The choice of scale matters: both macro- and micro-level analyses can illuminate some patterns while obscuring others.
Untapped Methods and Materials
Several other chapters highlight the value of methods and materials that do not usually feature in legal scholarship about international organizations. Kiri Olivia Santer, an anthropologist, undertook fieldwork as a participant-observer aboard a Panamanian-flagged NGO rescue ship, the Aquarius, to get a fine-grained understanding of maritime search and rescue of migrant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea during the autumn of 2018. Among other things, this fieldwork allowed Santer to see just how large Italy’s behind-the-scenes role was in a regime that formally allocated authority to other states. Santer observed Italian officials stepping in to coordinate on Libya’s behalf when its officials failed to respond to communications and, on another occasion, pressuring Panamanian authorities to revoke the Aquarius’s flag after the vessel disobeyed Libyan orders (pp. 155–57). Jan Eijking, an international relations scholar, assembled biographies of the individuals who negotiated the establishment of the International Telegraph Union in 1865 to shed light on the expertise and political connections they brought to that collective endeavor. And in a separate contribution, Quiroga-Villamarín looked to the physical spaces that international organizations inhabited, focusing on the interim headquarters of the League of Nations, International Labor Organization, and United Nations. Competition among member states can influence the location of those offices and motivate host states to be more generous. And, of course, the location has distributional consequences too: one of the explanations for Belize’s absence from the Human Rights Committee meeting described above is that the state was “broke” and could not afford to send representatives to Geneva (p. 219).
As a group, the contributors to Mansouri and Quiroga-Villamarín’s edited volume make a compelling case for “[a]ttending to the granular,” to use Richard Clements’s phrase. It is important to acknowledge that methods and materials that shed light on the practices of international organizations are not readily available. Privileges and immunities typically make the headquarters of international organizations and their archives inviolable—and therefore inaccessible without permission. As a result, these organizations have discretion over what information they will release and when they will do it. Legal materials are especially likely to remain inaccessible. For example the World Health Organization makes many records available to external researchers after twenty years, but makes an exception for records containing legal information “obtained or created under explicit or implicit conditions of confidentiality.”Footnote 12 And the World Bank’s Policy on Access to Information “does not provide access to information subject to attorney-client privilege, including, among other things, communications provided and/or received by the General Counsel, in-house Bank counsel, and other legal advisors.”Footnote 13 Sometimes scholars’ access to IO documents and interviews with staff comes at the price of a promise of confidentiality.Footnote 14 The obstacles to these sources and materials are formidable, but well worth trying to overcome.
What Comes Next: Circling Back to the Law of International Organizations
While the approaches reflected in this volume’s sixteen chapters range broadly, they all shy away from saying very much about the law. Legal questions do make an occasional, brief appearance. For example, Chimni, in setting out an agenda for future critical work, points out the need “to pinpoint the weaknesses and gaps in the ILC’s Draft Articles of Responsibility of International Organizations as it only deals with a narrow set of acts of omission and commission” (p. 24). For the most part, the law recedes to the background.
This shared aversion to engaging with the law makes some sense given that Mansouri and Quiroga-Villamarín expressly frame their volume as an effort to disrupt and destabilize a subfield that, in their view, has been too narrowly focused on doctrinal questions. The editors do so by showing readers other ways to look at international organizations—to understand more about how they work and about the consequences of their work. By itself, this might give scholars an “enlarged sense of possibility” of what international organizations law could or should do.Footnote 15 At a minimum, readers of this volume will not be able to unsee what they have seen. That might be enough to provoke them to stop unreflectively reinforcing the status quo—a nontrivial accomplishment!
Still, the implications of these new ways of seeing and understanding international organizations for the law of international organizations are left implicit and are not always easy to discern. For example, the contributions discussed under the “Winners and Losers” heading above do indeed reveal how certain states benefit from certain international organizations. But these contributions do not show us how legal features of these particular organizations—or how the cross-cutting rules that make up international organizations law—“help[] to structure patterns of winners and losers,” as Klabbers put it (p. 51).
By demonstrating the breadth of discretion exercised by international civil servants and others, the volume tees up but declines to address questions about how law does—or could or should—determine who exercises that discretion and how. For example, legal rules can determine who fills those roles and the circumstances under which they can be fired; this is one reason why Chimni appropriately exhorts critical scholars to investigate staff recruitment policies (p. 30). The significance of discretionary acts by international civil servants is also determined in part by legal rules. Can those discretionary acts constitute “subsequent practice” for purposes of interpreting the organization’s charter? Can they contribute to making customary international law? Legal rules can also help to structure patterns of winners and losers by (dis)empowering member states collectively vis-à-vis international civil servants and individual member states vis-à-vis the organization and each other. For example, under what circumstances can individual member states choose to withhold funding from international organizations or take countermeasures against them? The answers to legal questions like these help to determine the identity of winners and losers as well as the size of those wins and losses.
In his concluding chapter, Sinclair observes that “there is certainly room to push further in all of the directions pursued and advocated in these chapters” and closes with a wish list for future work (p. 319). This reviewer enthusiastically agrees with Sinclair—and supplements his list with an exhortation for future work that deploys critical and interdisciplinary approaches to grapple more explicitly with the law of international organizations and the existing literature on accountability. There is a lot to uncover about the origins and consequences of international organizations law as it currently stands. And there is a need for new perspectives to grapple with questions about how the law of international organizations ought to change or be reimagined, and whether it is indeed redeemable and capable of meaningfully being reformed.
