Since 1979, Iran has been the subject of great intellectual curiosity and scholarly scrutiny. Numerous attempts have been made to explain causes and consequences of the “Islamic revolution” and to dissect Iran's current political course in terms of its history and political culture. Indeed, without such a historical backdrop, the present political reality is incomprehensible. Moreover, it is significant to discern to what extent the Islamic Republic—its ideology and political agenda—is part of the main contour of Iranian political tradition and to what extent it is a deviation from it.
In Eternal Iran, Clawson and Rubin set out to illuminate some of these issues. The book is ambitious in its scope and range. It encompasses pre-Islamic imperial history, Islamic conquest and Islamization, and the emergence of the modern Iranian state. The main focus of the book, however, is the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its aftermath. If readers are looking for a new theoretical analysis of Iranian history or the 1979 revolution, this volume will disappoint them. Much of the material presented here has been covered before. However, if they are looking for an accessible account of Iranian history and its present political dynamics, they will find the present volume to be “user friendly”—free of jargon, well written, and a comprehensive introduction to the subject matter.
The book has several distinct strengths. Unlike many other scholarly works on Iranian history and politics—marked by their dearth of analysis on the role of ethnic and religious minorities—this volume pays special attention to the plight and the role of minorities in Iranian history and politics. The treatment and the contributions of religious minorities such as Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Bahai, as well as ethnic minorities such as Azerbaijanis, Kurds, and Baluchis are covered. The authors also attribute Iranian national pride—so omnipresent in political behavior on the global stage—to a distinct sense of identity that goes back to the mighty and cultured Persian Empire. With a history of more than 2,500 years of continuous civilization that dates back centuries before the Islamic conquest of Iran in the 7th century, many history-conscious Iranians take pride in their past and use it as a source of strength to cope with their present political predicament as a Third World nation on the periphery of the world's economic and power structure. The current reality of Iran as a Third World nation that produces neither the technology, the capital, nor the intellectual, cultural, and military might that drives the engine of globalization has not prevented some Iranian political leaders before and after the revolution to envision Iran as “the Center of the Universe.” This self-inflated image is often an obstacle to a sober assessment of Iran's limitations of power on the international stage. The flip side of this inflated self-image is the “fear of inferiority.” Once a mighty civilization, Iran is now shunned by some in the global community as a pariah state. It is in the context of this defensive posture that Iranian self-image is constantly juxtaposed with the perception of Westerners. As the authors accurately observe, the looming political presence of the West has been an intellectual preoccupation in modern Iranian history.
The authors' exploration of links between Iran's domestic developments and foreign-policy agenda provides readers with a broader perspective on Iranian foreign policy. The book is also up to date and incorporates the latest political events in Iran, including the ramifications of President Ahmadinejad's ascendance to power and the drama of Iran's confrontation with the United States and the European Union over the nuclear crisis. The authors aptly point out the alienation of large sectors of increasingly sophisticated Iranian intellectuals and educated youth from the regime. A new generation of Iranian youth with no memory of the 1979 revolution has stepped into the political scene; for them, the revolution no longer serves as the source of legitimacy. This younger generation's vision is westward looking, and they aspire to democracy and freedom. They are the major catalyst for any future social change in Iran.
The major weakness of the book, alas, is its ideological bias. The following examples demonstrate this problem. The authors' endorsement of the International Monetary Fund's glowing account of the Iranian economy's performance under the Shah's regime (p. 84) has been disputed by numerous scholarly analyses in the 1960s and 1970s. Embracing the U.S. State Department's loaded characterization of the Islamic Republic as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism” (p. 184) is also dubious, to say the least. The authors are well-served to heed the adage that one side's “terrorist” is the other side's “freedom fighter.” To be sure, there are many examples of the Islamic Republic's support for Muslim extremist groups, especially during the first decade of the revolution, when the revolutionary zeal was at its zenith and the desire to export Islamic revolution was at the top of Iran's foreign-policy agenda. However, to cite the Iranian government's attempt to take weapons in September 1992 to the Muslim Bosnians (p. 184), who were the target of genocide and ethnic cleansing by Serbian military forces and vigilante civilians alike, is a poor case to substantiate the authors' point about the Iranian government's “support for international terrorism” and is an example of ideological overreaching.
Despite the ideological edge discussed above, the book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Iranian history and politics, and its accessible prose renders it appealing to a wider audience.
