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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 March 2006
Professor Alfred Chandler's work, spanning many decades, has had a simple yet powerful message. In technology-intensive industries, successful firms (and by extension, countries) eschew unrelated diversification and reinvest earnings into new plants, distribution and marketing channels, and research to exploit economies of scale and scope. Although critics may carp that the basis for such prescriptions is thin, that defining success as large size and longevity makes the argument chase its own tail, it is the chemical industry, on which Professor Chandler leaned heavily in his argument, that created a more powerful challenge. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, the chemical industry entered a period of long and painful restructuring; business portfolios were shuffled and many well-established incumbents exited. Though some of this merely undid the excessive diversification of earlier decades, questioned remained. Whither the economies of scale and scope? What of the formidable advantage that established incumbents and their well-oiled corporate planning machinery?
This book is an attempt to make sense of it. It contains the story of two industries, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, once closely related and now split asunder. The story is told through thumbnail sketches of a diverse set of firms from each industry. For the chemical industry, we have the “core” firms, which consist of the six leading American chemical firms at the end of World War II that produced a diverse range of chemical products, and ten focused firms, including Lubrizol, PPG, Rohm and Haas, and Air Products. In addition, Chandler discusses the European entrants: Bayer, BASF and Hoechst, the major Swiss firms, as well as ICI, Akzo and Rhone-Poulenc. Finally, we have 24 other firms (“the challengers”): oil companies with chemical aspirations, three firms producing chemicals initially mainly for their own use, five conglomerates, and four spin-offs, byproducts of the restructuring.
For pharmaceuticals, Chandler distinguishes between firms that started as producers of advertising intensive, over-the-counter (OTC) medicines, candy and chewing gums, and those that began with more research-intensive, prescription medicines. As in chemicals, World War II marked a watershed, with the antibiotics heralding the “therapeutic revolution,” which is still continuing as evidenced in the advances in genetics and molecular biology. This increased the pressure on the firms to develop their own patent-protected drugs. In turn, this implied developing or acquiring large in-house R&D capabilities, where many firms stumbled, especially many of the OTC firms. Following this, there is a chapter on European and American challengers (including Johnson & Johnson, Proctor & Gamble, as well as the big German and Swiss chemical firms), and another chapter on the leading American biotech firms such as Genentech, Amgen and Biogen.
These sketches of firms are preceded by an introduction that introduces the three key themes, namely the importance of being an early mover, of developing barriers to entry through scale, and the need for developing an “integrated learning base,” which seems to consist of learning how to produce and market related products. Time and again Chandler points to the severe consequences to firms that fail to follow the “virtuous strategy,” either by failing to invest adequately in research or by reaching out to unrelated products. He returns to this theme in the conclusion, now fortified by references to the computer and electronics industries (the subject of a companion book, Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of the Consumer Electronics and Computer Industries, Alfred D. Chandler, New York, The Free Press, 2001).
This is familiar stuff, as is the conclusion that early entrants are hard to challenge after they have successfully established themselves. What is new is discussion of what happens when the science base of a high-technology industry becomes less fertile, as happened when polymer chemistry could no longer produce new breakthrough materials. In order to survive, firms must change, giving up the search for fundamental research in favor of incremental advances and focusing more narrowly. This is exactly what the stock markets (and their shock troops, the despised corporate raiders) wanted chemical firms to do, and what the CEOs of chemical firms resisted. The integrated learning base becomes less useful and may even hinder the firms in moving from innovation to merely efficient large-scale production, but the book seems to ignore this issue, seeking shelter in discussion of “defining the strategic boundaries of the firm.”
For his admirers, including myself, this book will disappoint when measured against its predecessors. For one, it is far too lean. Over 40 chemical firms and some 30-odd firms in pharmaceuticals are covered in a mere 240 pages, an average of three pages per firm. Fifty or more years of history are reduced to a litany: acquisitions of other firms, and (frequently) subsequent divestitures, followed by a reiteration of the virtues of integrated learning bases and the perils of unrelated diversification.
What is missing is rich detail to make the argument. For instance, the book notes that Warner-Lambert (an OTC firm) acquired Parke-Davis, an innovative firm, but ended up destroying Parke-Davis's innovative abilities, apparently due to poor management. But what form did this poor management take? Did they promote incompetent research managers? Did they underinvest in R&D? Did they underinvest in marketing? Did talented scientists leave because they chafed under managerial practice ill-suited for research? Were the compensation contracts unsuitable? Or, was it simply bad luck? In other words, even if one agrees that candy and antitoxins do not share an integrated learning base, what sorts of problems arise if a firm tries to encompass both?
Similar questions arise through out. To take another example, Allied Chemicals, the second largest American chemical company in the 1930s, was quickly overtaken by the likes of Dow and Union Carbide because it failed to develop an integrated learning base. As the book tells it, Eugene Webber, the reclusive CEO, set strict financial targets for the various divisions, which otherwise had great autonomy. By design, there was little communication among the divisions. But why was this structure fatal? Did managers in one division spot opportunities that other divisions could have profitably exploited? Or was it simply a failure to invest in research at a time when polymer chemistry and chemical engineering offered rich opportunities? In other words, even if one accepts that Allied represents a “failed strategy and structure,” one looks in vain for how and why the failure took place.
The book is a useful introduction to the firms, including some that have disappeared, that made up the American chemical and pharmaceutical industry. From a book by Professor Chandler, one expected so much more.