As a Junior Minister at the India Office, I joined as an observer the India and Burma Committee of the Cabinet under Attlee's chairmanship in autumn 1944. The agenda of our meetings was a mirror image of the conflict between Wavell,Footnote 393 who had succeeded LinlithgowFootnote 394 as Viceroy the previous year, and Churchill. He had been sent to India by Churchill as a professional soldier who would keep India quiet until the end of the war, without meddling in politics. It was intended as a strictly law and order job.Footnote 395 It must have been a rude shock to the Prime Minister when he soon found out that this professional soldier, not only understood politics, but took a strong view about the immediate necessity for constitutional advance, without waiting for further progress until after the war.
Wavell had set out his opinions in a long letter to the Prime Minster, which I found on my desk when I arrived at the India Office, and I quote the concluding sentences:
Above all, there is the question of credibility. We have lost the trust and confidence of Indians by promising so much and doing so little, and we have now to convince them of our sincerity. But the real essential is a change of spirit, a change that will convince the average, educated Indian that the British Government is sincere in its intentions, and is friendly towards India … if we want India as a Dominion after the war, we must begin by treating her more like a Dominion now … if certain measures which I would suggest were taken now … I believe it would be possible to effect a considerable improvement.
These modest measures of reform were the main subject of discussion by the India Committee until the Churchill Wartime Coalition Government broke up in May 1945. It might have been expected that a Committee of the calibre of Simon, Anderson, Grigg, Butler, Amery, Cripps and Attlee; men of immense political experience and first-hand knowledge of India, would welcome an immediate policy to increase Indian participation in their own system of government. However, owing to Churchill's unyielding opposition to Indian self-government, the unfortunate Viceroy found no support except from Amery, the well-intentioned but helpless Secretary of State, and on some occasions from Cripps.
Attlee must have been torn between his personal opinions, and his duty, as the Prime Minister's representative on the Committee, to oppose even the smallest step forward while the war continued. He was well aware that Churchill's attitude had not altered since his antagonism to the 1935 India Act, and neatly described it, and the reaction of his Cabinet, in the following words: ‘The Cabinet has always deferred to the Prime Minister's passionate feelings about India’. So nothing serious was done by Churchill's Coalition Government to prepare India for the great leap forward that took place so soon after the war. Attlee was unable to come out in his true colours until after the General Election in July 1945. He made sure that Indian independence was again included in the Labour Party's Election Manifesto.
When the India Committee of the Cabinet was reconstituted by Attlee after the Labour Election victory in 1945 it consisted of Stafford Cripps, Ellen Wilkinson, A.V. Alexander,Footnote 396 A. Henderson,Footnote 397 Lord Stansgate,Footnote 398 Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, and myself, with Attlee again in the Chair. This was scarcely a team that could compare in knowledge or intellectual calibre with Churchill's, but the presence of Cripps and Attlee gave it an indispensable link with India and its leaders.
At our first meeting on 17th August, 1947,Footnote 399 Cripps and Attlee declared bravely that we must quickly work out a policy to realise the long term undertaking in the Cripps’ war time offer. It will be remembered that the essence of what had been offered to India in 1942,Footnote 400 when the war was going against us, was a completely independent Indian Union as soon as hostilities were over, which would later decide whether or not to stay in the British Commonwealth. Thus it was plain to us from the start that our job was to replace British by Indian rule within the lifetime of the Labour Government. Little did we expect that our assignment would be complete within two years.
The Committee was guided by two strong personalities, Attlee and Cripps: the latter playing the major role. For Cripps was the only member with recent first hand experience of India, which he combined with personal acquaintance or even friendship with all the Indian leaders. He dominated the deliberations of the India Committee by his formidable fund of knowledge, his resourceful and inventive mind, his dialectical skill, and his strong political will. This impression was not confined to those who shared his politics. Wavell was often an observer at our meetings. He noticed with grudging admiration in his Journal, when recording his unfavourable impression of the India Committee, that ‘Cripps is of course the directing brain’.
I soon learned about the abject and humiliating thraldom in which the Viceroy was held. He was fettered hand and foot by the Churchill Government, and could do nothing without the express authority of the India Committee or the Cabinet. He even had to ask permission when he wanted to meet Indian political leaders as recounted by Wavell to MountbattenFootnote 401 in Simla in 1944. Wavell had asked permission from the Secretary of State to meet with GandhiFootnote 402 when the latter was released from prison on account of illness. He had been mortified when this request was turned down, and he said Churchill was furious about Gandhi's release. He simply could not see how he could go on governing India with such restrictions imposed upon him. Mountbatten then asked him why he had not simply arranged to see Gandhi on his way between prison and hospital for an informal talk: Wavell replied that this would have been against his orders. He had a soldier's conception of obedience to his superiors.
I had met Wavell from time to time in London, when he had returned for discussions with Churchill and the Secretary of State. On social occasions he could be an embarrassment. He lacked the small change of polite conversation, and at meals sitting between two ladies there could be long silences. This innate reserve deprived him of the diplomatic qualities needed for many useful and important personal relationships in public life especially in India. But appearing before a Committee of Ministers, he became a different person. If he was not as quick as some in oral argument, he had immense fluency and complete mastery of his subject.
The recommendations of the India Committee had of course to be endorsed by the Cabinet, and it was in the Cabinet Room that Attlee took the lead. He, not Cripps, put the case for the Committee, and it was inevitably agreed by the whole Cabinet. The only colleague whose Opposition he may have feared, because at heart he deplored the dissolution of the British Empire, was that of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin.Footnote 403 But there seemed to be a tacit agreement between the two men that, if Attlee gave Bevin a free hand over foreign policy, Bevin would give Attlee a free hand over India. So it was that the recommendations of the India Committee sailed through the Cabinet with little discussion and no substantial alterations. The absence of argument was not due to indifference, but a general agreement between Ministers about the direction of policy, which had indeed been laid down in our Election Manifesto in 1945.
Our first year and a half, from 1945 to 1946, was a record of abortive attempts to bring the Hindus and Muslims together. But the differences between Nehru and Jinnah,Footnote 404 who were heavily at odds over the claim to a separate State of Pakistan, could not be reconciled by the Cabinet Mission to India in 1946 or by the London Conference of Indian Leaders that followed it.
Wavell, after his failure to bring the parties together at the Simla Conference,Footnote 405 now realised we were drifting towards sporadic and dangerous violence and ultimate disaster, and that we must have a long term plan for the future of India. He offered us two alternatives, either to enforce British rule for at least 15 years, or to abdicate by a phased withdrawal. The former would entail the reinforcement of the Indian Army by 4–5 Divisions of British troops. This alternative was quickly dismissed as unacceptable to public opinion in the aftermath of the world war.
The second alternative was a phased withdrawal of our armed forces, civil servants, and those British civilians who wished to leave, by stages from British India, starting from the four Congress Provinces in the South, while holding temporarily the Muslim majority Provinces in the North. The total withdrawal was to be completed by March 31st, 1948. It should be noted that Wavell was the first person to suggest a fixed date for the termination of British rule. Apart from Pethick-Lawrence, who to the end was loyal to the Viceroy, the India Committee was unanimous in its rejection of the defeatism of a proposal which was based on complete pessimism about the chances of finding agreement between the two communities. At home the country would have been divided by the outrage of the Conservatives amid Churchillian cries of ‘scuttle’. It now became clear that, as neither of the alternative policies offered by Wavell were acceptable, we must look for a new Viceroy to bring us out of India with the widest possible measure of agreement between the Communities.
I have no direct evidence of the origin of the choice of Mountbatten to succeed Wavell, as neither Attlee nor Cripps discussed it with me. But he had already been talked about by Ministers in 1942 and 1943, when consideration was being given to a successor to Linlithgow. Churchill had in mind to give one of two top posts to Mountbatten at this time, either that of Viceroy of India or that of Supreme Commander in South-East Asia. He decided in accordance with the wishes of the Americans and Chiefs of Staff to send him to South East Asia. This, fortunately, was exactly what Mountbatten himself greatly preferred. But I suspect that Cripps was already considering a successor for Wavell in 1946, when he was in New Delhi with the Cabinet Mission, as he hated the Viceroy's defeatism. Sir Prenderil [sic] MoonFootnote 406 states that Mountbatten's name was mentioned in the presence of Major Short, the Mission's advisor on the Sikhs. In his view at least Cripps already had Mountbatten in mind as the man he wanted to replace Wavell. In his autobiography Attlee claims that Mountbatten's name came to him as an ‘inspiration’. But his memory of events was not always reliable, and it is hard to imagine that Mountbatten's name never came up in talks with Cripps.
Mountbatten considered that Attlee may have been influenced by Mountbatten's actions as Supreme Allied Commander South East AsiaFootnote 407 after the Japanese surrender: –
Here I had a case of 125 million native populations in the liberated area with whom I had to deal. Practically all my staff and certainly all the Civil Affairs Officers who had been recruited for military administration wished to re-impose Colonial rule in Burma, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, etc. The Governments in Paris and the Hague wished to do this by force of arms without incidentally having any Military means of doing it. At every turn I was faced with the fact that I was a voice crying in the wilderness, feeling convinced that the time had come when not only had the British but the French and the Dutch and any other Colonial powers to make friends with their Colonial populations and try and persuade them to remain voluntarily in an overall form of Commonwealth, British, French or Dutch …
When I was recalled for the Potsdam Conference and Winston lost the election I went to see Attlee, my new boss, and I told him exactly what I was doing and what my policy was and confessed to him that I kept it as secret as possible from Whitehall because I knew that Winston would fire me immediately if he knew what I was doing. So Attlee said that he entirely agreed with my policy and gave me his word that he would back me up to the hilt if I continued doing what I had set out to do.Footnote 408
Mountbatten also believed that Attlee may have approved of his handling of Nehru's visitFootnote 409 to Singapore and Malaya: –
Practically, the whole of my staff were against Nehru's visit to South East Asia. On my return from one of my routine visits to different parts of my vast command I enquired what preparations had been made for Nehru's visit to Singapore. I had then discovered to my horror that the local Military Authorities in Singapore were about to issue an order that all Indian Troops were to be confined to Barracks while Nehru was in the area, that they were in no circumstances to provide any form of transport for him or his people and that his visit should be played down in every way possible.
I immediately got hold of my best Indian Brigadier, Muchu Chaudhury,Footnote 410 and put him in charge of Nehru's visit personally with full authority from me. I lent Nehru one of my own cars for his personal use. I had him met by a senior officer of my staff who brought him to see me in Government House in Singapore and I then drove with him in an open car, very much against the advice of my staff, through the streets of Singapore to the Indian Red Cross where we were to see EdwinaFootnote 411 who was working with them. That evening he dined with us and we made lifelong friends’.
There followed a crucial meeting between Cripps, Attlee, and Mountbatten, when Mountbatten laid down the conditions on which he would accept the Viceroyalty. The most fundamental condition was the request for plenipotentiary powers. After Wavell's difficulties, Mountbatten was convinced of his need for such powers, indeed, Mountbatten stated that Churchill's refusal to allow Wavell to meet Gandhi was ‘uppermost in my mind when I demanded plenipotentiary powers from Attlee’.Footnote 412
Mountbatten gave a graphic account of the reception of such a request:
‘Mr Attlee consulted Sir Stafford Cripps, and even after 22 years I can remember his next words ‘You are asking for plenipotentiary powers over His Majesty's Government. No-one has been given such powers in this century’. There was silence for quite a while, and then he went on ‘Surely you cannot mean this.’ Escape at last, I thought, as I firmly replied that I did mean just that, and would understand, if, as a result, the appointment was withdrawn. Cripps then nodded his head, and Attlee replied ‘All right, you've got the powers and the job.’ It was interesting, I thought, that Cripps was the first to indicate agreement, and that Attlee took his cue from him.Footnote 413
There was indeed no precedent for any Viceroy to have this power, though Mountbatten was not the first to ask for it. Lord MorleyFootnote 414 refers in his recollections to the occasion when this request was put to him, as Secretary of State for India, by the then Viceroy, Lord Minto,Footnote 415 and curtly refused. ‘This notion of the free hand’, he wrote, ‘is really against the letter and spirit of the law and constitution.’
Whatever the merits of the constitutional argument, Attlee was surely right to agree. No-one but Mountbatten would have had a chance of success in the mission he was undertaking to bring about Indian independence had he been obliged to refer back to Whitehall before every decision. It was one of those rare conjunctions in history between the right man and the right moment. If Attlee had consulted the Cabinet, there would also have been the risk of a disastrous ‘leak’. One can imagine what they, particularly Bevin, would have thought of Mountbatten's ‘plenipotentiary powers’.
The other condition not accepted without considerable argument was the fixing of a terminal date for British rule in India. He had to overcome Attlee's reluctance to be pinned down to a precise date, but his refusal to compromise resulted in agreement that the Raj would end not later than 20th June, 1948.
I did not know until 1978, when I had a letter from Mountbatten, that at this meeting he had also asked for my appointment as Secretary of State for India:
Dear Billy,
What you may not have known is that I coupled with the grant of plenipotentiary powers the request that Pethick-Lawrence should be removed from the Secretary of State for India on the grounds that he was a quarter of a century older than me and of a different generation. I asked for somebody to be appointed of my generation and preferably younger than me and I had the temerity to suggest your name personally for although I did not know you well you were exactly the sort of person I felt I could work with. This proved to be absolutely the case and I should like to take this opportunity of thanking you personally for the wonderful support you gave me all the way through.
Yours ever,
DickieFootnote 416
It was understandable that Mountbatten preferred a young man who would do what he was told, without too much argument, to a much older man who already had strong views of his own about India.
When Mountbatten left for India at the end of February he carried with him a directive from Attlee to secure agreement for a united India, comprising British India and the Princely States, and broadly in line with the scheme of the Cabinet Mission which had visited India the previous summer. But if the two major parties, the Congress Party and the Muslim League, were still not agreed to participate in the Government of a United India, he was to advise the Cabinet how and to whom to hand over by June 1948.
I was appointed Secretary of State for India in April, and my appointment evoked the following letter from Mountbatten: –
The Viceroy's House,
New Delhi
22nd April 1947
My Dear Listowel,
I feel I must write in extension of my telegram to reiterate my congratulations on your courageous assumption of so heavy and responsible a task, and to assure you of my loyalty and cooperation.
There are momentous times ahead, but I am heartened by the thought that we shall be in partnership for them, and that I shall have your guidance and support in my handling of affairs on the spot.
Yours sincerely,
Mountbatten
Mountbatten set out on his task in characteristic fashion. For the first week in New Delhi he spent his time making friends with Jinnah and renewing friendship with Nehru, the leaders of the League and Congress respectively, and their families, without even breathing a word about politics. He then put his plan for a united India to the two party leaders. He reported to us with deep regret that Jinnah was adamant about the establishment of Pakistan as a separate nation, and would accept nothing less. They could only agree to disagree. He was therefore in the process of drawing up his own plan for the division of India. Such a plan, we of course realised, was the only safeguard against an even greater evil than partition. For if the British left India within a year, without any agreement between Muslims and Hindus to set up a separate Government for the predominantly Hindu and Muslim areas, the two communities would fight for mastery, and the sub-continent would break up, like the Mogul Empire of the 17th century, into a welter of warring fragments. This was the situation as I found it when I arrived at the India Office at the end of April 1947. We were still waiting for the promised partition plan.
We did not have long to wait before it reached us in London, brought by Lord Ismay,Footnote 417 personal adviser to Mountbatten, to explain its contents. It was considered by the India Committee at three long meetings in the first week of May, and approved with only minor alterations on May 8th. Attlee was asked to report to the Cabinet on May 13th. In the meantime we heard, to our dismay, that Mountbatten had changed his mind about the plan. In his own words ‘he had a hunch’ that he should show it to Nehru, in spite of the contrary advice of his staff. Nehru, he said, was aghast when he had studied it. But our feelings in Whitehall can well be imagined. We were being asked to reverse a decision that had just been taken at Cabinet level.
I took the view that the Viceroy must be allowed to change his mind, but that he would be unlikely to convert the Cabinet unless he came home to put his case in person. I consulted Lord Ismay, as I knew Attlee would consult him, but he disagreed, probably wishing to protect his master from an unwelcome recall to London. It would also put him in the shade. I always turned to Cripps for advice in an emergency, and this seemed just such an occasion. I found, to my relief, that he, Cripps, agreed with me, and said he would tell Attlee he was in favour of Mountbatten's recall to London. The Viceroy's account of this episode is slightly different; he has said that the alternative to his return was to send a Cabinet Minister to New Delhi. This may have been suggested privately by Attlee, but I was unaware of it. If the suggestion was made I am delighted Mountbatten turned it down.
So it was that Attlee, instead of reporting to the Cabinet about the partition plan on May 18th, simply informed his colleagues that Mountbatten had been asked to return for talks with the India Committee. On the following day Mountbatten appeared before the Committee to explain the reasons for his change of mind, and to submit a revised plan which he said met Nehru's agonising doubts about its predecessor. We were told that Nehru's main objection to the original plan was that it would allow the Provinces to choose independence, either alone or in groups. He thought the Princely States would follow suit, and that this would result in the ‘balkanisation’ of India.
The revised plan closed this loophole by confining the Provinces to a straight choice between India and Pakistan, and in this form it was acceptable to both Congress and the League. Mountbatten went on to inform us that both new nations now wanted to stay in the Commonwealth, while reserving the right to secede, but only if their independence could be expedited to a much earlier date than we had anticipated. We were particularly surprised and delighted by the change in the attitude of the Congress leaders, who had so recently declared for an ‘Independent Sovereign Republic’.Footnote 418 Mountbatten pointed out that Jinnah had always wanted Pakistan to become a Dominion in the Commonwealth, with the same status as the old Dominions. Congress realised that this would place them at a serious disadvantage, and had therefore asked for a similar constitutional status provided only that the transfer could be effected much earlier than June 1948.
We could hardly do less than agree without a murmur to a scheme that had the blessing of both the Viceroy and the two religious communities. We also agreed to do our utmost to bring forward that date of independence to the autumn of the current year, in spite of the Parliamentary problems that such a timetable would confront us. We had at last achieved a goal that had eluded us for so long, and Wavell for even longer, an agreement between the two main religious communities, the Hindus and the Muslims, about the future of India after British rule. The leaders of both communities had had the wisdom to accept a compromise. For Jinnah the partition plan gave him a ‘moth-eaten’ Pakistan, because it obliged him to share Bengal and the Punjab with Nehru. The Congress leader disliked it equally because he had lost his dream of a united India.
Our agreement to bring forward the date of independence to the autumn of 1947 meant that we must have the consent of parliament before the summer recess at the end of July. There were two equally important conditions for the success of our effort to get the Bill through both Houses before the recess. The first was the time it would take to draft the Bill to transfer power to the two new Dominions, and the second being the support of the Conservative Opposition in both the House of Lords and House of Commons. Mr Rowlatt,Footnote 419 the senior Parliamentary draftsman, assured the Indian Committee that he could prepare a Bill within 6 weeks of receiving our instructions. We finalised our instructions on May 22nd and Attlee told the Cabinet on June 26th that a draft Bill was ready. I do not suppose any Bill of this constitutional importance in our whole Parliamentary history has ever been drafted so quickly. In the first draft, the Bill was entitled ‘The India (Dominion Status) Bill’. But Cripps immediately pointed out that Indian opinion would think that we were giving something less than complete independence, and that this key word should appear on the face of the Bill. So the title was changed to ‘India (Independence) Bill’ by the Cabinet on June 26th.
The support of the opposition parties was essential to a quick passage of the Bill through Parliament. Attlee knew that he would have no trouble with the Leader of the Liberal Party,Footnote 420 but had the good sense not to tackle the Leader of the Conservative Party, Winston Churchill, himself. Instead he asked Mountbatten, whose war record was much admired by Churchill, strongly as he disapproved of his political ideas, to undertake this delicate task. Not the least of Mountbatten's services to India, was his success in persuading Churchill, the lifelong opponent of Indian self-government, to support the Bill. His assent made freedom the gift not just of the Labour Party, but of the whole nation. His conversion was due to the acceptance by both new countries of Dominion Status, and the agreement of both leaders to stay in the Commonwealth after independence. We were fortunate that Churchill was a statesman as well as a Party Leader, and too big a man to turn such an issue to party advantage. He alone could have made the Conservative Party face the embarrassing volte-face after its attack on the Government in February for leaving India.
Before the terms of the Bill could be settled, we had to decide about the future of the Princely States, which at that time occupied about one-third of the geographical area of India. As the paramount power, the India Committee took the view that we had no right under our Treaties with the States to transfer unilaterally our duties and obligations to anyone else. But it was obvious that after British troops and the British administration had been withdrawn from India we could no longer fulfil our obligations to protect the Princely States. The paramountcy of the protecting power would therefore lapse with British rule, and they would become completely autonomous. The choice before them would therefore be either to join one of the two Dominions, or to sustain their precarious independence without the buttress of British power. So the Bill provided that paramountcy would terminate on the date of the transfer of power. It was one of Mountbatten's outstanding feats of diplomacy, which he owed not a little to his royal blood and cousinship,Footnote 421 that he persuaded the vast majority of the small autocracies to accede to one or other of the two new Dominions. It was not his fault that Kashmir and Hyderabad stood out, leaving a legacy of bitter conflict to India and Pakistan.Footnote 422
To return now to the progress of the Bill through Parliament. The final stages of its preparation were a race against time. The deadline was July the 10th, which meant that it had to be taken through both Houses in a fortnight. Mountbatten had expressed a keen wish to discuss the text of the Bill with the Indian Leaders. The request was without precedent, as no United Kingdom Bill had ever before been submitted for scrutiny and comment by politicians in other countries. The idea was strongly supported by Cripps, but Attlee, with characteristic caution, was afraid that the Opposition might scent a breach of parliamentary privilege, and wanted us to wait until he had seen and spoken to them. He reported that the Opposition Leaders had no objection, provided that they saw the Bill first.
We did not receive the Congress and the Muslim League comments on the Bill and Mountbatten's comments on their comments until shortly before the India Committee met at 9.30 pm on July 3rd. That evening the Committee sat until midnight adding the amendments asked for by our critics, and it was just possible to get a copy of the amended Bill to the Clerk at the Table of the House of Commons by 1.00 am, the latest possible time if the Bill was to reach the House that day. It was printed during the course of the night, and formally presented to the House by the Prime Minister at 11.00 am on July 4th.
With the blessing of all three political parties, it was certain that the Bill would have a smooth passage through Parliament. The built-in Government majority assured its acceptance by the Commons, but I had some anxious moments in the Lords. A single successful amendment would have sent the Bill back to the Commons, breaching our agreement with the Indian leaders and delaying the Bill and with it Indian Independence, until after the long summer recess.
There was some uneasiness about our treatment of the Princely States, which were thought by some Peers to have been given less than a fair deal. This view was expressed by Lord Salisbury, a former Leader of the Lords, and Lord Templewood,Footnote 423 who, as Secretary of State for India, had been responsible for the 1935 Government of India Act. Several amendments had been tabled. I was greatly relieved when, sensing the feeling of the House, after a speech supporting it by Lord Halifax, none of these amendments were even moved.Footnote 424 This made it possible for the Royal Assent to be given to the Bill by a Royal Commission sitting in the House of Lords on Friday July 18th, only two days ahead of our deadline. To mark the significance of this historic moment in our parliamentary history, there was a ‘five-man’ Commission of Privy Councillors on the woolsack, such as is normally reserved for the Royal Assent to the Dissolution of Parliament before a General Election. The Royal Commissioners, seated on either side of the Lord Chancellor,Footnote 425 were Lord LyttonFootnote 426 (former Governor of Bengal), Lord Llewelyn [sic]Footnote 427 (a Cabinet Minister), Lord Stansgate (former Secretary of State for India), and myself.Footnote 428
The Punjab tragedyFootnote 429 was an inevitable consequence of the division of British India, and it could only have been avoided if the unity of India had been preserved. By the time Mountbatten went out it was already too late. The divisive process became increasingly difficult to reverse from the moment when the Muslim League became committed to Pakistan in 1940. As Mountbatten relates: –
I never had a chance of convincing Jinnah that he was wrong in insisting on complete partition because he was so pathological on the subject that one could not move him. On the other hand I understand that he only gradually became so obstinate and at one time might have been moved if the right arguments had been put to him in a way that he would have considered them seriously. Personally I could visualise having the chance of converting him to a unified India if I had been able to get there before his mind had been made up in this obstinate manner. He was the key to partition as Gandhi realised when he made his famous suggestion to me that I should reform the Cabinet making Jinnah the Prime Minister.Footnote 430
There can be no doubt that the British alone had the power to transfer their sovereignty to a united India. Gandhi had asked for dominion status at the Round Table Conference in 1931, and he was the voice of the majority. Before 1940 the transition could have undoubtedly been made without providing separate homelands for the two religious communities. But British statesmanship in the decade of appeasement was at the lowest ebb that I can remember. It is not surprising that the vision was lacking and that the last opportunity was thrown away. The 1935 India Act might have been that opportunity, if we had insisted on its implementation instead of allowing the Princes to exercise their veto. Instead of granting the self-government which had been promised since 1917, or insisting on federation, we clung to power under the cloak of respectability lent by protection for the minorities until we were forced to part with it by our own reduced circumstances after five years of war. The transfer of power in 1947 was no more than a mitigation of the failure of British policy to part with power earlier to an united India.Footnote 431
I stayed with the Mountbattens for a few days in New Delhi after independence, during the dreadful massacres in the Punjab. Lady Mountbatten dashed off, quite regardless of personal risk, to look round the hospitals where the sick and wounded were being treated. She must have seemed very different from the dignified but somewhat aloof Vicereines to whom India was accustomed. Her immense energy and exceptional ability as a public speaker won her a unique place in the affections of the ordinary people. One of the first things she did after moving into the Viceroy's House was to see for herself the living conditions of the multitude of servants whose homes were in the Viceregal compound, and to urge immediate improvement of their wretched quarters. She would go long distances in the heat of the Indian summer to visit a hospital in some remote part of the country.
I was determined to meet Mahatma Gandhi before I left India. This was not altogether easy to arrange as he was staying, as he often did, in the home of a sweeper. I naturally suggested that I should see him there, but he replied that he would prefer to come to meet me. I was really astonished that he had such a wide and up to date knowledge of politics, not merely the politics of India, but the political situation in the UK. This rare combination of the politician and the saint was surely something unique, and without it a smooth and rapid transfer of power would have been difficult, if not impossible.Footnote 432
It was the combination of Gandhi and Nehru that made possible the transfer as early as August 1947. The agreement of Congress was of course indispensable. But Congress itself depended on the support of the Indian masses. It was Gandhi, not Nehru, who touched the hearts of the peoples of India. His belief in god as the source of truth which laid down the moral law which forbids untouchability, the caste system and the inequality of women, and which insisted that non-violence was the only way in which these evils could be removed; this was the teaching which went over the heads of the Congress leaders and made the Indian masses his devout disciples.
My most vivid recollection of Mountbatten in his new role of Governor-General was to find him directing as Chairman the work of the Indian Cabinet Committee dealing with the war in the Punjab. It was certainly a novel role for a constitutional Governor-General, and must have shocked some of his colleagues in the old Dominions. Another typically Mountbatten touch to show that he was sharing the food shortage with the rest of India, was to serve spam for lunch at Viceroy's House. I had only tasted this insipid meat substitute once before, during the war when meat was rationed on a weekly basis. In the evenings we were deluged with war films. I did not get the impression Mountbatten had much time or taste for reading.
The curtain that rose over the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan, fell simultaneously on the 89 years of the Indian Empire. On August 15th the India Office ceased to exist, and the last of a long line of Secretaries of State for India became extinct.
My only remaining duty was to hand over my Seals of Office to the King. His Majesty, who had just started his autumn holiday with his family at Balmoral, was good enough to say that he would like to thank me personally for what the India Office had done to bring about the transition from Empire to Dominion. For the journey from London, a Viking of the King's Flight was placed at my disposal. I arrived at the castle half an hour late for tea. The Royal Family had waited, with characteristic courtesy, for my arrival, and when we sat down at a small table on the terrace I noticed with relief that I seemed to be the only guest. The little Princesses, Elizabeth and Margaret, waited on us, handing around the scones and cakes.
After tea the King said he would like a word with me in his study. He was obviously extremely pleased that a member of his own family had played the leading role in the achievement of Indian independence, and thanked me for the help I had been able to give him from Whitehall. Having in mind, I suppose, the shower of honours Mountbatten had recommended for his staff, and the Earldom he had conferred on his cousin, he asked me whether my services had been recognised. This was a somewhat embarrassing question, as Attlee had not in fact at that time offered me anything. I forget what exactly I said, but I think my answer was that I had only been in office for a short time, and had not expected recognition of my brief tenure of the Cabinet post. When the King told me he meant to keep the Seals of the Secretary of State in his library at Windsor, I had to confess that my Department had failed to find them, and thought that they must have been lost in the distant past.
I was glad to find that Lady Delia Peel,Footnote 433 an old friend of my mother, was the Lady-in-Waiting at the time, as she was able to tell me about the etiquette of the Royal Family, and it made my weekend very much easier. I was not even surprised by the piper who marched round the table at dinner in the evening.
The attainment of Dominion Status in August 1947 was of course no more than a device to give self-government at the earliest possible moment, and did not pre-judge the decision India would ultimately take in the Constituent Assembly following independence as to whether it would remain a member of the Commonwealth. When it transpired that India did want to stay in the Commonwealth, but as a Republic instead of a Monarchy, the dangerously divisive problem again arose as whether these decisions could be mutually compatible. It was certainly clear that the Crown link could not be severed without the agreement of the existing Commonwealth countries, and Attlee was determined to do his utmost to obtain their consent, and at all costs to avoid a breakup of the Commonwealth. Burma had already left the Commonwealth after declaring itself a Republic.Footnote 434
In March 1949 he therefore despatched his emissaries to prepare the ground for the coming Prime Ministers Conference in London, which would be a turning-point in the history of the Commonwealth.
These emissaries were chosen from the Ministers and Officials who had had considerable experience of Indian and Commonwealth affairs. They were Sir Norman Brook,Footnote 435 then Secretary to the Cabinet, who went to Canada, Mr Gordon WalkerFootnote 436 who went to Pakistan and Sri Lanka,Footnote 437 Sir Percival [sic] Liesching,Footnote 438 Head of the Commonwealth Relations Office who went to South Africa, while I was sent to Australia and New Zealand. The purpose of our mission was to persuade the Prime Ministers of the other Commonwealth countries that the flexibility of the bonds uniting the Commonwealth would allow them to be stretched so as to accommodate, for the first time, a Republic. This meant that the advantages of keeping India within the Commonwealth outweighed the disadvantages of losing the common link with the Crown. This, broadly, was the argument we were briefed to put to the old Commonwealth countries.
There were affirmative responses from Canada, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and South Africa, and I found that my old friend Prime Minister Chiffley, when I met him in Canberra, was keenly aware of the importance to Australia of the closest possible relationship with his Asian neighbour. But I had a very different experience in New Zealand. There I found Prime Minister Fraser to be dead against any weakening of the position of the Crown, for which he said the people of New Zealand had such a strong affection. I had two long sessions with him on successive days, but I could not shake what he regarded as the traditional loyalty of the people of New Zealand to the Crown. Far from being a dour Scot, he was so voluble that I found it quite difficult to get a word in when I wanted to meet his arguments.
So I returned to London with a confession of failure. Attlee, however, told me not to be too despondent, as he was sure Mr Fraser would come round when he found that he and the other Prime Ministers were against him. Attlee's forecast was right, and at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in June 1950Footnote 439 it was decided unanimously to find a place in the Commonwealth for the new Republic of India. I had a note from Attlee thanking me for my contribution, in visiting the Southern Dominions, to the success of the Commonwealth Conference.
The King would acquire the additional title of ‘Head of the Commonwealth’ – first suggested in the Cabinet by Cripps – as well as those already appertaining to the British Sovereign, although losing the ‘I’ in his signature of George, ‘R & I’ (‘Rex et Imperator’).Footnote 440 This momentous decision made it possible within the next 30 years to transform the old Commonwealth of British origin into the new Commonwealth of today, with a majority of Republics among the predominantly African and Asian membership. Thus the decolonisation of the British Empire, starting from India and Pakistan, led to more rather than less goodwill between the United Kingdom and its former dependencies, who now enjoyed not only their freedom from colonial status but, as well, a new worldwide partnership between free and equal nations.
India: 37 years after independence
I paid my last visit to India in 1978, when I was invited by the UK branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association [CPA] to lead a delegation of members of both houses to visit their branches throughout India. Our party consisted of six members of the House of Commons and myself. They asked me to be their leader and Mr Hugh Rossi MPFootnote 441 to act as deputy leader. They also included Dame Janet Fookes,Footnote 442 as member of the Speaker's Panel of Chairm[e]n and Deputy Speaker in the House of Commons and Mr Ian [sic] Lawrence,Footnote 443 now a QC and member of numerous committees in the House of Commons.
Starting from New Delhi where we were welcomed by Mr Hegde,Footnote 444 Speaker of the Lok Sabha and president of the branch. The CPA had no less than six branches in India, which gave us a chance to pay a fleeting visit to six states as well as New Delhi. We paid our respects to the President of IndiaFootnote 445 at the Lutyens Palace of the Viceroys, now the Rashtrapati Bhavan. The interior was still draped in mauve, the dreadful colour chosen by Lady Willingdon when her husband was Viceroy. We met the Prime Minister, and several of his Cabinet colleagues, and the Speaker arranged a dinner for us to meet Mrs Indira Ghandi [sic]Footnote 446 and other Opposition leaders. It was amusing to note that one sign over a large store in Main Street read ‘By Appointment to Queen Mary’. India has accepted the Raj as an episode in its history, much as Russia had accepted the Tsars. We attended meetings of the two chambers, including ‘Question Time’ in the Lower House, where the badinage made us feel quite at home. As I am not writing a ‘Traveller's Guide to India’, I shall only mention my outstanding impression of six states we visited on our way south from Delhi. I shall not forget the Taj Mahal, the Red Fort, the palaces of four Maharajahs with their splendid water gardens or the famous rock cut temples with their splendid examples of Hindu sculpture. In Bombay, we were taken across the Bay to the Elephanta Caves to see some more splendid Hindu sculpture. I cannot end without a word of thanks to Shri Rikhi, Secretary to the Lok Sabha in New Delhi, who was our guide and friend throughout our travels.
My Indian visit in 1978 was an experience for which I can never be sufficiently grateful to my Indian hosts and can only repay with a love for their country and people that will last all my days.
