No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
The term “terrorism” is normally applied to activities of small and scattered groups who pursue their goals with fanaticism and press their political and religious agenda by the force of fear and insecurity. There are also states that sponsor terrorism. However, whether a major country such as the United States can be labeled a terrorist country is not often addressed. A few writers on the left have explored that notion. They claim that the United States' militarism abroad is similar to what terrorist groups do. Moreover, most terrorists, from the Islamic fundamentalists of the Middle East to the right-wing assassins of Latin America, are products of U.S. imperial policies. Osama bin Laden was groomed by the CIA, as were Manuel Noriega of Panama and Roberto D'Aubuisson of El Salvador.
The term “terrorism” is normally applied to activities of small and scattered groups who pursue their goals with fanaticism and press their political and religious agenda by the force of fear and insecurity. There are also states that sponsor terrorism. However, whether a major country such as the United States can be labeled a terrorist country is not often addressed. A few writers on the left have explored that notion. They claim that the United States' militarism abroad is similar to what terrorist groups do. Moreover, most terrorists, from the Islamic fundamentalists of the Middle East to the right-wing assassins of Latin America, are products of U.S. imperial policies. Osama bin Laden was groomed by the CIA, as were Manuel Noriega of Panama and Roberto D'Aubuisson of El Salvador.
The United States itself is the product of war and aggression, created by grabbing land from Native Americans and Mexicans. It is an empire “as brutal as any other,” as Rahul Mahajan asserts (p. 104), constantly seeking alibis to invade other nations. What is the hidden agenda behind these invasions? To gain economic advantage, to install military bases, and to gain world supremacy, he responds. For example, the engagement in Afghanistan was due to concern for UNOCAL pipelines. Mahajan goes as far as saying that even intervention on behalf of the Kosovars was meant to “turn Kosovo into an economic protectorate of the United States and establish a military beachhead in the Balkans” (pp. 112–13).
Explaining the logic of attacking Afghanistan, he writes, “Americans argue that if a maniac breaks into your house and has already killed a family member, then you have no need to negotiate before attacking him back” (p. 21). But, Mahajan argues, the analogy is wrong— instead, it is a case in which a maniac attacks your house, and you level his entire neighborhood in revenge. The author, an Indian-born American lawyer, has collected enough evidence to indict America in any court of law. He leaves no stone unturned, although most of the information he presents is already part of the common repertoire that is rehashed over and over in the media. But in his attempt to convict America, he claims that the Taliban were better than the Northern Alliance and that Saddam Hussein was more or less a reasonable leader trying to comply, albeit lethargically, with U.N. resolutions. He writes, “The Taliban's only virtue, and the reason they had some popular support, was that they brought order to the region they governed. The so-called Northern Alliance, by contrast, is a group of warlords” (p. 41). Mahajan is not short of words or evidence. His advocacy is sharp and condemning. By the same token, however, one may argue that his predilection for advocacy stands in the way of more objective analysis. For example, while details of American misdeeds abroad are enumerated, the abject human-rights transgressions of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein find no coverage in Mahajan's book. Mahajan, in denouncing the United States, calls it just another brutal empire without discussing whether there is any qualitative difference between this “empire” and the former Soviet Union, or the nascent empire of the fascists in the first half of the 20th century.
Howard Zinn, who, according to his biography, “grew up in the immigrant slums of Brooklyn,” also finds America lost in the path of wickedness. Considering terrorism, Zinn, like Mahajan, argues that the U.S. government is the largest supporter of terrorism. The School of Americas, now renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, has been the military nursery for dictators and specialists in the violation of human rights. Zinn devotes a good part of his book (which is in interview form) to the stifling of dissent in America. He writes, “We have a long tradition in this country of stifling dissent exactly at those moments when dissent is badly needed” (p. 61). Zinn, a retired professor of political science at Boston University, has no difficulty quoting various news anchors, congressmen, and other authorities who kowtow to President Bush's war-mongering.
Zinn maintains that what is being done in the name of security for America across the world prompts more terrorism. “You might say that there is a reservoir of possible terrorists among all those people in the world who have suffered as a result of U.S. foreign policy” (p. 17). What should the United States do in the face of growing international terrorism? Zinn would not settle for less than a complete overhaul of the American political system. “If we want real security, we will have to change our posture in the world—to stop being an intervening military power and to stop dominating the economies of other countries” (p. 9). According to Zinn, the cause of all that evil is capitalism. The U.S. government could feed millions of people in the world if it stopped its war machine and spent the budget instead on the welfare of the people. However, that will not happen, because the country is driven by capitalist greed, which in turn billows out war and violence. Reflecting on history, Zinn shows how a good part of the United States was appropriated from Mexico during the Spanish War, a war that was begun based on trumped-up charges. Zinn does not take the time to discuss how a war-mongering capitalist country whose territorial integrity is based on war and conquest can change its “posture” in the world.
In Terrorism: Theirs and Ours, which also uses an interview format, the late Eqbal Ahmad, the Indian-born activist and scholar once accused of plotting to kidnap Henry Kissinger, identifies five different types of terrorism. Of those five, he considers state terrorism such as that committed by U.S. allies throughout the Cold War, the most dangerous, callous, and calculated. “Of the five types of terror, the official approach is to focus on only one form—political terrorism…. The form that exacts the highest loss of life is state terrorism” (p. 18). However, Ahmad considers political terrorism, as perpetrated by the likes of Yasir Arafat and Osama bin Laden, as simply an effort to be heard and recognized and to express anger against lasting injustices. Ahmad writes that, although former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir said in 1969 that “there are no Palestinians” (p. 19), decades of terrorism established an identity for them—so much so that even Israel recognizes an entity by that name. Ahmad also recognizes other motives for terrorism, such as “expression of anger and helplessness…tribal ethic of revenge…[and the reaction of] victims of violence” (pp. 18–19).
Analyzing the roots of modern political and religious terrorism, Ahmad maintains that the rise of religious terrorism and the jihadi movement was stirred by America. Jihad in Islam had been forgotten for 400 years before America kicked it off in the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. However, the rise of terror as a means of political action could be directly related to the decline of revolutionary (Marxist) ideology (for which America was most likely responsible) and indirectly to globalization (which is encouraged by the capitalists). Ahmad describes the debate between Marxist revolutionaries and the anarchists of the late 19th century, when the former denounced personal assassination—“terrorism,” in modern parlance—as a means of revolutionary action. “The revolutionary ideology receded, giving in to globalized individuals” (p. 21).
The U.S. government, according to Ahmad, conveniently ignores the truly egregious acts of terrorism perpetrated by its own allies while incessantly threatening non-allies with retaliation. He writes: “the ratio of people killed by the state terror of Zia ul-Hagh, Pinochet, Argentineans, Brazilians, Indonesian type, versus the killing of the PLO and other organizations is literally [sic], conservatively, 1000 to 1” (p. 16).
Ahmad, like the two other authors, seeks political solutions for terrorism, not military ones, because political terrorism in essence is political and requires political solutions. Military reactions would only exacerbate political terrorism and put more wind in the sails of the religious terrorists. While Ahmad's observation is compelling, one cannot surmise from his blanket “political solution” a practical method of dealing with modern terrorism.
Whether the receding of revolutionary ideology has led to the rise of individualized terror, as Ahmad claims, is also questionable. Marxist revolutionaries were not averse to terrorism. The late 20th century witnessed the rise of “urban guerrillas” who were both Marxist and well disposed toward the use of terrorism and personal assassination.
The ideas of the three authors discussed here, all of whom were raised in the margins of American society, are refreshing. However, they seem to be more concerned with the rule of justice in the world than the realities of international relations. Modern terrorism has created a need for debate, especially in the area of international law, where no provision is made for acts of small groups of terrorists against nations. Nevertheless, “terrorism” is a term used in the parlance of political science to denote violent actions of small groups to force their political or religious agenda on others. Using the same term to implicate a superpower is questionable, at best.