Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2004
What standard or principle should guide decisionmaking concerning the permissibility of allowing children to be organ donors? For a long time, it has been widely assumed that the best interest of the child is the appropriate standard. But recently, several critics have charged that this standard fails to give due weight to the interests of the family and the intimate relationships that the family makes possible.1,2 This article reviews and rejects both the best-interest standard (as it has been traditionally conceived) and the alternative standard recommended by the critics. I then propose a new standard to help parents, healthcare professionals, and judges decide when it is and is not permissible for children to serve as organ donors. This new standard modifies and broadens the best-interest standard to allow it to account adequately for the contribution that intimate relationships make to the well-being of children.
What standard or principle should guide decisionmaking concerning the permissibility of allowing children to be organ donors? For a long time, it has been widely assumed that the best interest of the child is the appropriate standard. But recently, several critics have charged that this standard fails to give due weight to the interests of the family and the intimate relationships that the family makes possible.1
Schoeman F. Parental discretion and children's rights: background and implications for medical decision-making. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1985;10:45–61.
Friedman Ross L. Children, Families and Healthcare Decision Making. New York: Oxford University Press; 1998.
Before proceeding, I will simplify the discussion by drawing a distinction and making two assumptions. Doing so will allow me to sidestep some important complications that would need to be addressed in a full treatment of child organ donation, but it will enable me to focus the discussion more precisely on the issues that I want to address here. The distinction I wish to draw concerns the degree of risk that the organ donation poses to the donor. I shall distinguish between donations that involve only a minor risk to the donor and donations that involve a significant increase over minor risk to the donor. Examples of the former include the donation of a pint of blood or bone marrow. Examples of the latter include the donation of a kidney. Unlike the former donations, the donation of a kidney poses a substantial risk to the developing capacities of the child, and, as such, it is considerably more difficult to justify. For this reason, it is necessary to keep this distinction in mind.
The first assumption I make is that the prospective child organ donor does not actively dissent to the proposed organ donation. Active dissent does not occur if the child either consents to the organ donation or is too young to consent or dissent. If a child donor does actively dissent to being an organ donor, it will become considerably more difficult to justify the organ donation. My second assumption is that at least one parent of the child who is a prospective organ donor consents to the donation. If neither parent consents to the organ donation, I assume that the donation would not be justified.
This distinction and these two assumptions enable me to define two focal cases:
With respect to these two focal cases, I seek to identify the standard that should guide decisionmaking concerning the permissibility of child organ donation. If such a standard can be identified for these focal cases, then it should prove useful in thinking about nonfocal cases. But, at least in this article, I do not attempt to extend the analysis to these nonfocal cases.
Many have thought that, in these focal cases, as well as in other cases, the standard that should govern decisionmaking concerning child organ donation is one that appeals to the best interests of the child organ donor.3
Masden v. Harrison, Mass., Eq. no. 68651 (1957 Jun 12).
Buchanan AE, Brock DW. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1973.
In Re Richardson, La. App., 284 So. 2d. 185 (1900).
Hunter J. Consent for the legally incompetent organ donor. New England Journal of Medicine 1991;12:535–57.
Strunk v. Strunk, Ky., 445 S.W. 2d. 145 (1969).
Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A. 2d. 386 (1972).
Despite its appeal, however, this standard is often difficult to apply. It is often unclear what interests of the donor should be taken into account when considering what is in his or her best interests. On this matter, it is often assumed that the psychological interests of the donor are relevant, but it is far from clear how these can be assessed in anything but a very speculative manner.9
Nathan v. Farinelli, Mass., Eq. no. 74-87 (1974 Jul 3).
But this practical difficulty with applying the best-interest principle is not a good reason for rejecting it. Any general standard for assessing the ethical permissibility of child organ donation requires sensitive judgment to be applied properly. There are, however, two more compelling reasons why this standard is questionable. First, the standard does not take into account the value of intimate relationships between children and potential organ recipients. As it has been traditionally conceived, the best-interest principle directs decisionmakers “to focus on the individual's self-regarding interests, not upon his or her alleged interests in the good of others.”10
See note 4, Buchanan, Brock 1995:133.
I will discuss these benefits in more detail later. My point here is that the best-interest principle (as it has been traditionally conceived) does not permit decisionmakers to consider all the relevant benefits. It directs them to consider only one class of benefits—those associated with the self-regarding interests of the donor.11
See note 4, Buchanan, Brock 1995:226–37. In this work Buchanan and Brock allow that other interests may compete with the value of promoting the self-regarding interests of the child. In principle, therefore, they concede that the best-interest principle does not fully determine the ethical permissibility of decisionmaking by adults for their children.
This point is strengthened by a second one. Parents who have more than one child have obligations to further the interests of each one. These obligations can sometimes come into conflict. Suppose, for example, that the best interests of a child would be set back by requiring him to do something that is necessary to advance the best interests of his sister. Here, if the parents are to act on the best-interest principle, they need to know whether to further his best interests or those of his sister. Further suppose that the issue at stake concerns the need for one child to make an organ donation to the other. Now, if it is claimed that parents must always look out for the best interests of the child who would be serving as the organ donor, then we need to be given some reason why this is the case. This reason cannot appeal to the obligation parents have to promote the best interests of their children, because this obligation fails to discriminate between the organ donor and the recipient when both are children of the parents.
This example demonstrates that the best-interest principle cannot stand alone. It must be supplemented by a further ethical principle that requires parents to balance fairly the competing obligations they owe to their children. I shall not propose such a fairness principle here. I mention the need for such a principle for the purpose of underscoring a simple but important truth. Values other than those associated with the best interests of the child organ donor are relevant to judgments about the ethical permissibility of child organ donation. These other values need to be taken into account. Once we do this, however, we will need either to leave the best-interest principle behind or modify it considerably.12
When we do this, of course, we will not have abandoned the idea that the best interests of the organ donor is a very important consideration. But we will have abandoned the idea that the best interests of the organ donor (understood in narrow terms) is all that matters; and that is what is implied in the best-interest principle.
This has motivated some to look for a different standard for assessing the ethical permissibility of child organ donation. One such standard was suggested by the court in Nathan v. Farinelli.13
See note 9, Nathan v. Farinelli.
This suggests a reasonably clear standard for assessing the ethical permissibility of child organ donation, one that I refer to as the intrafamilial principle. This principle holds that child organ donation is ethically permissible if it satisfies two necessary conditions: (1) that the parents of the child donor have considered all the relevant benefits and risks of the donation and have consented to it, and (2) that the recipient of the donated organ is a family member of the donor. This principle can be qualified and supplemented in various ways. For example, it may be held that if the parents' decision to consent, even if it is based on a consideration of all the relevant benefits and risks, is patently unreasonable, then the child organ donation should not take place. Alternatively, it may be held that, in some cases of child organ donation, a further condition must be met for the donation to be justified. In case 2 examples, for instance, it may be thought that the child donor's consent is necessary for the donation to be ethically permissible.14
See note 2, Friedman Ross 1998:111–30.
Still, despite these attractions, the intrafamilial principle runs into some serious problems of its own. An adequate ethical standard for assessing the permissibility of child organ donation must not only provide a means for identifying the class of persons to whom a child organ donor could (permissibly) donate his or her organs, but it must also provide guidance as to when these donations would be ethically appropriate. I argue that the intrafamilial principle fails to provide appropriate guidance on this crucial issue.
To see why, we must specify more concretely what is meant by “the full range of benefits and risks” that the parents must consider. If these concern only the best interests of the child organ donor, then the intrafamilial principle is indistinguishable from the best-interest principle. But proponents of the intrafamilial principle do not, of course, intend to restrict the meaning of this phrase in this way. Rather, they argue that under certain circumstances parents should be able to “trade off” the well-being of one child to promote family goals and objectives. According to Lainie Friedman Ross, for example, because “families can have interests that are not reducible to the interests and needs of particular members, parents must be allowed to make intrafamilial trade-offs.”15
See note 2, Friedman Ross 1998:43.
I argue that the trade-off idea is misguided. Although it gives content to the intrafamilial principle, it should be rejected because it is based on an ethically suspect conception of the family. It must be noted, however, that the rejection of the trade-off idea does not imply that the state should intervene to prevent families from acting on it.
The justification of state intervention raises additional considerations.
Bearing this in mind, what is wrong with the trade-off idea? It will be useful here to distinguish two possibilities. In the first, the overall interests of the child organ donor are set back for the good of the family understood as a collective unit. In the second, the interests of the child organ donor are advanced by the donation. This could occur because the child may benefit from helping a family member, and this benefit may outweigh the cost to him of the organ donation. The trade-off idea fails to distinguish these possibilities. But when proponents of the intrafamilial principle claim that “families can have interests that are not reducible to the interests and needs of particular members” they strongly suggest that the first possibility is what they have in mind. This is a mistake. It unnecessarily reifies the family, making it look as if it has purposes and goals of its own that stand over and above the purposes and goals of individuals within it.16
See note 4, Buchanan, Brock 1995.
This is why this understanding of the family is ethically suspect. It may be objected at this point that, when the family as a whole benefits, each member of the family benefits as well. But notice that, to the extent that this is true, we have moved from the first possibility to the second. As I explain in the next section, the second possibility does not require us to accept the trade-off idea. If the child organ donor will himself benefit from the donation, then his interests are not being traded off to benefit the family as a whole.
A second problem confronts the intrafamilial principle as well. As discussed, this principle restricts child organ donation to family members of the organ donor. But it is not clear how the family or the boundaries of the family should be defined. These problems have arisen in cases that have come, or may someday come, before the courts. By looking at a couple of these cases, I argue that we have reason to reject the intrafamilial principle in favor of another principle, one that captures its good insights but does not suffer from its problems.
The first case that poses a problem for the intrafamilial principle came before the Illinois courts in 1990. It concerned bone-marrow testing and harvesting procedures between 3-year-old twins and their 12-year-old half-brother, who was suffering from mixed lineage leukemia.17
Curran v. Bosze, 141 Ill. 2d. 473, 566 N. E. 2d. 1319 (1990).
This case raises many interesting issues, but two in particular bear importantly on the plausibility of the intrafamilial principle. The first is that, in this case, the parents of the prospective child organ donors disagreed among themselves about what ought to be done. When this occurs, the intrafamilial principle runs into problems, for the principle vests decisionmaking authority with the family. It does not specify who should have decisionmaking authority when family members—in particular, parents—disagree among themselves. The second issue concerns the relationship that must obtain between two people for them to be considered family members for the purposes of applying the intrafamilial principle. In this case, the twins were biologically related to their half-brother, but he did not live with them and they barely knew him.18
According to court testimony, the twins had met their half-brother only twice.
In deciding for Curran, the Illinois Supreme Court argued that an “existing close relationship between the donor and recipient” must be present for the donation to be permissible.19
See note 17, Curran v. Bosze.
The second case that I will consider is hypothetical, but, given that there is now widespread support for the ethical permissibility of organ donation between adults who are not genetically related,20
Evans M. Organ donations should not be restricted to relatives. Journal of Medical Ethics 1989;15:17–20.
Spital A. Unrelated living kidney donors. Transplantation 1994;57(1):1722–6.
Terasaki P, Cecka JM, Gjertson DW, Takemoto S. High survival rates of kidney transplants from spousal and living unrelated donors. New England Journal of Medicine 1995;6:333–6.
The case concerns a 14-year-old child, John, who wishes to donate a kidney to a close friend, David, who is not a family member. David has no relative who is a “suitable” donor, and John is the only available donor who is both HLA compatible with David and willing to consent to the donation. John's parents also consent to the donation, and they believe, after considering all the relevant risks and benefits, that the donation is acceptable. John has also considered all the relevant risks and benefits of being a kidney donor, and he very much wants to go forward with the donation. In this case (and certainly in a case that involved only a case 1 donation, such as bone marrow), I believe that the donation is ethically permissible. It would be a mistake, I believe, for either the courts or the hospital to prevent the donation from taking place.
This judgment clearly contradicts the intrafamilial principle. It is based on the thought that child organ donations should not necessarily be limited to family members. If this is right, then this case, like the first one, gives us a reason to reject the intrafamilial principle and to look for a better principle for judging the ethics of child organ donation. I now turn to this task.
Both the best-interest and intrafamilial principles are supported by valid considerations. When considering the ethics of child organ donation, the interests of the child donor must be taken into account and given substantial weight. Likewise, children should not serve as organ donors for recipients that they do not know or do not have any relationship with. It is one thing if adults wish to donate organs to strangers; quite another for children to do so. Restricting child organ donation to donations within the family respects this important point.
However, as I argued, both of these principles run into problems. The best-interest principle excludes some relevant considerations, and the intrafamilial principle is based on an ethically suspect conception of the family and fails to adequately handle the hard cases discussed in the last section. Bearing this in mind, I now propose a third principle—the intimate attachment principle—for determining the ethical permissibility of child organ donation. This principle builds on the good insight behind the intrafamilial principle. It holds that child organ donation is only permissible if it meets the following condition: There must exist an intimate attachment between the child donor and the recipient. This intimate attachment usually exists between biological family members, but it does not always exist, as Curran v. Bosze illustrates. More importantly, intimate attachments can exist between children and other persons who are not related to them. Thus, in principle at least, the intimate attachment principle can justify child organ donation to recipients outside the family.
To understand the content of the intimate attachment principle, I need to explain what an intimate attachment between persons is and when we can know that one exists. Before doing this, it is important to stress that the intimate attachment principle is only one necessary condition on ethically permissible child organ donation. Other conditions, such as the consent of at least one parent, must also be met. It should be kept in mind that this principle is intended to help parents, healthcare professionals, and judges decide when child organ donations in case 1 or case 2 examples would be ethically permissible. As I indicated previously, the principles under discussion here do not necessarily apply to other kinds of (nonfocal) cases.
What, then, is an intimate attachment between persons—in particular, between a child and another person? The key element in such an attachment is that the well-being of the child is, in some way, inextricably bound up with the well-being of the person to whom he or she has an attachment.23
See note 2, Friedman Ross 1998:117.
Schoeman F. Rights of children, rights of parents, and the moral basis of the family. Ethics 1980;91:6–19.
There are, of course, different ways in which a child's well-being can be bound up with the well-being of another person. Consider the case of a child's parent. Children obviously have a strong interest in the continued survival of their parents. Their emotional development, as well as their physical support, clearly are at stake. For this reason, I believe that child organ donations to their parents could, where medically appropriate, be justified. Children can also form intimate attachments with siblings and close friends. In the Curran case, the court held that the prospective child organ donors did not have a “close existing relationship” with their half-brother. As I said, I believe this was a correct ruling; but it should be clear that “close existing relationships” can obtain between friends as well as siblings. Given this obvious fact, to restrict child organ donation to siblings would be arbitrary. So long as the child organ donation would be medically appropriate, I see no reason why children should not be permitted to donate organs to close friends.
Admittedly, the notion of an intimate attachment and the corresponding notion of a child's well-being being bound up with another are not precise ideas. Reasonable people will sometimes disagree over whether such an attachment exists in a given case. This, however, is to be expected. I am not proposing an algorithm for determining when each and every prospective donation would be ethically permissible. More modestly, I am proposing a standard or principle to help guide or direct thinking on this matter. It is also true that the notion of an intimate attachment is no more imprecise than the notion of the child's (self-regarding) best interest, which, as we have seen, has been the dominant principle relied on by the courts.
Indeed, as I suggested earlier, the intimate attachment principle can be understood as an extension of the best-interest principle. When an intimate attachment exists between a child organ donor and a prospective recipient, then the well-being of the former is bound up with the latter. This makes it possible for the organ donation to serve the best interests of both the donor and the recipient.25
I do not claim that whenever an intimate attachment exists between two persons, then an organ donation between them would serve the interests of both. More weakly, I claim only that it is possible, and in some cases, quite plausible, to think that this could occur.
See note 4, Buchanan, Brock 1995.
See note 24, Schoeman 1980.
I have made plain that I am considering cases where the child herself consents to the donation with the approval of at least one parent. In these cases there is good reason to think that an intimate attachment exists. Or, to put this point another way, children and their parents are usually in a better position than anyone else to judge whether an intimate attachment exists between the child and the would-be recipient of organ donation.
For this reason, a strong case can be made for the view that parents should be considered the presumptive authorities of when an intimate attachment exists between their child and another person. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that the judgments of parents should never be challenged. Given the potential for abuse on this matter, healthcare professionals have an obligation to consider whether parental decisions are ethically sound. Moreover, and more strongly, I believe that when the risks to the child organ donor are more than minimal (as in case 2 examples) there should be routine judicial review of parental decisions, even when these concern consensual voluntary decisions within the family.
Notwithstanding these points, in this article I have not been primarily concerned with the question of who should have decisionmaking authority with respect to deciding whether a proposed child organ donation is permissible. Nor have I been concerned with the issue of when, and under what conditions, state intervention is justified. Rather, I have been concerned with identifying the standard that should guide decisionmaking on this issue, regardless of who has the authority to make the decision.
According to the intimate attachment principle, child organ donations are ethically permissible if there exists an attachment between the child donor and the recipient such that the well-being of the former depends, in part at least, on the well-being of the latter. The application of this principle to real-world cases leaves much room for debate. To what degree, for example, must the child donor's well-being depend on the recipient's well-being for there to exist an intimate attachment? And how should we verify that an intimate attachment exists when there is doubt on the matter? Despite these hard questions, however, the intimate attachment principle provides a clear and compelling standard for assessing the ethical permissibility of child organ donation. It refines the best-interest principle and captures what is valuable in the intrafamilial principle. When an intimate attachment exists between a child donor and a recipient, the interests of the child donor will be furthered by the donation. And, given that intimate attachments usually exist between family members, the intimate attachment principle will generally not conflict with family autonomy. Although it captures what is valuable in both of these other principles, however, the intimate attachment principle goes beyond them and provides a stronger justification for child organ donation. This justification, if taken seriously, would have important implications for current practice. The intimate attachment principle broadens the scope of permissible child organ donation. If the argument of this paper is correct, the range of ethically permissible child organ donations is significantly broader than is currently thought.