[…] what is peculiarly proper to the essence of the incipient philosophy of this phenomenological–transcendental radicalism is that […] rather than having a ground of things taken for granted and ready in advance, as does objective philosophy, it excludes in principle a ground of this or any other sort. Thus it must begin without an underlying ground. But immediately it achieves the possibility of creating a ground for itself through its own powers, namely, in mastering, through original self-reflection, the naïve world as transformed into a phenomenon or rather a universe of phenomena […] Its fate (understood subsequently, to be sure, as an essentially necessary one) is to become involved again and again in paradoxes, which, arising out of uninvestigated and even unnoticed horizons, remain functional and announce themselves as incomprehensibilities. (C181/K185; italics mine)Footnote 1
‘The spiritual shape of Europe’—what is it? [We must] exhibit the philosophical idea which is immanent in the history of Europe (spiritual Europe) or, what is the same, the teleology which is immanent in it, which makes itself known, from the standpoint of universal mankind as such, as the breakthrough and the developmental beginning of a new human epoch—the epoch of mankind which now seeks to live, and only can live, in the free shaping of existence, its historical life, through ideas of reason, through infinite tasks. (C274/K319)
Husserl’s discussion of teleology in his Vienna Lecture is nothing short of puzzling, even downright problematic, given what appears to be an unabashed endorsement of Enlightenment notions of reason and progress. Even more troubling is Husserl’s unapologetic Eurocentrism—reminiscent of Hegel’s views on the philosophy of history—bound to fulfil, in his view, through a veritable entelechy, the Greek ideal of universal, theoretical knowledge. How are we to make sense of these claims, which fly in the face of phenomenology’s neutral metaphysical and epistemological stance? How are we to understand the normative import of philosophical and theoretical work broadly construed? How are we, those committed to the philosophical and concrete value of transcendental phenomenology, to understand the structures, goals and conditions for the possibility of these, our efforts?
In what follows, I will argue that what prima facie strikes us as problematic—even troubling—about Husserl’s discussions of teleology and of the related notions of normativity, reason and progress are necessary features of the historicity of our work as theoreticians, as phenomenologists. We must thus strive to uncover not only what these features are, what they entail, but also, crucially, what the necessity of these features amounts to. This, I propose, is the key to understanding both what Husserl means by teleology in the Crisis and the distinctive critical task he prescribes in the same text. What will transpire are the radical ways in which Husserlian teleology, given its structure and relationship to the notion of phenomenology as critique, clearly distinguishes itself from any potential Hegelian overtones.
To accomplish this, I will argue that transcendental phenomenology, as Husserl conceives it at the end of his career and as robust transcendental critique,Footnote 2 is necessarily a ‘critique from within’. More specifically, I will explore four aspects of this form of critique that structurally delineate it as such; all four Husserl stresses throughout his final work, namely that: 1) we must examine our history and theoretical tradition; 2) we must render what we and our forebears have taken for granted as obvious (selbstverständlich), all the way to basic epistemic, methodological and normative commitments; 3) as we proceed, we must continuously reflect not only on these grounds and their subsequent developments, but also on these self-reflective accomplishments themselves; and finally, 4) it is not only the grounds of our theoretical tradition(s) that we must unearth and shed light on, but also the goals that drive us forward as they relate to these grounds. These four aspects of phenomenological critique deliberately and methodologically ‘mirror’ the core structures of historical teleology in need of investigation: traditionality, obviousness, sedimentation of norms and the mutually reinforcing dynamic between grounds and goals.
Two senses of teleology, intricately interwoven, emerge: historical and transcendental. With this, a certain neat ‘doubling’ of what we mean by ‘necessity’ and ‘validity’ (as they pertain to these two senses of teleology) may also be expected to emerge. However, a further distinction—between two qualitatively different kinds of historical (here theoretical) teleology, namely non-critical and critical—further complicates matters. Critical teleology relates differently to validity and necessity than non-critical teleologies. This is so because, in its own teleology, radical critique is a transcendental–eidetic endeavour that thinks through historical formations and accomplishments to the apodictic structures of their corresponding meaning and value constituting processes.Footnote 3 Thus, examining the specific historical teleology pertaining to phenomenology as distinctive, radical critique, especially as it endorses a certain notion of necessity, will help clarify ‘normativity’, ‘progress’, and ‘reason’: all multivalent concepts that figure largely in Husserl’s controversial Vienna Lecture.
Ultimately, what emerges is not a philosophical view marred by crippling contradictions—such as, for example, the tension between cultural-historical relativism and apodictic universalism, which Husserl 1910–11 sought to avoid at all cost early on in Philosophy as Rigorous Science, or the tension between a blind endorsement of Enlightenment rationality and metaphysical neutrality—but a potency at the very heart of phenomenological inquiry itself. Husserl often used the language of paradox to gesture toward this potency (such as his claim that phenomenology is ‘without a ground, yet not groundless’ (C181/K185)). I propose we leave behind the shadow of a binary logic and instead think positively about this puzzle through the language of ambiguity: the realization that critical, philosophical work, our work, if it is to be free of presuppositions and guard itself against unwarranted accomplishments, with their ever-luring, seductive validity (think objectivism and naturalism), must at once be both historical and transcendental. Nowhere does Husserl more expediently capture this ambiguity of phenomenology as ‘critique from within’ than through his notion of the historical a priori. And while with Ricoeur, we may decry this ambiguity as ‘a tragedy’ (2007: 172), one that, as it realizes philosophy’s own task, is also inevitably traitorous: a drama ‘born from the fact that every actualization of the task threatens the loss of the task’ (158), we must also assume it as our path if we are to navigate, through the ‘crust’ of our history, the treacherous waters of lived contradictions (C17/K15) and incomprehensibilities (C181/K185). The journey, while difficult, is less traitorous than first appears. Not only does this positive notion of ambiguity (as opposed to its pervasive negative sense) help clarify Husserl’s complex and, yes puzzling, understanding of phenomenological inquiry, it also clearly distances the phenomenological method of inquiry from a linear, progressive, contradiction-driven process such as Hegelian dialectic (cf. Hegel Reference Hegel1934: 491ff.; Hegel Reference Hegel1928: 26–27, 31–37, 40–59, 68–74).
I. The given and the taken
While Husserl’s proposal, namely that transcendental phenomenology undergo a ‘re-orientation’ through what he refers to as ‘teleological-historical reflection’ (C3, n. 1/Kxiv, n. 3) in its study of the structures of meaning-constitution, is not without controversy, at least one thing is clear: what he proposes is not just any kind of historical reflection (C115/K118; C354/K365). It is an inquiry very much fuelled by the vital consequences of certain theoretical decisions—an inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of certain privileged interests and preoccupations (C119/K121), which hold the upper hand and are responsible, according to Husserl, along with our assuming attitude toward them, for the ‘crisis of reason’ in which, arguably, we still find ourselves (C7–18/K4–17). Motivated by the ‘loss of faith’ in our ability as theoreticians to make sense of ‘the totality of what is’ (C13/K11), transcendental historical reflection is anything but a ‘pseudo-consolation’ (C11/K9). It looks not only at this crisis’s lineage (which, as we shall see, is anything but linear) and at our tradition as heirs of Modernity, but also seeks to expose, through a ‘gazing back’ (zurückblicken), the ‘driving force’ (Triebkraft) (C71/K72)—the historical teleology—carrying this theoretical tradition forward. According to Husserl, this ‘driving force’ is a veritable ‘latent entelechy’ behind this tradition’s movements (C16/K13–14): a ‘concealed, long-felt’ unity (C100/K103), setting the tone for its directions of inquiry.
Through historical reflection, meant to complement its other core methods (i.e., the reductions and eidetic variation),Footnote 4 phenomenology must assume the role of critique of present systems of knowledge (C71/K72) to expose the conditions for the possibility of these systems’ flow, their Gedankenbewegung (C59/K60), their influence on our current situation (C57/K58), on which, like all theoretical endeavours, it must draw. Phenomenology must engage this present situation (C71–72/K73), though not without substantial transformation. As such, this inquiry occurs through the critical philosopher’s ‘knowing life’ (C98/K101) as it challenges the very grounds for its own validities and accomplishments. Critical ‘inquiring back’ into traditional commitments is self-reflective in this manner (C100/K103, Hua XXIX: 373–75), leaving us ‘without a ground’ insofar as, rather than taking this ground as given, we orient ourselves toward its very scrutiny.
According to Husserl, whatever the specific original motivations may be in the case of theoria as idea of universal knowledge (C281/K326ff.), the overarching framework for any theoretical endeavour, including its teleological weight, is the structure of meaning-constitution itself. The unfolding of any tradition is thus a historische Besinnung (C71–72/K73).Footnote 5 Understood this way, any theoretical tradition involves indeterminacy, given its open meaning, value, and possibility-constituting horizon. However, this indeterminacy is by no means an ‘open’ unfolding. Any system of meaning, as a ‘subjective accomplishment’ (C98/K101), is bound by its communal, generational movement forward. What Husserl refers to as ‘historical reflection’ must then occur from a position of historical privilege: our own living present in all of its depth and unfolding.Footnote 6
This is no easy feat. The impact of a tradition’s primal establishments (Urstiftungen) becomes more ‘obviously’ mirrored, through its sedimenting re-establishments (Nachstiftungen), in its ultimate establishments (Endstiftungen) (C71–72/K72–73). This obviousness of both grounds and goals makes them all the more obscure—illusory even (C49/K50)—given their epistemic and normative push and pull: one whose lure as ‘necessary’ few can resist; one few can bring themselves to question.
The critical philosopher, to be autonomous (Selbstdenker; C71–72/K72–73), must seek to expose not only the grounding decisions that delineate and drive any and all projects within their tradition, but also the normative and epistemic commitments that linger ‘beneath the surface’. Teleological-historical reflection is an inquiry into conditions for possibility, both original and sedimented; it is also a reflection on the traces these ‘founding’ commitments leave behind, especially when blindly accepted. One goal of this radical critical inquiry is to expose how commitments to theoretical endeavours come at a cost. That this occurs is unavoidable. How this occurs is something for which we must self-reflectively assume responsibility: we must assiduously investigate the grounds on which we lay claim in our theoretical work, for they are bound to lay claim on us, leading us, when unchecked, into normative and existential dead-ends. But how to accomplish this feat, which Husserl deemed an infinite task (cf. C21/K19, C120/K122)? Does not this un-ending character of the task challenge the idea of ‘ultimate’ goals? What are we to make of this critical task’s own teleology and its presumably attainable eidetic goals?
We should remind ourselves of the ‘flowing’ or ‘hermeneutical’ movement of Husserl’s historical reflection; what he aptly describes through the metaphors of ‘zig zags’ and ‘leaps’ (C58/K59). It begins, as it must, in medias res; whatever it may thus uncover about ultimate grounds and goals, it must do so by thinking through layers of meanings and values—the ‘crust of historical facts’ (C18/K16) and accomplishments—as they gradually organise around core principles and norms. What appears to be a search for ultimate origins, a founding quest of sorts, whose non-negotiable ambitions may strike us as problematic, is much more an inquiry into the anonymous, the obvious, in its unquestioned familiarity. More potent than ‘all-but-forgotten’ origins and founding theoretical decisions (C112–13/K115), these sedimenting reinforcements quietly drive interests and inquiring directions (Fragerichtungen) (C8–9/K6; C356/K366). What we take as standards for necessity and validity (C112/K114) is thus a complicated, historically convoluted affair.
The same holds for the ‘unity’ of any tradition oriented, in its systemic task, toward intelligibility. According to Husserl, all theoretical traditions exhibit a teleologically ‘unifying sense’ (C112–13/K115): their very movement forward (Fortschreiten) toward goals as ultimate norms (C296/K344). By ‘norms’ here we understand not only specific rules and principles, but veritable standards for theoretical and practical success and failure (Crowell Reference Crowell2013: 2ff.). To make sense of Husserl’s notion of teleology—not just in the context of his examination of the modern scientific tradition and its hold on philosophy, but as it pertains to any tradition, including phenomenology—we must delve into the fray of this unfolding.
II. Thinking through the obvious
The very flow and holistic movement of a tradition (Fortschreiten, C120/K122), its direction of inquiry (Progressus der Forschung; C8–9/K6), its development of knowledge (Erkenntnisprogress; C355/K366–67), are all tightly linked to the tradition’s methodological commitments. This is why Husserl stresses that methods matter beyond original, theoretical decisions. A tradition’s epistemic flow sediments the original parameters for necessity and validity, although not without modification. Whatever shifts of interest (C24–25/K22) and transformations (Verwandlungen) (C23/K20) do occur further delineate and nuance the tradition’s overall general style of inquiry (Gesamtstil; C31/K28–29), re-establishing its unities of meaning (C100/K103–4). Styles, such as the naturalistic ‘universal-causal style’ (C33/K31), are self-reinforcing (C16/K13–14) backgrounds of intelligibility (C33/K31).
Traditions are thus ever-morphing, yet stylistically unified (C 359–60, 362/K370–72). Sedimentation involves not only core epistemic and methodological norms but also the communal accomplishments of a tradition of thought (C355/K366), as they crystallize through further conceptualization. What is necessary and valid as well as the norms for necessity and validity themselves (C132/K135; C188–89/K192) are the outcomes of a ‘double grounding’: one original, the other genealogical. Both forms of grounding are difficult to tackle, especially since decisions and epistemic accomplishments seamlessly become naturalized and normalized, assuming the mantle of necessity and universality as if they were ahistorical (C255/K366). As such, general styles of inquiry are both lively (lebendig) and seductive (C362/K372).
The highest difficulty of Husserl’s radical critical task is, in my view, precisely to avoid this pitfall. Phenomenology as critique ‘from within’ must seek to attain necessity and universality without naturalization. I will argue that only an ambiguous method of inquiry, one at once self-reflectively historical and transcendental, can hope to accomplish this.Footnote 7 The task of tracing theoretical interests (C112/K114) in their unifying, concealed entelechy (C100/K103–4), across shifts and turns, across variations in the anonymity (C112/K14–15) of their validity groundings (C140/K143, C184/K191), amounts to rendering intelligible the conditions for the possibility of this very fluidity, this ‘lively forward movement’ (lebendige Fortarbeit; C354/K366), both transcendental and historical ones. Such inquiry is necessarily a ‘breaking with a style’. As it orients itself toward originally sedimented goals in the manner that it does (cf. C70ff./K71ff.), it performs a radical shift in attitude, mustering the resolve necessary to resist falling back on habituated norms in their historical teleology. The task of radical critique requires a stance of epistemic and normative vulnerability as well as one of methodological humility. This is what Husserl calls for when he challenges us to look into ‘our situation’, still very much ‘under the spell’ (Bann) of the modern spirit of inquiry (C57/K59), and perform a ‘breakdown’ (Zusammenbruch; C58/K59) into its origins and development.Footnote 8
One way Husserl proposes we accomplish this is to explore and rely on the revelatory potency of exemplars and models (C25/K22ff.). According to him, these key moments have an important mapping ability: because they capture the very delineating and organizing principles that hold together theoretical traditions in a systemic and historically dynamic manner, they can function as ‘guiding models’ (Leitbilde; Modelle) for a reflection that seeks to expose both original and sedimented traditional grounds as well as ultimate goals (C24–26/K22–23). The best way to understand the conceptual systematicity of traditions (Begrifflichkeit; C71/K73) is through the lens of possibility horizons,Footnote 9 especially as they relate to conceivability and knowability (or in less strictly epistemological and more transcendental terms, experienceability).Footnote 10 All validity systems rely on fixed typologies of correlation (C166/K169–70), which organize multiplicities in a manner that renders them intelligible according to the epistemic and normative parameters of the tradition in question. This is why, to succeed critically, historical reflection must be transcendental, must structurally examine ‘manners of givenness’ (C169/K170) in their intricate normativity and patterns of validity (C184/K191).
Whether personalistic, naturalistic, or transcendental, the correlates of attitudes are infinite horizons of possibilities, i.e., what we could constitute as intelligible when assuming that attitude. These horizons are of determinable indeterminacy (EU §8). What possibilities fall under the purview of this determinability depends on the grounding epistemic and normative commitments at play in the respective (here theoretical-traditional) context (C166–67/K169–71). This is the realm of the conceivable (denkbar), which may exhibit higher or lower levels of flexibility, but for the most part is strictly bound, given that historical-traditional conditions of determinability (i.e., the attitude’s ‘world-logic’; EU §9) impose strictures that translate into a ‘voracious’ tendency to maintain the epistemic and normative status quo.Footnote 11 There lies the luring power of the obvious. The conceivable disguises its obscurity as clarity; it presents itself as ‘beyond question.’ Exemplary moves such as causal inductivity (C39/K38)Footnote 12 and exemplary moments—the Galilean mathematization of nature—within a tradition’s unfolding have both blinding and revelatory potency: blinding, in that their continuous and pervasive sustaining of ‘variations on the same theme’ does little to break the spell of the obvious; yet also revelatory given that they distil the very principle(s) dictating what counts as a variation at all (EU §79)—as opposed to say a ‘fluke’ yet to be rendered intelligible through the accepted general epistemic style.
This latter point is important: the exemplary stands out not only through its guiding, modelling abilities, but also as a limit, beyond which lies the otherwise, that which is literally a-typical or ‘out of the ordinary’ (ausgezeichnet) (C27/K24). Precisely here we see Husserl’s optimism regarding the potential success of his eidetic quest (cf. C100/K103–4). Exemplars, as limit forms (Limesgeschtalten; C26/K23), mark the borders of historical conceivability systems, and, in so doing, they also point at limits whose necessity is apodictic rather than naturalized and normalized (EU §87, esp. d). These apodictic limits’ ‘otherwise’ is structurally, and as a result also concretely, inconceivable for us (Hua XI: 72). This is what Husserl means by transcendental necessity (C27/K24), which the structures of experience exhibit. And since all world/horizon-constitution, including that pertaining to scientific inquiry, is a subjective accomplishment, this kind of transcendental necessity—what could not be otherwise for us as intelligibility-oriented beings whose experiences are intentional—is what we, as theoreticians, must tirelessly reveal.
Our critique must re-orient itself and investigate the transcendental teleology that marks all forms of meaning-constitution, irrespective of specific attitude or stance. We do so, however, through a historical investigation into the ‘long-felt’, ‘concealed teleological dimension’ of the styles and conceptual-systemic formations that delineate and determine our situation: the directions and manners of inquiry that take precedence for us. As we shall see, despite what appears to be an endorsement of Eurocentrism and theoretical determinism in a Hegelian vein, Husserl’s call to critical inquiry in the Vienna Lecture beckons us precisely to this questioning that which most resists inquiry: our deepest theoretical commitments, what we hold as absolute evidence. This, too, must become a ‘problem’ for us (C100/K103; C189/K193), which necessarily entails assuming personal responsibility for our current theoretical situation, whose reach spans beyond geographic Europe given the universalizing penchant of this stance itself.
III. Self-reflection: an infinite task and its teleology
If only things were ‘this simple’! This, our situation, still one of crisis, is not a purely theoretical situation. No amount of careful methodological and epistemological investigation could do justice to its messy complexity. Precisely because of this Husserl put forth a further concrete way of doing critical work, beyond exemplarity, one that nuances and complicates the task, not least through an embarrassment of riches, namely by viewing the Lebenswelt and our experience of it as the ultimate sustaining ground for any and all theoretical endeavours (C110/K112)Footnote 13 —a ground not only fuelling theory but also constantly enriched by it (C140/K143; C159/K161). Thus, not only do original principles and norms (primal establishments, Urstiftungen) gradually get sedimented in a tradition’s movement forward, sedimented norms constitute self-reinforcing grounds (Nachstiftungen) driving all theoretical interests and preoccupations (C116/K118), and all of this happens under the aegis of our everyday experience of the Lebenswelt. Also, theoretical accomplishments and commitments seep back into the fabric of the Lebenswelt, streaming-in (einströmen; C52/K52), reshaping it in mostly obscure ways. The layering, flowing development of meaning-constitution (Sinnfortbildung; C158/K161), is thus dynamic, defying all thought of linearity.Footnote 14 Husserl understood that critical investigations must strive to structurally emulate this slippery dynamic from within its very flow.Footnote 15
As a result, the anonymity that radical historical reflection seeks to expose is not just one of ‘forgotten origins’ and ‘beneath the surface’ workings of assumed principles and norms. It is also an anonymity that stems from the very porousness of our communal everyday and theoretical lives (C109/K111; esp. K111–12fn.). Neither can be strictly delineated, neither is fully separable. Critical inquiry into validity foundings (Geltungsfundierungen; 140/143) must be incisively dynamic, strike through the ‘crust of historical facts’ (C18/K16), the thick, ever-folding garb of ideas (C51/K51–52). This translates at a teleological level: our theoretical interests and goals, the kinds of questions we raise in the manner that we do as we rely on specific concepts and language to capture what we deem knowable and worthy of epistemic pursuit—all this fuels and is fuelled by our everyday concerns and preoccupations.
Yet couched within the very idea of universal theoria also lie claims to absoluteness (C72/K73), purity (C179/K182), and transparency (C119/K122). Phenomenology is no stranger to this, especially in its Ideas I guise, where swift gestures could purportedly secure not just a neutral ontic ground, but one of complete epistemic and normative suspension of judgement as well (Hua III/1: §62). Can phenomenology negotiate this siren song; can it problematize its own standards of evidence? Husserl’s answer is, in his final work, torn. At times he assumes a vulnerable, more hesitant position (C151/K154, C155/K157–58, Hua XXIX: 424–26)Footnote 16 —one undoubtedly more critically productive; at others, he champions phenomenology’s complete theoretical freedom (C374–75/K383). The two need not be mutually exclusive, as I argue elsewhere (Aldea Reference Aldea2016: 39ff.). It depends on how one understands this freedom, how one understands the relationship between anonymity and transparency. Since what is obvious (selbsverständlich) translates into prejudice (Vorurteil), and since prejudices are obscurities parading as unquestionable facts (C72/K73), such freedom could only sustain itself through constant self-reflective vigilance and resolve. No mere shift in attitude, no ‘abstract will to be without prejudice’ could suffice (C120/K122).
So in what direction does this discussion of phenomenology as ‘critique from within’ point us? What does it tell us about Husserl’s conception of teleology? Teleology, in its historical unfolding, is nothing other than a stylistically unified, traditional orientation toward intelligibility. As such, this ‘historical-traditional teleology’, along with the principles, norms and methods, both original and sedimented, which members of the community associated with the tradition in question decide upon and come to assume, provides a unifying sense (Einheitssinn) (C112–13/K115) to all projects and endeavours these members pursue.Footnote 17 Not only is this teleology a movement driven forward by historical teleology understood as latent, self-fuelling, self-normalizing force; it is also marked by depths and layers that far exceed the confines of any clearly delineated, decided-upon commitments pertaining solely (or primarily) to any one tradition. Theoretical general styles of knowledge acquisition draw on the bedrock of meanings and values—the background of incomprehensibilities (C189/K192–93), to use Husserl’s own words—which they seamlessly, in an ever-sedimenting manner, help reshape. Yet while epistemic and normative commitments, such as conceptual frameworks and goals, are for the most part anonymous and obscure as discussed above, they are also lively (lebendig) under cover of their obviousness. They firmly orient current theoretical inquiries as well as inquiries to come; thus, while the horizon of our inquiring possibilities is in principle infinite, all indeterminacy is determinable in well-delineated manners. What is conceivable (denkbar), for us, as ‘traditional thinkers’, what is interesting, puzzling, worthy of pursuit is very much at the mercy of our historical teleology. And this teleology is by no means insulated. A plurality of historical teleologies informs it.
How then can we break the spell of anonymity and obviousness enfolding historical teleology? That Husserl encourages us to attempt this breakdown (C58/K59) shows that he thinks that historical teleologies need not, structurally speaking, be blinding in these ways. There are, indeed, transcendentally necessary aspects shared by all historical teleologies, such as the orientation toward intelligibility, whatever the specific standards for that may be. That they be ‘spell-casting’ beyond inquiry is not one of them. The key lies, unsurprisingly, in self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung). What makes the kind of self-reflection Husserl proposes in the Crisis stand out, however, is the notion of transformation (Verwandlung; C177/K180) at the core of this critical endeavour ‘from within’.
For those familiar with Husserl’s claim that phenomenology can accomplish a full genuine transcendental turn, that it succeeds where the Cartesian method of doubt fails (C99/K102, C155/K158–59; Hua I: §§1–11, Hua XXIX: 397–403), the language of (radical) transformation is not exactly new. However, Husserl’s discussion of phenomenology as critical and transcendental endeavour in the Crisis further qualifies this ‘turn’. The critical-transcendental turn is robust in ways the reductions alone are not. In the Crisis, and elsewhere throughout his programmatic works, Husserl does not shy away from qualifying the bracketed naïveté as an ontic one (C110/K112). But it is wishful thinking to believe that the suspension of everyday metaphysical commitments also places under rigorous scrutiny the thick epistemic and normative bedrock that comes with these commitments (cf. C151–55/K154–58). Here Husserl falters. He recognizes this shortcoming of the reductions, including the transcendental and eidetic ones that motivate the phenomenological inquiry toward the apodictic grasp of the structures of meaning-constitution—or why else introduce a new method of reflection? Yet he also falls back on familiar moves: suspending ontic commitments grants us the epistemic, modal and normative neutrality we need as critical inquirers. A brief, focused look at Husserl’s rethinking of the transformation conditioning phenomenological critique in the Crisis will help.
What historical reflection is supposed to accomplish, as a distinctive change of interest (C145/K147–48) that complements the work of the reductions, is precisely a transformation understood as re-orientation toward the very flow of our motivation toward intelligibility, toward this movement unfolding in general, typical styles—be they ‘traditional’ in the strict sense of the term or broadly speaking harmonizing, in the manner of everyday meaning-constitution (Hua XI: 25, 30, 66–67, 83–84; EU §67). We are always already ‘oriented’ in our living present (C71–72/K73, C98/K101, C100/K103); the critical stance must therefore perform and sustain, by definition, a ‘re-orientation’ in and through this present. And this re-orientation entails commitment to the arduous inquiry into the dynamically layered depths of our general meaning and value-constituting styles.
Briefly put: critical transformation is a shift in teleological orientation, in more ways than one (C166/K169–70). First, it involves the study of historical–traditional teleologies in a systematic manner, focusing on their stylistic depths (original and sedimented), their modal-epistemic reach, their ‘progressive fulfillment’ (C56/K57), and their self-reinforcing tendencies (C31/K29); second, it entails the study of phenomenology’s own historical teleology, in the aspects just mentioned and its intricate interactions with other traditional teleologies; finally, this re-orientation would not be radical and rigorous in a strictly phenomenological sense (C175/K178) without its study of transcendental teleology—i.e., the transcendentally necessary teleology of the a priori of correlation as it relates to its historical instantiations. Even together, however, the reductions and teleological-historical reflection cannot sustain this re-orienting task, which is by no means a shift we can swiftly perform. For if it is to succeed, as point three above and our earlier discussion of exemplars and models both suggest, critical inquiry as radical reorientation (Umstellung) must also be eidetic (C176/K179).Footnote 18 It must break down, systemically, the very orienting ‘logic’ (EU §§9, 39) delineating and mapping theoretical meaning, value and possibility constitution. And this it can only accomplish by delving into this logic ambiguously: at once historically and transcendentally.
This demands that we rethink our notion of ‘success’ and its conditions for possibility. The task of radical critique is necessarily normative—in the strict sense of the term and, broadly, when considering how we constitute criteria for success and failure.Footnote 19 How phenomenology relates to its own historical teleology as well as its motivation toward the apodictic grasp of transcendental teleology involve a different kind of indeterminacy than the one at work in uncritical, or in Husserl’s language ‘latent’, historical teleologies. Phenomenology relies on a different framework for setting the parameters of determinability in the context of its own inquiries and projects. Phenomenological historical teleology, in its own movement toward what it understands as ‘intelligibility’ (i.e., the apodictic grasp of the structures of meaning-constitution in all of its forms), and ‘regular’/non-critical historical teleologies do share aspects (such as ‘streaming-in’ and porousness, for instance). But there are also significant differences that come with the transcendental-eidetic and historical-critical commitments, one of which is precisely this self-reflection understood as critical reorientation (Hua XXIX: 363–64, 376–86). To further tease out how the indeterminacy of phenomenological historical teleology is different from the indeterminacy involved in ‘traditional’ historical teleologies, let us revisit Husserl’s discussions of grounds in the context of his method. This will help us think through the ambiguity of historical and transcendental teleologies, and the normativity at the core of this ambiguity, as well as Husserl’s notions of reason and progress as they pertain to his philosophical project.
IV. Grounds and goals: thoughts at historical limits
For phenomenology to succeed as robust critique striving to attain ‘historical understanding’ (C71/K72) of the conditions for possibility as well as structures of theoretical thought, it must perform regressive inquiries (C115/K118) into the ‘latent life’ of the epistemic, normative, and methodological depths (C120/K122), into the ‘pre-sentiments’ (Vorahnungen; C22/K20) sustaining potent and exemplary traditions of thought, especially those shaping its situation, such as the positive scientific one. Since these depths, both original and sedimented, are held together by the intelligibility-oriented ‘driving force’ (Triebkraft; C71/K72), and since phenomenology also strives to uncover how traditional projects and endeavours draw on and (re)constitute their conceivability domains (i.e., horizons of determinable indeterminability), these regressive inquiries cannot be linear.
They must uncover these depths following the clues of exemplars as models (C25/K22ff.) and as guiding ideas (Leidideen; C121/K124), thus gradually mapping this modal domain in a holistic manner (Gesamtschau; C58/K59), by tracing the ‘historical limits’ responsible for what is conceivable (denkbar) and for what falls outside the scope of the tradition’s epistemic pursuits (the inconceivable). These limits are not transcendentally necessary although, through normalization and naturalization, they assume the mantle of universal validity, purportedly independent of any subjective accomplishment. They are, however, historical, and, as such, exhibit the necessity conferred upon them by the primal and ultimate establishments (Ur-/Endstiftungen), the validity foundings (Geltungsfundierungen; C140/K143, C184/K191), the deepest problems of meaning (tiefste Sinnesprobleme; C353/K365) and the tradition’s sedimenting re-establishment (Nachstiftung) of these very norms. In the case of positive scientific inquiry, these would amount to, for example, basic commitments to the causal-explanatory framework, faith in inductivity and predictability, objectivism (C294–95/K342–43), etc.
This holistic mapping is precisely what Husserl meant to capture with his metaphorical language of zig-zags and leaps (C58/K59). It is a movement that must pay close critical attention not only to intentional origins (C29/K26, C31/K29), but also to the seductive potency of ‘surviving goals’ (fortlebenede Ziele) (C71/K72), of ‘remaining concepts’ (Restbegriffe) (C9/K6), of luring terminological choices (C362/K372)—all lingering in the background yet very much ‘alive,’ constantly performing the spiritual function (C119/K121) of directing new projects immer wieder in well-delineated, guided manners (C71/K72). Only by ‘zig-zagging’ can critical inquiry negotiate all three of the aspects of teleological reorientation discussed above. Only by being ‘without a ground, yet not groundless’ (C181/K185) can phenomenology safeguard itself from the siren song of its own historical teleology as it proceeds with its investigations. It must maintain itself in a state of crisis, understood as the resolve always to place evidence under question (C100/K103; C189/K193). It must not take what its own history grants: the inevitably obscure basis of its own validities (C98/K101).
As it examines traditional, general styles of intelligibility constitution, phenomenology must also be an ‘exhibition’ of its own style of inquiry (Selbstdarstellung; C119/K122). Without this self-exposing exercise, phenomenology, like any theory, would be but ‘an oracle’, in Husserl’s metaphor (C188–89/K192). So, like all theoretical-traditional endeavours, given epistemic, normative and methodological commitments, phenomenology too necessarily relies on and constantly reshapes its domain of conceivability; however, unlike uncritical endeavours, it relates differently to its horizon of determinable indeterminacy. Furthermore, its indeterminacy is qualitatively different. Phenomenological inquiry necessarily moves in a non-linear, non-‘progressive’ manner (if by ‘progress’ we mean anything like a ‘neat’ process of Aufhebung). Its movement forward and backward, through the lived present, is one of surface and of depth, involving both the historically contingent and the transcendentally necessary. Because of this structural ambiguity, the indeterminacy it constitutes is not primarily bound by historical necessity; instead, what binds ‘phenomenological conceivability’—what openly delineates and organizes its modal and conceivability domain—is the transcendental necessity of the structures of meaning-constitution itself, even as phenomenology works to uncover these very structures further.
Moreover, since phenomenology as radical critique strives not to be ‘engulfed by the horizon of the obvious’ (C176/K179–80), the original grounds and goals it seeks to uncover, in its inquiry into theoretical thought broadly construed, cannot solely be historical limits (C153/K156). The ultimate source (Quelle; C97/K100) and ultimate goal or turn (Wendung; C100/K103–4) it is after are transcendental limits, limits that could not be otherwise for us, as meaning and value-constituting beings. Systemic mappings (C116/K188), zig-zags, and leaps take on a richer meaning here: they are historically and eidetically informed. As Husserl presents his historical method of reflection in the Crisis, he consistently reminds us of the eidetic nature of our inquiring task (C22/K19, C147–50/K150–53). Radical critique is an awakening of limits (C71/K72), an exposing of both historical and transcendental grounds and goals understood as conditions for the possibility of theoretical thought—the kind of thought that systemically seeks to make sense of ‘the totality of what is’ (C13/K11). Neither set of conditions can remain obscure. Nor can their respective senses of validity and necessity remain covered over by the thick layers of sedimented work, by the ‘garb of ideas’ whose comfort we all too readily succumb to (C131–32/K134–35).
Given this overarching ambiguity of the critical movement, at once historical and eidetic-transcendental, the method of ‘teleological-historical reflection’ Husserl proposes in his final work, to the bewilderment of subsequent generations of phenomenologists, is not an ‘introduction’ to phenomenological inquiry (C3, fn.1/Kxiv, fn.3). It is one of the three main methodological facets, along with the reductions and transcendental–eidetic variation, of phenomenology construed as robust critique. This ambiguity also shows not only that the historical and transcendental–eidetic dimensions of phenomenology are compatible (pace Carr 1974: 120), but also that their collaboration is necessary for phenomenology’s critical success as ‘radical reorientation’.Footnote 20 Therefore, just as ‘teleological–historical reflection’ is no ‘introduction’ into the phenomenological attitude, no mere propaedeutic step, so too this reflection is no ‘indirect reflection’ on history ‘through the intermediary of its teleology’ (Ricoeur Reference Ricoeur2007: 151). What may appear as ‘mediation’ here is nothing other than the ambiguity of historical and transcendental teleology at the core of critical reflection. History does not ‘have’ a teleology: it is teleology, understood as the intricate, sedimenting movement of stylistically unified yet porous traditional modes of meaning and value constitution.
Because of this, historical necessity claims a hefty toll on phenomenology as well, which is precisely why phenomenology must remain ever vigilant in its infinite task (C21/K19; C120/K122). This task toward autonomy (C71–72/K72–73) and self-transparency (C119/K122) necessarily involves reflection on phenomenology’s own historical and transcendental limits (C153/K159), especially as they relate to each other. This is what Husserl seeks to capture through his claim that reoriented transcendental phenomenology is motivated toward the grasp of the historical a priori (cf. C373/K383), which is less a paradox and more an ambiguity. That we are bound to constitute meaning, to seek intelligibility, in a communalized, stylistically unified manner, through basic commitments that gradually recede from the limelight and covertly transfer across field/endeavour-specific boundaries is apodictically necessary; how this occurs in different historical contexts is contingent. The difficulty lies in differentiating transcendental necessity from historical necessity (i.e., naturalized, normalized contingency), which, as Husserl shows us in his masterful Origin of Geometry, is no easy task. This phenomenology must always strive to do. And this it can only hope to accomplish by being radically self-reflective in the manner discussed above.
To return to one of Husserl’s most intriguing claims, namely that radical critique must be ‘without a ground, yet not groundless’, I would add that critique must be ‘without a goal, yet not goalless’. Precisely because critique involves re-orientation, it is teleologically oriented in a self-reflective manner. No goal is beyond question for it. We see this critical–teleological stance clearly exhibited at the core of the process of transcendental–eidetic variation, which does not involve, as some worry, a petitio fallacy (Sowa Reference Sowa2007: 102ff., and Sowa Reference Sowa2010). Although not goalless, the process engages precisely the kind of indeterminacy discussed above, and in so doing, it problematizes, in Husserl’s distinct view of the term (i.e., without unquestioned Evidenz), its own goals and grounds. Thus, while specific variation processes may terminate in eidetic intuition, given that such processes unfold in the overall context of historical reflection (historische Besinnung), all eidetic accomplishments are ‘fair game’ as far as the community’s endeavours are concerned, with the proviso that these endeavours be transcendental and critical, rigorously and radically reoriented. It is in this sense that phenomenology is an ‘infinite task’. We are, as Husserl points out, ‘beginners’ (C133/K136), not because our endeavour is bound to remain, for the most part, a propaedeutic one (pace Heidegger), but because while ‘engrossed by our task’, we are bound to assume no grounds or goals for it.
This task of radical transformation (Verwandlung; C177/K180) lies in an infinite progression (Fortschreiten; C120/K122), always ‘in the work’ (durch die Tat; C134/K137), both at a personal and at a communal level. And while this may look like a scattered enterprise—a tragedy even!—since it assumes its ambiguity and resists the lure of the strict guidance that an uncritical historical teleology would provide, it is, according to Husserl, the only path able to bring all theoreticians together beyond our ‘splintered multiplicities’ (C16–17/K15; C291/K338; Hua I: §2). Thus, historical reflection (historische Besinnung), Husserl’s puzzling late method meant to ‘reorient’ transcendental–eidetic phenomenological inquiry, is necessarily a form of self-reflection (Selbstbesinnung) (C71/K72–73; C189/K193) as well as a core aspect of transcendental phenomenology as fundamental reflection (Fundamentalbetrachtung) (C99/K102, C155/K157–58). It is no mere ‘entry point’ into the phenomenological attitude (Kern Reference Kern1962), no mere ‘stage’ before the ‘real work’ begins. Through historical reflection understood as Geschichtskritik (C59/K60), transcendental–eidetic work unfolds from within its lived as well as traditional present, from within its interactions with the predominant traditional styles of inquiry, from within its very unfolding and ongoing accomplishments, from within its orientation toward transcendental intelligibility. What makes this work critical is its rejection of assumed grounds and goals. What makes it radically so is its ‘second order’, ‘meta-reflective’ stance, which does not, while ‘outside’ the investigated matter at hand, nevertheless reinforce the very logic of the teleological movement under investigation.Footnote 21 Instead, this critical work involves a dynamic–transformative stance that challenges its very logic of meaning-constitution from within its own historical concreteness. All principles, commitments and goals guiding this critical work come under scrutiny.
V. Teleology and ambiguity: making sense of finality
Where does this leave us regarding Husserl’s claims about teleology in the Vienna Lecture? Can the critical ambiguity at the core of phenomenological inquiry help us make sense of his notions of reason and progress? His prima facie blatant Eurocentrism? The prescriptive dimension of phenomenological critique? How are we to understand phenomenology’s own distinctive historical teleology and what is its relation to reason and progress, to transcendental teleology? First, a look at the relationship between what Husserl views as the teleology of the ‘European spirit’ itself and the historical teleology pertaining to phenomenology as critique.
According to Husserl, the ‘European spirit’ exhibits a supranational ‘unity of spiritual life’ (C273/K318)—a historical development (Bewegung) toward the infinite idea of universal knowledge (C275/K320–21, Hua XXIX: 392–97) as the result of the Greek notion of theoria seeping into everyday-cultural life. This telos, this norm (C276/K322; C296/K344) is an ideal form governing the overall, general style of this historical development in its various stages, layers, and turns, thus unifying it. The development of exact science, from Galileo onward, falls squarely within this overall normalizing style (Normalstil; C280/K326). Just as philosophy, here understood as phenomenological critique, is responsible for revealing prejudices and obscurities at the core of scientific inquiry, so too must it work to uncover the assumptions undergirding this European socio-cultural and political teleology (C272/K317). What is a mere teleological pre-sentiment (Vorahnung; C275/K320–21) must be brought to surface, especially since, through its obscurity, it casts a potent spell: this norm’s claim to absolute necessity (C277/K322–23). Thus, the ‘intoxicating effect’ of the modern mathematization of nature is but one of this norm’s potent and stylistic instantiations (C293/K341), which most science and philosophy still very much exhibit. All such exemplary moments are variations on the same general stylistic theme (C280–81/K326–27). The advancing transformation (fortschreitende Umbildung; C277/K322) of this overall normalizing Gesamtstil, the teleology of theory as idea of universal knowledge itself, in all of its conceptual and linguistic formations, accomplishments, valuations, takes the guise of a steady inevitability, reaching well beyond the geographic boundaries of Europe (C279/K325, C288/K335).Footnote 22
What this steady pace of theoria is after, as it organizes and maps an ‘in principle’ infinite domain of determinable indeterminacy, is unconditioned truth itself (C278/K324; C291/K338). The problem arises when determinateness translates into ‘premature satisfaction’ and an uncritical sense of finality supplants the infinity of the task at hand (C291/K338), as in the case of science’s pervasive faith (and that of most current philosophical work) in the success of the causal-explanatory framework, especially as it suffuses our experience of the Lebenswelt itself. Such satisfaction, stemming from an artificial limitation of the task of rationality, is bound according to Husserl to lead to contradictions and dissatisfactions—to the crisis of rationalism which is not restricted to the scientific sphere (C297–99/K345–47).
We should here qualify our previous claim: historical teleology is an orientation toward intelligibility norms understood as general styles of meaning and value-constitution. All systemic knowledge acquisition—all theoretical validity accomplishments—is stylistically unified. And this unity, although historically grounded in original and sedimented traditional establishments (Stiftungen), is ultimately transcendentally grounded in the structures of the historical a priori itself. Husserl uses different formulations to refer to this a priori, but whether he refers to the ‘historical a priori’ (C373/K383) or ‘the a priori of history’ (C349/K362)—that is, whether he places the emphasis on the noetic or noematic aspects of this a priori of correlation—he has in mind the necessary structure of all forms of meaning, value and possibility-constitution as they are instantiated historically (C369/K378; C292/K340). Therefore, theoretical–historical teleologies are nothing but concrete instantiations of the transcendental, historically unconditioned teleology at the core of the a priori of correlation, namely the orientation (Blickrichtung) toward the idea of universal knowledge with respect to ‘the totality of what is.’Footnote 23
Therein lies the (critical) finality of radical transcendental critique as infinite task, namely, in its ultimate establishment (Endstiftung) of apodictic insight. This establishment, according to Husserl, marks its very ‘beginning’ as philosophical inquiry (C73/K74). It does so by setting both this task’s ultimate standard for transcendental success, namely apodicticity, and its standard for historical success, namely resolute self-responsibility. The standard for critical success is thus fundamentally ambiguous; this, too, undermines a reading of historical reflection as an ‘introduction’ to phenomenological reflection. We are dealing here with an ambiguous form of interpretation, transcendental and historical. This is Husserl’s point behind his claim that historical reflection is not narrative in the manner of a story, but dynamically interpretational (C11/K9; Hua XXIX: 47). While we could attempt to make sense of this finality of our un-ending task through a Heideggerian notion of anticipation (Dodd Reference Dodd2004: 72ff.)—or anticipatory resoluteness, especially as it reminds us that the end we anticipate does not structurally entail ‘completeness’ (Heidegger Reference Heidegger2006: §48)—the notion of ambiguity I propose here is equipped to disentangle Husserl’s paradoxical formulations without either threatening to impoverish their meaning or importing a not unproblematic ontological framework into Husserl’s project.
Unlike theoretical thought broadly construed, phenomenology, as radical re-orientation, must serve humanity through a constant investigation into cultural and theoretical products, especially their normative and cultural dimensions (C283/K329, C287/K334). Given its goal of complete self-responsibility (Selbstverantwortung)—one that takes into account the grounding of theory in the Lebenswelt and the effects of theoretical accomplishments on our everyday experience of it—radical critique must take a path at once theoretical and practical (C286/K333ff.). As such, it must problematize the notions of progress and normalization at the core of all theoretical endeavours, including its own, a task both Kant and the neo-Kantians failed to accomplish, according to Husserl (C295–97/K343–45).
VI. Concluding thoughts: normativity, reason, progress
In traditional-historical teleologies broadly construed, progress refers to any direction or trajectory of research (Progressus der Forschung), stylistically unified by the established guiding norm(s) for intelligibility. More specifically, in the context of the positive scientific tradition, progress stands for the steady and uncritical development (Enwicklung; C53–58/K54–59), in the overall ‘universal causal style’ (C31/K29), toward the goal of perfect explanation (C42/K41; C289–90/K336–67). Progress has a qualitatively different meaning in transcendental phenomenology. It is the resolute unfolding of the infinite task ever (re)orienting itself toward the idea of universal knowledge as it questions the normalizing and stylistically unifying weight of this very goal itself. The task is nothing short of a critique of knowledge and of reason (C288/K335), where reason refers broadly to our meaning- and value-constituting ability, from its most basic form as embodied everyday experience to the highest forms of theoretical-methodological inquiry (C290/K337).
Reason understood this way is not only teleological, normative and validity-oriented; it is also bound to the habituation and the sedimentation of its own accomplishments. As a result, especially in its scientific guise, it is all too easily (and always prematurely) seduced by the power of its own claims to absoluteness (C288/K334–35), becoming, according to Husserl, ‘one-sided’ (C291/K338). By absolutizing certain epistemic, normative and methodological principles and/or accomplishments—a certain line or direction of inquiry— what would be an infinite task becomes artificially limited. The standards for validity and necessity, given this one-sidedness of the inquiring task and of rationality itself, are thus relative. Scientific rationality, with its unquestioning commitment to causal explanation, inductivity, objectivity and predictability (C295/K343), unnecessarily limits itself, weakened by ‘paradoxes’ it cannot think through (such as the subjective undergirding of all objective accomplishments).
Critical reflection must think ‘through’ this naïveté, especially one as potent as objectivism (C292–93/K339–40, C297/K344–45). It must bring front and centre precisely the puzzles, or ‘paradoxes’, that one-sided rationality relegates to the fringes and the shadows. To do so, critical reflection must be at once transcendental and historical, theoretical and practical. These ambiguities are potent resources that structurally safeguard this critical reflection from becoming one-sided itself. The ‘genuine’ rationality (C296–98/K343–46) at work in critical reflection robustly construed can thus resist the seductive siren song of tradition, a song it must nevertheless hear, unlike Odysseus. The normative and epistemic grounds and goals it engages, both in its subject matter and those pertaining to its own movement, remain a problem for it. Its horizon of determinable indeterminacy remains qualitatively open, theoretically free in a manner no one-sided traditional endeavour could secure and sustain. As such, critique is radical reflection on reason’s own possibilities and on the norms and principles systemically delineating and organizing these possibilities themselves (C15/K13, C296/K344; Hua XXIX: 371–73).
Thus, the crisis is only one of ‘apparent failure’ of rationalism (C299/K347). We would do well, according to Husserl, to differentiate between forms of misguided rationalism, such as the one at work in uncritical science and philosophy, and rationality itself (C289–90/K336–37, C292/K339). The latter is not structurally bound to fail; the temptations are difficult, but not insurmountable. While we must indeed decouple critical reflection from the blind teleology and normativity of any one-sided rationalism, along with its notion of a linear, totalizing progress (Carr Reference Carr2016)—and this includes, according to Husserl, Enlightenment rationalism (C290/K337)—we must recognize that critical teleology and normativity are necessary aspects of the self-responsible, historical rationality at work in radical critique. This is so just as transcendental teleology and normativity are structural orientations toward intelligibility (broadly construed as meaning) at the very core of the a priori of correlation (C292/K340). Here lies the ‘unity of historicity’ (C193/K196) at work in the critical task—a task whose ambiguous movement challenges premature satisfactions from ‘within’ their very flow. It is tempting, with Heidegger and the postmodern forms of critique his work inspired, to renounce faith in reason altogether; but would not that, too, be naïve and one-sided? (C292/K339) The path is an infinitely complicated one.
Because this critical work is both personal and communal (C182/K185), a work whose reach, in the form of accomplishments, transcends the confines of philosophy, we must assume personal responsibility for this work and for the impact of its accomplishments (C189/K193; Hua XXIX: 48–49). Critique demands not only a transformation in the inquiring attitude (in the strict, theoretical sense), but also an existential transformation, in how we understand and relate to the principles and norms we adopt and sustain, in the goals we set for ourselves as thinkers, and as intelligibility- and value-oriented social beings bound to inquire in and through their living present, bound to strive for the betterment of their situations. This is why, in the Vienna Lecture, Husserl’s call to a radically critical task speaks of the ‘European spirit’ and its ‘hidden teleology’. If there is a Eurocentrism in Husserl’s work, it is one ‘grounded’ in assuming responsibility, especially since the crisis (European given its source) touches all through its luring processes of justification. For our striving toward betterment to be critical, it must unfold from within the very clutches of this lure.
