Linda Mancillas’ Presidents and Mass Incarceration maps the meteoric increase of the prison population in the United States focusing specifically on how presidents played a role “in get[ting] the job done” (Mancillas, 6). Mancillas is clear that she has a political motivation: She calls for an end to the system of mass incarceration and a change in the way that the leaders of the United States respond to crime. Nevertheless, the book offers a comprehensive historical exploration into the question of how we ended up with the current system.
Her analysis spans the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson to Donald Trump. She marks the Johnson era as the beginning of a change in the American consciousness where anti-crime tactics shifted from poverty reduction to incarceration. No president after Johnson managed to dismantle the system, and few tried.
Methodologically, she analyzes the role that each president played in the construction of this system as she explains its subsequent development. She utilizes a Neustadt-inspired approach by theorizing that presidents’ overall leadership skills matter and that successful presidents utilize these skills to support legislation. To do this, she looks at the initiatives supported and introduced by presidents, the media's reporting on key events, and presidents’ stated support for legislation. Her main argument is that the media and presidents’ framing of crime, race, and the drug war during the 1960s and 1970s helped to construct a narrative that rendered mass incarceration possible, and presidents utilized this narrative to push an agenda that contributed to it. While most Republican presidents after Johnson supported these policies in speeches and executive actions, it was Democrat Bill Clinton who helped solidify the massive expansion of the prison population through his attempts to show that he would not be soft on crime. With a consensus on tough-on-crime policies, the prison population exploded. Any attempt to pass criminal justice reform, after the problem was identified, was delayed or thwarted, with the possible exception of Obama's modest reforms. But even that had limited impact due to the lack of consensus between Republicans and Democrats. Mancillas makes it clear that presidents' consistent attempts to appeal to white voters with racially charged rhetoric about drugs and crime helped breed an environment where a massive increase in the prison population could become a reality.
The more complete story begins with Lyndon Johnson, whose attempts to expand anti-poverty programs were threatened by the perception of rising domestic discord through protests and increased crime and drug usage rates. Media focused on this, which bred support for the implementation of systems of mass incarceration (Mancillas, 28).
Exploiting these conditions, Nixon utilized law and order rhetoric during his campaign, which he framed as a moderate alternative to both the liberal Democrats and the radical GOP presidential candidates, like Barry Goldwater and George Wallace (Mancillas, 30). He blamed a lack of individual responsibility for the rise in crime that occurred during the 1960s and proposed harsher penalties for drug use (Mancillas, 36), utilizing this rhetorical framing to successfully support legislative proposals for mandatory minimum sentences (Mancillas, 44).
Neither Ford nor Carter presided over significant expansions of the country's response to crime, though Carter was criticized by some on the Right for being “soft on crime.” Reagan utilized this perception of Carter to frame crime in the United States as the failure of Democrat-backed policies. Following the path of Nixon, he appealed to white working-class voters’ racial resentments. He blamed crime on Supreme Court decisions, written by Democrat-appointed justices that provided protections to the accused (Mancillas, 78). Reagan subsequently utilized this narrative to push for even harsher drug laws and declared a War on Drugs, while George H.W. Bush continued along the path set by Reagan.
With a need to appeal to the middle-class's shifting values on crime, Clinton reframed the Democratic Party's policy position as being “tough” but “fair” (Mancillas, 92). He was cognizant of his need to not appear soft on crime and coupled that stance with his plan to maintain a business friendly environment. He worked to gain support for bi-partisan “three-strikes” legislation, which he signed into law. Clinton also supported the privatization of public services, including prisons (Mancillas, 94). All of this ultimately converged when the policies that Clinton proposed and supported led to a dramatic increase in the prison population.
While crime rates continued to fall during the 1990s and early 2000s, law enforcement policies during the George W. Bush years were ultimately influenced by the War on Terror and the increased focus on the War on Drugs (Mancillas, 106). Already a pro-law and order politician based on his actions as Texas governor, Bush maintained that approach during his 2000 campaign.
Although domestic crime rates remained low during Obama's presidency, his focus shifted to immigration, but he often acted through executive action. At the same time, a growing consensus among some policy reformers began to form around the need for criminal justice reform. Notably, Obama did take some action to end some controversial policies, like terminating the federal government's reliance on private prisons (Mancillas, 134). But, he was unable to gain support for substantial reforms that would require legislative action.
Finally, Trump's rhetoric, according to Mancillas, echoed Nixon. And he signed three executive actions to expand law and order policies early in his presidency. She concludes that Congress has failed to take action to address mass incarceration through comprehensive criminal justice reform.
Overall, this book offers an important contribution to our understanding of the role that presidents have played in implementing mass incarceration. Although it could benefit from a more explicitly sketched link between the overall methodology and findings and the theoretical conclusions, this book offers important insights into the way that presidents' use of race in their campaigns contributed to actual policy outcomes.
