This book investigates the current political challenges confronting the two ethnic communities, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, in their attempt to resolve the tensions separating them. Layer by layer, Salih makes apparent the various counterpoints and locates them in the social relations and strategic interests of regional powers such as Greece, Turkey, the United States, the European Union, and the former Soviet Union. These power contestations have played a major role in the body politic of Cyprus' sovereignty, security, role in the Middle East and the Balkans, and indeed its entry into the European Union. Salih argues that the concept of a “unified Cypriot identity was eroded as each community articulated the ethnic and national priorities of their motherlands, Greece and Turkey” (back cover; chap. 1).
The book is divided into nine chapters. It first historicizes these political counterpoints by showing the concrete effects of the failure of the partnership (chap. 1), that is, the Turkish invasion (chaps. 2–3), ethnic conflict resolution (chap. 4), attempts to reassess the failure and the unfinished business of invasion and secession (chap. 5), the process of further militarizing the island (chap. 6), and how seismic diplomacy between Greece and Turkey informed and forged possibilities for rapprochement (chap. 7). Chapters 8 and 9 contain the conclusion and epilogue. Salih allows us to move through the difficult terrain of negotiating peripheral states' power in the production of regional and global power. His work elucidates how forces larger than just the two communities and their own process of accommodation and rapprochement inform negotiations about failed partnerships.
The realist and liberal conflict resolution frameworks the author draws upon to explain the “failures” in diplomacy do not allow us to read the gender, racial, or class components of this conflict. Although these frameworks' major focus is on the state as well as the international institutions of conflict resolution and security, Salih provides us with rich resources to understand that power is heteronormative (“Makarios' ‘unusual homosexual proclivities”’ [p. 5]) and gendered (i.e., who is more masculine and, indeed, more powerful). Such power dynamics play out in negotiating regional alliances in this “new” world order as well as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots leaderships' masculinity. On both sides of the island, the leadership attempted to “outdo” the “other” through access to different resources, creation of particular economic alliances, and further militarization of communities. Former President Clerides' attempt to deploy and parade the Russian S-300 missiles stands out as one example. “Cleridis said that he was pleased by the immaculate military hardware, and pointed out, ‘there is more which we are not putting on display’”' (p. 163).
The author's sources are excellent, and he draws extensively on the current discourses on security, terrorism, liberal democracy, and genocide as they are promulgated in local and international media and United Nations texts, as well as on relevant theories of conflict resolution, political economy, and Orientalism (p. 177) to explicate his thesis. For these reasons, this book is an excellent contribution to our present knowledge of the subject at hand. It allows us to recognize that conflict, war, militarization, and negotiations are not contained within the borders of what are historically and legally constituted as sovereign states. Rather, these social relations are informed by larger strategic and ethnic and national priorities of powers such as the “motherlands” (Kurdish question, liberalization of the economies of Greece and Turkey, collaboration around the Balkans) and regional interests (European Union) rather than merely the interests and narratives of Cypriots themselves.
For example, when Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz discussed these issues with Greece on 2 November 2000, he stated, “To be an EU member is a Turkish goal. But it will never accept unilateral solution on the Aegean and Cyprus in order to reach this goal. We would prefer instead of spending so much money on weapons to spend it somewhere else” (p. 197). Salih posits that the stalemate results from the asymmetries between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as the strategic relevance of Greece and Turkey to the definition of European, Middle Eastern, and Balkan politics. “After 1963, Greek Cypriots sought to marginalize, terrorize, and subject Turkish Cypriots, thereby eliminating intercommunal dialogue and inhibiting the creation of a State” (back cover). Plans for conflict resolution and rapprochement are contingent and are continually informed by a “revitalization of traditional cultural, political, and religious values, bolstered by security threats” (back cover). Moreover, these plans are not necessarily always implemented to support the interests of the majority but rather to support elites' privileges.
This book is a must for professors, nonprofit organizations, and institutes that work on issues of conflict resolution as well as Middle Eastern politics. It allows us to recognize that the new neoliberal project and its implementation in Europe can be an opportunity to bring about a fair resolution of the present stalemate. According to Salih, the provision of the Kofi Annan plan provided the Cypriots a potential moment to break the political deadlock. The leadership, Salih argues, had a “blind obedience to political ends and military means” (p. 302) and found many of the points of the plan compromising their interests.
Salih's point is well taken within the liberal, conflict resolution frameworks he employs. If the author had theorized the rich data he so brilliantly provides us concerning the domestic and transnational restructuring of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (pp. 204–10, 256) while utilizing Said's Orientalism framework to explain the asymmetries that exist among the different actors involved in Cyprus, he could have demystified the various responses that emerged from the two communities regarding the Annan doctrine. In addition, Salih could have used his politicoeconomic data (e.g., International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union subsidies) to shed light on the connections among productions of domestic and transnational power relations and implications on the stalemate in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the book is very productive, and it is highly recommended for courses on the Middle East and international conflict because it allows us to understand the complexity and contingency in negotiating power and conflicts within Cyprus as well as regional power productions.
